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Studies in mid-Victorian imperialism

STUDIES IN MID-VICTORIAN IMPERIALISM

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C. A. BODELSEN

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PREFACE

The present book is an attempt to describe the rise and growth of an Imperialist spirit in England. What is proposed is not to account for the effects of the Imperialist spirit on the colonial and foreign policy of England, but to trace the evolution of that spirit itself, as reflected in contemporary literature, in public debate, and in the press.

The initial difficulty with which a writer on this subject finds himself confronted is the vagueness which surrounds the word Imperialism itself. It has been used to denote the most widely different ideas: the consolidation of the ties that bind colonies to the mother country, aggressive Nationalism, Caesarism, certain doctrines about the functions of the State, the theory of the civilizing mission of the white race, the system of ethics by which it has been attempted to justify conquest and the domination of the weak by the strong, etc. etc. In the present book I have used the word Imperialism in one sense only, namely denoting that specifically British movement which aims at preserving and consolidating the unity of the British Empire, and I have attempted to trace this movement from its origin till the end of the 'eighties.

Such a limitation of the scope of the inquiry is not so arbitrary as it may, perhaps, at first blush appear. The desire to preserve and strengthen the unity of the British Empire has in itself logically nothing to do with Jingoism or Caesarism, or with any particular school of fiscal, social, or foreign policy. There is no reason why this political idea, dealing, as it does, with a definite and exclusively British problem, should not be treated apart from the various extraneous elements with which it has happened to be at different times associated. It would, indeed, be well if it could be designated by some other name than the ill-defined word Imperialism with its somewhat unpleasant associations. However, no other word exists, and, as I have not been bold enough to coin a new word, I have had to be content with the old one.

In point of fact, British Imperialism, in the sense in which that word is used here, did not until comparatively recent times have anything to do with other political theories. It began as a protest against the Separatist tendencies which were so powerful about the middle of the nineteenth century. Till the first years of the 'seventies it practically confined itself to deprecating the break-up of the Empire, and

during the better part of the 'seventies and the 'eighties it concentrated on an attempt to bring about a closer political union of England with her colonies. It was thus at first a very simple movement, almost wholly devoid of any extraneous elements, and it was only after the failure of the so-called Imperial Federation movement that it became definitely associated with the reaction against Free Trade and mid-Victorian Pacifism, though the first beginnings of both these tendencies are traceable some time before. The idea of trusteeship for backward races, which forms such an important element of present-day English Imperialism played no considerable part in that movement before the 'nineties, when it received a powerful impetus from the acquisition of tropical territory which had resulted from the "scramble for Africa".

The history of English Imperialism in the period with which this book deals has therefore a certain unity, and forms, as it were, a comparatively well-defined chapter in the history of the English attitude to the colonies.

British Imperialism being, in its earlier stages, essentially a reaction against certain theories of colonial policy, it cannot be fully understood without some reference to those theories. Hence the sections entitled "Early Separatism and the Colonial Reformers" and "Mid-Victorian Separatism." To give an exhaustive account of the anti-colonial movement in England — a movement which, as I have tried to show, is not nearly so reprehensible as it is made out to be by later Imperialists — would be a task almost too great for one man. It would not only demand a study of the printed records of the lives of all public men of any note since the loss of the thirteen colonies, but, as most biographies of English statesmen are, for various reasons, extremely reticent on the subject of colonial policy, it would also involve an examination of a far greater mass of unpublished material, most of which would probably be very difficult of access. The present account of the anti-colonial movement is therefore necessarily somewhat sketchy. It does not set out to give an exhaustive history of that movement, but rather to illustrate it by examples from the speeches and writings of prominent statesmen and writers, to analyse its various forms, and to attempt to explain the foundations on which it rested. These sections may be considered as a sort of introduction to the following account of the rise of Imperialism, Dilke's early work on colonial affairs forming an intermediate stage between the anti-colonial and the Imperialist schools.

It may perhaps be thought that too much has been made of the activities of the pioneers of the Imperialist movement in 1869 and the early 'seventies. To this period I, however, attach very great importance. Though the fact is not generally realized, these years form the turning point in the history of English public opinion on the colonial question, and in the now forgotten discussions which took place during that period almost all the arguments and ideas of the Imperialists of the 'eighties were anticipated. Moreover, I believe that the decisive defeat of Separatism took place, not as commonly believed, in the 'eighties, but

already in the early 'seventies. Both the originality and the significance of the Imperialists of the 'eighties seem to me to have been somewhat overrated. What they did was not so much to invent new ideas or to convert unbelievers, as to give literary expression to, and to popularize a movement already well under way, and to attract the attention of those who had previously been indifferent.

The limited sense in which I have taken the word Imperialism prevents me from taking into consideration those outbursts of Nationalism which took place periodically in the Victorian era on the occasion of war, or the prospect of war with other powers, outbursts which, as has already been pointed out, were totally unconnected with any theory of colonial policy. On the colonial question contemporary fiction and poetry are almost entirely silent.

The great number of footnotes and references may perhaps strike the reader as pedantic. In defence I may say that they can always be skipped by those who have no use for them, while they may be of interest to those who are making a special study of the subject with which the present book deals.

I

THE ENGLISH ATTITUDE TO THE COLONIES FROM THE LOSS OF THE FIRST EMPIRE TILL 1869

EARLY SEPARATISM AND THE COLONIAL REFORMERS

The American War of Independence and the loss of the thirteen colonies naturally had a profound influence on the English outlook on colonial affairs. Not only did England lose the greater part of her colonial Empire, but the loss took place under exceptionally painful and humiliating circumstances, and the American colonies, which had been maintained at the cost of so much blood and treasure, not only abandoned their connexion with the mother country, but actually became her rival, willing, as events showed, to join her enemies at a time when she was fighting for her very existence.

The loss of the first colonial Empire seemed a singular vindication of Turgot's saying, that colonies are like fruits, which cling to the tree only till they are ripe. When the greater part of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies became independent too, it seemed as if the emancipation of colonies, when they had reached a certain stage of development, was a law of nature. The belief in the eventual secession of all colonies, strengthened, as it was, by the cult of liberty in the abstract which was one of the legacies of the French Revolution became almost universal(1); in parts of the 19th century it coloured the outlook of nearly all English statesmen in their dealings with colonial affairs and deeply influenced the relations between the mother country and her colonies.

With the thirteen American colonies England had lost by far the greater part of her colonial Empire. The Colonies that remained, and those which were acquired in the years following the Peace of 1783, might still be extensive, but they were (with the exception of the West Indian Islands) poor and thinly populated. In some generations they

(1) The current opinion is well expressed in the words of the *Edinburgh Review* (Oct. 1808, p. 153): "Independence is a stage at which all distant and prosperous colonies are destined ultimately to arrive. If foresight does not voluntarily relax the ties of the metropolis, force will in time assuredly break them." Even the *Quarterly Review*, which was opposed to separation, concludes an article, in which it violently attacks the Separatists, as follows "It is pretty much with colonies as with children; we protect and nourish them in infancy; we direct them in youth, and leave them to their own guidance in manhood; and the best conduct to be observed is to part with them on friendly terms." (April 1829, p. 342.)

might possibly become flourishing provinces, but as yet their value was only potential, while it was obvious that their retention in their present condition entailed considerable inconveniences, dangers and expense. Under these circumstances the almost universal belief that independence was their ultimate destiny naturally made itself decisively felt: why should England undertake the burdens and responsibilities of a connexion which would be broken off at the very moment that it should cease to be burdensome, at the moment, that is, that the colonies should reach such a stage of development as to begin to be useful and to give some return for the sacrifices which their retention had entailed? The belief that separation was the ultimate and inevitable destiny of the colonies and the realization that their retention at present imposed heavy burdens on the mother country were the two chief premisses which led to the conclusion that the colonies were not worth keeping.

There were advocates of separation already in the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. On the whole it may be said that the early Free-Traders and those of the Utilitarians and the "Philosophical Radicals" who were not associated with the Colonial Reform Movement had Separatist leanings. Thus Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations*(1) maintained that "under the present system of management Great Britain derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies,"(2) a conclusion at which he arrived through his condemnation, from a Free Trade point of view, of the monopoly of the colonial trade enjoyed by the mother country — in his opinion the sole advantage to be derived from the possession of colonies.(3) In the same year in which Adam Smith published the *Wealth of Nations* (1776), Josiah Tucker, another pioneer of the Free Trade movement, published a pamphlet *The True Interests of Britain,* in which he recommended the abandonment of the American colonies, maintaining that such a step would entail no real loss to England, and in 1781 he brought out, under the title of *Cui Bono,* a series of letters addressed to Necker, in which he advocated the same views: "Were America this moment to lay herself at our feet, to submit to a carte blanche, provided we would take her again into favour — it is evidently our interest not to accept of such a present."(4) On receiving the news of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown he writes: "If this defeat should terminate in a total separation from America, it would be one of the happiest events that ever happened to Great Britain."(5) Jeremy Bentham, the Utilitarian philosopher, entertained similar views and addressed in 1793 a pamphlet to the French National Convention, entitled *Emancipate Your Colonies,*(6) and his disciple, James Mill, held

(1) Bk. IV. Ch. VII Part III. (2) Emancipation of the colonies he, however, considered "such a measure as never was, and never will be, adopted by any nation in the world", national pride being too strong for such a step. Ibid. (3) "The monopoly is the chief badge of their dependency, and it is the sole fruit which has hitherto been gathered from that dependency. Ibid. (4) Op. cit. p. 87. (5) Ibid. p. 140. (6) In his old age he became, however, converted by the Colonial Reformers (Cf. Mills: *Colonization of Australia.* pp. 152—53).

The King's Library

that colonies, while a fruitful source of wars, were of little or no use to their possessor.(1)

The prominent Radical, Joseph Hume, looked forward to a rebellion in Canada which would terminate "the baneful domination of the mother country."(2) In 1823 he called the attention of the House of Commons to "the situation of the colonies belonging to Great Britain, and the expense of their Government," and maintained that "it was obvious that the colonies, instead of being an addition to the strenght of the country, increased its weakness, and he believed it would be better able to cope with any contingency which might arise, if those colonies were freed from their allegiance and became their own masters."(3)

Lord Brougham, the well-known Radical, declared in 1838 that the amicable separation of Canada would be"a positive gain" to England,(4) ind in 1840 he described himself as "setting little, very little value on the importance of the connexion, holding that its disadvantages greatly preponderated over its advantages."(5) The three "Philosophical Radicals" Grote,(6) Roebuck,(7) and Warburton,(8) all advocated separation.

Sir Henry Parnell, a prominent Whig politician, in his *Financial Reform*(9) (1830) maintains that "the possession of colonies affords no advantages which could not be obtained by commercial intercourse with independent States," and concludes that "the number of them should be greatly reduced." "We defy anyone", writes the *Edinburgh Review* for August, 1825,(10) "to point out a single benefit, of any sort whatever, derived by us from the possession of Canada, and our other colonies in North America. They are productive of heavy expense to Great Britain, but of nothing else. ... Every man of sense, whether in the Cabinet or out of it, knows that Canada must, at no distant period, be merged in the American republic". "We have no hesitition" writes the same journal in February 1826(11) "in saying, that instead of being of any value to England, it would have been well for her, had Canada, Nova Scotia, etc. continued to this hour in the possession of their aboriginal savages. ... Neither is there the least prospect that we shall long continue to maintain our dominion over these expensive dependencies. There is not a man of sense in the Empire who does not look forward to the dissolution, at no distant period, of the connexion between Canada and England."(12)

The *Westminster Review* repeatedly attacked the colonial connexion. In April 1830 it described the colonies as "impediments to commerce,

(1) Cf, His article on *Colonies* in the 1818 supplement to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* (2) Quoted in Lucas's edition of the *Durham Report* I. p. 77. (3) *Hansard* VIII. p. 250. (4) *Hansard* III. 40. pp. 213—14. (5) *Hansard.* III. 55, p. 266. (6) *Hansard* III. 40, p. 60: "He was a friend of separation and ... he thought a separation would be the best thing both for England and Canada." (7) *Hansard* III, 40. p. 310. (8) *Hansard* III. 40. pp. 108, 638.

(9) Op. cit. ch. XV. (10) Op. cit. pp. 291—92. (11) Op. cit. p. 350.

(12) The author of these articles seems to have been J. R. McCulloch, the well-known economist and free-trader, who expresses the same views, sometimes in almost identical language, in his *Statistical Account of the British Empire* (1837) vol. I. pp. 593—602.

drawbacks on prosperity, pumps for extracting the property of the many for the benefit of the few."(1) In July 1830 it advocated the "instant emancipation" of Canada,(2) a step which would only mean "anticipating by a few, a very few years, the inevitable separation."(3)

Sir J. Coffin declared in the House of Commons (13/3 1822) that "it would have been a good thing for this country, if Canada had been sunk to the bottom of the sea," and that "the sooner the Assembly and colony were suffered to go, he should be sorry to say — *au diable* the better."(4)

A Conservative Peer, Lord Ashburton spoke in 1840 of "the uselessness of maintaining colonies of a certain description", and expressed a hope that, if e. g. Pennsylvania should petition to be taken back into the Empire, "the good sense of England would make the same answer and say 'govern yourselves — we have enough to do'". As the best colonial policy he advocated: "to ascertain the proper time for separation and to effect it on friendly terms."(5)

That the Separatist ideas did not become completely predominant in the first half of the 19th century is chiefly due to the activity of the group of men called the Colonial Reformers, who may, in a sense, be considered the forerunners of modern Imperialism. The most prominent of the Colonial Reformers were Lord Durham, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, Sir William Molesworth, and Charles Buller. These men were Radicals, but of a school of Radicalism different from that of the middle of the century. Their Radicalism was inspired by the liberty-worship of the French Revolution (modified to suit English conditions), not by economics. Owing to their devotion to liberty in the abstract, and to the fact that retrenchment occupied a prominent place on the Radical programme, the Colonial Reformers, especially Molesworth,(6) sometimes used language which laid them open to the charge of Seperatism. In reality they were the truest Imperalists of their time, and it is hardly too much to say that it was due to their efforts more than to anything else that the second colonial Empire did not go the way of the first.

The Colonial Reformers contributed two important ideas to the colonial policy of the time: systematic colonization and responsible government in the colonies.

In the 18th century he possibility of using the colonies as outlets for a surplus population had not been considered, because there was at the time no surplus population in England. The growth of the population and the serious unemployment following upon the Napoleonic wars seemed to corroborate Malthus' theories, and made over-population the bugbear of economists in the beginning of the 19th century. It profoundly influenced the Colonial Reformers. The principal advocate of systematic colonization as a remedy for the social evils of the mother

(1) Op. cit. p. 403. (2) Op. cit. p. 47. (3) Ibid. p. 48. Similarly July 1827. p. 1. (4) *Hansard* II. 6. p. 1076. (5) *Hansard* III. 55, p. 261. Somewhat similar views were expressed in the House of Commons by Ewart (*Hansard* III. 54. p. 752). (6) Cf. the speech printed in "*Free Trade and the Manchester School*," p. 414.

country was Wakefield, who elaborated a system of colonization which bears his name. Considerations of space forbid more than a passing mention of this system, which was set forth in his *Sketch of a Proposal to Colonize Australia* (1829), *A Letter from Sydney* (1829), *England and America* (1833) and especially in *A View of the Art of Colonization* (1849), and the chief points of which were, that free grants of colonial lands should be abolished in favour of sale at a fixed price, with the twofold object of forcing immigrants to work as labourers for some time before they could become owners of land, and of providing a fund to be spent in conveying emigrants to the colonies.(1)

The necessary condition of the realization of these schemes of colonization was, of course, the continued unity of the Empire. To preserve this unity the Colonial Reformers proposed to grant to the colonies extensive powers of self-government. The fullest measure of self-government compatible with the retention of the Imperial connexion was to them the surests way of maintaining the Empire. At this conclusion they arrived partly through the realization that the present system of colonial government had failed, partly through their devotion to liberty as an abstract principle, and partly through their detestation of the bureaucratic system on which the colonies were governed from Downing Street. Wakefield had had some personal experience of the sloth and incompetence of the Colonial Office and Durham was thrown over by the Home authorities. Buller wrote a satire on Downing Street,(2) suggestive of Dickens' description of the Circumlocution Office.

Both these points of their programme the Reformers were on the whole successful in carrying. The Wakefield system was, with some modifications, adopted by the Government and applied to Australia, and South Australia and New Zealand were colonized under the auspices of the Reformers. The chief contribution of the Colonial Reformers to British colonial policy is, however, the introduction of responsible government in what is now called the Dominions.

It is sometimes believed that colonial self-government was a result of the lesson taught by the American Revolution. This is not the case.(3) If anything, the American Revolution made the Home Government suspicious of colonial liberty; from 1781 to 1840 no self-governing constitution was granted to any colony, while in those colonies which, like the Canadas, had already received representative institutions, the Executive Councils (i. e. the Ministries) were appointed by the Governor on his own choice and were not subject to the control of the Assemblies. In the Canadas this state of things produced an almost permanent deadlock between the Executive and the Assemblies; in 1837 a rebellion ensued, and it could no longer be concealed that the present system of government had failed completely. In 1838

(1) The latter was, however, only a secondary consideration. (2) Printed in his *Responsible Government for the Colonies* (1840) and Wakefield's *Art of Conization* pp. 279—96. (3) In fact, the abolition of slavery in 1833 entailed a much more serious infringement of colonial rights than that which had brought about the American Revolution.

the constitution was suspended and the Home Government sent out Lord Durham as High Commissioner. He took with him Buller as his chief secretary and Wakefield as his unofficial adviser. The result of this mission was the famous Durham Report, which lays down the principles that form the basis of colonial self-government in the Empire. The principal remedy prescribed by Durham for the unsatisfactory state of things in the Canadas was responsible, as distinguished from representative government. The submission of a colonial Executive to the control of a popular Assembly was then an almost revolutionary proposal, which to many seemed incompatible with the continuation of the Imperial connexion. It provoked a good deal of opposition;(1) in the Union Act of 1840, in which the new Canadian constitution was embodied, responsible government was not mentioned, and from 1840 to 1846 the Melbourne(2) and Peel(3) Administrations attempted to steer a middle course, endeavouring to maintain the responsibility of the Governor without actual conflicts with the majority of the elected chamber. After the coming into power of Lord John Russell's Administration in 1846, the Home Government gave in, in spite of the doubts of the Prime Minister, (4) and responsible government was granted by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Grey, during the Governorship of Lord Elgin, Durham's disciple and son-in-law. In the course of a few years similar systems of government were extended to all the North American and Australasian colonies while the South African colonies followed suit a little later.

Responsible government probably saved the Empire. One cannot read the writings of professed loyalists like Haliburton and Howe without realizing that the position of dependence was producing an abnormally developed "inferiority complex" in the colonial mind, mag-

(1) The *Quarterly Review* for March 1839, inveighs against "this new, and to us, incomprehensible system of 'colonial connexion': the Report calls it connexion — to our understanding it is absolute separation" (p. 516), and asserts that "if that rank and infectious Report does not receive the high, marked, and energetic discountenance and indignation of the Imperial Crown and Parliament, *British America is Lost.* (p. 525). Similarly Haliburton: *The Attaché* (the essays called *The Canadian Exile, Independence,* and *Responsible Government)* and *The Clockmaker,* pp. 72, 180 (ed. 1884).

(2) The Colonial Secretary was Lord John Russell. (3) The Colonial Secretaries were Lord Stanley (afterwards Lord Derby) and Gladstone.

(4) Russell's logical mind was repelled by the illogical position of the Governor under responsible government: on one hand he is bound by the advice of his colonial Ministers, on the other he is subject to orders from the Home Government, to whom he owes his appointment. Cf. his speech in the House of Commons, June 3, 1839 (*Speeches and Dispatches of Earl Russell,* II. p. 66—69), his dispatch to Lord Sydenham Oct. 14. 1839 (Egerton and Grant: *Canadian Constitutional Development,* pp. 266—70) and Grey's *Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration,* I. p. 202.

The belief that responsible government was incompatible with Imperial unity was shared by the Duke of Wellington, who declared in the House of Lords that "local responsible government and the sovereignty of Great Britain were completely incompatible." (*Hansard* III. 55, p. 242) and by Stanley (Lord Derby); *Hansard* III. 75, pp. 38—63, and III. 124, pp. 708—9.

nifying every real or imaginary slight on the part of the Home Government in a way that might have proved highly dangerous to the connexion.

It must, however, be observed that the colonial self-government contemplated by the Reformers was subject to certain limitations. They made a distinction between local and Imperial affairs, and it was only with respect to local affairs that they recommended the grant of responsible government. Imperial affairs ought according to Durham to remain under the control of the Home Government, and Imperial affairs he defined as follows: "The constitution of the form of government — the regulation of foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the other British colonies, and foreign nations — and the disposal of public lands."(1) Though he advocated the fostering of a Canadian national feeling in order to counteract the influence of the United States,(2) he does not seem to have looked upon responsible government as conferring a separate colonial nationhood, but rather as merely a form of local government. Wakefield constantly spoke of it as "municipal government."(3)

Though the Colonial Reformers were a minority, the energy with which they threw themselves into the debate on colonial questions and the prestige which they enjoyed as experts on colonial affairs gave them a considerable influence. Statesmen like Russell and Grey (though disagreeing with them on many points), and thinkers like John Stuart Mill(4) were largely influenced by them. Great as was their influence it was, however, comparatively short-lived, and as a power in English Radicalism they were soon superseded by an entirely different school of thought: the Manchester School.

The reason for the short duration of the influence of the Colonial Reformers is twofold. In the first place their activities were limited to a few years. Durham's high-handed methods in Canada wrecked his

(1) *Report,* II. pp. 282. Wakefield mentions foreign affairs, waste lands, the command of His Majesty's forces, and the Post Office as subjects which ought to be kept under Imperial control (*Art of Colonization* p. 312). He foresaw, however, that the colonies would in time acquire control of waste lands. (Evidence before the committee on Waste Lands *Parl. Papers* XI. 1836, § 823).

(2) *Report* II. p. 311—12. (3) *Art of Colonization,* pp. 230, 232, 269, 271, etc. (4) John Stuart Mill was an original member of the "Colonization Society" founded by the Reformers in 1830. He supported Durham's Canadian policy in two articles in the *Westminster Review* (Jan. and Dec. 1838) and in *Representative Government.* ch. 18, p. 313. His attitude to the colonial question is interesting. While maintaining that England could get on very well without her colonies, he contends that the Imperial connexion should be kept up as long as not disagreeable to the feelings of either party, because it was "a step, as far as it goes, towards universal peace, and general friendly co-operation among nations;" because it prevented the colonies from becoming absorbed into foreign States and thus becoming a source of additional aggressive strength to some hostile power; because it was a guarantee against exclusion by hostile tariffs; and because "it adds to the moral influence and weight in the councils of the world, of the Power which, of all in existence, best understands liberty" (ibid. ch. 18 p. 316—17). Systematic colonization as a remedy for over-population is advocated in his *Political Economy* (II. p. 545).

career even before the publication of his Report. He was thrown over by the Melbourne Government and returned in disgrace in 1838, to die in 1840 at the age of 48. Buller died in 1848 at the age of 42. Wakefield's career was ruined by the fact that he had undergone a term of imprisonment for at dishonourable offence, a circumstance which prevented him from holding office; moreover his constitution broke down from overwork in 1846, and he spent the last years of his life as an invalid in New Zealand. Molesworth lived to become Colonial Secretary in 1855 only to die four months after taking office.

The second reason for the failure of the Colonial Reformers to win over the great body of Englishmen to their views was the partial miscarriage of their projects of colonial self-government. In the grant of responsible government in local affairs, combined with the retention of Imperial control of certain subjects, the Reformers thought that they had found a formula which would bring about a permanent solution of the colonial problem and do away with all colonial unrest. This, as events proved, was not the case. It soon became evident that the colonies considered the measure of responsible government which they had received, merely as the first step in a career of increasing autonomy. Directly they had obtained the control of the Executive they set about widening the range of subjects to which this responsibility applied. The dividing line between Imperial and local affairs had, in spite of the protests of Molesworth;(1) never been fixed by statute, but left to settle itself by constitutional practice. Consequently it was not very difficult for the colonies to encroach upon what had originally been intended as the preserve of the Home Government. One by one the reservations contemplated by Durham, with the exception of the control of foreign policy, were attacked, and one by one they fell. The power of the Colonial Parliaments to alter their own constitutions, after being granted in individual cases, was conceded once for all in 1865 by the Colonial Laws Validity Act, § 5. The Imperial control of waste lands was practically never enforced in Canada after 1840, while in Australia it formed for some time the subject of a controversy between Lord Grey and the colonial Governments. Finally it was abandoned by the Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir J. Pakington, in 1852. Imperial control of the colonial tariff policies also went by the board. Clause XXVII of the Australian Constitution Act of 1850 gave the Australian colonies full fiscal autonomy (with the reservation, however, that they were forbidden to impose differential duties). When Canada in 1859 introduced a protective tariff containing duties calculated to diminish imports from England, the Home Government confined itself to a mild remonstrance, which met with an emphatic declaration, on the part of the Canadian Government, of their right to impose such duties as they thought fit.(2)

This gradual crumbling away of the remnants of Imperial control

(1) *Speeches*, pp. 301—03, 378. (2) Cf. Keith, *Responsible Government*, pp. 1159—1164.

must necessarily militate against the belief, not only in the permanence but also in the desirability of the Imperial connexion. In the first place it seemed to show that the Colonial Reformers had been too optimistic in their belief that a system could be found which would guarantee the permanent unity of the Empire: for years the connecting links had been filed thinner and thinner; it seemed certain that they would soon snap altogether. In the second place it appeared to many more doubtful than ever if, after all, the continuance of the connexion was worth while. The principal reason why the Reformers had wished to retain the colonies was that they wanted to utilize them as outlets for organized emigration, in order to relieve the distress caused by over-population at home. But a necessary condition of the schemes of systematic colonization, which to the Reformers seemed the principal inducement to retain the colonies, was that the Home Government should retain the control of colonial waste lands, and that these lands should not be considered the property of the colonies, to do with as they pleased, but an asset of the whole Empire. "The country which has founded and maintained these colonies at a vast expence of blood and treasure," wrote Durham,(1) "may justly expect its compensation in turning their unappropriated resources to the account of its own redundant population; they are the rightful patrimony of the English people, the ample appanage which God and Nature have set aside in the New World for those whose lot has assigned them but insufficient portions in the Old." In the words of Buller,(2) "the waste lands of the colonies are the property, not merely of the colonies, but of the Empire, and ought to be administered for Imperial, not for local purposes." "The lands," wrote Lord Grey,(3) "constitute a vast estate, which has been acquired, and to which all the value it possesses has been given, by the very large expense which has been incurred by the mother country in establishing, maintaining, and protecting its colonies. This estate the Crown holds as trustee for the benefit of all its subjects, not merely of the few thousands who may at this moment inhabit a particular colony, but of the whole British people."(4) With the abandonment of Imperial control of colonial crown lands however this inducement to retain the colonies disappeared.

Another encroachment on the residuum of Imperial Powers, which dealt a serious blow at the popularity of the colonial Empire in England, was the adoption on the part of the colonies of a policy of tariff protection at a moment, moreover, when a large section of the public in the mother country looked upon such a policy as little short of insane or criminal. When the Home Government gave the colonies fiscal autonomy it was probably taken for granted that they would use it to introduce Free Trade. Thus Cobden expressed himself "agreeably

(1) *Report* II. p. 13. (2) *Report on Public Lands and Emigration,* (Reprinted in Egerton's edition of the *Durham Report,* III. p. 57.) The Report was signed by Buller, but drawn up by Wakefield and Hanson. (Cf. *Hansard* III. 49. p. 503). (3) *Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration.* I. 318—19.
(4) See also Cobden as quoted on p. 34.

surprised" when the Russell Government in 1850 proposed to grant the Australian colonies fiscal autonomy, and generally expressed his approval of that policy.(1) His surprise was probably less agreeable when he saw the colonies using the right acquired to initiate a tariff policy which he had spent his life in combating. That the colonies would not levy protective duties on English goods had always been considered a matter of course. Buller in 1843(2) had expressed his confidence that "of the fiscal policy of the different portions of your own Empire, you can always make sure and may rely upon being met by no hostile tariff on their part," and Molesworth(3) and John Stuart Mill(4) had declared security against hostile tariffs to be one of the principal considerations which made colonies worth keeping. Grey vigorously insisted on the right of the Home Government to control the tariff policies of the colonies. "It has always been held to be one of the principal functions of the Imperial Legislature and Government", he wrote, "to determine what is to be the commercial policy of the Empire at large. ... When Parliament, after a protracted discussion of many years, finally determined upon abandoning the former policy of endeavouring to promote the commerce of the Empire by an artificial system of restrictions, and upon adopting in its place the policy of Free Trade, it did not abdicate the duty and the power of regulating the commercial policy, not only of the United Kingdom, but of the British Empire. The common interests of all parts of that extended Empire require that its commercial policy should be the same throughout its numerous dependencies; nor is this less important than before because our policy is now directed to the removal — instead of, as formerly, to the maintenance — of artificial restrictions upon trade."(5)

CARLYLE

This may be the most suitable place to deal with Carlyle's contribution to the discussion of the colonial question.

Among modern writers on British Imperialism there is sometimes a tendency to exaggerate the importance of Carlyle's share in the Imperialist movement. He has even been described as "the father of of British Imperialism."(6) This estimate, which is due to an exaggerated idea of the originality of Carlyle's theories of colonial policy and to an imperfect knowledge of the earlier stages of British Imperialism, is only true, if at all, with some very important qualifications.

In the first place, it may perhaps be considered doubtful whether Carlyle was ever quite so much concerned about the future of the Em-

(1) Cobden's *Speeches* I, p. 503—04. (2) Wakefield *Art of Colonization* p. 472. (3) "Free Trade with the colonies and free access to the colonies should, in my opinion, be the sole end and aim of the dominion which Great Britain still retains over her colonies" (Egerton: *Selected Speeches of Molesworth,* p. 209). (4) See p. 19. (5) *Colonial Policy.* I. pp. 281—82. As will be seen later on, this view was maintained by Grey when as an old man he joined hands with the Imperialists of the 'seventies. (6) Schulze-Gaevernitz. p. 78. Gazeau: *L'imperialisme anglais* p. 79. J. Izoulet: Preface to a French translation by C. Bos of *Past and Present.*

pire as he is sometimes made out to be. He did occasionally give expression to his belief in the desirability of maintaining the colonies and his pride in the achievements of England in the field of colonization. He often advocated systematic colonization and State-organized emigration. But there is something accidental in his advocacy of the maintenance of the Empire. He did not so much write about the colonies for their own sake as bring them in in the course of disquisitions on other subjects. His Imperialism is to a large extent simply one aspect of his attack on Utilitarianism and the Manchester School, with which Separatism was so closely bound up (see p. 32 ff.), and almost invariably connected with the advocacy of organized emigration as a remedy for pauperism and unemployment. He was a social reformer rather than an Imperialist, and when writing upon emigration it is clearly the benefit of the emigrants, not that of the home country which is his primary consideration.

Few men have had their opinions, as expressed in their correspondence and conversation, so well recorded as Carlyle. Yet in the published collections of his letters and in the records of his conversation very few allusions to the colonies and colonial affairs are to be found,(1) though he had some of his nearest relatives in Canada, and though he himself at one time thought of emigrating. In spite of the interest which Froude himself took in the colonial question, the four volumes of his *Life of Carlyle* contain next to no evidence of any interest on the part of Carlyle in the colonies. He took no part in the agitation for State-aided emigration in 1869—1870, in which his intimate friend Froude was so active, and he did not publicly protest aganst the supposed Separatism of the first Gladstone Administration (see p. 87 ff).(2)

It seems, then, safe to say that the advocacy of colonization and Imperial unity played only a comparatively subordinate part in Carlyle's life and writings. Nor is his position as an advocate of Imperial unity and systematic colonization in the first half of the century by any means a unique or isolated phenomenon. At the time when he wrote on the colonial question, relations with the colonies attracted considerable attention in certain circles and were the subject of a good deal of discussion: "Colonies", he writes in April 1850,(3) "excite more attention at present than any of our other interests." The problem of colonial self-government was in process of solution, and the Colonial Reformers were carrying on their agitation for responsible government in the colonies, systematic colonization, and the reform of the Colonial Office. It is on this background that Carlyle's writings on colonial questions must be seen. It is not improbable that he was directly influenced by the Colonial Reformers. One of the most prominent of

(1) In his correspondence with Gavan Duffy, the Irish-Australian statesman, he occasionally speaks about Australian affairs, deploring the democratic tendency of Australian politics (Duffy: *Conversations with Carlyle* p. 211), and the absence of emigration from England on a large scale (ibid. p. 243). (2) His defence of Governor Eyre was probably inspired less by Imperialist views than by his theories about the treatment of inferior races and the right of the strong to rule the weak. (3) *Latter Day Pamphlets*. p. 95.

them, Charles Buller, was his former pupil and his friend, one of the few of his contemporaries that Carlyle really admired.(1) He knew Molesworth who "pleased him considerably,"(2) and was, during his first years in London, on very intimate terms with John Stuart Mill, who was at that time associated with the Colonial Reform Movement. Like the Reformers he was a kind of "Philosophical Radical".(3) His Imperialism was closely akin to that of the Reformers, and was, like theirs, closely connected with social reform. His criticism of the sloth and pedantry of the Colonial Office, "a world-wide jungle of red tape, inhabited by doleful creatures, deaf or nearly so to human reason or entreaty,"(4) where "every colony, every agent for a matter colonial has his tragic tale to tell you of his sad experiences," is reminiscent of Buller's description of that institution,(5) and he uses the same simile about building free bridges to the colonies for emigrants as Wakefield (see p. 27).

The exaggerated estimate of Carlyle's influence on the growth of Imperialism in England which is sometimes entertained by modern writers is largely due to the emphasis laid by writers of a later period, especially on the Continent, on the ethical aspect of Imperialism. In reality British Imperialism has always been more matter-of-fact and less concerned with ethical, religious and biological theories than one might be led to believe by such writers as Schulze-Gaevernitz, Brie, or Gazeau. Carlyle's ideas about the identity of right and might had very little, if anything, to do with his theories of colonial policy, and they were not, on the whole, adopted by his immediate successors. Attempts to justify conquest and dominion over weaker peoples on abstract grounds played no considerable part in Imperialist thought till many years after the movement had started. It is almost totally absent from the writings of the Imperialists of the 'seventies, it is not found in Seely, and it is almost absent from Froude's writings on colonial questions, though the latter shared Carlyle's right-might theories.

On the whole Carlyle's influence on Imperialist thought and on the growth of the Imperialist movement is not striking. In the Imperialist agitation which began about 1869—70 he himself took no share, and he is very rarely referred to in the literature of the movement. It is clear that the early Imperialists in general did not look upon Carlyle as the originator of the school. The same association of Imperialism with the advocacy of emigration as a remedy for pauperism that characterized Carlyle's writings on the colonial question is found in the early Imperialist movement in the 'seventies, but the connexion between the two things seems too obvious to warrant the

(1) Froude *Thomas Carlyle, a History of the First 40 Years of his Life.* vol. II. p. 216. Carlyle wrote an appreciation of Buller on his death included in *Rescued Essays of Carlyle.* (2) Froude: op. cit. vol. II. p. 423; Froude *Carlyle's Life in London.* vol. I. p. 19. (3) He calls Teufelsdröck "a speculative Radical" (*Sartor Resartus.* ch. X). (4) *Downing Street,* (*Latter Day Pamphlets* p. 94). (5) Included in Wakefield's *Art of Colonization.*

conclution that it is due to the direct influence of Carlyle, except in cases like those of Froude and Jenkins, who avowedly were his disciples.

What are Carlyle's views on the colonial question? In the first place he denies the assertion that the colonies are useless and only a source of expense. "An instinct deeper than the Gospel of M'Croudy", he writes in *The New Downing Street,* "teaches all men that Colonies are worth something to a country! That if, under the present Colonial Office, they are a vexation to us and themselves, some other Colonial Office can and must be contrived which shall render them a blessing: and that the remedy will be to contrive such a Colonial Office or method of administration and by no means to cut the colonies loose. Colonies are not to be picked off the street every day; not a colony of them but has been bought dear, well purchased by the toil and blood of those we have the honour to be sons of; and we cannot just afford to cut them away because M'Croudy finds the present management of them cost money. The present management will indeed require to be cut away; — but as for the colonies, we purpose through Heaven's blessing to retain them a while yet! Shame on us for unworthy sons of brave fathers if we do not. Brave fathers, by valiant blood and sweat, purchased for us, from the bounty of Heaven, rich possessions in all zones; and we, wretched imbeciles, cannot do the function of administering them? And because the accounts do not stand well in the ledger, our remedy is, not to take shame to ourselves, and repent in sackcloth and ashes, and amend our beggarly imbecilities and insincerities in that as in other departments of our business, but to fling the business overboard, and declare the business itself to be bad. We are a hopeful set of heirs to a big fortune!"(1)

"Bad state of the ledger will demonstrate that your way of dealing with your colonies is absurd, and urgently in want of reform; but to demonstrate that the Empire itself must be dismembered to bring the ledger straight? O never. Something else than the ledger must intervene to do that. ... Why does not Middlesex repudiate Surrey and Chelsea Kensington, and each county and each parish, and in the end each individual set up for himself and his cash-box, repudiating the other and his, because their mutual interests have got into an irritating course?(2) ... This poor nation, painfully dark about said tasks and the way of doing them, means to keep its colonies nevertheless, as things which somehow or other must have a value, were it better seen into. They are portions of the general Earth, where the children of Britain now dwell; where the gods have so far sanctioned their endeavour, as to say that they have a right to dwell. England will not readily admit that her own children are worth nothing but to be flung out of doors! England looking on her colonies can say: Here are lands and seas, spice-lands, corn-lands, timber-lands, over-arched by zodiacs and stars, clasped by many-sounding seas; wide spaces of the Maker's building, fit for the cradle yet of migthy Nations and their Sciences

(1) *Latter Day Pamphlets* p. 141. (2) Ibid. p. 142.

and Heroisms. Fertile continents still inhabited by wild beasts are mine, into which all the distressed populations of Europe might pour themselves, and make at once an Old World and a New World human. By the eternal fiat of the gods, this must yet one day be; ... To me has fallen the godlike task of initiating all that: of me and of my colonies, the abstruse Future asks, Are you wise enough for so sublime a destiny? Are you too foolish?"(1)

The maintenance of the Empire is, he holds, no impossibility: "Mycale was the *Pan-Ionian* rendezvous of all the tribes of Ion, for old Greece: why should not London long continue the *All-Saxon-home*, rendezvous of all the 'Children of the Harz-Rock' .... What a Future: wide as the world, if we have the heart and heroism for it ...."(2)

The principal reason for Carlyle's faith in the desirability of maintaining the colonial Empire is his belief that it can be utilized to remedy the social evils of the mother country. The "Condition of England Question" is at the back of all his writings on colonial affairs, animated as they are by a vivid sense of the folly of all talk about over-population, as long as half the world is still empty. As early as in *Sartor Resartus* (Finished in 1831) he writes: "Too crowded indeed! Meanwhile, what portion of this inconsiderable terraqueous globe have ye actually tilled and delved, till it will grow no more? How thick stands your population in the Pampas and Savannas of America; round ancient Carthage, and in the interior of Africa; on both slopes of the Altaic chain, in the central Platform of Asia; in Spain, Greece, Turkey, Crim Tartary, the Curragh of Kildare? One man in one year, as I have understood it, if you lend him Earth, will feed himself and nine others. Alas, where now are the Hengsts and Alarics of our still glowing, still expanding Europe; who, when their home is grown too narrow, will enlist and like firepillars guide onwards those superfluous masses of indomitable living valour; equipped, not now with the battle-axe and war-chariot, but with the steam-engine and plough-share? Where are they? — Preserving their game!"(3)

In spite of his declarations that no "Morrison's Pill" can be found to cure the evils of modern England, Carlyle constantly recurs to organized emigration as the remedy. *Chartism* ends with a vision of a new migration of the Teutonic peoples: "Now once more, as at the end of the Roman Empire, a most confused epoch and yet one of the greatest, the Teutonic Countries find themselves too full. On a certain western rim of our small Europe, there are more men than were expected. Heaped up against the western shore there, and for a couple

(1) Ibid. p. 143. (2) *Past and Present.* bk. IV. ch. III. (p. 257). Cf. also his panegyric on Shakespeare as the binding-link between the branches of "Saxondom": "From Paramatta, from New York, under what sort of Parish-Constable soever English men and women are, they will say to one another: 'Yes, this Shakespeare is ours; we produced him, we speak and think by him; we are of one blood and kind with him.' (*Heroes and Hero-Worship* pp. 183—85). Note that "Saxondom" is made to include America. (3) Op. cit. Bk. III. ch. IV. The same passage forms the conclusion of *Chartism.*

of hundred miles inward, the 'tide of population' swells too high, and confuses itself somewhat. Over-population? And yet, if this small western rim of Europe is overpeopled, does not everywhere else a whole vacant Earth, as it were, call to us, Come and till me, come and reap me! .... For all this of the "painless extinction", and the rest, is in a world where Canadian Forests stand unfelled, boundless Plains and Prairies unbroken with the plough; and on the west and on the east green desert spaces never yet made white with corn; and to the overcrowded little western nook of Europe, our Terrestrial Planet, nine-tenths of it yet vacant or tenanted by nomads, is still crying, come and till me, come and reap me! And in an England with wealth, and means for moving, such as no nation ever before had. With ships; with warships rotting idle, which, but bidden move and not rot, might bridge all oceans. With trained men, educated to pen and practise, to administer and act; briefless Barristers, chargeless Clergy, taskless Scholars, languishing in all court-houses, hiding in obscure garrets, besieging all antechambers, in passionate want of simply one thing, Work; — with as many Half-pay Officers of both Services, wearing themselvees down in wretched tedium, as might lead an Emigrant host larger than Xerxes' was! Laissez-faire and Malthus positively must part company. Is it not as if this swelling, simmering, never-resting Europe of ours stood, once more, on the verge of an expansion without parallel; struggling, struggling like a mighty tree again about to burst in the embrace of summer, and shoot forth broad frondent boughs which would fill the whole earth?"(1)

In *Past and Present* he raises the question, why the organization which is brought to such perfection when directed towards a destructive object like war, is never attempted in the arts of peace: "Why should there not be an 'emigration service' and Secretary," he asks, "with adjuncts, with funds, forces, idle Navy-ships, and ever-increasing apparatus; in fine an effective system of Emigration; so that, at length, before our twenty years of respite ended, every honest willing Workman who found England too strait, and the 'Organisation of Labour' not yet sufficiently advanced, might find likewise a bridge built to carry him into new Western Lands,(2) there to 'organise' with more elbowroom some labour for himself? There to be a real blessing, raising new corn for us, purchasing new webs and hatchets from us; leaving us at least in peace; instead of staying here to be a Physical-Force Chartist, unblessed and no blessing! Is it not scandalous to consider that a Prime Minister could raise within a year, as I have seen it done, a Hundred and Twenty Millions Sterling to shoot the French; and we are stopt short for want of the hundredth part of that to keep the English living? (3)

(1) *Chartism* ch. X. (2) Cf. "to build a bridge, as it were, toll-free for the passage of poor labourers from the old country to the colonies" Wakefield: *England and America.* II. p. 184. (3) Op. cit. Bk. IV. ch. III (p. 247). The idea of utilizing the Navy to carry emigrants to the colonies is also touched upon in *Latter Day Pamphlets. (The New Downing Street)* p. 139.

It should, however, be noticed that in advocating emigration it is principally the interests of the individuals which Carlyle has at heart. The chief object is not to strengthen or promote the unity of the Empire, but to give the emigrant a chance of escaping from the misery of contemporary England. In some of the passages quoted above, the countries which Carlyle holds up as fields of emigration, are not British possessions at all.

Another element in Carlyle's Imperialism, beside his concern about the "Condition of England Question", is his national pride. In the colonial Empire he sees something to be proud of, one of the greatest achievements of the English of past generations: "How many brawny arms generation after generation, sank down wearied;" he writes in *Chartism,*(1) "how many noble hearts, toiling while life lasted, and wise heads that wore themselves dim with scanning and discerning, before this waste *Whitecliff,* Albion so-called, with its other Cassiterides *Tin Islands,* became a British Empire! The stream of World-History has altered its complexion; Romans are dead out, English are come in. The red broad mark of Romanhood, stamped ineffaceably on that Cart of Time, has disappeared from the present, and belongs only to the past. England plays its part; England too has a mark to leave, and we will hope none of the least significant. Of a truth, whosoever had, with the bodily eye, seen Hengst and Horsa mooring on the mud-beach of Thanet, on that spring morning of the Year 449; and then, with the spiritual eye, looked forward to New York, Calcutta, Sidney Cove, across the ages and the oceans; and thought what Wellingtons, Washingtons, Shakespeares, Miltons, Watts, Arkwrights, William Pitts and Davie Crocketts had to issue from that business, and do their several taskworks so, — he would have said, those leather-boats of Hengst's had a kind of cargo in them!" "Nature alone knows thee, acknowledges the bulk and strength of thee," he exclaims, "thy Epic, unsung in words, is written in huge characters on the face of this Planet, — sea-moles, cotton-trades, railways, fleets and cities, Indian Empires, Americas, New Hollands; legible throughout the Solar System!"(2)

The English are to him a sort of chosen people whose special mission it is to throw open the waste lands of the world: "To the English People in World History," he writes,(3) "There have been, shall I prophesy, two grand tasks assigned? Huge-looming through the dim tumult of the always incommensurable Present Time, oulines of two tasks disclose themselves: the grand industrial task of conquering some half or more of this Terraqueous Planet for the use of man; then secondly, the grand Constitutional task of sharing, in some pacific endurable manner, the fruit of said conquest, and showing all people how it might be done." "Sugar Islands, Spice Islands, Indias, Canadas, — — these, by the real decree of Heaven, were ours."(4) This element in Carlyle's Im-

(1) Ch. VIII. p. 211. (2) *Past and Present,* Bk. 111. ch. V. (p. 154).
(3) *Chartism,* ch. VIII. p. 214. (4) *The New Downing Street. Latter Day Pamphlets.* 137.

perialism is not without counterparts in the writings of later Imperialists like Kipling and Henley, but it is almost totally absent from the earlier Imperialist literature from 1870 to about 1890.

There is a curious contrast between Carlyle's prophetic denunciations of contemporary England and his distrust of the ability of the English to govern themselves, on one hand, and his panegyrics on the English race on the other, as in the chapter entitled *The English* in *Past and Present*. His national pride occasionally takes the form of eulogizing national characteristics which in themselves cannot be called praiseworthty, a trait which is not unknown in English literature. "How one loves to see the burly figure of him", he writes, "this thick-skinned, seemingly opaque, perhaps sulky, almost stupid Man of Practice, pitted against some light adroit Man of Theory, all equipped with clear logic, and able anywhere to give you why for wherefore!"(1) Heaviness and the lack of self-expression become objects of admiration because they are assumed to be specially English qualities. Thus Carlyle becomes the discoverer of that idol of the lady novelists of a later age; the Strong Silent Man, "Ah yes," he writes, "I will say again: the great *silent* men! Looking round on the noisy inanity of the world, words with little meaning, actions with little worth, one loves to reflect on the great Empire of *Silence*. The noble, silent men, scattered here and there, each in his department; silently thinking, silently working .... I hope we English will long maintain our *grand talent pour le silence*. Let others that cannot do without standing on a barrel-head, to spout and be seen of all the market-place, cultivate speech exclusively."(2) "Of all the Nations in the world at present", he writes in *Past and Present,* "the English are the stupidest in speech, the wisest in action. As good as a dumb nation, I say, who cannot speak and have never yet spoken .... As for me, I honour, in these loud-babbling days, all the Silent rather.... The 'talent of silence' is our fundamental one. Great honour to him whose Epic is a melodious hexameter Iliad; not a jingling Sham Iliad, nothing true in it but the hexameters and forms merely. But still greater honour, if his Epic be a mighty Empire slowly built together, a mighty Series of Heroic Deeds, — — a mighty Conquest over Chaos; which Epic the 'Eternal Melodies' have, and must have, informed and dwelt in, as it sung itself! There is no mistaking that latter Epic. Deeds are greater than Words."(3)

In spite of this pride in the achievements of the English race and his belief in its special misson, Carlyle was, however, totally free from Jingoism. He was against the Crimean War,(4) and he detested Disraeli's "spirited foreign policy" and did what he could to thwart it.(5)

While the chief elements of Carlyle's Imperialism was the belief in colonization as the special and glorious mission of the English people

(1) *Past and Present,* bk. III. ch. V. p. 153. (2) *Heroes and Hero Worship,* p. 362. (3) Bk. III. ch. V. (p. 154—55), similarly the essays entitled *Downing Street* and *Stump Orator* in *Latter Day Pamphlets.* (4) "I have hardly seen a madder business" he notes in his Journal (Froude: *Carlyle's Life in London,* vol. II. p. 151. Similarly ibid. p. 173. (5) Ibid. pp. 439—42.

and as a remedy for its sufferings, at least in one or two places a note of commercial Imperialism creeps in, an echo of the contemporary discussion of the mercantile value of colonies, which forms a curious contrast with the prophetic tone of the surroundings. In *Past and Present* he warns against the danger that the industrial monopoly of England may in time be threatened by foreign rivals and laments the fact "that we should find our national existence, depend on selling manufactured cotton at a farthing an ell cheaper than any other people."(1) "'Hostile Tariffs'," he writes, "will arise, to shut us out; and then again will fall, to let us in: but the sons of England, speakers of the English language were it nothing more, will in all times have the ineradicable predisposition to trade with England."(2)

On the question of tariff policy Carlyle seems, however, for once in a while to have accepted the tenets of the Manchester School, a fact which was probably due to the association, at the time, of tariff protection with the Corn Laws, which Carlyle detested as cordially as Cobden.(3) He even defends the action of England in forcing China at the cannon's mouth to open her ports to British trade in opium and other commodities.(4)

If Carlyle was influenced by the Colonial Reformers in his advocacy of systematic colonization and his attacks on Downing Street, he did not share their views on the subject of colonial self-government. The principle of responsible government he either did not understand, or did not believe in. The crucial point in the development of colonial self-government may be said to have been reached in Canada in 1849 under the Governorship of Lord Elgin. The majority of the colonial Parliament had voted a compensation to those who had suffered loss of property during the rebellions of 1837 and 1838, a measure which was looked upon by many as unduly favourable to the ex-rebels, and which excited the most violent opposition on the part of the Loyalists, who however were in a minority in the elected Chamber. True to the principle of responsible government, Lord Elgin gave his assent to the measure, a step which brought down upon him a storm of vituperation from the Loyalists. The Parliament Buildings at Montreal were burnt down by rioters and the Governor himself was nearly mobbed. The wisdom and fearlessness of Lord Elgin's attitude is now universally acknowledged. Carlyle, however, poured scorn on his conduct, denouncing the lenient treatment of rebels and ridiculing the idea of

(1) Op cit. Bk. III. ch. IX. p. 176. (2) Ibid. Bk. IV. ch. III. p. 257.
(3) *Past and Present* pp. 156, 159, ch. VIII. etc. *Latter Day Pamphlets*. pp. 156, 157, etc. (4) *Past and Present,* bk. IV. ch. III. p. 257. *The New Downing Street, (Latter Day Pamphlets)* p. 137. An utterance quoted by Duffy seems, however, to indicate that later in life he extended his distrust of laissez-faire to the policy of Free Trade too: "Free Trade was the most intense nonsense that ever provoked human patience. The people of Australia were quite right to protect their industries and teach their young men trades in complete disregard of Parliamentary and platform palaver. No nation ever got manufactures in any other way." (*Conservations with Carlyle*. p. 218.)

a Governor who was a mere machine for signing Acts of the Colonial Parliament.(1)

It is, however, only fair to remark that Carlyle's criticism of colonial self-government was not, like that of several later Imperialists, dictated by a desire to extend the sphere of activity of the Imperial Government. He was too much impressed by the incompetence of Downing Street for that. Nor was it caused by any dislike of colonial autonomy *per se*. The real reason was Carlyle's deep distrust of Democracy and Parliamentary government in any form. He was distressed to see the colonies reproducing a political system which he looked upon as the bane of the mother country(2). Complaints that the Australian colonies are imitating the "national Palaver" of the metropolis are found in his letters to Duffy. "I could not but own," he writes to the latter in 1861,(3) "that in comparison with the old Colonial Office and Parliamentary-Fogie methods of administration, it might be a real improvement; and that, in short, in the present anarchic condition of England, there was nothing for it, but to let her colonies go, in this wild manner, down the wind, whither they liked, till once it became insupportable to the poor minority of wise men among themselves, and they (probably sword-in-hand) could resolve to take some course with it, life to themselves having grown worse than death under such conditions."

Carlyle's idea was to make some strong man governor, and to leave him to rule his own colony on patriarchal lines. — What could not Friedrich have made of Dominica! he exclaims in *Shooting Niagara*. The Queen should summon "some gallant-minded, stout, well-gifted cadet" and say to him: "See, I have scores and scores of 'Colonies' all un-governed, and nine tenths of them full of jungles, boa-constrictors, rattlesnakes, Parliamentry Eloquences, and Emancipated Niggers ripening towards nothing but destruction; one of these you shall have, you as Vice-King; on rational conditions and *ad vitam aut culpam* it shall be yours (and perhaps your posterity's if worthy): go you and buckle with it, in the name of heaven; and let us see what you will build it to."

Carlyle's theories of hero-worship and of the identity of right and might are too well-known to make it necessary to give an account of them here. It should however be noticed, as has already been pointed out, that they have no essential connexion with his theories of colonial policy, and that they are, in fact, almost never mentioned by him in conjunction with these theories, when we except his occasional expressions of a utopian desire to see the colonies ruled by a "Hero", and his denunciation of negro-philanthropy as applied to the West Indies.(4) A corollary of his right-might doctrine is the theory (which, like that doctrine and like his Hero-worship, was later on adopted by his disciple Froude), that there was no such thing as an inherent right of a nation

(1) *Latter Day Pamphlets*, pp. 95, 141—45. (2) Cf. the essays entitled *Stump Orator* and *Parliaments* in *Latter Day Pamphelts*. (3) Duffy, *Conversations with Carlyle* p. 211. (4) *The Nigger Question* and *Shooting Niagara*.

to possess the land it occupied, a theory best expressed in the following passage from *Chartism*:(1) "Might and Right do differ frightfully from hour to hour; but give them centuries to try it in, they are found to be identical. Whose land was this of Britain? God's who made it, His and no other's it was and is. Who of God's creatures had a right to live in it? The wolves and bisons? Yes they; till one with a better right showed himself. The Celt, 'aboriginal savage of Europe,' as a snarling antiquary names him, arrived, pretending to have a better right; and did accordingly, not without pain to the bisons, make good the same. He had a better right to that piece of God's land; namely a better might to turn it to use; a might to settle himself here, at least, and try what use he could turn it to. The bisons disappeared; the Celts took possession, and tilled. Forever, was it to be? Alas, Forever is not a category that can establish itself in this world of Time. A world of Time, by the very definition of it, is a world of mortality and mutability, of beginning and ending. No property is eternal but God the Maker's: whom Heaven permits to take possession, his is the right; ... The strong thing is the just thing: this thou wilt find throughout in our world; as indeed was God and Truth the Maker of our world, or was Satan and Falsehood?"

Similar theories have sometimes been expressed by later Imperialists, especially about the time of the Boer War, and they loom large in the German literature on British Imperialism. The theory is a tempting one for advocates of aggressive Imperialism, but in point of fact, as has already been pointed out, it had very little to do with Carlyle's own views on colonial questions.

The reason why the right-might theory and the abstract justification of conquest, in short the attempt to establish a special set of ethics for the use of Imperialism, plays such a small part in Carlyle's theories of colonial policy is the fact that the obvious fields for the systematic colonization recommended by Carlyle were Canada and Australasia, empty countries in which there was practically no native population whose suppression had to be justified.

MID-VICTORIAN SEPARATISM

As the influence of the Colonial Reformers waned, a new school of Radicalism, came to the front. Of the Radicals who provided the driving force which transformed Whiggism into Liberalism the majority were middle class men, whose Radicalism, unlike that of the „Philosophical Radicals," was essentially economic. The political and economic doctrines by which they were chiefly guided were those of the so-called Manchester School, whose chief political leaders were Cobden and Bright, and whose most brilliant literary exponent was Goldwin Smith.

The chief characteristics of the Manchester School were distrust of the interference of the State in economical matters and the advocacy of

(1) Op. cit. ch. VIII. pp. 212—13.

a policy of *laissez-faire*. The principal point of attack was tariff protection, but the dislike of interference in "the laws of economy" extended to the whole sphere of economics, e. g. to factory legislation. The School was, on the whole, apt to look upon the economic laws, less as generalizations derived from an analysis of economic phenomena, than as rules of conduct to be followed as closely as possible. This particular view was so predominant at the time, that political economy became practically synonymous with *laissez-faire*. Hence the attacks of Carlyle, Froude and other opponents of the Manchester School on "the dismal science."(1) As the whole colonial connexion was commonly looked upon as something artificially maintained in opposition to tendencies which would otherwise lead to emancipation, and as the colonial system was still associated with the doctrines of Mercantilism, the Free Trade and *laissez-faire* doctrines of the Manchester School naturally gave its adherents a bias against the maintenance of colonies. The strong emphasis laid by the School on the pecuniary aspect of affairs, its activities in favour of retrenchment, its anti-militarism, and its studied disregard of sentimental considerations tended in the same direction, and made the Manchester School the centre of Separatism.

As for Cobden it has sometimes been maintained that he was not, strictly speaking, in favour of colonial emancipation.(2) It is true that on one occasion(3) he declared that he "wanted to retain them by their affections," and on another(4) that his purpose was to do away with the colonial monopolies, not the colonial system. In face of the unambiguous expressions of a desire to get rid of the colonies which occur in his speeches and correspondence, it seems, however, difficult to deny that he was a Separatist in the most literal sense of the word, a fact which is admitted by his friend and admirer Goldwin Smith.(5) "The colonies, army, navy, and church," he wrote in 1836, "are with the Corn Laws, merely accessories to our aristocratic government. John Bull has his work cut out for the next 50 years to purge his house of those impurities."(6) In 1842 he wrote in a private letter:(7) "The colonial system, with all its dazzling appeals to the passions of the people, can never be got rid of except by the indirect process of Free Trade, which will gradually and imperceptibly loosen the bands which unite our colonies to us by a mistaken notion of self-interest." In another letter written in 1865(8) he comments as follows on the proposed federation of the North American colonies: "I cannot see what substantial interest the British people have in the connexion to compensate them for guaranteeing 3 or 4 millions of North Americans

(1) e. g. *Latter Day Pamphlets*, pp. 10, 142. etc. (2) Thus by B. R. Wise in *Macmillan's Magazine* Aug. 1886, and Hobhouse in *Democracy and Reaction*, p. 18. (3) Speech at Manchester, Jan. 10. 1849 (Bright and Rogers *Speeches of Cobden*. I. p. 486. In the same speech he calls the United States "a colony emancipated, and we may thank our stars it has broke loose." (4) House of Commons, May 15. 1843 (ibid. I. p. 60). (5) *Reminiscences* p. 245. (6) *Political Writings of Cobden*. p. 2. (7) Morley: *Life of Cobden*. I. p. 230.
(8) Ibid. II. pp. 470—71.

living in Canada against another community of Americans living in their neighbourhood. We are told indeed of the 'loyalty' of the Canadians, but this is an ironical term to apply to people who neither pay our taxes, nor obey our laws nor hold themselves liable to fight our battles, who would repudiate our right to the sovereignty over an acre of their territory, and who claim the right of imposing their own customs duties, even to the exclusion of our manufactures. We are two peoples to all intents and purposes, and it is a perilous delusion to both parties to attempt to keep up a sham connexion and dependence which will snap asunder if it should ever be put the strain of stern reality ... I have felt an interest in this confederation scheme, because I thought it was a step in the direction of an amicable separation."

Cobden was hardly very interested in the colonial question for its own sake. He seems principally to have arrived at it through the advocacy of financial retrenchment, and he was, in common with many other statesmen of the time, eager to make the colonies pay for their own defence.(1)

The Separatism of Bright seems to have been somewhat less inspired by purely pecuniary considerations; he took a good deal of interst in India,(2) and it seems probable that his Pacifism and his hatred of Militarism (with which the colonial system was still very vaguely associated) entered into it for a good deal. That he was in favour of separation cannot, however, he doubted. In a speech in the House of Commons on Canadian fortifications in 1865(3) he said: "I believe if Canada now, by a friendly separation from this country, became an independent State ... it would not be less friendly to England, and its tariff would not be more adverse to our manufactures than it is now . In the case of war with America, Canada would be a neutral country ... I do not object to that separation in the least; I believe it would be better for us and better for her." Speaking in the House of Commons in 1867(4) he said: "There are persons in this country, and there are some also in the North American Provinces, who are ill-natured enough to say that not a little of the loyalty that is said to prevail in Canada has its price ... If they are to be constantly applying to us for guarantees for railways, and for grants for fortresses, and for works of defence ... then I think it would be far better for them and for us — cheaper for us, and less demoralizing for them — that they should become an independent State ..."

As for Goldwin Smith who, when the reaction against the anti-colonial school began to set in, was looked upon by the Imperialists as the chief representative of Separatism, it will perhaps be better to deal with his writings at the end of this chapter, summarizing, as they do, most of the aspects and arguments of Separatism.

Several circumstances combined to play into the hands of the Se-

(1) *Speeches* of Cobden I. p. 55, I. 504, II. 331. (2) He expressly deprecated the idea of abandoning India in a speech at Birmingham, April 16, 1879 (*Adresses* p. 502). (3) *Speeches* I. pp. 153—54. (4) *Speeches*. I. p. 167.

paratists. The effect of the encroachments, on the part of the colonies, on what had originally been considered Imperial rights has already been mentioned. The victory of Free Trade in 1846 and the following years removed one more of the grounds on which the maintenance of colonies had hitherto been defended.

The old colonial system had been based on the principles of Mercantilism: the colonies and the mother country were to supplement one another as producers of raw materials and of manufactured articles respectively. In order to keep up this scheme of economical interchange (the so-called *pacte colonial*), a system of restrictions had been maintained, by which it was sought to give the United Kingdom a monopoly of the colonial markets and the inter-Imperial shipping trade, while at the same time the colonies had been given substantial tariff preferences in the United Kingdom. In the 18th and the early part of the 19th century the monopoly of the colonial trade which the mother country thus enjoyed, had been considered one of the most important, if not the most important, of the benefits resulting from the Imperial connexion.(1) Even though many Englishmen had ceased to believe in the advantage of monopolies long before the final victory of Free Trade — indeed the hostile attitude of so many economists in the first half of the century was largely due to the fact that the colonial connexion was considered part and parcel of Mercantilism(2) — it cannot be doubted that the abolition of the preferential system dealt a severe blow at the beiief in the possibility and the advantage of retaining the colonies. In the colonies the repeal of the preferences undoubtedly weakened loyalty to the mother country, and in England the abolition of the monopoly removed one of the chief inducements to retain the colonies. "With the colonial trade thrown open, and colonization at an end," wrote Merivale, the Permanent Under Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1847 to 1859, "it is obvious that the leading motives which induced our ancestors to found and maintain a colonial empire no longer exist."(3) "Many of the most eager advocates of the principles of Free Trade," wrote Grey in 1853, "concurred in arguing that if the colonies were no longer to be regarded as valuable on account of the commercial advantages to be derived from their possession, the country had no interest in keeping these dependencies, and that it would be better to abandon them ... it is impossible to deny that the view of the subject to which I have adverted is at least plausible."(4)

(1) "The advantage of such colonies to their respective mother countries consists altogether in those peculiar advantages which are supposed to result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature — and the exclusive trade, it is acknowledged, is the sole source of all those peculiar advantages." (Adam Smith *Wealth of Nations* Bk. IV. Ch. VII. Part III.) See also the passage quoted on p. 14. (2) See p. 14. Roebuck writes: "The economical statesmen clearly perceive that the cry of 'ships, colonies, and commerce' was a monopoly, anti-free-trade cry, and they therefore regard with jealousy every scheme for the preservation and management of our colonies" (*The Colonies of England.* p. 9).

(3) *The Colonial Question* in 1870 (*Fortnightly Review.* Jan.—June. 1870. p. 155.) (4) *Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration.* I. pp. 10—11.

To this was added, as the final stroke, the refusal of the colonies to follow the lead given by the mother country in establishing Free Trade and the fact that they began to levy protective duties, not only on foreign, but on English goods (see pp. 21—22). It is difficult now to conceive the absolutely implicit and almost religious belief in Free Trade entertained by many Englishmen about the middle of the century. Protectionism was considered not only as wicked, but as a monstrous idiocy, a wilful blindness to the most obvious truths. Thring speaks about "improper duties on imports and exports in contravention of Free Trade and commonsense",(1) and calls the colonies "insolent and disobedient children."(2) Cobden prophesied in 1846 that every country in Europe would have gone over to Free Trade in less than 5 years.(3) Grey described tariff retaliation as "the silliest of silly policies,"(4) and Goldwin Smith spoke of "the vice of Protectionism" and of the "ignorant cupidity" of the colonies (See p. 54). The absolute confidence in the self-evidence of the Free Trade doctrines is characteristically displayed in Cobden's negotiations with Napoleon III for a commercial treaty:(5) It is quite evident that he considered Napoleon less as a negotiator than as a pupil to whom it was his task to impart the true principles of political economy.

That British colonies should be guilty of the heresy of protection seemed to the Manchester School like sinning against the light, and there is no doubt that the fact considerably strengthened the existing Separatist tendencies. "When the first protective tariff was enacted in Canada," Bright declared, "the thought that came to my mind and the observation that I made, was that 'this is the first step towards the separation of Canada from Great Britain';"(6) and the Canadian tariff policy would, in his opinion, "if persisted in, be fatal to its connexion with the mother country."(7)

It may perhaps be well to recapitulate the process by which a section of the English public arrived at the conclusion that the emancipation of the colonies would be a desirable event:

It cannot be too much emphasized that the fundamental proposition from which Separatism started was the belief that independence was the ultimate and inevitable destiny of the colonies, a belief which was due, partly to the supposed lesson of the American War of Independence and the emancipation of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires, and partly to the conviction that the constant encroachment of the colonies on subjects which were considered the preserve of the Home

(1) *Suggestions for Colonial Reform* (1865) p. 21. (2) Ibid. p. 7.
(3) Speech, Jan. 15, 1846. Quoted by McGunn in *Six Radical Thinkers.* p. 103. (4) Letter to Elgin $^{25}/_{10}$, 1849 (Morison, p. 273). (5) Morley: *Life of Cobden,* vol. II. ch. XI. (6) Speech Jan. 28, 1885. Quoted by the *Quarterly Rev.* April 1885, p. 515. (7) August 6, 1879 *The Public Letters of John Bright.* p. 237.

Government was the expression of a colonial tendency towards emancipation,(1) and must, in the long run, end in separation.

Colonial independence seemed the more inevitable because the history of the first colonial Empire had brought about an impression that there was something abnormal and in itself humiliating in the position of a "dependency" which no colony would put up with, if it were strong enough to be independent. The modern, somewhat shapeless conception of the Empire as a partnership between equal States did not exist: the colonial status necessarily spelt subjection.(2) "I have an idea," wrote Trollope in 1862, "that it would become the Canadas to rebel and assert their independence at some future period — unless it be conceded them without such rebellion";(3) and in 1872 he wrote: "Does anybody believe that a population of 20 millions in Australia would remain subject to a population of 40 millions in the British Isles?"(4)

So widespread was this belief that the colonies could not remain for long in the Empire that many of those who sincerely wished to maintain the unity of the Empire did not dare to hope for it. Thus, for instance, the *Quarterly Review* for July 1863 ends a strong plea for the retention of the colonies with an expression of the belief that a day will come "when rich, populous, and self-dependent colonies grown into nations will claim a dissolution of partnership."(5)

Given the belief that colonial independence was only a question of time, it is obvious that Englishmen should be disinclined to incur sacrifices for the sake of the colonies. That the retention of the colonial Empire did involve sacrifices could not be denied. The annual expenditure on Imperial troops in the colonies was generally about £3,000,000. A large proportion of this sum went to cover expenditure on naval and military stations like Gibraltar and Malta, which could not in fairness be classed with the other colonies, but on the other hand it was maintained that the mere existence of the colonial Empire involved the necessity of a far larger navy than would otherwise have been necessary.

Moreover it was commonly held that the possession of colonies brought with it an increased danger of war. This consideration especially applied to Canada, the proximity of which to the United States made it at the same time liable to be embroiled in a war with its powerful neighbour, and extremely difficult to defend. Consequently Canada became the *bête noir* of the Separatists, and attempts to prove the uselessness of dependencies were generally illustrated by references to the affairs of that colony. Writers like Roebuck,(6) who were not ad-

(1) "It is a great pity," wrote Rogers in 1854, "that, give as much as you will, you cannot please the colonists with anything short of absolute independence, so that it is not easy to say how you are to accomplish what we are, I suppose, all looking to, the eventual parting company on goods terms." *Letters of Blachford* p. 175. (2) "A self-governing dependency ... is a contradiction in terms". (Cornewall Lewis: *Government of Dependencies,* p. 289. (3) *North America.* I. p. 44. (4) *Australia and New Zealand.* I. p. 356. Similarly Merivale *Colonization and Colonies* p. 218. Cf. also the quotation from Lowe on p. 47 and from Blachford on p. 50. (5) Similarly *Fraser's* June 1849, p. 638. See also p. 57. (6) *The Colonies of England* (1849) p. 188—221.

verse to the retention of the other colonies, advocated the emancipation of Canada as being in a class by itself. (See also pp. 40, 62, 64). When the success of the North in the American Civil War and the Fenian raids across the Canadian frontier seemed to make the danger of a rupture with America more imminent, this became one of the most powerful factors in the Separatist movement, the more so as Canada, by failing, in the opinion of the English public, to provide for an adequate defence of her frontier, seemed to throw an undue burden on the mother country.(1)

In return for these drawbacks of the colonial connexion there was little to show. Not only did English goods no longer enjoy preferential treatment in the colonies,but they were subject to tariffs of a more protective character than those of many foreign countries. To be sure the colonies were, calculated per head of their population, far better customers than other countries, but it was impossible to prove that this was not a natural consequence of economic laws which would operate in the same way if the political connexion was severed. In any case the Separatists could point to the enormous increase in the trade between England and the United States which had taken place after the latter had become independent: "We have derived ten times more advantage from our intercourse with the United States since they achieved their independence," wrote McCulloch,(2) "than we derived from them while we had a governor in every State, or than we have derived from all our other colonies put together. And this advantage has not been accompanied by any drawbacks." "The commerce between the mother country and the colonies was but a peddling traffic compared to that vast international intercourse, the greatest the world has ever known, which grew up between them, when they had exchanged the tie of subjection for that of equality," wrote Merivale in 1841.(3)

Similarly, if the advocates of the connexion referred to the usefulness of colonies as outlets for emigration, the Separatists could assert that emigration would go on at exactly the same rate if they were to become independent, a statement which could not easily be disproved, and in support of which they could point to the stream of emigrants who left England for the United States. That schemes of systematic emigration and settlement, as contemplated by the Colonial Reformers, could no longer be carried out, after the control of waste lands had passed into the hands of Colonial Governments sometimes hostile to immigration, was obvious.

That the colonies could possibly be a source of military strength in case of war, few, even of the staunchest advocates of the connexion,

(1) A militia bill brought in by Galt was thrown out by the Canadian Parliament, an event which provoked a storm of indignation in England. See O. D. Skelton: *Life and Times of Sir Alex. Galt.* pp. 340—48. J. C. Dent, in his *Last Forty Years'* (II. p. 426) maintains that the tone adopted by the English press on this occasion struck a blow at Canadian loyalty from which it has never fully recovered. (2) *Statistical Account of the British Empire.* I. p. 597.
(3) *Colonization and Colonies.* I. p. 230.

dared to maintain. That they would never send troops to the assistance of the mother country was simply taken for granted. "Nobody expected Canadian regiments to storm the Redan side by side with the English soldiers. Nobody hopes to see Australians or New Zealanders volunteer for service out of their own country" wrote Lord Thring in 1865.(1)

The question whether the colonies paid or no seemed the more relevant, because the English public was inclined to look on the colonies as possessions of England in the literal sense of the word, a view that was only natural, considering that the colonies were largely empty and with no considerable population of their own. To the contemporary Englishman they were primarily *lands,* not populations.

The discussion of the existence or absence of positive advantages to the mother country from the possession of colonies forms the chief substance of numerous publications about the middle of the century, of which the most important are: *An Essay on the Government of Dependencies* (1841) by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, J. A. Roebuck's *The Colonies of England* (1849), and Arthur Mills' *Colonial Constitutions* (1856), Cornewall Lewis' book, in especial, had a considerable influence, and his reasoning pervades most writings on the subject till about 1870. Examining the advantages which can be derived from the possession of dependencies, he finds these to be: 1. tribute, 2. military assistance, 3. trade facilities, 4. outlets for emigration, 5. facilities for the transportation of criminals, and 6. prestige. As far as the British colonies are concerned he holds that the first five advantages are either non-existent, or that they would exist even if the colonies were independent. The sixth advantage, prestige, he condemns as purely imaginary and devoid of real value. His practical conclusion as to the value of colonies is as follows: "If a dominant country understood the true nature of the advantages arising from the relation of supremacy and dependence to the related communities, it would voluntarily recognise the legal independence of such of its own dependencies as were fit for independence; it would, by its political arrangements, study to prepare for independence those which were still unable to stand alone ...."(2)

Roebuck, on the other hand, while fully admitting that the colonies under the present system were an unnecessary burden and a source of unprofitable expense, (3) maintained that under a better system of

(1) *Suggestions for Colonial Reform* p. 23. "Nobody believes that the presence of Australian representatives in the imperial assembly that voted the funds would reconcile their constituents at the other side of the globe to paying money for a war, say, for the defence of Afghanistan against Russia or for the defence of Belgian neutrality" (Morley: *Critical Miscellanies* III. p. 315). Similarly Cornewall Lewis *Essay on the Government of Dependencies.* ch. VI., Goldwin Smith *The Empire,* (See p. 54), and Dilke *Greater Britain* (See p. 65). (2) Op. cit. p. 324. As War Secretary in the second Palmerston Administration he expressed his views on colonial policy in the House of Commons, July 25, 1862 (*Hansard* III. 168. p. 860) as follows: "I for one can only say that I look forward without apprehension, and I may add, without regret, to the time when Canada might become an independent State, but I think it behoves England not to cast Canada loose or send her adrift before she has acquired sufficient strength to assert her own independence." Cf. also his *Letters,* p. 88. (3) Op. cit. pp. 7. 8.

management they might be made profitable, with the exception of Canada, the peculiar circumstances of which made him believe that independence was the only alternative to annexation to the United States.(1)

Mills also endorsed the belief that colonies were useless to the mother country, but at the same time he denied that this would justify the latter in cutting them adrift prematurely; for "the alternatives of pecuniary loss and gain are not the only, or even the primary considerations of enlightened statesmen,"(2) and premature separation would expose the colonies to the risk of disorganization and civil war.

Apart from the supposed disproportion between the drawbacks and the advantages of the colonial connexion, Separatist opinion was strengthened by the vindictive spirit displayed by the United States towards the mother country. It was felt that the experience of the American War of Independence must on no account be repeated in the case of the remaining colonies, and that no price would be too high to prevent a parting in anger. This view, which was shared by many writers on the subject, is most clearly expressed in The *Exodus of the Western Nations* (1865) by Viscount Bury, who was later on to play some part in the reaction against Separatism. Bury was obsessed by the idea that separation was inevitable, and that the present relations between the colonies and the mother country were anomalous and calculated to bring about a quarrel sooner or later. It was therefore imperative that a peaceful separation should be arranged on statesmanlike lines before it was too late. "The present relation of England to her colonies cannot be final: they will not always remain in the position of colonies,"(3) he remarks "We stop half way. If we are convinced that our colonies will some day leave us, we must not be content to acquiesce passively in the fact, we must act upon it energetically .... If ultimate separation be inevitable, our first care should surely be to secure an amicable, not an unfriendly separation."(4) Bury even drew up a draft treaty between England and Canada embodying the terms of separation.(5) "The manner and time of separation", he writes, "should be decided by statesmen, and om statesman-like grounds. The independence of British North America might then become a subject dear to the pride of both nations, the occasion of goodwill that would last throughout generations."(6)

But separation was not only advocated with a view to the interests of the mother country. The striking growth in prosperity and power of the United States was, somewhat illogically, believed to be an effect of

(1) The book is somewhat self-contradictory. There are passages which seem to indicate that what Roebuck is contemplating is not absolute separation, but something approaching to "Dominion status." (2) Op. cit. p. XLVI. In a pamphlet: *Systematic Colonization* (1847) he advocated organized colonization and deprecated "scuttling and sinking the colonies as condemned ships." p. 12.

(3) Op. cit. I. p. 26. (4) Op. cit. I p. 17. (5) Op. cit. pp. 459—63.

(6) Op. cit. I. p. 28. See also the quotations from Goldwin Smith and Trollope on pp. 51, 56,

their emancipation,(1) and it was widely felt that by retaining the colonies England was retarding their growth and preventing them from achieving a similar succes. The clearest expression of this view is found in Trollope's writings on the colonial question (See p. 51). Owing to the current impression that there was in the nature of things something humiliating in the position of a colony, it was, moreover, felt that the state of subjection which was supposed to be inseparable from the colonial status was adverse to the development of self-reliance and self-respect.(2) This is an idea which frequently recurs in the writings of the time. A somewhat uncritical admiration for Nationalism for its own sake was one of the characteristics of the period, and it was not yet perceived that Imperial unity was not incompatible with the development of separate nationhoods within the Empire. Thus the Separatists might draw their arguments both from the consideration of English and of colonial interests.

It must be kept in mind that the whole question, with the exception of few and short periods when some spectacular event like the Canadian Rebellion momentarily attracted public attention, was debated in an atmosphere of indifference and ignorance.(3) Few English statesmen took an interest in colonial questions when they were not connected with some topic of more absorbing interest, like retrenchment or relations with America. As for the attitude of the general public, that is probably reflected in the literature of the period. The part played by the colonies in mid-Victorian fiction is surprisingly small. A person dependent on the fiction of the period for his knowledge of contemporary England might be excused if he failed to discover that the Empire consisted of more than the islands of Great Britain and Ireland. People knew, of course, that there was a place called Australia, where convicts were sent, and where one could make one's fortune by growing wool, like Abel Magwitch in *Great Expectations,* and a place called New Zealand, where there were always wars with the natives, and where even Mr. Micawber would become a Justice of the Peace. But on the whole people knew little of the colonies, and took little interest in them. In Parliament it was in nine cases out of ten impossible to secure attention to colonial affairs.(4) The House of Commons laughed at Hume for

(1) Thus Cobden: speech at Manchester $^{10}/_{1}$ 1849 (*Free Trade and the Manchester School,* p. 303). (2) Th. Rogers; *the Colonial Question* pp. 425, 427, 432, Roebuck *the Colonies of England,* p. 110. See also pp. 55—56.

(3) "It may be doubted," writes Th. Rogers in *the Colonial Question* (1871), "whether $^{4}/_{5}$ of the personages who sit in the Houses know the names of the chief towns in the several British colonies, or could give any but the vaguest answer as to their resources, and their wealth." (Op. cit. p. 411). A few pages further on he demonstrates his own ignorance of colonial conditions by declaring that horse-racing would be regarded by the colonial democracies as "an insolent manifestation of arrogant wealth" (p. 424), an assertion which would have made an Australian smile. (4) Cf. Buller: *Responsible Government,* pp. 67—69; *The Spectator* $^{24}/_{7}$, 1869, p. 863, $^{16}/_{10}$, 1869, p. 1202 and $^{14}/_{5}$, 1875, p. 607; Morley; *Life of Gladstone,* I p. 268. *A Voice from the Colonies.* (*Fraser's Magazine,* Feb. 1869), and Newton: *Life of Lord Lyons,* I. p. 169.

proposing to admit members for the Australian colonies.(1) Lord Stanley apologized to the House for speaking on a subject on which it was so difficult to command its attention as Canada.(2) It was generally a matter of great difficulty to make members attend a debate on a colonial question at all. On several occasions the House was counted out,(3) less than 40 members being present. Some important colonial bills were passed by little more than a quorum.(4)

The colonists themselves were a sort of country cousins. When a distinguished colonist comes to London," wrote Wakefield,(5) ... "he prowls about the streets, and sees sights till he is sick of doing nothing else, and then returns home disgusted with his visit to the old country. Nobody has paid him any attention because he was a colonist."

Having examined the factors which were at work to bring about Separatist feeling it remains to ask: To what extent was Separatism accepted by public opinion?

The extent to which mid-Victorian statesmen as a whole were influenced by the teachings of the Separatists is extremely difficult to determine. An examination of their biographies and speeches furnish only scant information on this point, in the first place because their biographers were seldom sufficiently interested in colonial questions to give them more than the briefest notice, and in the second place because the statesmen probably did not always speak their minds on these questions. This especially applies to the men in responsible positions: a member of Her Majesty's Government was naturally cautious about expressing a desire to get rid of some of Her Majesty's subjects.

It must not, of course, be believed that at any time everybody was a Separatist. In any given period there were men who believed that the continued unity of the Empire was both possible and desirable, like Lord Elgin and Lord John Russell,(6) Lord Grey and Lord Carnarvon. The *Quarterly Review,*(7) *Fraser's Magazine,* (8) and even the *Edin-*

(1) $^{16}/_{8}$, 1838 *Hansard* III. 6. p. 114. (2) $^{25}/_{2}$,1834, *Hansard,* III. 22, p. 801. (3) Thus $^{25}/_{5}$, 1835 during a debate on French fishery rights in Newfoundland (*Hansard* III, 28. p. 168); $^{1}/_{3}$, 1836 during a debate on the state of Mauritius (*Hansard* III. 31, p. 1132), and $^{25}/_{3}$, 1841 during a debate on the land fund and finances of New South Wales (*Hansard* III. 57. p. 608). (4) The South Australia Colonization Bill passed its second reading in a House of about 50 members ($^{24}/_{7}$, 1834; *Hansard,* III. 25. pp. 429—439). In a debate on the transportation of convicts Russell complained that the opposition benches "were nearly empty" (*Hansard* III. 53, 1279). (5) *Art of Colonization,* p. 147. (6) Even Russell had, however, moments of backsliding, caused chiefly by his misgivings that colonial self-government was not compatible with Imperial unity. Thus in the House of Commons, Feb. 8. 1850, he said: "I anticipate, indeed, with others that some of the colonies may so grow in population and wealth that they may say, 'Our strength is sufficient to enable us to be independent of England. The link is now become onerous to us; the time is come when we think we can, in amity and alliance with England, maintain our independence.'" (*Hansard.* III. 108, p. 567.) Similarly *Hansard* III. 40, p. 41. (7) e. g. 1811 (p. 496), March 1826, Apr. 1829, March 1830, July 1863, Jan. 1870. (8) June 1849, March 1850, Nov. 1851, May 1862.

burgh Review(1) on several occassions stood up for the colonies. Sir Charles Adderley, a prominent member of the Conservative party and a disciple of the Colonial Reformers, may also be mentioned in this connexion as an advocate of the permanence of the Empire,(2) though his advocacy of the largest possible measure of colonial self-government, his insistence that the colonies must be able to do without the financial or military assistance of the mother country,(3) and his distrust of schemes of closer union brought him in conflict with the Imperialist movement of the 'seventies and the 'eighties. But these advocates were comparatively passive, and offered no serious opposition to the rising tide of Separatism. On the whole it may be said that Separatism grew steadily in force from about 1850 for nearly twenty years.

Within the ranks of those whose views on colonial policy were influenced by the teachings of the Separatists, two classes may roughly be distinguished. There was a comparatively small group of men who were actively in favour of separation, who thought that the loss of the colonies would be a matter for congratulation, and some of whom were even in favour of taking active steps to bring about such an event. This group was perhaps not very numerous, but it counted among its members the most brilliant contemporary writer on colonial questions: Goldwin Smith, and the leading members of the Manchester School (thus exercising a considerable indirect influence on the Liberal party), it was energetic, and knew its own mind, and its influence was consequently out of proportion to its numbers.

Secondly, there was a much larger group of men, who, while not actually rejoicing in the prospect of separation, nevertheless considered emancipation to be the natural and inevitable destiny of the colonies. The border line between this group, which might be called the Pessimists, and the Separatists proper was somewhat vague, for the belief in separation as an ultimate certainty naturally coloured the outlook of those that held it and made them unwilling to countenance sacrifices on the part of the mother country on behalf of the colonies. This group probably comprised the majority of mid-Victorian statesmen of both parties. Even believers in the future of the colonial Empire like Russell(4) had occasional lapses from the faith. I shall not here attempt to give an exhaustive account of the attitude of mid-Victorian statesmen to the colonial question: I shall confine myself to show, on the evidence of their contemporaries, that Separatist tendencies were commonly attributed to many of them, and to illustrate by examples from their writings and speeches, etc. the attitude of some of the most prominent among them.

On May 18, 1849 Lord Grey wrote to Elgin, the Governor-General

(1) April 1851. Cf. also the *British Quarterly*, Nov. 1849, and the *Spectator*, $^1/_2$, 1862. (2) e. g. his *Letter to Disraeli on the Present Relations of England with her Colonies.* (1862) pp. IX—X. (3) *Some Reflections on the Speech of Lord John Russell on Colonial Policy* (1850) *Review of 'the Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration' by Earl Grey, and of Subsequent Colonial History (1869)*, etc. (4) See p. 42).

of Canada: "There begins to prevail in the House of Commons, and I am sorry to say in the highest quarters, an opinion (which I believe to be utterly erroneous) that we have no interest in preserving our colonies and ought therefore to make no sacrifice for that purpose. Peel,(1) Graham and Gladstone, if they do not avow this opinion as openly as Cobden and his friends, yet betray very clearly that they entertain it, nor do I find some members of the Cabinet free from it."(2) In his *Colonial Policy*(3) (1853) he states that the abandonment of the colonies "is not only advocated by one active party in the country, but is also hardly less effectually supported by persons occupying an important position in Parliament and who, while they hesitate to avow their adherence to it, hold language which obviously leads in the same direction, and advocate measures the adoption of which would inevitably bring about this result."

"To ripen those communities to the earliest possible maturity — social political, and commercial — to qualify them, by all the appliances within the reach of a parent State, for present self-government, and eventual independence is now the universally admitted object and aim of our colonial policy," writes Arthur Mills in his *Colonial Constitutions*(4) (1856). Robert Lowe, when examined before the Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure in 1861, was asked whether "it would be thought by most British statesmen undesirable that the secession of an important colony should take place?" and made the evasive reply "I cannot say; there is a difference of opinion on the subject."(5) Mills, who was Chairman of the Committee in question, when proposing in the House of Commons, March 4, 1862, a resolution based on the findings of the Committee, viz. that the colonies ought to provide for their own defence, deprecated the idea that the Committee was in favour of dismemberment of the Empire, but maintained that throughout the inquiry it had been assumed that Great Britain "aimed at developing the resources of the colonies and qualifying them for present self-government and eventual independence."(6) Goldwin Smith in his *Reminiscences* maintains that the Separatist ideas held by him about 1863 "were at that time prevalent.

(1) Peel had on one or two occasions expressed himself with considerable strength in favour of retaining the colonies. Cf. his *Speeches,* vol. IV. pp. 441 and 771.

On the other hand the following passage from a letter to Lord Aberdeen (May 16, 1842) is distinctly reminiscent of the writings of the Separatists: "Let us keep Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, but the connexion with the Canadas against their will, nay without the cordial co-operation of the predominant party in Canada is a very onerous one. The sooner we have a distinct understanding on that head the better ... Why should we go on fighting not our own battle (I speak now of a civil battle), but theirs ... But above all, if the people are not cordially with us, why should we contract the tremendous obligation of having to defend, on a point of honour, their territory against American aggression. C. S. Parker: *Sir Robert Peel,* vol. III. p. 389. (2) Printed in Morison's *British Supremacy and Canadian Self-Government.* p. 266. (3) Op. cit. I. p. 17. Similarly Roebuck: *the Colonies of England.* p. 7. (4) Op. cit. p. LXIX.

(5) Parl. Papers. XIII, 1861, p. 229. (6) *Hansard.* III. 165. p. 1032.

Some of our statesmen avowed them, more were inclined to them."(1) "Of the few people in England who thought about colonial subjects in my day, the general opinion was that the destiny of the colonies was independence."(2) Bury, writing about the belief that separation was bound to come, remarks.(3) "So widespread is this belief, that our whole colonial policy is based upon the assumption that our colonies will at some future time desire to become independent nations."

In 1864 J. Brown, a Canadian politician who had visited England on behalf of the Canadian Ministry in order to ascertain the attitude of the Home Government to the proposed Canadian federation, reported as follows: ". . there is a manifest desire in almost every quarter that, ere long, the British American colonies should shift for themselves, and, in some quarters, evident regret that we did not declare at once for independence."(4) In a letter to his wife, Jan. 1. 1867 Galt, the Canadian Statesman, then on a visit to London, writes: "I am more than ever disappointed at the tone of feeling here as to the colonies. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that they want to get rid of us. They have a servile fear of the United States, and would rather give us up than defend us, or incur the risk of war with that country."(5) Sir Richard Cartwright, another Canadian politician, who visited England in 1866, was convinced that "the leaders on both sides, Gladstone and Disraeli included, would have been still more pleased if we had asked for our independence at once."(6)

Merivale, writing in the *Fortnightly Review* for Feb. 1870, (7) explains, that "the object of our statesmen has been twofold: to encourage the colonies to prepare for independence for their own sake, and at the same time to relieve the people of this country from the share which they formerly bore in contributing towards their administration and defence." As late as 1872 Edward Creasy, the historian, complains(8) that "the main object of many statesmen of the home country seems to be to promote the Euthanasia of all connexion between the Imperial Realm and her dependencies." About the years 1869—70 there was, as we shall see, a very widespread belief that the Gladstone Government was about to take active steps to cut the colonies adrift. (See pp. 87 ff).

As for the attitude of individual statesmen and political writers, that of Peel, Russell and Grey, Cobden and Bright, Bury, Cornewall Lewis, Roebuck, Mills, etc. has already been mentioned. As for Disraeli he believed, on his own showing,(9) before 1872 that the unity of the Empire could not be maintained. That he also at one time thought

(1) Op. cit. p. 169. (2) Op. cit. 439; (similarly pp. 209—10). (3) *Exodus of the Western Nations* (1865), II. p. 17. (4) J. Pope, *Memoirs of Sir John A. Macdonald*, I. p. 274. (5) Skelton: *Life of Galt* p. 410. (6) *Reminiscences* p. 55. (7) *The Colonial Question in 1870.* (8) *The Imperial and Colonial Constitutions of the Britannic Empire*, pp. 41—42. (9) "When those subtile views were adopted by the country under the plausible plea of granting selv-government to the colonies, I confess that I myself thought that the tie was broken." (Crystal Palace Speech, June 24, 1872) See p. 120.

that separation was not a matter for regret seems to appear from some of his letters.(1) Lord Derby and Lord Manners both declared that they would rather see Canada independent that permit her to control her Clergy Reserves.(2)

On the other hand the accusations that have been levelled against Gladstone on this count do not seem to be justified. He certainly believed that the colonies would at some future date become independent.(3) That he did not consider the colonies a source of actual profit to the mother country seems equally clear. Probably his own view is accurately expressed in his observation that "the maintenance of our connexion with the colonies was to be regarded rather as a matter of duty than as one of advantage."(4) He was indeed in favour of retrenchment of Imperial expenditure on the colonies and of throwing upon them the burden of their own defence,(5) a policy which was shared by almost all the statesmen of the time; he would certainly never have dreamed of retaining them against their wishes, but there is no evidence that he wanted to take active steps to get rid of them. On the contrary he expressly stated his opinion that "no considerations of money ought to induce this House or the Legislature to sever the connexion subsisting between any one of the colonies and the mother country."(6) In the House of Commons, March 28, 1867, he declared: "My belief is that there would be no bounds to the efforts which this country would make for the purpose of aiding and supporting the North American Provinces in their willing and energetic efforts to maintain their connexion with this country."(7) Sir Henry Parkes in his *Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History,*(8) relates how he met Gladstone in London in 1882 and, in the course of the conversation, mentioned that he had often been charged in Australia with being indifferent, if not inimical, to the connexion between the colonies and England: "He was visibly surprised at what I told him, and said I was authorised to say that he had never at any time favoured any such view."

On the other hand there can be no doubt that several of the other

(1) For the attitude of Disraeli see further p. 120 ff. (2) 1853. *Hansard* III. 124, pp. 708—9. and ibid. p. 1124. (3) "When it ceases, I hope that instead of the connexion being severed in the midst of bloodshed, as was the case with the United States, it may rise from the natural and acknowledged growth of these communities into States perfectly fitted for self-government" . . April, 16, 1849, *Hansard* III, 104, p. 354.) "It would also be a great problem of statesmanship at a future period, when those growing societies should have attained to such a degree of maturity as to be truly fit for self-government, to fix upon the period when the connexion with the parent State should be severed". (May 29, 1840; *Hansard* III. 54. p. 731).

"Surely it is a great object to place, if possible, our colonial policy on such a footing, not for the purpose of bringing about a separation, but of providing a guarantee that, if separation should occur, it should be in a friendly way. That is the sense, the principle, and the secret of our policy with regard to colonial reform" (April. 26, 1870; *Hansard* III. 200, p. 1901). (4) May 29, 1840 (*Hansard* III, 54, pp. 730—32. See also Morley's *Life of Gladstone*. I. p. 359. (5) Thus March 28, 1867, *Hansard* III. 186, p. 755. (6) April 4th, 1849. *Hansard* III. 104, p. 354. (7) *Hansard* III. 186, p. 755. (8) Op. cit. III. p. 103.

prominent members of the Liberal party had strong leanings towards Separatism. Robert Lowe, speaking on March 28, 1867 in the House of Commons on the proposed Imperial guarantee for the Canadian Railway Loan said that "we are in America somewhat in the position of the Plantagenets in France ... namely encumbered with large dominions, which a mistaken sense of honour forebade them to get rid of, although unable to defend them ... In the time of the American Revolution the colonies separated from England because she insisted on taxing them. What I apprehend as likely to happen now is that England will separate from the colonies because they insist on taxing her."(1) In his evidence before the select committee on Colonial Military Expenditure in 1861(2), he deprecated the maintenance of Imperial garrisons in the colonies because they might become "a formidable obstacle in the way of an amicable separation." Lord Dufferin writes in a private letter:(3) "It is perfectly true that, after I had been oppointed to Canada (i. e. in 1872), Bob Lowe(4) came up to me in a club and said 'Now you ought to make it your business to get rid of the Dominion.'"

Lord Granville, the Colonial Secretary in the Gladstone Administration of 1868, whom public opinion in 1869—70 credited with being one of the leading spirits among the Separatists,(5) wrote to Lord John Russell in 1869: "Our relations with North America are of a very delicate character. The best solution would probably be that in the course of time and in the most friendly spirit the Dominion should find itself strong enough to proclaim her independence."(6) Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary of the same administration, expressed himself even more unambiguously. Answering a letter from Lord Lyons, in which the latter had expressed his belief that Canada could not be defended, he wrote: "I agree in every word you say about our possessions in North America, and wish that they would propose to be independent, and to annex themselves (sic.). We cannot throw them off, and it is very desirable that we should part as friends." (7)

Sir Henry Thring, the distinguished parliamentary draftsman, who from 1869 to 1886 occupied the position of Parliamentary Council to the Treasury, published in 1865 a pamphlet entitled *Suggestions for Colonial Reform,* in which he drew up a scheme for the establishment

(1) *Hansard.* III. 186, p. 762. As late as 1877 Lowe contributed an article to the *Fortnightly Review* (*The Value to the United Kingdom of the Foreign Dominions of the Crown,* Nov. 11) in which he wrote: "Whenever the time shall arrive for the colonies to claim a voice in the general policy of the Empire, there is nothing for it but separation, since the only alternative that can be suggested (i. e. federation) is utterly unworkable. The result is that we shall act most wisely by looking the question fairly in the face, whenever the inevitable day shall come when our larger colonies shall make the claim to have a voice in affairs ... It is not natural that ... they should submit to be for ever in a state of tutelage." He adds that it may be a consolation to think that they no longer answer the purpose for which they were originally founded, i. e. the mercantile monopoly. (2) *Parl. Papers XIII.* 1861, § 3333. (3) Printed in Lyall's *"Life of Lord Dufferin"* I. p. 286. (4) Then Chancellor of the Exchequer. (5) See p. 89 ff. (6) Fitzmaurice: *Life of Granville,* II. p. 22. (7) $^1/_6$, 1870. Newton, Life of Lord Lyons I. p. 292.

of rational statutory relations between England and the colonies, including the method by which the latter were to become independent. The scheme contains a provision according to which a colony can be declared independent against its own will, as a punishment for the failure to fulfil certain obligations.

On the occasion of the Parliamentary debates on the British North America Act, by which the Dominion of Canada was established, and on the proposal to guarantee a Canadian railway loan in 1867 allusions to the secession of Canada from the Empire were made by several members.(1) Bright's speech on February 28 and Lowe's on March 28 have already been quoted. The former bill was supported in the House of Lords by Lord Monck, then Governor-General af Canada, on the ground that "in the event of their ever being desirous of severing that connexion, they, (the Canadians), would be enabled to choose their future position in the world regardless of any external disturbing influence." (2) Adderley, when proposing the railway guarantee, found it necessary to explain what would happen to the loan in the case of Canada choosing to annex herself to the United States,(3) while the member for Barnstaple, Mr. Cave, expressed his opinion that "if, instead of giving the colony £ 3,000,000 with the view of separating it from the United States, we were to give it £ 10,000,000 of money to join and unite them, it would be more patriotic."(4)

Still more significant however than these proofs of Separatist leanings on the part of party politicians is the fact that Separatism, or at any rate the belief that separation was unavoidable, was for many years accepted as a guiding principle by the leading permanent officials of the Colonial Office. The influence of the permanent officials of the great administrative departments can in any case hardly be over-rated. In the case of the Colonial Office, the affairs of which were of an extraordinarily varied character and rarely attracted any public attention, this influence was necessarily exceptionally great,(5) the more so as the Office was not considered of sufficient importance to attract the most prominent members of the Cabinet, and as Colonial Secretaries changed in such quick succession as to make it extremely difficult for them to acquire a thorough knowledge of the business of the Office.

The Permanent Under Secretaries of States during the period with which we are dealing were:

1836—1847 Sir James Stephen
1847—1859 Herman Merivale
1860—1871 Sir F. Rogers (afterwards Lord Blachford).

Another important official at the Colonial Office was Sir Henry Taylor

(1) On the same occasion, however, some members made distinctly anti-Separatist speeches. Thus Sir John Pakington (*Hansard.* III. 185, p. 1186) and Baillie-Cochrane (ibid. p. 1191). (2) *Hansard.* III. 185. p. 582. (3) *Hansard* III. 186, pp. 743—44. (4) Ibid. p. 748. (5) Cf. Molesworth's speech in the House of Commons Jan. 23. 1838. (*Hansard.* III. 40. p. 385. Cf. also the *Greville Memoirs.* I. p. 148. and Haliburton's *The Colonial Office* (in *The Attaché*).

who, without being Permanent Under Secretary, occupied a position not much inferior to that of Stephen, Merivale, and Rogers.

Stephen was a humanitarian and an upholder of native rights against the settlers. His influence with Colonial Secretaries was notorious(1) and acquired for him the nickname of 'Mr. Mothercountry,' and 'Mr. Over-Secretary Stephen.'(2) It was against him that the attacks of the Colonial Reformers were principally directed. Stephen was convinced that a speedy emancipation was the destiny of the colonies. "My father appears to have shared the opinion prevalent among the Liberal party that the colonies would soon be detached from the mother country," writes his son Leslie Stephen,(3) "On the appointment of a Governor-General of Canada, shortly before his resignation of office, he observes in a diary that it is not unlikely to be the last that will ever be made."

Merivale, though the condemnation of this views on colonial policy by later writers seems to me unjustified (see p. 58), was led by his advocacy of Free Trade and his attacks on the old colonial system(4) to use language which laid him open to the charge of favouring Separatism.

Taylor(5) and Rogers were both Separatists. Taylor wrote to Lord Grey in 1852:(6) "I cannot but regard the North American colonies as a most dangerous possession to this country, whether likely to breed a war with the United States, or to make a war otherwise generated more grievous and disastrous. I do not suppose the provinces to be useless to us at present, but I regard any present uses not obtainable from them as independent nations to be no more than the dust of the balance as compared with the evil contingencies." In 1864 he wrote to his chief, the Duke of Newcastle:(7) "As to our American possessions, I have long held and often expressed the opinion that they are a sort of *damnosa haereditas;* and when your Grace and the Prince of Wales were employing yourselves so successfully in conciliating the colonists, I thought that you were drawing closer ties which might better be slackened if there were any chance of their slipping away altogether. I think that a policy which has regard to a not very far-off future should prepare facilities and propensities for separation .... In my estimation the worst consequence of the late dispute with the United States has been that of involving this country and its North American provinces in closer relations and a common cause."

Roger's views were similar if somewhat less extreme. In a letter to Taylor(8) written in 1865 he says: "I go very far with you in the desire to shake off all responsibly governed colonies, and as to North America,

(1) Cf. *Sir James Stephen's Letters,* edited by C. E. Stephen, p. 116. Taylor says that he "virtually governed the colonial Empire" (*Autobiography* II. p. 301, I. pp. 123, 233). Cf. also the *Quarterly Review,* (March 1839) and Mrs Fawcett: *Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir William Molesworth.* p. 160. (2) *Autobiography* of Henry Taylor II. p. 300. (3) *Life of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen,* p. 49. (4) *Lectures on Colonisation and Colonies* Part I. (5) As for Taylor's influence, cf. the *Greville Memoirs.* II. p. 348. (6) May 6, *Correspondence of Sir Henry Taylor,* p. 200. (7) Feb. 26, *Autobiography of Henry Taylor* II. p. 235. (8) Ibid. II. p. 241.

I think if we abandon one we had better abandon all .... I also go far with you in hating the talk about prestige. But I think our present relation to Canada involves an understanding that we are not to let other people take them away from us unless they like it." In his autobiographical notes he gives the following account of the views which guided his colonial policy:(1) "I had always believed — and the belief has so confirmed and consolidated itself, that I can hardly realise the possibility of anyone seriously thinking the contrary — that the destiny of our colonies is independence, and that in this point of view the function of the Colonial Office is to secure that our connexion, while it lasts, shall be as profitable to both parties, and our separation, when it comes, as amicable as possible. This opinion is founded first on the general principle that a spirited nation will not submit to be governed in its internal affairs by a distant government, and that nations geographically remote have no such common interests as will bind them permanently together in foreign policy with all its details and mutations."

We have, so far, only dealt with the views of politicians and political writers. The fiction of the period contains, on the whole, so little information about the prevailing views on the question, that the only lesson which it seems safe to draw from it is that of the indifference of educated public opinion to colonial affairs. There is, however, one writer who forms an exception to his rule, namely Anthony Trollope. Trollope was one of the few writers of the time who was sufficiently interested in the colonies to visit them. He went to the West Indies in 1858, to Canada (and the U. S.) in 1862, to Australia in 1872, and to South Africa in 1878. The result of these journeys, in the course of which he studied the various aspects of colonial life with a thoroughness contrasting favourably with the somewhat touristy methods of a writer like Froude, was four voluminous books: *The West Indies and the Spanish Main* (1859). *North America* (1862), *Australia and New Zealand* (1873) and *South Africa* (1878). Beside a wealth of information about colonial conditions, these books contain a very good statement of the author's opinions on the relations between England and her colonial Empire, which may be worthy of some notice as representing the views of one of the few mid-Victorian writers who had a first-hand knowledge of the colonies.

Trollope not only believed that separation was bound to come, he considered it a desirable event. In *The West Indies and the Spanish Main*(2) he writes: "We have a noble mission, but we are never content with it. It is not enough for us to beget nations, civilize countries, and instruct in truth and knowledge the dominant races of the coming ages. All this will not suffice unless also we can maintain a king over them! What is it to us, or even to them, who may be their king or ruler ... so long as they be happy, prosperous, and good? And yet there are men mad enough to regret the United States! Many men are mad enough to look forward with anything like composure to the inevitable, happily

(1) Letters of Lord Blachford, p. 300. Cf. also ibid. p. 175. (2) Op. cit. p. 84.

inevitable day, when Australia shall follow in the same path." "A wish that British North America should ever be severed from England, or that the Australian colonies should ever be so severed," he writes in *North America,*(1) "will by many Englishmen be deemed unpatriotic. But I think that such severance is to be wished if it be the case that the colonies standing alone would become more prosperous than they are under British rule. We have before us an example in the United States of the prosperity which has attended such a rupture of old ties .... If the States have so risen since they left their parent's apron-string why should not British North America rise as high? That the time has as yet come for such a rising I do not think; but that it will soon come I do most heartily hope."

It will be seen that Trollope's desire for separation is dictated by considerations of the welfare of the colonies, not of the mother country. "The mother country," he writes in *Australia and New Zealand,*(2) "in regarding her colonies ... should think altogether of their welfare, and as little as may be of her own power and glory." "If we keep them, we should keep them — not because they add prestige to the name of Great Britain, not because they are gems in our diadem, not in order that we may boast that the sun never sets on our dependencies, but because by keeping them we may best assist them in developing their resources. And when we part with them, as part we shall, let us do so with neither smothered jealousy nor open hostility, but with a proud feeling that we are sending a son out into the world able to take his place among men."(3) The basis of his Separatism is the belief that a state of dependency is in itself a humiliating condition which will not be tolerated by a fully developed colony(4) and that the retention of the political tie with the mother country retards the growth of the colony. Of the pecuniary motive for separation, so strongly emphasized by the Manchester School, there is no trace whatever. He even deprecates the view, otherwise almost universally accepted, that the colonies ought, as far as possible, to pay the whole expense of their defence. Such an attitude, he says,(5) "reminds one of an ancient paterfamilias, who insists on having his children and grandchildren under the old parental roof, and then grumbles because the butcher's bill is high."

Another element in Trollope's Separatism is the fear of a "separation in anger," so frequently expressed in the writings of the period. When the time for separation shall come, he says, England should send her colonies into the world like a mother who parts with her married daughters. "They should not escape from her arms with shrill screams and bleeding wounds, with ill-omened words which live so long, though the speakers of them lie cold in their graves."(6)

In *Australia and New Zealand* (1873) a slight change in this implicit advocacy of separation, possibly due to the Imperialist agitation which

(1) Op. cit. I. p. 129. (2) Op cit. I. p. 22. (3) Op. cit. I. p. 360.
(4) See the passage quoted on p. 37. Similarly *North America* I. 130—31.
(5) *North America,* I. p. 123. (6) *North America,* I. pp. 130—31.

was already then well under way, is perceptible. The time for separation, he thinks, has not yet arrived:(1) "I do think that some of us in England have been a little too forward in our assurances to the colonies that they have only to speak the word themselves, and they shall be free, even from such slight control as England now exercises over them. I believe that any words so used have sprung from that tendency among us to lessen the bondage of authority, which has grown among the middle classes till it has become the doctrine of British statesmen. But they have been accepted as bearing a more defined sense in the colonies, and we are bound, as far as it may be in our power, to abstain from inflicting even sentimental grievances on our friends. Separation, though it may be ultimately certain, is, I think, too distant to have a place as yet in the official or parliamentary vocabulary of a Colonial Minister."(2) Still, "when the time shall come in which the colonies can serve themselves better by separation, than by prolonged adherence, England, I think, should let them go. The difficulty will consist in fixing the time."(3) "To declare that the statesmanship must be shabby that shall have the object of allowing the colonies to start themselves as a separate people at some future time, is to pronounce an opinion ... which can never stand an argument."(4)

This sketch of the Separatist (or Pessimistic) tendencies in mid-Victorian England may perhaps most fitly be concluded with an account of the views of Goldwin Smith, not only because he was the ablest of the writers who advocated separation, but also because he was in many respects the most representative of them, and because his work constitutes, to some extent, an epitome of the whole outlook of the School.

Goldwin Smith was Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford from 1858 to 1866 and Professor of English and Constitutional History at Cornell from 1868 to 1881. While at Oxford he contributed a series of letters to the *Daily News* in 1862 and 1863, in which he advocated the emancipation of the colonies and the formation of the self-governing provinces into independent States. From about 1871 he settled down in Toronto, where he lived till his death. Here he contributed extensively to Canadian newspapers and periodicals, and displayed great activity in favour of the emancipation of Canada from the British connexion. Subsequently giving up the idea of a separate Canadian nationality, he flung himself into the agitation for union, political and commercial, with the United States, an agitation which completely failed, and which procured him a good deal of unpopularity in Canada. His views on this matter are summarized in *Canada and the Canadian Question* (1891) in which he deprecates attempts artificially to create a Canadian nationality, maintaining that Canada naturally consists of four separate parts, each divided from the rest of the Dominion by natural barriers and connected with the United States. In accordance with these views he denounced the

(1) Op. cit. II. p. 497. (2) Ibid. I. p. 8. (3) Ibid. I. p. 353. (4) Ibid. I. p. 355.

construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway as cutting across the natural lines of communication, and criticised the Canadian protective tariff policy.(1)

It is however chiefly with his letters to the *Daily News* that we are concerned here. In these extraordinarily well-written letters, which were published in book form under the title of *The Empire* in 1863, and which attracted considerable attention, Goldwin Smith puts the case for colonial emancipation with a clarity and vigour unsurpassed by any earlier writer on the subject. Ostensibly an impartial bystander trying to form a purely objective estimate of the value of colonies, Goldwin Smith was really a violent partisan, whose belief in the uselessness and danger of retaining the colonial Empire occasionally betrayed him into actual hostility to the colonies themselves. "When people talk of the dependencies as the very soul of England," he writes,(2) "they forget that the oak flourished broad and deep before these parasites began to cling round its trunk and feed upon its life."(3) In his insistence on the pecuniary aspect of the Imperial connexion, his total disregard of all sentimental considerations, his hatred of militarism, and his disgust with the protectionist tariff policies of the colonies, he was a typical adherent of the Manchester School, of which, late in life, he called himself the last survivor.(4)

The basis of Goldwin Smith's Separatism is an estimate of the tangible benefits and drawbacks of the connexion, along the lines laid down by earlier writers like Cornewall Lewis, resulting in the conviction that the colonial Empire, while it gives to Great Britain no advantages whatever which would not accrue to her equally if the colonies were independent nations, is a source of expense, weakness, and danger: of expense, because the mother country has to pay for military operations necessitated by the rashness of the colonists themselves in dealing with their neighbours or with natives; of weakness because the extent of the Empire makes military concentration in Europe impossible,(5) while at the same time, for all practical purposes, leaving the colonies defenceless against a strong and determined enemy;(6) of danger, because it exposes Great Britain to the constant risk of entanglements with the United States and other foreign powers, caused by the conduct of the colonists or by "the temptations which it holds out to ambitious ministers when they cannot win the hearts of the nation by good measures at home, to win it by swaggering abroad."(7)

To set off these drawbacks and dangers the colonial Empire offers no advantages whatsoever: "The time was when the universal prevalence of commercial monopoly made it well worth our while to hold colonies in dependence for the sake of commanding their trade. But

(1) See also *The Expansion of England (Contemporary Review,* Feb. 1884.) Goldwin Smith's theories of colonial policy are stated in several other articles (See the Bibliography). (2) *The Empire,* p. 129. (3) Cf. also Haultain *Goldwin Smith,* pp. 167—68. *(4) Reminiscences,* p. 215. (5) Op. cit. p. 2. (6) Op. cit. p. 101. (7) Op. cit. p. 77.

that time is gone. Trade is everywhere free; and this expensive and perilous connexion has entirely survived its sole legitimate cause. It is time that we shoul recognise the change that has come over the world."(1) If the colonists on an average buy more English goods than foreigners, that is, according to Goldwin Smith, entirely due to the fact that they find it to their advantage to buy English goods, and their doing so has nothing to do with the political connexion between them and England,(2) as is seen by the fact that trade with the United States became immeasurably greater after the War of Independence than while they were English colonies.(3) In fact, so far from being especially safe customers, the colonies offer a particularly precarious market, because, being English in character, they are more likely than other countries to set up the same manufactures as exist in the mother country.(4)

How little practical advantage the connexion offers to the mother country as far as commerce is concerned, is seen from the fact that it has not enabled England to prevent the colonies from setting up protective tariffs to the exclusion of English goods. It seems as if this tendency to protectionism in the colonies is really one of the principal reasons for Goldwin Smith's antagonism to the colonial connexion. "The colonies have a strong propensity to the commercial vice of Protectionism," he writes.(5) "They have shown this evil tendency not only in Canada, but ... in Australia also ... Protection is the natural resort of ignorant cupidity, and ignorant cupidity is the besetting sin of communities intensely commercial and wanting in education."(6)

In short, the monopoly having been abolished, the commercial advantages of retaining the colonies have vanished with it, and the assertions to the contrary made by apologists of the colonial connexion are merely attempts to provide a rational excuse for unfounded prejudices.(7)

Nor are the colonies indispensable, or even very valuable, as outlets for the emigration of a surplus population. By far the greater part of emigration from the United Kingdom goes, not to the colonies, but to the United States. (8) Moreover emigration is a doubtful remedy for over-population, because it drains away the fit and the strong and leaves the old and the helpless.(9) As for the military aspect of the question, the colonies, so far from adding to the strength of England will not even pay for their own defence.(10)

That considerations of expense form one of his principal motives for wishing to get rid of the colonies, Goldwin Smith makes no attempt to deny. To critics of this attitude who denounce it as sordid, "a taxpayer's yell," he answers: "Yes, the 'yell' of some English clerk, whose scanty salary is charged with income-tax, or of some peasant,

(1) Op. cit. p. 2. (2) Op. cit. p. 92. (3) Op. cit. p. 41. (4) Op. cit. p. 92 (5) Op. cit. p. 90. (6) Similarly Op. cit. p. 42. (7) Op. cit. p. 93. (8) Op. cit. pp. 27, 133. (9) Op. cit. p. 179. (10) Op. cit. pp. 73—87. In *Canada and the Canadian Question* he writes: "If England ever has occasion to call on her children in Canada for a real sacrifice, she may chance to repeat the experience of King Lear" (p. 271).

whose ounce of tea is reduced to half, that colonial opulence may go untaxed."(1) For the argument that the possession of colonies enhances the prestige of the mother country he has nothing but scorn: "Prestige goes with real strength, and with real strength alone."(2) "Not 'apparent power,' but most apparent weakness is the true name for territories scattered over the globe, known to yield neither revenue nor military force to the possessors."(3) "Wooden artillery has been useful as a stratagem in war; but I never heard that it was useful, or that anything was risked by a wise Commander to preserve it, after the enemy had found out that it was wooden."(4)

As for the colonies themselves they may appear to derive some advantage from the connexion. It is true that they succeed in making England pay part of the cost of their defence. But on the other hand the mere fact that they belong to the Empire greatly increases the risk of their being drawn into wars.(5) Besides, in consequence of their connexion with England, the colonies are importing social traditions absolutely unsuited to new countries.(6) The setting up of a mock Monarchy in the colonies and their nominal subjection to the British Crown mask the absence of a conservative element in their institutions (Goldwin Smith is no friend of Democracy) and "makes them feel free to plunge with impunity into all the excesses of Universal suffrage."(7)

Worst of all, by keeping them in a state of dependency, England is preventing the rise of a genuine spirit of nationality in her possessions. The sentiment of national unity is to Goldwin Smith an indispensable condition of stable government, and the possibility of such a sentiment springing up in a dependency, he does not believe in. Consequently public life in the colonies is, according to him, sordid and corrupt:(8) "We are keeping the colonies in a perpetual state of political infancy, and preventing the gristle of their frames from being matured and hardened into bone."(9) "Our presence in Canada artificially preserves from absorption the French Canadian element, an antediluvian relic of old French society with its torpor and bigotry, utterly without value for the purposes of modern civilization."(10)

From premisses such as these only one conclusion could be drawn: the colonies must go.(11) They must go with the shortest possible delay to avoid a "parting in anger," or England will "forfeit the glory

(1) *The Empire* p. 151. (2) Op. cit. p. 31. (3) Op. cit. p. 33. (4) Op. cit. p. 32. (5) Op. cit. pp. 2,99, 111. (6) Op. cit. p. 51. (7) Op. cit. p. 3.

(8) Op. cit. pp. 47—56. "Nobody who has not lived in a dependency can be fully aware how complete is the want of a national spirit. No pride is felt in the country . . . Nobody is willing to make any great sacrifice for a dependency, or passionately desires to link his name with its glory. Patriotism, in short, can hardly be said to exist, while Imperialism, supposing it a worthy substitute, is beyond the mental range of the great mass of the people" he writes in *The Expansion of England, (Contemporary Review,* Feb. 1884). (9) Op. cit. p. 3.

(10) Op. cit. p. 5. (11) With regard to India he takes up a somewhat different position. Though doubting whether either of the two parties is any the better for the connexion, he recognizes that England has undertaken responsibilities and financial commitments which make the abandonment of India next to impracticable. (*The Empire* pp. 257—97).

of being the first to confer independent existence on a daughter-nation."(1) The colonies may be loyal, but so much the more desirable is it to bring about a separation while it can yet be effected amicably: "Now, then, is the time, before any subject of dispute arises, to make this loyalty and this affection sure for ever."(2)

That the colonies do not want to be emancipated he does not accept as a valid objection: "If I am told that it is strange and ungracious to propose separation at a moment when the Canadians are so loyal, my answer is, that I believe no greater or nobler boon can be given them than independence, and that no time can be better for bestowing that boon than one of mutual confidence and affection."(3) "I cordially agree that the colonies have rights as well as ourselves. They have a right above all, even if they do not know it themselves, to be released from the childish thraldom which, if it is prolonged, will be fatal to the hope of attaining the manly strength and stature of great nations."(4) But that this attitude is not really dictated by a regard for the welfare of the colonies is shown by this answer(5) to a Canadian who had spoken about "the dishonour which would attach to the throne by throwing off loyal and grateful subjects:" "As to the claims of 'loyal and grateful subjects', let us, at whatever risk of dissipating agreeable fiction, look facts in the face. The loyal and grateful subjects of Her Majesty in Canada lay heavy protective duties on the subjects of Her Majesty in England. I do not blame the Canadians for regulating, as they think fit, their separate interests. But that they have interests separate from ours, is a proof that they are not a part of the same nation."(6)

In another passage,(7) however, he points out that the colonies should not be "cast off suddenly, rudely, and without regard for their safety": England might, he suggests, guarantee their safety for a certain term of years. It should also be noticed that he expressly deprecated the idea that he was against colonies as such: "I am no more against colonies than I am against the solar system. I am against dependencies, when nations are fit to be independent. If Canada were made an independent nation she would still be a colony of England."(8) "That connexion with the colonies which is really a part of our greatness," he remarks in another place,(9) "the connexion of blood, sympathies and ideas — will not be affected by political separation. And when our colonies are nations, something like a great Anglo-Saxon federation may, in substance if not in form, spontaneously arise out of affinity and mutual affection." To this idea, that the dismemberment of the Empire might be made a step towards "the moral federation of the whole English-speaking race throughout the world"(10) he often reverts.(11)

(1) Op. cit. p. 114. (2) Op. cit. p. 59. (3) Op. cit. p. 103. (4) Op. cit. p. 36 (5) Op. cit. p. 110. (6) "My first thought, I allow," he writes in another place (Op. cit. p. 95), "was justice to the English people, who maintain, by the sweat of their brow, that 'noble fabric,' as the *Times* calls it, of reckless and useless expenditure, which the ambition of former days reared, and the blindness of these days upholds." (7) Op. cit. p. 86. (8) Op. cit. p. 123.

(9) Op. cit. p. 6. (10) *Canada and the Canadian Question.* p. 265.

(11) Thus in *Loyalty, Aristocracy and Jingoism* (Toronte 1896) pp. 26 and 65.

It must not be imagined that Goldwin Smith was a mere irresponsible crank. His ability and intellectual powers were universally admired. Matthew Arnold thought that his refusal to enter Parliament and his retirement to Canada was "a loss to his friends, but a still greater loss to his country."(1) Lord Selborne thought him more like what he imagined Milton to have been than any other man.(2) He was a personal friend of many prominent statesmen. Nor was *the Empire* on the whole severely criticised in England.(3) "The letters on the Empire,"(4) he writes, with general connexions, gave me for the time something of a political position. I was offered the nomination for Chelsea and Kensington, a constituency in which the Liberals had a safe majority."

Austere, aristocratic, and intolerant of what he considered muddled thinking, Goldwin Smith was not, however, the type of man likely to find himself in accord with everybody. *The Empire* brought down upon him attacks from the *Times,* and from Disraeli, who declared that colonial policy was the business of statesmen, not of "professors and rhetoricians," or of "prigs and pedants."(5) The cause of these attacks was probably not so much his views (which after all hardly differed very much from those of his critics) as the ruthlessness with which he expressed them. It is characteristic that the *Times,* with which paper he for some time, carried on a running quarrel, in a leading article on his first letter almost conceded his point,(6) while, however, maintaining that, while it lasted, the colonial connexion was not wholly devoid of advantages to the mother country, and pointing out that "the colonists have rights as well as ourselves. They are British subjects, and as long as they choose to remain so the mother country has no right to deprive them of their heritage." In the colonies the letters of course caused strong denunciations to be heaped on his head.(7)

Looking back at the period as a whole one cannot help being struck by the impression that the opprobrium heaped upon the heads of the writers with whom we have dealt by Imperialists of later times, is to some extent undeserved. It is not fair to judge the opinions of seventy years ago by the standards of to-day.

(1) A. Haultain *Goldwin Smith,* pp. 10—12. (2) Ibid. (3) The *Daily News* $^{31}/_{1}$, 1862, entirely endorsed his views: "It appears to us impossible to dispute the soundness of this principle (colonial emancipation) or to doubt the practical wisdom of its timely application." So did the *Daily Telegraph* ($^{5}/_{2}$, 1862), and *Fraser's* (May 1862). It was praised in the *Westminster Review* (Juli 1863) and the *Saturday Review* ($^{25}/_{4}$, 1863). It is significant that the *Quarterly Review* (July 1863) and the *Spectator* ($^{1}/_{2}$, 1862), both of which made their reviews of the letters the occasion for a very able defense of the Empire, should both conclude by stating their belief that the break-up of the Empire was, after all, only a question of time. (4) *Reminiscences.* p. 170. (5) *Hansard* III. 169, p. 96. The immediate cause of Disraeli's attack was Goldwin Smith's advocacy of the evacuation of the Ionian Islands. (6) $^{4}/_{2}$, 1862. "Nor do we pretend to deny that the time must come when they will no longer require our aid, and when it will be better for both that they should set up for themselves." (7) Cf. *The Empire,* p. 95, and Bowen *Thirty Years of Colonial Government,* I. p. 209.

A variety of opinions based on the most widely different motives are lumped together under the name of "Separatism." In reality, as we have seen, the writers in question were in many cases actuated less by a desire for colonial emancipation than by a belief that it was bound to come, an entirely different matter, and a belief which, under the existing circumstances, was very natural. Occasionally one even suspects that what they mean is not really complete and formal separation, but merely emancipation from the irksome control of the Colonial Office. At least one of the so-called Separatists, Merivale, foresaw something in the nature of the modern idea of a Commonwealth of practically independent nations on an equal footing. "It does not follow as a necessary consequence," he writes, "that the attainment of domestic freedom is inconsistent with continued dependence on the Imperial sovereignty. The epoch of separation is not marked and definite, a necessary point in the cycle of human affairs, as some theorists have regarded it. Union might be preserved ... long after the sense of necessary dependence has gone ... The mere political link of sovereignty may remain, by amicable consent, long after the colony has acquired sufficient strength to stand alone. Existing relations may be preserved, by very slight sacrifices, on terms of mutual goodwill. But this can only be by the gradual relaxation of the ties of dependence. The union must more and more lose the protective, and approximate to the federal, character. And the crown may remain, at last, in solitary supremacy the only common authority recognised by many different legislatures, by many nations, politically and socially distinct."(1) Mills gave expression to a similar view in *Colonial Constitutions,(2)* and in an article called *Our Colonial Policy* in the *Contemporary Review*,(3) and Adderley (who cannot, however, be called a Separatist) declared that "between the alternatives of dependence and separation lies the real secret of a lasting connexion — that of common partnership."(4) Such views were, however, rare, dependence or absolute separation being generally considered the only possible alternatives.

As for the motives which made English politicians and political writers desire, or contemplate with equanimity, the disruption of the Empire, they varied greatly. It is difficult to deny that Cobden, idealist as he was in his way, was actuated in his views on the colonial question, almost solely by considerations for the welfare of the mother country, not of the colonies, and that his principal motive was the desire for financial retrenchment. But with many others, like Roebuck and Trollope, the decisive factor was a belief that the colonies themselves would be the better for separation. The feeling that the state of dependency which was considered a necessary consequence of the colonial status, was unnatural and undignified, the identification of nationality with the State which formed part of the Victorian cult of

(1) *Colonization and Colonies*. II. p. 293. (2) Op. cit. XLIX.
(3) May 1869, p. 239. (4) *Review of Colonial Policy* II, p. 420; similarly *The Present Relations of England with the Colonies*, p. 4.

nationality, and the desire to avoid at any price a parting in anger, entered for much. With most of them, moreover, the supposed lessons of the American War of Independence and the too literal interpretation of the simile of parents and grown up children made separation seem a natural and inevitable thing.

But if they failed to perceive the force of colonial loyalty, some of them showed a much juster appreciation of the feeling of colonial Nationalism which was beginning to spring up in Canada and Australia and which was ultimately to dominate the whole colonial question. The Imperialists of the 'seventies and 'eighties were apt to overlook the force of this development in their discovery of colonial loyalty, and to look upon the colonists as Englishmen in exile. But Goldwin Smith strongly emphasized the value of a feeling of separate nationality in the colonies, and Roebuck was so much taken up with the same idea that he advocated the artificial creation of a separate Canadian, as distinct from British, nationality as the only means to prevent the absorption of Canada into the United States "Let her statesmen," he wrote, "feel themselves the rivals of those of Washington, and able to meet them on equal terms; and ... you would soon see them with expanded views and daring conceptions, the really formidable opponents of that encroaching republic which is destined to usurp dominion over the whole continent unless checked and circumscribed by a spirit as bold and free as her own."(1)

By their constant talk about the necessity or desirability of separation, they exasperated and wounded colonial loyalty and thus actually brought separation nearer. But on the other hand it can hardly be doubted that the liberal policy of almost unlimited colonial self-government and the constant yielding to colonial demands, to which the continuance of the connexion is mainly due, was greatly facilitated by the belief that the connexion was in any case bound to come to an end in some not too distant future. For several decades after the Canadian rebellion of 1837 the situation was precarious. There were strong tendencies towards Separatism in the colonies, which would probably have been brought to a head by any attempt on the part of the Home Government to arrest the process of devolution or to curtail the rights of the colonial legislatures, an attempt which would almost certainly have been made if some statesman of strong Imperialist convictions had been in power in England. As it was, the Home Government remained passive, and in the colonies the knowledge that independence could always be had for the asking made the existing ties less galling. Paradoxically the Separatists may thus be said to have contributed their share towards the continued unity of the Empire.

(1) *The Colonies of England,* pp. 224—5.

DILKE

Charles Wentworth Dilke's early writings on colonial questions occupy, both as regards the time of their appearance and their general character, a position mid-way between the work of Separatists like Goldwin Smith and the Imperialists of the next decades. Strongly influenced by Goldwin Smith and his fellow-partisans, whose arguments and very phrases constantly recur in *Greater Britain,* Dilke was yet miles apart from the Manchester School, to whose spirit he was entirely opposed, even if he accepted many of its arguments. The general spirit of the Manchester School was, in spite of the brilliance of Goldwin Smith, on the whole somewhat stolid and unimaginative. It was anti-militaristic and professedly cosmopolitan, though its cosmopolitanism was a matter of theory rather than of actual conviction and was combined with a certain amount of provincialism and mid-Victorian English insularity. It was above all things dogmatic; its views on matters of social, commercial and foreign policy were characterized by an extreme adherence to certain fixed beliefs, the absence of which in others was looked upon as the most reprehensible heresy. Dilke, on the contrary, was brilliant, though his was a brillance not so much of logic and argument, like that of Goldwin Smith, as of imagination. Intensely interested in the ideas and manners of other countries, he was anything but insular. Though he took no great interest in the Nationalism which has for its centre the idea of State, his work is largely inspired by the conception of a wider Nationalism: that of community of race or of civilization, and he studied and wrote on military questions all his life. By his predilection for wide views, sweeping generalizations and imaginative political speculations he suggests the "geo-political" Imperialism later so much in vogue on the Continent. Always ready to see the other side of a question, to examine every subject with an open mind, and to consider any point of view, however unconventional, he was the very reverse of dogmatic.

Born in 1843, Dilke graduated i 1865 at Cambridge after a brilliant University career and started in 1866 on a tour round the world described in *Greater Britain,* which appeared in 1868. Partly on the strength of the success of this book he was invited to stand for the borough of Chelsea in the Radical interest and was elected in 1868. In the House of Commons he became one of the most prominent members of the Radical party and formed an intimate alliance with Joseph Chamberlain. His Radicalism and his Republican opinions kept him out of office till 1880, when he became Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In 1882 he entered tthe Cabinet as President of the Local Government Board. His influence was rapidly increasing and he seemed destined to become leader of the Liberal party, when in 1885 his career was wrecked by his becoming involved in a divorce case. He was not included in the third Gladstone Administration in

1886 and in the election of the same year he lost his seat and temporarily withdrew from political life. In 1887 he wrote six articles for the *Fortnightly Review* dealing with the position of the Great Powers. These articles were published in book form in the same year under the title of *The Present Position of European Politics*. *The British Army* (1888) is a series of articles on military affairs similarly contributed to the *Fortnightly Review* in 1887 and 1888. In 1890 he brought out his *Problems of Greater Britain*. In 1892 he returned to the House of Commons as member for the Forest of Dean. In 1899 he published a series of essays on the colonies under the title of *The British Empire*.

By far the most interesting of his writings on colonial subjects is *Greater Britain,* which describes itself as "a Record of Travel in English-speaking countries during 1866 and 1867." It is an account of the writer's experiences and impressions during his journey round the world in 1866—67.

The book opens with his arrival in Virginia, the starting point of a journey through the States. From there he goes to New York, where he notes with alarm the growth of the Irish element, and to New England, for whose Puritan people he conceives a profound admiration. After a visit to Harvard he goes on to Canada and is struck, like Trollope, with the contrast between her backward condition and that of her great southern neighbour. Going by railway to Fort Riley, at that time the furthest point which the Pacific Railway had reached, he crosses the Western plains and the Rocky Mountains by mail-coach, a journey which was at that time far from safe from Indian raids. He spends some time at Salt Lake City, where he meets Brigham Young and is greatly impressed by the colonizing abilities of the Mormons, who have converted deserts to gardens wherever they have gone.(1) Crossing Nevada he visits the mining districts of California, and San Francisco. From San Francisco he goes via Panama to New Zealand, and from there to Australia where he arrives during the hottest and dryest season of the year, consequently receiving a somewhat unfavourable impression of the Australian climate and scenery, the monotony, parchedness and gloom of which he greatly exaggerates. Having visited the States of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia he leaves Australia for Ceylon and India visiting all the principal towns and studying the military problems of the North-West frontier. He finishes with a voyage down the Indus to Karachi and from there to Bombay, from which city he goes back to Europe.

Dilke is no ordinary tourist. Keen as is his appreciation of scenery (and *Greater Britain* contains some admirable natural descriptions), he is still more interested in the racial, political and social problems of the countries through which he travels. He has a marked predilection

(1) He even defends polygamy on the ground that large families prevent the accumulation of excessive fortunes. (Op. cit. I, ch. 17).

for generalizations and "ideas," much imagination, and a considerable fund of knowledge on the most varied topics. He likes to surround himself with an air of omniscience and is always ready to form and express an opinion on any subject. In fact, allowing for the difference of time and atmosphere, *Greater Britain* is the sort of book which might have been written by a twentieth century writer like Mr. H. G. Wells.

Dilke takes an interest in all that he sees, his outlook is unconventional (*vide* his defence of the Mormons), and he is comparatively free from prejudice. He takes pains to meet representatives of people of all sorts and conditions, and he constantly illustrates his narrative with snatches of conversation, anecdotes and specimens of local idioms, for which he has a very keen ear.

A considerable part of the book is taken up by disquisitions on the relations of England with her colonies. In his treatment of this subject Dilke distinguishes between what he calls "colonies", that is settlements with a large white population (what we should now call the Dominions), and the dependencies proper, like e. g. India and West Africa.

As to Dilke's treatment of the problems connected with the former, the influence of Goldwin Smith is very marked. Like most of the Separatists, he takes an especially gloomy view of the position of Canada, this colony being, as has already been pointed out, on account of its proximity to the United States and the Separatist tendencies known to exist in parts of its populaion, a favourite object of attack on the part of those who wished to point out the disadvantages of the colonial Empire. With regard to Canada, Dilke is frankly in favour of severing the connexion.

The connexion between England and Canada, besides being contrary to the best interests of the "Saxon" race, is, he maintains, the more undesirable because the colony cannot be held against a determined effort on the part of the United States: "As Montana becomes peopled up, we shall hear of the colonization of Red River(1) by citizens of the United States, such as preceded the hoisting of the 'lone star' in Texas, and the 'bear flag' in California, by Fremont; and resistance by the Hudson's Bay Company will neither be possible, nor in the interests of civilization desirable."(2) To make the Canadian Dominion really proof against attack is impossible, for even with the addition of British Columbia and the country between that colony and Ontario, Canada would hardly be as populous or as powerful as the single State of New York: "'Help us for ten years, and then we will help ourselves', the Canadians say; 'help us to become 10 millions and then we will stand alone;' but this becoming 10 millions, is not such an easy thing."(3) As it is, Canada draws millions from the mother country for her defence and relies mainly on the English army to defend her 4,000 miles of frontier. Besides, she indirectly involves England in untold expenditure on military preparations by the mere fact of her existence on the borders of the United States.

(1) The present Manitoba. (2) Op. cit. I p. 74. (3) Op. cit. I, p. 75.

The fact that of the two chief sections of the "Saxon" race — that in Britain and that in America — the latter is again split in two, appears to Dilke irrational and absurd. For such an anomaly there is, according to him, no excuse except the wishes of the Canadians, who profit by it in making England pay for their defence, and who gratify their spite against their neighbours at the expense of the mother country. "Those who ask why a connexion so one-sided, so opposed to the best interests of our race, should be suffered to continue," he writes, "are answered, now that the argument of 'prestige' is given up, that the Canadians are loyal, and that they hate the Americans, to whom, were it not for us, they must inevitably fall. That the Canadians hate the Americans can be no reason why we should spend blood and treasure in protecting them against the consequences of their hate..... As for Canadian 'loyalty' it appears to consist merely of hatred towards America, for while we were fighting China and conquering the rulers of Japan, that we might spread free trade, our loyal colonists of Canada set upon our goods protective duties of 20 % — — — —. We might, at least, fairly insist that the connexion should cease, unless Canada will entirely remove her duties."(1)

Considering Dilke's total lack of sympathy with the Canadian point of view, it is not to be wondered at that he arrives at the conclusion that "at bottom it would seem as though no one gained by the retention of our hold upon Canada."(2) If the connexion were severed Canada would no longer be exposed to such Fenian raids as took place at the conclusion of the American Civil War and would escape the danger of being the battlefield on which quarrels between England and the United States would be fought out. Moreover Canada, once Republican, would cease to be a thorn in the flesh of the neighbouring Republic, the Monroe Doctrine would be satisfied, and Canada would be much less exposed to the danger of an attack from the United States. Finally the separation of Canada from the Empire would relieve England of the pressure on her foreign policy caused by the certainty of a defeat by the United States in the event of war with that country.(3)

There is, he thinks, no reason why England should be more friendly to Canada than to the United States: "In all history there is nothing stranger than the narrowness of mind that has led us to see in Canada a piece of England and in America a hostile country. There are more sons of British subjects in America than in Canada, by far; and the Americans look upon the old country with a pride that cannot be shared by a man who looks to her to pay his soldiers."(4) Indeed, Canada, with her large French population, is really less of an English Colony than the United States. "It is impossible to forget," he writes, "that British troops are here employed as guardians of the only true French colony in the world against the inroads of the English race."(5) (i. e. the United States).

(1) Op. cit. I pp. 78—79. (2) Op. cit. I p. 79. (3) Op. cit. I p. 79.
(4) Op. cit. I p. 80. (5) Op. cit. I, p. 69.

As to the other settlement colonies Dilke's attitude is more sympathetic and less uncompromisingly hostile to the connexion. In the chapter which concludes the section dealing with the Australasian colonies he surveys the "colonies" (i. e. the Dominions) and tries to form an estimate of their value to the mother country. Following in the footsteps of earlier Separatist writers he points out the one-sided nature of a partnership which involves the taxation of English merchants and artisans in aid of populations far more wealthy than that of the mother country: "There is something ludicrous in the idea of taxing St. Giles' for the support of Melbourne, and making Dorsetshire agricultural labourers pay the cost of defending New Zealand colonists in Maori wars."(1) Still: "whatever may be the case with regard to Canada, less fault is to be found with the cost of the Australian colonies." (2) To demand that they shall pay for the troops actually employed among them in time of peace, and in addition take their share in the maintenance of the British navy would be only fair, and if England should insist on this, it is more than doubtful if the Australians would do more than grumble and pay up. If so, there would be little objection to the continuance of the connexion from the point of view of English interests. If, however, such a demand should lead to friction "we may plead that, even should separation be the result, we should be none the worse off by its occurrence."(3)

For what advantages does England get from these colonies to counterbalance the expenditure which their retention involves? In former times the mother country was rewarded by the monopoly of the colonial trade. This state of things no longer exists. So far from England getting material benefit from her colonies through the trade monopoly, "the colonial expenses which, rightly or wrongly, our fathers bore (and that not ungrudgingly) when they enjoyed a monopoly of colonial trade, are borne by us in face of colonial prohibition."(4) (i. e. prohibitive duties) That trade follows the flag, or, indeed, that England derives any commercial advantage from her self-governing colonies which would not accrue to her even if they were independent, he refuses to believe. "The retention of colonies at almost any cost", he remarks, "has been defended — so far as it has been supported by argument at all — on the ground that the connexion conduces to trade, to which argument it is sufficient to answer that no one has ever succeeded in showing what effect upon trade the connexion can have, and that as excellent examples to the contrary we have the fact that our trade with the Ionian Islands has greatly increased since their annexation to the kingdom of Greece, and a much more striking fact than even this — namely, that while the trade with England of the Canadian Confederation is only $^4/_{11}$ of its total external trade ..... the English trade of the United States was ... in 1866 ..... $^4/_7$ of its total trade. Common institutions, common freedom, and common tongue have evidently far more to do with

(1) Op. cit. II, p. 148. (2) Op. cit. II, p. 150. (3) cit. II, p. 153.
(4) Op. cit. II. p. 149.

trade than union has; and for purposes of commerce and civilization, America is a truer colony of Britain than is Canada".(1)

From the military point of view, the colonies, so far from adding anything to the strength of the mother country, are a source of weakness. The notion that they ought to take an active share in Imperial wars Dilke finds reasonable,(2) but he does not believe that they would consent to do so. "It is not likely hovewer, nowadays," he remarks, "that our colonists would, for any long stretch of time, engage to aid us in our purely European wars. Australia would scarcely feel herself deeply interested in the guarantee of Luxembourg, nor Canada in the affairs of Servia,"(3) — a singularly unfortunate prophecy. "The fact that we in Britain paid our share — or rather nearly the whole cost — of the Maori wars would be no argument to an Australian, but only an additional proof to him of our extraordinary folly."(4)

As outlets for emigration the colonies are, according to Dilke, no more valuable than they would be if the Great Mogul ruled them.(5) Indeed: "under separation we should, perhaps, find the colonies better emigration-fields for our surplus population than they are at present. Many of our emigrants who flock to the United States are attracted by the idea that they are going to become citizens of a new nation instead of dependent upon an old one."(6)

Having thus disposed of these three traditional arguments for the retention of the self-governing colonies, Dilke proceeds to examine the argument that the colonies are a source of prestige to England, an argument which, as was the case with Cornewall Lewis and Goldwin Smith, fills him with contempt. The idea of mere size adding to the prestige of a country is, he declares, absurd, a doctrine under which China ougth to be 26 times as powerful as France. "The idea conveyed by the words 'mother of free nations' is every bit as good as that contained in the cry 'prestige'."(7)

Dilke himself advances a new argument which is typical of the man, namely that the possession of settlement colonies might perhaps be said to tend to preserve the English from insularity, from that dwarfing of the mind which would otherwise make England "Guernsey a little magnified." He only advances this argument, however, to withdraw it again, for "it is a question, however, whether our real preservation from the insularity we deprecate is not to be found in the possession of true colonies — of plantations such as America, in short — rather than in that of mere dependencies. That which raises us above the provincialism of citizenship of little England is our citizenship of the greater Saxondom which includes all that is best and wisest in the world."(8)

Having in this way demolished, to his own satisfaction, all the

(1) Op. cit. II. pp. 153—54. (2) Op. cit. II. p. 150. (3) Op. cit II. p 151. In vol. II. p. 109 he even discusses the prospect of Australia going to war against England. (4) Op. cit. II. p. 151. (5) Op. cit. II. p. 154. (6) Op. cit. II. p. 156. (7) Op. cit. II, p. 155. (8) Op. cit. II, pp. 155—56.

arguments for the retention of the self-governing colonies, Dilke cannot but arrive at the conclusion that their retention is, in the present circumstances, of no demonstrable value to the mother country: "Any relation would be preferable to the existing one of mutual indifference and distrust. Recognising the fact that Australia has come of age and calling on her, too, to recognise it, we should say to the Australian colonists: 'Our present system cannot continue; will you amend it, or separate?' The worst thing that can happen to us is that we should 'drift' blindly into separation. After all, the strongest of the arguments in favour of separation is the somewhat paradoxical one that it would bring us a step nearer to the virtual confederation of the English race."(1)

So far, it will be seen, Dilke follows Goldwin Smith. The arguments against the retention of the colonies are Smith's, so is the fear of a policy of "drift" (cf. *The Empire* p. 87) and the hope for a moral federation of the English race. At this point however Dilke stops short and refuses to follow Goldwin Smith's lead. Their premisses are the same, but their conclusions, though similar, are not identical. Goldwin Smith arrived, as we have seen, at the conclusion that separation was not only desirable, but that it should be carried out, if necessary, without regard to the wishes of the colonies. Dilke, too, was inclined to look upon separation as desirable, but he did not wish to force it on the colonies. His arguments are advanced (except in the case of Canada), not in order to induce the home government to "cut the painter," but to make it demand of the colonies that they should undertake a fair share of the burden of their defence.

If the colonies are willing to do so, Dilke sees no objection to their remaining within the Empire: "From the foundation, separation would be harmless does not of necessity follow the conclusion, separation is to be desired. This much only is clear — that we need not hesitate to demand that Australia should do her duty. With the more enlightened thinkers of England, separation from the colonies has for many years been a favourite idea, but as regards the Australians it would hardly be advisable. If we allow that it is to the interest both of our race and of the world that the Australians should prosper, we have to ask whether they would do so in a higher degree if separated from the mother country than if they remained connected with her and with each other by a federation. It has often been said that instead of the varying relations which now exist between Britain and America, we should have seen a perfect friendship, had we but permitted the American colonies to go their way in peace; but the example does not hold in the case of Australia, which is by no means wishful to go at all..... Separation, we may then conclude, though infinitely better than a continuance of the existing one-sided tie, would, in a healthier state of our relations, not be to the interest of Britain, although it would perhaps be morally beneficial to Australia."(2)

In short, Dilke considers the retention of Australia and New Zea-

(1) Op. cit. II, p. 157. (2) Op. cit. II. pp. 156—57.

land a duty, an onerous and unpleasant duty, perhaps, but still a duty, which England ought to perform, provided that the colonies do not shirk their obligations.

Unlike Goldwin Smith Dilke was not a doctrinaire. Thus, in spite of his bitter remarks about the Canadian Protectionists quoted on page 63 Dilke took a far less dogmatic view of colonial Protectionism than one would have expected from a Radical in the year 1868. Indeed his account of the Protectionist movement in Australia is so impartial(1) that he had to add a note to the chapter in question, when *Greater Britain* was reprinted in 1885, explaining that, though the chapter had been erroneously interpreted as a defence of Protectionism, it was merely meant to be a statement by a Free Trader(2) of the views held by colonial Protectionists.

Turning to Dilke's views on the dependencies proper, i. e. the Crown Colonies and India, we find that, in contradistinction to the earlier writers on colonial affairs, who mostly confined themselves to the settlement colonies, and the modern Imperialists, who are apt to look upon the connexion with the Dominions as of primary and with the dependencies as of merely secondary importance, with Dilke it is the other way about. According to him, the arguments which led him to conclude that the retention of the self-governing colonies offered no advantages to the mother country do not apply to the dependencies. As far as the latter are concerned trade *does* follow the flag: "Whether, indeed, dependencies pay or do not pay their actual cost, their retention stands on a wholly different footing from that of colonies. Were we to leave Australia or the Cape, we should continue to be the chief customers of those countries: were we to leave India or Ceylon, they would have no customers at all; for falling into anarchy, they would cease at once to export their goods to us and to consume our manufactures."(3)

"Furthermore the dependencies form "a nursery of our statesmen and warriors," and the English people could not without loss to the national character give up its task of governing and educating the inhabitants of backward countries.(4)

The annexation of uncivilized countries for these purposes need, according to Dilke, cause England no qualms of conscience; in the first place the sentiment of nationality hardly exists in such countries, and in the second even the very worst British administration is preferable, for the mass of the people, to the best conceivable government by native rulers(5). In his ideas of trusteeship for races unable to face the conditions of the modern world alone Dilke was not only in advance

(1) The chapter in question concludes in the statement that Protection in Australia, "it not supported by a selfish clique, but rests upon the generosity and self-sacrifice of a majority of the population." Op. cit. II, p. 70. (2) He condemned Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Scheme in *Colonial Preference. Mr. Chamberlain's Scheme* (Printed in The *Liberal View,* London, 1904.)

(3) Op. cit. II. p. 394. (4) Op. cit. II. p. 395. (5) Op. cit. II. p. 392.

of the Separatists, but also of the Imperialists of the 'seventies and the 'eighties, who hardly touched upon this side of the colonial problem at all.

The idea of trusteeship is further elaborated in the chapters on the Indian Empire, which contain an admirable statement of the character of British rule in India, its objects, advantages, and drawbacks, which may be worth a brief notice, if only as an illustration of Dilke's grasp of the true bearings of colonial questions:

As India cannot within a reasonable future govern herself, England must govern her "in the interests of the people of Hindustan."(1) "The only justification for our presence in India", he maintains, "is the education for freedom of the Indian races,"(2) England's mission in India being "to plant free institutions among a dark-skinned race."(3)

English rule in India, though despotic, is not bad. Indeed, according to Dilke, "the hardest thing that can be said of it is that it is too good..... we worry the natives with municipal institutions and benevolent inventions that they cannot and will not understand."(4) In spite of its general succes it is doubtful if British rule in India can ever become popular: for one thing it is too rigidly Western and suffers somewhat from a certain lack of adaptability. Furthermore the extremely democratic character of British rule has humbled the old upper class without raising a new middle class to take its place. Moreover, while it has created a numerous class of educated natives, it offers to them no chance of any but a subordinate career. Besides, the Indians have certain legitimate social grievances — the English persist in looking down on all natives. Finally there is the hatred which Orientals always bear their masters, no matter who those masters may be. Still England is on the whole ruling India well; her rule is working marvellous changes in Indian society, the greatest of them being the creation of an Indian national sentiment which has never before existed.(5)

It will be seen that though Dilke shared the convictions of the Manchester School on certain aspects of colonial policy, he on other points totally disagreed with that School; indeed his views in some respects bear a strong resemblance to those of modern Imperialists, and show a sounder understanding of some of the problems of the Empire than that exhibited by the adherents of the Imperial Federation Movement in the 'seventies and 'eighties. It may at first blush seem surprising that a man so deeply interested in the spread of English civilization and so ardent a believer in the civilizing mission of the English people, should have contemplated with indifference the break-up of the Empire. The explanation is to be found in his ideas about race. Very far from sharing the cosmopolitanism of the Manchester School, Dilke was an enthusiastic believer in the destiny of what he calls the English (or still oftener the Saxon) race, though his use of the word seems to

(1) Op. cit. II. p. 389. (2) Op. cit. II. p. 381. (3) Op. cit. II. p. 407.
(4) Op. cit. II. p. 375. (5) Dilke's views on the colonial question are restated in a lecture delivered before the Liberal Association of Brighton. $^{24}/_{3}$, 1869.

indicate that what he really meant was not English race, but English civilization. While the Manchester School looked upon the world as the natural economic unit, while the Imperialists of later times thought in terms of States, Dilke thought in terms of race, or rather of national civilizations.

To suppose that Dilke was opposed to colonization would be the greatest mistake possible. Colonization he considered the most important task of the English people. What he argues against is the retention of colonies in a state of dependence after they are capable of standing on their own legs. Race and national civilization are, to him, the things that matter; the accidents of political allegiance are mere externals, of no real importance. To him the United States is still a British colony and a truer British colony, at that, than Canada with its French element: "America", he writes, "offers the English race the moral dictatorship of the globe, by ruling mankind through Saxon institutions and the English tongue."(1) "In America the peoples of the world are being fused together, but they are run into an English mould: Alfred's law and Chaucer's tongue are theirs, whether they would or no. There are men who say that Britain in her age will claim the glory of having planted greater Englands across the seas. They fail to perceive that she has done more than found plantations of her own — that she has imposed her institutions upon the off-shoots of Germany, of Ireland, of Scandinavia, and of Spain. Through America, England is speaking to the world."(2)

By "Greater Britain", an expression coined by Dilke himself, he understands, not the British Empire, as the term is now generally taken to mean, but the British Empire *and* America.(3) To his mind there are no British as opposed to American interests. The welfare of America is to him just as important as the welfare of Britain. Speaking about the possibility of England at some future time being overshadowed by the United States, he remarks: "The ultimate future of any section of our race is of little moment by the side of its triumph as a whole."(4)

"The idea which in all the length of my travels has been at once my fellow and my guide," he writes in the Preface to *Greater Britain,* — "a key wherewith to unlock the hidden things of strange new lands — is the conception, however imperfect, of the grandeur of our race, already girdling the earth, which it is destined, perhaps, eventually to overspread." No possible series of events can prevent the English race "whose very scum and outcasts have founded empires in every portion of the globe,"(5) from numbering 300 millions by 1970. Italy, Spain, France and even Russia will become pygmies by the side of such a people.(6) Already as it is, the power of England and America would be more than a match for the remaining nations of the world,

(1) Op. cit. I. p. 318. (2) Preface to *Greater Britain.* (3) In a Memoir left by Dilke he writes: "It is contracting an idea which, as its author, I think lofty and even noble, to use "Greater Britain" only of the British Empire as is now done." Quoted in Gwynn and Tuckwell: *Life of Dilke.* I. p. 68. (4) Op. cit. II. p. 407. (5) Op. cit. II. p. 406. (6) Op. cit. II. p. 406.

"whom in the intelligence of their people and the extent and wealth of their dominions they already surpass."(1) "So entirely are the English countries now the mother-lands of energy and adventure throughout the world, that no one who has watched what has happened in California, in British Columbia, and on the west coast of New Zealand, can doubt that the discovery of placer gold-fields, on any coast or in any sea-girt country in the world, must now be followed by the speedy rise there of an English government: were gold e. g. found in surface diggings in Japan, Japan would be English in five years."(2) Similarly it is the unavoidable destiny of China to become an English or an American colony.(3) Speaking of the Mormons he remarks that if they are driven out of Utah they will colonize Mexican territory, only to be again annexed to the United States: "Theirs, however, will once more be the pride of having proved the pioneers of that English civilization which is destined to overspread the temperate world."(4)

Race being the decisive factor in all Dilke's political ideas, the possibility of the race changing or deteriorating is a constant bugbear with him. A fear that race may be conditioned by climate and surroundings is apparent in several places in *Greater Britain:* Will the "Saxon" race be able to maintain its characteristics in the conditions of America or Australia? Is it true that, if the American settlers can in the long run maintain themselves under the climatic conditions of America, it will be at the price of being no longer English, but Red Indians?(5)

The corollary of Dilke's admiration for the "Saxon" race is a corresponding distrust of the ability of other nations: "The map of the world will show that freedom exists only in the homes of the English race. France, the authoress of modern liberty, has failed as yet to learn how to retain the boon for which she is ever ready to shed her blood. Switzerland, a so-called free state, is the home of the worst of bigotry and intolerance; the Spanish republics are notoriously despotisms under democratic titles. America, Australia, Britain, the homes of our race, are as yet the only dwelling-spots of freedom."(6) Writing about Egypt he deplores the introduction of French "vice." "The French at the present day," he remarks, "appear to have no foreign policy, unless it is a sort of desire to extend the empire of their language, their dance-tunes, and their fashions ..."(7) Russia is "a European nation capable of surpassing Eastern tyrants in corruption by as much as it already surpasses them in dull weight of leaden cruelty of

(1) Op. cit. II. p. 406. (2) Op. cit. I. p. 274. (3) "It is obvious to any one who watches the conduct of our admirals, consuls, and traders in the China seas, that it is inevitable that China should fall to us as India fell, unless, indeed, the Americans should be beforehand with us in the matter." (Op. cit. II. p. 391. (4) Op. cit. I. p. 182. (5) Op. cit. I. pp. 309—10. Similarly II, p. 114 and p. 147. (6) Op. cit. II. p. 382. (7) Op. cit. II. p. 401. His dislike of France was probably due to his detestation of Napoleon III. After the war of 1870 his views changed somewhat. He formed a lifelong friendship with Gambetta. *The British Empire* contains an appreciation of French colonial enterprise (p. 110).

oppression."(1) "Drunken, dirty, ignorant, and corrupt, the Russian people are no fit rulers for Hindustan."(2) The only non-British people which finds favour in his eyes are "our Teutonic brethren," to assist whom in their struggle for national unity would be a task worthy of the British Empire.(3)

Separated from their context these quotations may strike the reader merely as expressions of crude Jingoism. But it must be kept in mind that it was much easier to look upon the "Anglo-Saxon" race as a chosen people in 1868 than it would be, say, in 1920. Dilke's comments on the qualities of his race are not introduced as pretexts for complacent self-congratulations. He evidently considers them mere statements of facts, like mentioning the area or population of a country. Indeed Dilke is obviously non-partisan and detached to the best of his ability. If he says that the English and American people are unsurpassed in certain qualities it is because he belives it a fact. If he had found it otherwise he would have said so. In fact when he does come across something derogatory to the English, he does not keep it back. Thus, writing about the English in India, he says: "there is only too much fear that the English, unless held in check, exhibit a singularly strong disposition towards cruelty, wherever they have a weak enemy to meet ... Even a traveller, indeed, becomes so soon used to see the natives wronged in every way by people of quiet manner and apparent kindness of disposition, that he ceases to record the cases ... I noticed in all the hotels in India the significant notice: 'Gentlemen are earnestly requested not to strike the servants' ... It is in India when listening to a mess-table conversation on the subject of looting, that we begin to remember our descent from Scandinavian sea-king robbers."(4)

Greater Britain immediately attracted much attention. Most of the leading journals reviewed it at great length and it rapidly ran through three editions. It had an immense sale in the United States (in a pirated edition) and large portions of the book were translated into Russian.(5) In France it won the praise of Thiers.(6) John Stuart Mill, at that time a stranger to Dilke, wrote to him: "It is long since any book connected with practical politics has been published on which I build such high hopes of the future usefulness and distinction of the writer."(7) Lord John Russell, himself a professed Imperialist, recommended it to students of colonial affairs.(8)

The reviews of the book throw an interesting light on the attitude of contemporary public opinion to the colonial question. With some isolated exceptions the reviews did not pass any censure on Dilke's Separatist opinions. Thus the *Morning Post*(9) expressly recommended

(1) Op. cit. II. p. 283. (2) Op. cit. II. p. 310 (3) Op. cit II. p. 404. (4) Op. cit. II. pp. 222—24. (5) Gwynn and Tuckwell: *Life of Dilke,* I. p. 69. (6) ibid. p. 59. (7) ibid. p. 70. (8) *Speeches and Despatches* p. 155. (9) $^{3}/_{12}$, 1868.

the chapter on *Colonies* as "an able treatise on the relations of our dependencies with their mother country," and the *Times,* which gave the book four whole columns, went out of its way to express agreement with his Separatist views as regards Canada: "Look at the increasing strength of the Irish on our Canadian frontier, in connexion with the capabilities for defence of that straggling, indefensible boundary line, and we cannot help asking with Mr. Dilke, might it not be well to draw off, while we can yet do it with a good grace? Nations, no more than individuals, are bound by their honour to the impossible."(1) Praise of the book and eulogies of the brilliance, cleverness, and originality of its author formed the dominant note,(2) together with some criticism of his fondness for too sweeping generalizations.(3)

The Pall Mall Gazette(4) found fault with his excessive Nationalism, while the *Edinburgh Review* gently rebuked him for his advocacy of the annexation of Canada to the United States in spite of the wishes of the Canadians.(5) The review in the *Quarterly* was evidently written by some person specially interested in Australia. The review accuses Dilke of "entire mis-descriptions of scenery," probably referring to Dilke's unfavourable pictures of the heat and dryness of an Australian summer, and accuses him of general inaccuracy, citing some examples from Tasmanian history. Finally he charges Dilke with unreasonable antagonism to British rule and tries to refute his arguments for the uselessness of dependencies, maintaining that trade follows the flag and -- an argument which Dilke curiously enough seems to have overlooked — pointing to the harmful effect on the civilization of the young communities which might result from a severance of the cultural link with the mother country.(6)

On the other hand a long review in *Blackwood's Magazine,*(7) in which Dilke's Radical opinions are violently attacked from an extreme Tory point of view, contains no criticism whatever of his advocacy of colonial emancipation. The same may be said of almost all the other reviews of the book: Dilke's views on colonial policy were evidently not considered startling.(8)

At the expense of chronology a brief account may be given here of *Problems of Greater Britain* (1890), written twenty-two years after *Greater Britain,* during Dilke's involuntary absence from political life.

(1) March 31, 1869. (2) Thus the *Contemporary Review* (Jan.—April 1869) p. 624, the *Saturday Review,* (Dec. 12, 1868) the *Athenaeum* (Nov. 14. 1868), the *Spectator* (Dec. 12, 1868), the *Daily News* ($^{26}/_{11}$ 1868). (3) *Quarterly Review* (Jan. 1870). *Saturday Review* (Dec. 5. 1869). *Edinburgh Review* (April 1869).

(4) Dec. 10, 1868. (5) "In our economical policy we have rather hastily forgotten the claims of those of our countrymen who settled in Canada with the express view of retaining for themselves and bequeathing on their children the status of English subjects." April 1869. (6) Jan. 1870. (7) Feb. 1870.

(8) In Dilke's subsequent political life colonial policy came to play a less prominent part than *Greater Britain* might have led one to expect, his chief interest and study being foreign policy and army reform. In 1877 he gave only half-hearted support to the attacks on the Conservative administration on account of the annexation

In the intervening twenty-two years much had been changed. Separatism had practically ceased to exist in England, Seeley and Froude had written their books on the colonial question, the Imperial Federation movement was in full swing, and attempts at devising forms of closer union between the mother mountry and her colonies were the order of the day. The difference between *Greater Britain* and *Problems* of *Greater Britain* is in itself a remarkable indication of the change which had taken place.

Problems of Greater Britain was intended by Dilke to supplant the earlier book, which he considered "wholly out of date",(1) the continued demand for it being "a source of embarrassment to the author, who could not but feel that the work had become in a great number of points wholly inapplicable to existing circumstances."(2) *Problems of Greater Britain* is not, like *Greater Britain,* a book of travel; it is a handbook of colonial affairs, containing information about the economical, social, and political conditions of the various colonies, accounts of the most important problems connected with them, character sketches of their leading statesmen, etc. Apart from its value as a political handbook, which must have been considerable at the time, and from the evidence of Dilke's remarkable knowledge of almost all aspects of colonial life which it affords, the book is interesting because of the contrast offered by its views on the relations between the mother country and the colonies, with those contained in *Greater Britain.*

When Dilke spoke of the earlier book as out of date, he was probably thinking more especially of the chapters in which he attempted to prove that the retention of the colonies offered no advantage to England, and that in the case of Canada, separation was desirable. Every trace of this has vanished in *Problems of Greater Britain.* When separation is discussed it is the *danger* of some colony seceding which is mentioned.(3) That it is desirable to preserve the unity of the Empire is simply taken for granted, and it is only incidentally that he thinks of giving a reason why this is so:(4)

of the Transvaal, declaring hat he was opposed "not to the policy of annexation ..... but to the manner in which that annexation had been carried out," *(Life of Dilke,* I. p. 272) but after Majuba he was instrumental, together with Chamberlain, Bright and Courtney, in bringing about a restoration of the independence of the Republic (Ibid. I. p. 368) and in 1879 he brought forward a motion condemning the South African policy of Sir Bartle Frere. (Ibid. I. 273.) In 1880 he refused the Under-Secretaryship for the Colonies because it did not carry with it a seat in the Cabinet. (Ibid. I. p. 307) In 1882 he supported the demand of Canada to negociate commercial agreements on her own account. (Ibid. I. p. 400). In 1884 he advocated an expedition to rescue Gordon (though he thought Gordon had "lost his senses"), but was in favour of withdrawal from the Sudan afterwards. Ibid. II. chap. XXXV) He was in favour of an active policy in Egypt in 1882 (ibid I, ch. XXIX) but against permanent occupation (Ibid. II. pp. 252—56). He was associated with the Aborigines Protection Society (Ibid. I. p. 102) and co-operated with E. D. Morel in attacking the administration of the Congo Free State. (Ibid. II. p. 381) He was in favour of a more determined opposition to the French and German colonization policy in Africa and New Guinea. (I. p. 533—39).

"(1) Preface to *Problems of Greater Britain.* p. VII. (2) Ibid. (3) e. g. op. cit. p. 695. (4) Op. cit. p. 696.

As for the old argument of trade following the flag, Dilke is still, as in 1868, a sceptic. "It is doubtful," he remarks, "whether the political relation, for example, between Australia and Great Britain, has much to do with the large export and import of commodities with takes place between them."(1) A much more important consequence of the connexion is, according to him, the large investment of English capital in the colonies, which has been obtained by them at a comparatively low rate of interest, largely on account of the political connexion, which gives to these investments a special degree of security.

But apart from economical considerations, the connexion is also to be powerfully supported by other less material arguments: "the widening of the moral and intellectual horizon by the world-wide character of the British Empire," he writes, "is of equal advantage to the colonist and the home-staying Briton ..... the connexion, even though it be little more than nominal, which exists between the United Kingdom and countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa stimulates the energy of the English people; but it also prevents the growth of a hopeless provincialism in the colonies themselves."(2) The argument that only large Empires would have any chance of making their influence felt in the future, an argument used with so much force by Seeley (see p. 166) is also taken up by Dilke:(3) "France may grow in military and naval power; and Germany in this respect, as well as in population, trade, and wealth; yet so far more rapid is the increase in the strength and the riches of the British Empire and of the United States that, before the next century is ended, the French and the Germans seem likely to be pygmies when standing by the side of the British, the Americans, and the Russians of the future."

Part VII of the book is devoted to an examination of the various schemes for a closer union of the Empire which formed the subject of so much discussion at the time: Imperial Federation, Councils of Advice, the Zollverein scheme, etc., each of which is subjected to an impartial criticism in the light of Dilke's knowledge of colonial conditions. It is due to this knowledge that Dilke, almost alone of the Imperialists of the period, saw that the realization of the schemes of closer union was being made impossible by the rise of a sense of separate nationality in the Dominions, that those Colonials who had associated themselves with the Imperial Federation movement were not in sympathy with the great body of colonial opinion, and that attempts to enforce a hard-and-fast scheme of Imperial union might endanger the existing connexion. "Among the older settlers", he points out, "the leaning towards closer relations with the mother country is connected with a conservatism in politics and in matters of property which places them out of sympathy with the ruling democracies of the Australian colonies ..... Australia is gliding by insensible degrees into a national life, and while an alliance between herself and the mother country on the present conditions may long continue, any active at-

(1) Op. cit. p. 696. (2) Op. cit. p. 697. (3) Op. cit. p. 697.

tempt to replace it by a tighter hold is likely to de dangerous."(1) The best way of strengthening the Imperial connexion is therefore, he suggests, not to be sought in schemes of constitutional reform, but in increased co-operation on subjects of common interests, such as defence, communications, naturalization, legislation and the administration of justice, etc.(2)

(1) Op. cit. pp. 636—38. (2) Op. cit. p. 629.

II

THE TURN OF THE TIDE

At the end of the 'sixties the influence of the Anti-Colonial school may be said to culminate, and to begin to be superseded by a new outlook on the colonial question. It must not, of course, be thought, as has already been pointed out, that before that time everybody had been in favour of cutting the colonies adrift. Those in favour of actually taking steps to get rid of them were no doubt few. Even those who believed that England would be better without her colonial Empire may not have been in a majority. But there can be little doubt that the great majority, whatever may have been their views on the advantages or disadvantages of such an event, thought that the break-up of the Empire was only a question of time; and with separation as an almost inevitable event it followed naturally that no great interest could be taken in colonial affairs, and that the mother country could not be expected to count with the colonies as a factor of very great importance in the shaping of her policy.

In the course of one decade all this was changed. With a rapidity and completeness which seem almost incredible, the Separatist school in England practically vanished from the face of the earth and the Pessimists dwindled into an insignificant minority. Nobody, except one or two die-hard Manchester men, dreamed of maintaining that the colonies ought to be got rid of. Protestations of belief in the future of the Empire became part of the stock-in-trade of most politicians, and expressions of pride in the extent and greatness of the Empire a commonplace. Those who opposed the rising tide of Imperialism no longer did so out of antagonism to the colonial connexion, but because they disapproved of the particular methods employed by the Imperialists, or because they thought that the measures which the latter proposed would *not* conduce to the solidarity of the Empire.

Is is not quite easy to account for this astounding change in public opinion. A multitude of forces were at work to transform the views of the average Englishman on the colonial question, some of them of a character rather difficult to pin down. Some of the factors that brought about the change were active from the very start of the Imperialist movement. Others went to swell it after it had begun.

In the first place the change in public opinion was, no doubt,

greatly facilitated by the very indifference with which the general public had looked upon the subject. As the vast majority had never troubled themselves much about the colonial question and had not formed very definite opinions on it, the resistance to be overcome by the rising Imperialist movement was not so strong as might appear from the hold which Separatist doctrines had gained on the minds of political writers and professional politicians.

The very violence with which the doctrines of the Anti-Colonial school had been expressed helped to facilitate a change: extremist movements generally bring about a reaction against themselves, and when a man of the intellectual capacity of Goldwin Smith could argue seriously that the Colonies should be forcibly pushed out of the Empire in order to avoid "a parting in anger" it must be clear to everyone that the bounds of commonsense were being passed.

As time went on, moreover, it became more and more evident that the prophecies of the Separatists were not being fulfilled. The confederation of the North American provinces into the Dominion of Canada, which had been looked upon by many as the first step towards the peaceful secession of those provinces,(1) did not bring about any increase of Separatist feeling in Canada; if anything, it had the opposite effect. One of the chief arguments on which the advocacy of Separatism rested being that the Empire was bound to break up in a not too distant future, the mere fact that it did not show any signs of doing so tended to deprive the case for separation of much of its force.

It was realized with something like a shock of surprise that the colonists, hitherto chiefly looked upon as troublesome subjects always clamouring for more independence, were largely animated by a romantic attachment to the mother country and by a loyalty which seemed to increase with the distance from "Home". The discovery of colonial loyalty had much to do with the new attitude adopted by Englishmen towards the colonies, and the attachment of the colonies to the mother country is commented upon in almost all the early Imperialist writings. An exaggerated estimate of this sentiment and a failure to realize its limitations underlie most of the writings of the so-called Imperial Federalists (see p. 141).

Moreover, some of the specific circumstances which had made the colonial connexion appear burdensome and dangerous to the mother country had disappeared or were disappearing. The argument which had told most forcibly against the retention of the colonial Empire with the Manchester School was its cost, more especially the share of colonial military expenditure borne by the Imperial exchequer.(2) This share was gradually being diminished. In 1861 a Select Committee of the House of Commons had considered the question and found that the responsibility and cost of the military defence of the colonies ought

(1) Cf. Skelton: *Life of Galt*. p. 390. (2) The *Times* spoke of this as "the chief, if not the only difficulty which besets the maintenance of the Empire." ($^{25}/_{10}$, 1872).

mainly to devolve upon themselves,(1) and in 1862 the House of Commons resolved without a division "that colonies exercising the rights of self-government ought to undertake the main responsibility of providing for their own internal order and security, and ought to assist in their own external defence."(2) Acting on this policy the Home Government gradually withdrew the Imperial troops from the colonies. This step, which, incidentally, was severely condemned by many of the early Imperialists, and which was often interpreted as a sign of an unfriendly attitude on the part of the Home Government towards the colonies, in reality did much to further the cause of Imperialism by removing one of the most irritating drawbacks of the colonial connexion.

Similarly the danger of England becoming entangled in a war with the United States through some quarrel between Canada and her Southern neighbour, a danger which had loomed so large in the imaginations of Goldwin Smith and others of the same school, and which had made them look upon the speedy emancipation of that colony as a question of the most urgent necessity, was passing away. The Fenian raids across the Canadian frontier failed ignominiously and ceased. The aggressive attitude of the victorious Northern States after the Civil War gradually subsided. Thus another inducement to get rid of the colonies was eliminated.

Perhaps, however, the most important of the forces which were at work transforming public opinion on the colonial question was the gradual change of outlook on commercial and foreign policy which was taking place in England and which, among other things, was in the end to destroy the Manchester School. To the Manchester School, and to the majority of English people about the middle of the century, the economic unit was the world. A man who shared the outlook of that school, even if he was ever so enthusiastic about his overseas countrymen and even if he put the greatest value on colonization and the opening up of new countries, might yet look with comparative equanimity on the breaking up of the Empire. For these territories would remain English in speech and civilization, even if they became independent, and they would buy English goods and export raw materials for the industries of England just as before, on the principle of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market. In short, in all the things that really mattered separation would make no difference. The boundaries which separated State from State formed no barriers to civilization or to trade, or at least they would form no obstacle when, in the course of a few years, all States had realized that Free Trade was the only sensible commercial policy. States were, or would soon become, mere administrative units, and the frontiers which divided them would mean little more than — with a slight exaggeration — those which divided county from county. It would therefore, apart from sentimental considerations, be no greater calamity if Canada became independent or annexed to the United States than if for instance Northumberland was made a Scotch instead of an English

(1) *Parl. Papers* XIII. 1861. (2) *Hansard.* III. 165, p. 1060.

county. In the latter half of the century this outlook was gradually changing. The rise on the Continent and in America of a new and more militant Nationalism imperceptibly influenced English thought; a new conception of the State as something more than an administrative unit, and a new and more aggressive Nationalism was in the air.

While the popular conception of State and nation was thus being transformed, a similar change was taking place in the English outlook on the relative position of England in the world. In the palmy days of Free Trade and the Manchester theories England had had almost a monopoly of industrial production on a large scale. England seemed so powerful and so rich that she need fear no rival. She could have afforded to do without colonies, even if colonies could be proved to be really a source of commercial and political strength. The Manchester School and the Free Trade movement were closely connected with the self-assurance and complacency of mid-Victorian England: the belief that England was wiser and stronger than all others and above the petty rivalry of other powers. The introduction of Free Trade and the refusal to use retaliation as a weapon with which to open protected markets had in them something of the attitude of a man who proudly throws away his stick because he believes himself strong enough to fight with his fists. But about 1870 misgivings were beginning to be felt about the permanence of this position. Other countries were beginning to appear as competitors. "That dream" (that England was to be the workshop of the world), writes D. Grant in 1870, "is already a dream of the past ... the singularity of our position has gone".(1) Froude in the same year sounds a note of warning that "there are symptoms which suggest, if not fear, yet at least misgiving as to the permanency of English industrial supremacy."(2) (See p. 108). Jehu Mathews in *A Colonist on the Colonial question* (1872) warns England that the colonial markets may in the end become indispensable, because "there seems to be reasonable grounds for fearing that England's commercial supremacy may already be in danger."(3) Pessimistic views about the future of British trade seemed the more justified because of the commercial and industrial depression which visited England in the last years of the 'sixties.

As the feeling of commercial security and the confidence of always being able to compete successfully with other countries were shaken, the old argument that the colonial markets presented advantages which no other market could offer, and that the value of English goods purchased by the colonies calculated per head of the population was several times as large as that of the goods purchased by foreign countries began to assume a new importance. The Separatists might answer that this was due to the specific circumstances of the colonies, not to the fact of their being colonies; and that colonists, like all other people,

(1) *Home Politics, or the Growth of Trade.* p. 185. (2) *England and her Colonies* (Short Studies III, 14). (3) Op. cit. p. 55. Similarly Grant: Op. cit. p. 185.

bought in the cheapest and sold in the dearest markets. Still the fact remained that they did buy more, and neither of the two sides could prove their case. In the books, pamphlets and lectures dealing with colonial questions, the argument that "by some mysterious process trade has a great tendency to follow the flag,"(1) is repeated again and again.

This argument was at first only used to show that the colonial markets offered special advantages which might be lost with the severance of the political tie, and that the colonial trade might in future assume a greater relative importance than at the present moment. There was in the early years of the movement no serious defection from the ranks of Free Trade, and hardly anyone suggested that England might compensate herself for the loss of foreign trade by securing special privileges in her colonies. Such a thing was hardly necessary as England, already as it was, had something approaching to a natural monopoly of the colonial trade, and in any case belief in Free Trade was as yet too unshaken for such an idea to be entertained for a moment by responsible statesmen. It was only in the 'eighties, as more and more countries went over to Protection, that the Imperialist movement began to become opposed to Free Trade. The cry that English industry was being threatened did not sound very loud during the first years of the Imperialist movement, but as more and more industries felt the pressure of foreign competition it swelled from year to year, until we get, about the turn of the century, that curious mixture of denunciations of British industrial decadence and lack of enterprise and glorification of British national qualities which characterized so much of the Imperialist propaganda at the time.

The mere fact of the growth of the chief settlement colonies about the middle of the century no doubt helped to bring about a change in the attitude of the English public. This growth had been extraordinary.(2) Moreover, very exaggerated estimates of the future increase of the colonial populations were common. Forster calculated that by 1950 the colonies would have a population of 82 millions, thus outnumbering the mother country.(3) Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor of New South Wales, estimated that Australia would have a population of $12^1/_2$ millions by 1925.(4) In the face of this present and potential growth, the colonies could no longer be brushed aside as insignificant provinces.

Another factor which made for a change of the English outlook on colonial affairs was the progress of communications. In 1769 Burke had ridiculed the idea of the American Colonies sending representatives

(1) Edward Wilson, *National Disintegration,* letter to the *Times,* Nov. 10th 1869. (2) The population of British North America grew from 1,282,000 in 1888 (*Parl. Papers* XXXVI 1862) to 3,689,000 in 1871 (*Canada Year Book* 1920). The population of Australia grew from 52,000 in 1825 to 1,145,000 in 1860 and 1,647,000 in 1870 (*Commonwealth Year Book* 1920), while that of New Zealand grew from 59,000 in 1858 to 256,000 in 1871 (*New Zealand Official Year Book*).

(3) *Our Colonial Empire* (1875). (4) J. Vogel *Greater or Lesser Britain* (*Nineteenth Century* July 1877).

all the way across the Atlantic.(1) A great change had come over this aspect of the question with the establishment of telegraphic connexion with America and Australia(2) and the development of ocean communications. From the end of the 'sixties the assertion that steam and electricity have annihilated distance and thus done away with one of the greatest obstacles to the permanent unity of the Empire is mentioned in almost every book, pamphlet, or article on the colonial question.(3) As will be seen later on (see p. 141), the Imperialists were apt somewhat to exaggerate the effect of this development.

The diminution of distance had two important consequences. In the first place, as has already been pointed out, it obviously made the continuance, even the closer union of the Empire an easier problem. In the second place it did away with the isolation of the colonies and their consequent immunity from attack. In earlier times it had seemed almost impossible for a European country to undertake a war of conquest against a country on the other side of the globe.(4) If England had relinquished Australia or New Zealand it seemed a matter of course that they would simply have gone on as independent countries. With the development of communications the possibility of their being annexed by some other power if abandoned by England began to appear, and this made the question of emancipating the colonies appear in an entirely different light. Colonies dropped by England might be picked up by some other power, perhaps even by a protectionist power.(5)

On the whole the spectacle of other powers willing to spend blood and treasure in order to acquire colonies did much to convince England that she had underestimated the value of her own possessions. The *Standard* $^{13}/_{9}$, 1869, writes: "If we do not value our colonial Empire ourselves, at least we know those who do, who are striving by all their might to do precisely that which we are called upon to undo. While we are cutting off our arms and legs and loosening our members, every other nation on earth is actively engaged in consolidating its possessions." Labilliere, pointed to the colonial effort of France in a speech at the Cannon Street Meeting Dec. 12, 1869, (see p. 100 ff), and in a paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute in Jan. 1875 he asked — "Is there a German who loves his country, from Prince Bismarck down to the most insignificant politician, who would not give much and strive hard to make the German Empire like our British Empire,

(1) *The Present State of the Nation.* pp. 313—16. (2) The Atlantic cable was finally completed in 1866, and the Australian cable inaugurated in 1872. The Suez Canal was completed in 1869. (3) See p. 173. (4) "The fear of conquest of the Australian Colonies if we left them to themselves is on the face of it ridiculous." Dilke *Greater Britain* II. p. 152. Similarly the *Edinburgh Review,* Jan. 1870 p. 109. and Th. Rogers: *the Colonial Question* (1871), p. 429.

(5) The *Westminster Review* in an article appearing in the July number of 1870 mentions as one of the fatal consequences of the abandonment of the colonies, "transference of what now constitutes the strength and the glory of this country to independent or rival powers. Should America, Prussia or any other rising power take a helpless but abandoned colony under its protection, England's loss will be the other nation's gain." Similarly the *Spectator* $^{26}/_{6}$, 1869, p. 753.

which some Englishmen think should be alloved to fall to pieces?..... we do not sufficiently esteem what we possess."(1) The colonizing activities of other countries were making an end of the old state of things, when those parts of the world which England did not care to claim might be safely left to themselves without fear of their being snapped up by some other power, and the tariff policies which were being adopted by other States made it clear that only those territories which were under the direct control of the Imperial Government could be counted on to maintain the Open Door.

Also in another respect did the example of other powers influence the growth of Imperialism in England. There are fashions in all things, even in world politics. All over the world in the second half of the century the tendency was against particularism and in favour of the amalgamation of small States into larger. Italy had been united in 1861 and Germany in 1871. In America the North had carried a destructive civil war to victory in order to preserve national unity. To many Englishmen the case of the British Empire seemed parallel to those of Germany, Italy and the United States. What these countries had done the British Empire could do too, and to do so was the more necessary, because the more the great States of the world grew in size and power, the more precarious became the existence of the smaller powers. (See p. 173.) What the *Pall Mall Gazette* wrote about the colonies in 1869, (2) held good of the mother country as well: "Of late this prospect (of independence) has seemed less grateful than formerly to the colonies. The tendency of men's minds everywhere has been to the aggregation of small and the better consolidation of large States, and neither in Europe, nor in America does the course of events seem to promise well for the continued independence of the weaker powers." "Shall we," said Labilliere,(3) "furnish the only exception to the rule of the unity of kindred people?"(4)

The examples of Germany and the United States were above all instrumental in suggesting a *federal* solution of the colonial question. Of such a solution there was an example within the Empire itself, namely the Dominion of Canada, which was proving a success in spite of the prophecies of Goldwin Smith.

(1) Labillere *Federal Britain,* p. 41. Similarly the *Quarterly Review,* July 1863, p. 143, and Jenkins in the *Contemporary Review* (Jan. 1871, p. 169.) G. F. Bowen in his *30 Years of Colonial Government,* p. 5, points to the colonial development of other powers as one of the causes of the rise of British Imperialism. (2) Dec. 20. (3) Paper read at the Westminster Conference of 1871; reprinted in *Federal Britain* p. 69. (4) Similarly Arnold Forster, "Why should we, and we alone, shun a consummation which every other nation in the world is striving to attain? Wherever we look in Europe we find Governments and nations ready to spend blood and treasure for the attainment of that which we fortunately possess — namely the union of the members of a kindred race" (*The Liberal Idea and the Colonies. Nineteenth Century,* Sept. 1883). Cf. also Young, *Imperial Federation* p. 33, Macfie, in his paper read before the Social Science Congress at Bristol 1867, and Seeley in his letter to the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference $^{29}/_{7}$, 1889. *(Report of the Conference).*

A revival of the interest in emigration at the end of the 'sixties did much to stimulate the new interest in the colonies and the desire to retain them. (See p. 103 ff). Logically, of course, the retention of the colonies was not necessary in order to maintain an outlet for emigration, for, as was constantly pointed out by the Separatists, even if the colonies became independent, emigrants could still go there, unless, indeed, they should use their independence to keep emigrants out. Such a step was, however, actually feared on the part of the United States after the conclusion of the Civil War, and that there was even on the part of the self-governing British colonies an inclination to exclude emigrants was notorious. In any case it could not be denied that the hardships inseparable from emigration were considerably increased when the emigrant had to go to a foreign country and change his allegiance, and that all emigrants would be lost to the British State if the colonies were cut adrift. This is an argument which constantly reappears in the writings of the early Imperialists.

It is also possible that the extension of the franchise by the Reform Act of 1867 may indirectly have had at least something to do with the change of public opinion with which we are dealing. That Separatism was never really popular, and that the working men of England never shared the views on colonial policy of the middle class Governments who ruled them is an assertion which has often been made,(1) and which may be true, though it is not easy to prove, for the English working classes in the 'sixties and 'seventies were largely inarticulate. The assertion was made already at the time. Roebuck had written as early as 1849:(2) "The people of this country have never acquiesced in the opinion that our colonies are useless; and they look with disfavour upon any scheme of policy with contemplates the separation of the mother country from the colonies. For this opinion the people have been seldom able to render an adequate reason." Sir John Pakington, speaking in the House of Commons, Feb. 28, 1867, maintained that not one per cent of the people of England was really in favour of colonial emancipation.(3) Macfie in a debate in the House of Commons May 12th 1871,(4) expressed his regret that the Government had so long failed to recognize "the great interest which the majority of the people, and especially the working classes, felt in the subject of the relations between the mother country and her colonies." The association of early Imperialism with the agitation for State supported emigration — distinctly a working-man's movement, — the monster petition of working

(1) e. g. Duncan Hall, *the British Commonwealth of Nations*, p. 55. J. M. Dalton: (*Nineteenth Century*, July 1884). *The Federal States of the World.*"

(2) *The Colonies of England*, pp. 7—8. (3) *Hansard* III. 185. p. 1190.

(4) *Hansard* III. 206. p. 750. Similarly Sir Stafford Northcote in a debate at the Bristol Congress of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science in 1869. (Transactions of the N. A. P. S. S. for 1889 p. 129.) and the Marquess of Normanby, House of Lords, $^{19}/_{2}$, 1867. (*Hansard*. III, 185, p. 576 b.) Sir Julius Vogel in *Greater or Lesser Britain* (*Nineteenth Century*, July 1877, p. 816) maintains that "a very large proportion of the adult working population hold the colonies in high, though mystical veneration."

men to the Queen in 1870 (see p. 104), and the fact that some of the early Imperialists were Radicals point in the same direction.(1)

That the working classes — in so far as they took any interest in the subject at all — should be against the colonial policy of the Manchester School, is not very wonderful. Many of them had relatives and friends who were doing well in the colonies. They had no reason to look with any special favour on the Manchester School, which was essentially an employers' movement, and which showed little understanding of the working men's interests. In whatever light it may have appeared to other classes, to them at least it must have been manifest that as far as social policy was concerned the laissez-faire school of economy was a failure, and that the surrender of England to the laws of supply and demand had not made it a better country for poor men to live in.

Finally some other causes, which did not appear till the Imperialistic movement was well started, helped to swell it. It was undoubtedly helped forward by that reaction towards national self-assertiveness (with which it became later on vaguely associated), which did so much to bring the second Disraeli Administration into power in 1874, and which characterized the foreign policy of that Government. It was stimulated by the growing interest in exotic countries and overseas life which transformed the country-cousin of former days into the modern lady novelist's hero from the Prairie or the Veldt. It received a new impetus when some of the colonies offered to send contingents to the Sudan, thus upsetting the stock argument of the Anti-Colonials, that any military assistance from the colonies in Imperial wars was outside the bounds of possibility.

While the forces which were transforming public opinion on the colonial question were complex, somewhat intangible, and rather difficult to trace, the immediate cause which set the ball rolling is comparatively easy to determine. In 1868 the first Gladstone Government came into power. This may be looked upon as the first Liberal, as distinguished from Whig Administration, and it was considerably more influenced by Radical thought than any earlier Ministry. It was, therefore, a Government from which Radical measures and new departures were expected. It was known to have certain leanings towards the Manchester School, indeed John Bright was a member of the Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade. It is then not to be wondered at that the public was prepared to see the Government undertake to effect a signal change in the relations between the colonies and the mother country, perhaps even to follow the line indicated by Goldwin Smith. Such an event was expected by

(1) The attitude of the *Beehive* — a working-man's paper — is curious. On Oct. 9th, 1869, it eulogizes Goldwin Smith, assuring him that the representatives of the working-men in Parliament will share his views on colonial policy. In the course of November the paper is apparently converted, for on Dec. 4th it launches an attack on the "servile or lazy acquiescense" of politicians in the doctrines of the Separatists, and from now on it is on the side of the Imperialists, asserting on Feb. 19. 1870, that though "certain classes" have tried to get rid of the colonies, the newly enfranchised working men will put a stop to that.

Goldwin Smith himself, who had written in *The Empire*:(1) "It is not to be expected that an inch of the Empire will be given up by the present Premier (Palmerston). Though youthful in bodily vigour, he is old in ideas and unconscious of the great moral and material changes which have taken place in Europe since he first entered public life. But he will be succeeded, probably, by statesmen more imbued with the ideas, and more alive to the exigencies of our own age; and depend upon it, such statesmen will be disposed to retrench our Empire in order to add to our security and greatness." Another critic of the colonial connexion, John Noble, speaking after the formation of the Gladstone Government, voiced the confidence of the opponents of the colonial connexion that the new Government would do something to meet their wishes:(2) "The existing condition of affairs is unjust and oppressive as respects the people of this country. The Americans revolted because the Home Government imposed taxes upon them; now the case is reversed: British taxpayers demand emancipation from taxation imposed upon them by the colonies." He trusted, however, to the Gladstone Government to bring this state of things to an end: "At great change is imminent in the administration of our colonial dominion."

Certain events which took place soon after the coming into power of the Gladstone Government seemed to confirm the impression that a new departure in colonial policy was imminent. In Canada Alexander Galt, who at that time maintained decidedly Separatist views, (3) was offered the Order of St. Michael and St. George under circumstances which lent colour to the belief that the Home Government shared his views.(4) About the same time the Governor General of Canada in his official capacity made a speech at Halifax which was (probably erroneously) interpreted as giving official support to the schemes of annexation to the United States, and Sir Philip Wodehouse, the Governor of Cape Colony, in an address to the Legislative Assembly, declared that "in Northern America, we have unmistakable indications of the rapid establishment of a powerful independent State. In Australia it is probable that its several settlements with their great wealth and homogeneous population will see their to a similar coalition. In New Zealand, the severance is being accomplished under very painful circumstances."(5) That the abandonment of the West African Colony of

(1) Op. cit. p. 10. (2) At the Bristol Congress of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, Sept. 1869. (*Transactions* of the N. A. P. S. S., 1869, p. 111.) (3) He lived, however, to become a prominent member of the Imperial Federation League. (4) *The Beehive,* April 14, 1870. Cf. also Skelton: *Life of Galt,* pp. 451—457. R. R. Torrens in the House of Commons, April 26, 1870, pointed out that Galt had stated before the Canadian Parliament his conviction, based upon correspondence with the Home Government, that "the policy of independence had been arrived at by the Imperial Government, and, so far as his loyalty to the Crown was concerned, he stood on the same ground as the Ministers of the Crown of England," and that the Colonial Secretary had refused to publish the correspondence referred to. (*Hansard,* III, 200 p. 1820). Cf. also Froude: *the Colonies once More,* p. 197 and the *Spectator* $^{26}/_{3}$, 1870, p. 393. (5) Quoted by Torrens in the House of Commons, April 26, 1870. (*Hansard.* III. p. 200. p. 1823.)

Gambia to the French was contemplated was admitted by the Government in the House of Commons, June 10, 1870.(1)

These supposed signs of a desire on the part of the Government to get rid of the colonies were, however, insignificant in comparison with the effect of the policy pursued toward New Zealand, a policy which did more than anything else to spread the belief in the Separatism of the Gladstone Government.

In pursuance of the policy laid down by the House of Commons in 1862 and acted upon by successive Governments of both parties, the Gladstone Government was carrying out the evacuation of New Zealand by the Imperial troops. There would have been nothing remarkable in this, if New Zealand had not at the time been afflicted by a dangerous rising of the natives in the North Island, who for years resisted all attempts to suppress the outbreak. In the spring of 1869, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Granville, in a series of dispatches repeatedly refused requests from New Zealand for the retention of some of the Imperial forces in view of the dangerous military situation, (a policy which, it is only fair to add, had also been followed by his predecessor in the Derby-Disraeli Administration of 1866—1868, the Duke of Buckingham)(2) and urged the speedy embarkation of the remaining troops.(3) The dispatch which did most to give a large section of the public both in England and in the colonies the impression that the Government was actuated by something like hostility to the settlers was that of March 21, 1869. The New Zealand Government had asked the Imperial Government for the loan of one and a half millions for defence purposes. This was refused by Lord Granville in a dispatch, the tone of which would hardly have been admissible in a note to a foreign power under strained relations. It reminded the colony that its founders har occupied New Zealand without any invitation or encouragement from the Home Government, hinted that the Maori wars had been caused by the greed of the settlers and by their unwise attempts to appropriate the lands of the natives, and pointed out that, so far from the New Zealanders being morally entitled to claim the support of the mother country, England had already spent large sums for the benefit of the colonists, and that there existed "a claim, and a very heavy claim, if we thought proper to urge it, on the part of the mother country against the colony."(4)

These events attracted no small attention. Viscount Bury called the attention of the House of Commons to the situation in New Zealand on July 22, 1869, in a long speech, and advocated the granting

(1) *Hansard.* III. 201, pp. 1842—43. (2) Cf. his dispatch of Dec. 1. 1868, in which he washes his hands of all responsibility in respect of the military defence of the settlers, and maintains that the European population "is fully able to defend themselves, if they make the proper arrangements, against a few thousand disaffected Maories, of whom a few hundred only appear to be at present in arms. *Parliamentary Papers,* XLIV, Sess. 1868—69). (3) The correspondence is printed in *Parl. Papers.* XLIV, Sess. 1868—69. (4) *Parliamentary Papers,* XLIV, Sess. 1868—69.

of assistance to the colony.(1) Lord Carnarvon, who had attacked the policy of the Government in a letter to the *Times,* November 3, 1869, raised the question in the House of Lords, February 14, 1870,(2) characterized the withdrawal of the troops in the midst of a dangerous native war as "unwise and churlish," and criticized the language of Granville's dispatches. A protest against the objectionable dispatch of March 21, appeared in the London press on June 18, 1869, over the names of the well known colonial administrator, Sir George Grey, and four other prominent New Zealanders, declaring "that the policy which is being pursued towards New Zealand would have the effect of alienating the affections of His Majesty's loyal subjects in that contry, and was calculated to drive the colony out of the Empire."(3)

The English daily press, otherwise none too interested in colonial affairs, took up the New Zealand question, and in the latter half of 1869 it became a constantly recurring topic. The *Times* had a leader on it about once a week. It gave its entire approval to the policy of Lord Granville and adopted a tone towards the colonies which surpassed in unpleasantness even that of the Colonial Secretary. Thus in a leading article, October 14, 1869, it asserted that the Maori war "originated in the colonial greed of land," and that the New Zealand militia was "recruited from the dregs of the New Zealand towns." As to the requests for Imperial assistance, it declared that "it was as unreasonable and unbecoming for New Zealand in its political capacity to beg help in a domestic difficulty from Great Britain as it would be for Berkshire to importune Oxfordshire to assist in paying its rates." It even opposed the proposal to guarantee a loan to New Zealand. (May 17, 1870). The Liberal *Daily News*(4) and the Conservative *Morning Post*(5) took up a similar position.

On the other hand, the Conservative *Standard* carried on a regular campaign against Lord Granville, and the Radical, but anti-Manchester *Spectator* strongly criticized the tone adopted by the Colonial Office towards New Zealand, describing the dispatches as "from end to end a repertory of carefully worded and apparently intentional contempt. The department evidently dislikes and despises New Zealanders, as it once despised and disliked the people of the thirteen colonies .... The tone of every Ministerialist is that of a man who does not care to dismiss a servant, but who dislikes him so much that he will be delighted if he gives warning and takes himself out of the house. No tone is so calculated to alienate the colonists .... it hurts them like a snub from a superior hurts the subordinate, irritates them like the rejection of a profferred friendship, drives them into enmity as a condition of continued self-respect."(6)

It is quite possible, indeed probable, that to Granville and the Cabinet the New Zealand question was merely an isolated and not very significant affair. Probably the New Zealand policy was due, not to

(1) *Hansard* III, 198, pp. 456—68. (2) *Hansard* III, 199, pp. 193—213. (3) The *Times,* June 18, 1869. (4) E. g. July 24, 1869. (5) E. g. July 24, 1869. (6) July 24, 1869.

Lord Granville, but to the permanent officials of the Colonial Office, notably Blachford, whose notes(1) show that he was in complete sympathy with that policy. By the public at large, however, it was widely interpreted as part and parcel of a deliberate policy of colonial emancipation. When Froude wrote in 1870,(2) "G(ladstone) and Co. deliberately intend to shake off the colonies. They are privately using their command of the situation in order to make the separation inevitable," he was giving expression to an opinion which was shared by many of his countrymen. In fact, the assertion or denial of Separatist intentions on the part of the Government forms the dominant note of almost all writings on the subject in 1869 and 1870.

A few examples will suffice. The *Spectator* for July 24, 1869, writes: "It is clear that Mr. Goldwin Smith's colonial 'policy,' the policy, that is, of shaking off the colonies as too burdensome .... has not only been accepted by the existing Government, but that they are acting on it. It is not only New Zealand which is going to be dismissed, but Australia, not only Australia, but the Canadian Dominion, all that ring of Anglo-Saxon States which, with a little trouble, a little patience, and a little consideration for men who, even in the presence of a Colonial Office clerk, think themselves vertebrate animals, might be converted into a chain of faithful and most powerful allies;" and it warns the Government that a day will arrive when the country will call it to account for what it has done: "even this Government, powerful as it is, will wince under the question 'What have you done with the British Empire?'" The monster petition to the Queen from working men in London (see p. 104) states that they have "heard with alarm and indignation that your Majesty has been advised to consent to give up the colonies." The *Standard* is constantly accusing the Government of Separatism all through the autumn and winter of 1869—70. Thus on October 13, 1869, it writes: „Solely on his own responsibility, and without any sanction from any of the recognized depositories of public opinion, the Ministry of Mr. Gladstone have resolved to dismember the Empire. By a minute of Lord Granville it has been decreed that there shall be no colonies." Edward Jenkins writes in the *Contemporary Review* (January 1871): "We are exposed to the possibility of waking up unexpectedly to find our Empire slipped away in a night; cut loose by our statesmen." As late as 1872,(3) J. Mathews remarks: "The members of the Gladstone administration seem fully to share the views of those who look on the weakening of the colonial tie as a cause for congratulation." "Indeed, to suppose that the policy which we are criticizing (the withdrawal of Imperial troops from the colonies) can have been adopted with any other design than that of serving as an initiatory step towards emancipation, seems absurd."(4)

(1) Cf. *Letters of Lord Blachford,* p. 298. (2) To Skelton *The Table Talk of Shirley,* p. 142. (3) *A Colonist on the Colonial Question,* pp. 60, 62.

(4) Similarly the *Globe,* Dec. 12, 1869, and *Blackwood's Magazine,* Dec. 1869 (pp. 272—76), Feb. 1870, (pp. 260—61) and April 1870 (p. 513). Cf. also *Our River* by "A Colonial Briton." (1871.) (See further pp. 97. 98, 112.)

The assertion that the Gladstone Government was in favour of cutting the colonies adrift repeatedly found its way into Parliament. Lord Carnarvon, speaking in the House of Lords, February 14, 1870, said: "There is a whisper abroad that there is a policy on foot to dismember this Empire. I cannot believe it, but it is said that such a policy exists. If there is such a policy, in God's name let us know it: if there be not, let it be disavowed. There has certainly been some confirmation of these rumours, of the force of which we are as capable of judging as anybody else."(1) R. R. Torrens, ex-Premier of South Australia, spoke in the House of Commons, April 26, 1870, of the "feeling of uneasiness and uncertainty respecting the character and the permanency of the political relations existing between this country and her colonies,"(2) and said that "with the deepest regret he must state that a conviction — whether founded on adequate grounds or otherwise — had been induced upon the colonial mind, that it was the deliberate policy and set purpose of Her Majesty's Government to bring about a separation; that in furtherance of that purpose some colonies were encouraged by significant suggestions to ask for independence, whilst others were being incited and goaded on to the same end by an unequal and inconsistent course of difficulties, by misrepresentations and bitter taunts, when the circumstances rather called for indulgent and sympathetic consideration."(3) Earl Russell and Earl Grey both alluded to it in the course of a debate in the House of Lords, June 20, 1870,(4) and Baillie Cochrane spoke in a debate in the House of Commons, May 12, 1871,(5) of "the prevalent impression in the House and in the country that the Government regarded with indifference the interests of our colonial empire and that their separation would occasion little regret."

In fact the whole discussion of the colonial question in 1869 and 1870 is pervaded by these rumours. Reading the newspaper files of the period one cannot help being struck by the fact that the emancipation of the colonies was looked upon, not only as a possible, but as a probable event. The tone adopted is often one suggestive of the last defence of a lost cause. Thus the *Standard* writes:(6) "Let us not perish in the thick darkness of official ignorance. The decree which is to dissolve the Empire should be the solemn and deliberate decree of the whole people. The decision should be given with all the authority of the whole nation, and, as we venture to affirm, after formal consultation with the various members of it which are to be rejected."

The answers of the Ministerialists to these accusations of Separatism were not, at first, calculated to make an end of the rumours. In his reply to the deputation from the Cannon Street Meetings on December 15, 1869, (see p. 101) Lord Granville said that "he would

(1) *Hansard* III, 199, p. 209. (2) *Hansard* III. 200, p. 1817. (3) Ibid. p. 1820. The popular belief that the Government was in favour of Separatism was alluded to by Viscount Sandon in the same debate. Ibid. p. 1891.
(4) *Hansard* III. 202, pp. 454, 472. (5) *Hansard* III, 206, p. 768.
(6) November 26, 1869. Similarly *Blackwood's* Feb. 1870, pp. 260—61.

be exceedingly sorry to see England deprived of all her colonies, but England would never attempt to retain them by brute force,"(1) an answer which was taken by the meeting to be an indirect avowal that he would not be sorry to see the emancipation of *some* colonies. In the House of Lords, February 14, 1870, he gave a very evasive answer to Lord Carnarvon's challenge,(2) repeated the statement that no attempt would be made to retain an unwilling colony by force, and asserted that, though "many thougtful men" looked forward to a peaceful separation, the majority would prefer to retain the Imperial connexion. A supporter of the Government, Viscount Monck,(3) declared himself to be in favour of colonial emancipation, quoted Cornewall Lewis to the effect that colonies were useless, and asserted that, in spite of disavowals, he believed that the tendency of the Ministerial policy was in the direction of colonial independence, and that that policy had his support on those grounds.(4) Attacked by R. R. Torrens in the House of Commons, April 26, 1870, Gladstone gave the following explanation which was not calculated to allay the misgivings of those who feared for the Imperial connection: "There ought to be nothing to preclude the hope when the growth of a colonial possession is such as to make separation from the mother country a natural and beneficial result, that that separation so far from being effected by violence and blood-shed might be the result of a peaceable and friendly transaction. Surely it is a great object to place, if possible, our colonial policy on such a footing, not for the purpose of bringing about a separation but of providing a guarantee that, if such a separation should occur, it should be in a friendly way. That is the sense, the principle, and the secret of our policy."(5)

In a debate in the House of Commons on May 12, 1871, the Government did at length(6) come forward with an emphatic disavowal of the idea of colonial emancipation. Speaking of the Separatist theories, the Under Secretary for the Colonies, Knatchbull-Hugessen, said: "they were not opinions which had ever been avowed — and he hoped they never would be avowed by a British Government. It was not difficult to point out some of the advantages which had been derived and were still derivable from the British system of colonization ... Let them (the colonies) feel that there was nothing to be gained by separation; let them have nothing to complain of; let them see that we regard them as brethren, make their interests our own .... This was the policy of the Government." "He confessed that there had often floated before his mind a vision of a confederation of all English speaking people bound together by a tie too light to be galling or oppressive, but too strong to be broken by hostile attack. But for the

(1) *The Times,* Dec. 17, 1869. (2) *Hansard* III. 199, p. 213. (3) The first Governor General of the Dominion of Canada. (4) *Hansard* III, 199, pp. 226—28. (5) *Hansard* III, 200, p. 1901. (6) A disavowal of any intention to cut New Zealand adrift was given by Granville to commissioners from New Zealand in January 1870, but does not seem to have gained much publicity at home (Rusden: *History of New Zealand.* II. pp. 636—37; 2nd ed.).

realization of any such vision they must wait for the development of the still distant future."(1)

It was the belief that the Gladstone Government was about to cut the colonies adrift and that their treatment of New Zealand was part and parcel of a deliberate scheme for bringing about such an event which started the new Imperialist movement. Throughout its earliest stages it was coloured by this belief and closely associated with protests against the New Zealand policy of the Government. Insignificant as were the beginnings of that movement and trivial as were the first stages by which its progress was marked — they are now almost forgotten — it may be worth while to give some account of this reaction against the supposed Separatism of the Gladstone Government, because it forms, as it were, the turning point in the English outlook on the colonial question: until 1869 Separatism had been in the ascendant, after that year Imperialism is steadily gaining ground.

"The Royal Colonial Institute," or, as it was originally called "The Colonial Society," may be looked upon either as a forerunner of or as a very early force in the new movement. It was founded on June 26, 1868, but its inaugural meeting was not held until May 15, 1869. Its nominal founder(2) and first President was Viscount Bury, the author of *The Exodus of the Western Nations,* who had now modified his earlier Separatist views. Its objects were at first somewhat nebulous. It had some of the character of a colonial club, for it proposed to provide a meeting place for people connected with or interested in the colonies, and to establish a reading room and a library. It was also to be a scientific institution with the object of promoting knowledge of and interest in problems connected with the colonies, and it was Lord Bury's ambition to make it correspond to the Royal Geographical Society. At its meetings papers on colonial subjects were to be read and discussed, and it was to undertake scientific, literary, and statistical investigations in connection with Imperial problems. The Society was to be entirely non-political.(3) That it was not originally meant to be a centre of Imperialist propaganda seems sufficiently indicated by the fact that its President was the author of *The Exodus of the Western Nations,* who as late as 1870 maintained that the emancipation of colonies was a law of nature.(4)

The original non-partisan character of the Society is furthermore seen from the fact that Lord Granville was one of the vice-presidents, that Monck and Rogers were on the Council, and that Gladstone, Granville and Childers were present at the inaugural dinner, where Gladstone spoke about "the noble tradition of the unity of the British race" and the American Ambassador, Reverdy Johnson, somewhat tactlessly

(1) *Hansard* III. 106, pp. 761—68. (2) Its real originator is said to have been its first honorary secretary, Roche. (3) Report of the Foundation Meeting, *Proceedings of The Royal Colonial Institute,* 1868—69. (4) House of Commons, $^{26}/_{4}$, 1870, (*Hansard* III. 200, pp. 1850, 1851).

alluded to the possibility "that some of the colonies which now flourish under the dominion of Her Majesty, and have so much reason to be proud of that dominion, may in the process of time find themselves under the flag of the United States."(1) On the same occasion another speaker, Sir Charles Clifford, alluded to a feeling that the colonies were not essential to the welfare of England, and declared that "that feeling does not exist in this room," a statement which was greeted with applause.

In fact the non-partisan character of the Society did not prevent it from joining in the agitation for Imperial unity which began to gather headway soon after its foundation, and before long it became one of the headquarters of that movement. Its motto was "United Empire." The inaugural meeting (March 15, 1869) was opened by Lord Bury with a speech in which he alluded to the dangerous influence of Goldwin Smith, attacked "the school of politicians whose leading idea appears to be that colonies are an excrescence of our Empire, rather than an important element of its prosperity; an encumbrance rather than a material element of strength, a source of commercial and political loss rather than of national wealth,"(2) and stated that one of the chief duties of the new-formed Society would be to combat those doctrines. In his attack on the Separatists, he was supported by the prominent Liberal politician, Chichester-Fortescue, and others. The very first paper read before the Society was *On the Relations of the Colonies to the Mother Country* by William Westgarth (see below) in which it was maintained that the retention of the colonies was beneficial to England, and that the Empire was likely to last.(3) In the following years a number of papers of a decidedly Imperialist character were read: thus, *The Colonial Question* (1870), *Practical Suggestions on our Colonial Relations* (1871), and *Propositions For the Reform of Our Relations With the Colonies* (1872), all by Westgarth, *The Crisis of the Empire. Imperial Federation* by Macfie (1871) etc., etc.

The Society had only few members. At the start there were 174 fellows, but among them were men of high standing such as Cardwell, Lord Carnarvon, Childers, Lord Granville, the Duke of Manchester, Herman Merivale, Sir Stafford Northcote and the Marquis of Salisbury.(4) Among the members who took part in the proceedings were some men of less prominence, who were, however, to play no inconsiderable part in the movement, such as: Labilliere, a Victorian who had settled down in England, and Edward Wilson, the English-born editor of the influential Melbourne paper, the *Argus,* who, having spent over twenty years in Victoria, had returned to England about 1864. William Westgarth, the author of several books on Australia, was another English-born Colonial; he had been a member of the legislatures of New South Wales and Victoria, and had returned to London after

(1) *P. R. C. I.* 1869, p. 22. (2) *P. R. C. I.* 1869. (3) *P. R C. I.* 1869.
(4) From the list of Fellows, 1870. No earlier list seems to have been published.

having spent seventeen years in Melbourne. James A. Youl was a native-born Tasmanian, who had settled in England in 1854, and who had been agent for Tasmania from 1861 to 1863. Macfie, the Liberal member for Leith, F. Young, C. W. Eddy, Edw. Jenkins and Drummond Wolff — in fact almost all the men who were to take part in the early movement — were also among the fellows.

The Royal Colonial Institute was, however, by the small number of its members and by its semi-scientific character, prevented from immediately and directly exercising any very great influence on the public mind. The first beginnings of a popular Imperialist movement took the form of a reaction against the supposed anti-colonial policy of the Government as exemplified by their treatment of New Zealand.

On August 26, 1869, a circular dated August 13, and signed by James A. Youl, Henry Sewell, (a former Premier of New Zealand) and H. Blaine appeared in the London press. The contents of this circular were as follows:(1) at a meeting of "influential colonists" in England at the Colonial Society's Rooms on Aug. 4, 1869, it had been resolved to appoint a Committee "with a view (among other things) of communicating with the different colonial Governments in reference to the present state of relations between the mother country and her colonies." The occasion which gave rise to the above meeting was "the announcement of a policy by the Home Government towards her colonies (applied to the particular case of New Zealand) which appeared to demand consideration from all persons interested in the colonies" and which "seemed to point as an ulterior result to a severance of the connexion between the colonies and the mother country, perhaps hurriedly and in an unfriendly spirit." The object of the circular was to bring about a conference of representatives of the colonies in London in February 1870 in order that they might discuss and urge upon the Home Government such changes in the present relations as might appear desirable.

In England this circular created some stir among a public whose attention had already been directed towards the colonies by the Maori War. The relations between England and her colonies began to be debated in the daily press, and throughout the latter half of 1869 and the beginning of 1870 the contributions to this discussion grew in volume.

An examination of this newspaper controversy throws an interesting light on the English attitude towards the colonial problems at the time. The *Times,* while stating its opinion that the circular "marked an epoch," hinted that the proposed conference might be used in order to negotiate a peaceful separation.(2) "There is no ground for surprise," it wrote, "still less for indignation, if it be asked whether it

(1) The *Times*. Aug. 26, 1869 (2) "If the policy now pursued point, as the circular before us says, to the severance of the connection between the colonies and the mother country, it is well that the end should be foreseen and provided for, so that it be not at last achieved hurriedly and in an unfriendly spirit." (Aug. 26, 1869).

would not be better for both Englishmen and Australians, if the independence the latter have in fact should receive a name." One must not be misled by metaphors like "mother country": England, the *Times* maintained, could only be called the mother country of Australia in the same sense as Slesvig-Holstein was the mother country of England.(1) "All that is really valuable in the existing Imperial system," it wrote on September 10, 1869, "may be preserved even though the dreaded dissolution be more imminent than we ourselves believe, while the change all men agree in foreseeing will almost certainly produce even more benefit to the colonies than to the mother country .... Nor do we believe that the conception of scattered Britains united in the closest friendship and inheriting the traditions of a common history, is one whit less ennobling than the proud but somewhat arrogant dream of one armed power overawing the world."

On the other hand the *Morning Post*(2) expressed its approval of the circular and strongly deprecated the policy of cutting the colonies adrift: such a step, it maintained, would mean the end of England's greatness. The independent *Pall Mall Gazette* was sympathetic, and the Conservative *Standard* and the Radical *Spectator,* both took up the case of the colonists with great vigour: in a leading article, September 7, 1869, the *Standard* asserted that the colonial problem was not a question of material advantages, tariffs, etc.: "Over them all", it wrote, "presides a feeling, an emotion, a sentiment, which can neither be weighed nor sold for so much a yard, but which is nevertheless just as much a real force in the world as family affection or ambition, hatred or love." In a series of leading articles,(3) it attacked the alleged Separatism of the Gladstone Government and the "policy of drift" (an expression which the Imperialists had taken over from Goldwin Smith, who had used it about the passive continuance of the Imperial connexion), maintained that the loss of the colonial Empire would be disastrous to England, pointed out the value of the colonial, compared with foreign markets, and enthusiastically applauded each new champion of the movement.

The *Spectator,* which on Jan. 23rd, 1869, had printed a eulogy on Lord Granville, and which on Jan. 30 and May 22, had deprecated the grant of military assistance to New Zealand, evidently became convinced that the Government was about to cut the colonies adrift, and in June 1869 it threw itself into a violent campaign against the colonial policy of the Gladstone Government, which it attacked in a number of well-informed and well-written articles.(4)

The Youl Circular received the approbation of the veteran statesman Earl Grey, who in a letter of Sept. 4, 1869, to Youl,(5) declared his belief that the policy of the Gladstone Government would lead to

(1) Ibid. (2) August 27, 1869. (3) $^{11}/_{9}$, $^{18}/_{9}$; $^{2}/_{10}$; $^{28}/_{10}$; $^{4}/_{11}$; $^{26}/_{11}$; $^{3}/_{12}$; $^{11}/_{12}$; $^{24}/_{12}$; $^{29}/_{12}$; $^{31}/_{12}$; 1869; and $^{26}/_{1}$; $^{4}/_{4}$; $^{26}/_{4}$; $^{27}/_{4}$; $^{29}/_{4}$; $^{2}/_{5}$; $^{24}/_{5}$; $^{31}/_{5}$; $^{13}/_{6}$; $^{22}/_{6}$; 1870. (4) $^{5}/_{6}$, $^{26}/_{6}$, $^{24}/_{7}$, $^{28}/_{8}$, $^{4}/_{9}$, $^{18}/_{9}$, $^{16}/_{10}$, $^{18}/_{12}$, $^{25}/_{12}$ 1869 and $^{8}/_{1}$, $^{19}/_{2}$, $^{12}/_{3}$, $^{26}/_{3}$, $^{30}/_{4}$, $^{14}/_{5}$, $^{9}/_{7}$, $^{27}/_{8}$, $^{10}/_{9}$, $^{1}/_{10}$, $^{8}/_{10}$, 1870. (5) Printed in the *Times* $^{26}/_{10}$ 1869.

the loss of the colonies, and expressed his approval of the proposed conference, as a step calculated to avert such an event. But, he added, even though the present policy would probably lead to a disruption of the Empire, he did not think that policy ought to be discontinued unless certain conditions were fulfilled, namely the resumption by the Imperial Government of some of the powers of self-government which had hitherto been left to the colonies.

Grey's attitude is typical of a certain tendency to use the difficult situation in which New Zealand found itself as a pistol to hold up to the heads of the colonists in order to make them give up some of their autonomy, a tendency discernible in many contributions to the discussion of the colonial question at the time. It is found, not only in papers like the *Pall Mall Gazette,* whose attitude to the movement was not wholly one of approval, but even in such ardent supportes of the cause as the *Standard* (see further page 138).

Another characteristic of the newspaper debate in the latter half of 1869 and the beginning of 1870 is a certain tendency to adopt an attitude of "I told you so:" the colonists have only themselves to blame; they have asked for too great a measure of self government, and now they find that they are not strong enough to shift for themselves.(1)

Another characteristic is the rather supercilious tone adopted towards the colonies, which are evidently regarded somewhat in the light of troublesome poor relations. Even a friendly journal like the *Evening Star,* takes it for granted that "a colonist would hardly be a colonist if he had not got a grievance."(2) while the *Times* sneers at "the volubility of their complaints," and at the "wonderful unanimity" with which they forget their local quarrels in the attempt to get the mother country to help them.(3)

An evidence of the interest which the public was beginning to take in the colonial question is the prominence given to that subject at the Bristol Meeting of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science in September and October, 1869, where *the Legal and Constitutional Relations Between England and her Colonies* were made the subject of a discussion, papers being read by J. E. Gorst, Thomas Hare, John Noble, Labilliere, end Macfie. Of these papers, that of John Noble was the only one that did not advocate the retention of the colonies. Noble, following the traditional lines, inquired what were the advantages accruing to the mother country from her connexion with the self-governing colonies, and arrived at the conclusion that, neither as customers, nor as fields of emigration, did they offer any advantages which they would not offer equally if they were independent nations, that their retention caused considerable expenditure and that therefore the advantage of the connexion, if any, was solely with the colonies and not with the mother country(4). Of the papers favourable to the Imperial connexion that of Labilliere was the one in which the new outlook on the

(1) Thus e. g. the *Pall Mall Gazette* $^{20}/_{12}$, 1869. (2) $^{3}/_{9}$, 1869.
(3) $^{26}/_{7}$, 1869. (4) *Transactions* of the N.A.P.S.S. 1869. (See also p. 88).

colonial question is most clearly perceptible. It is a well written essay(1), sustained by the writer's enthusiasm for and belief in the future of the Empire. As far as the material advantages of the Imperial connexion are concerned Labilliere meets the Separatist arguments by pointing out that, if the colonies were independent there would be the expense of keeping up diplomatic relations with them and of maintaining men-of-war in their waters for the protection of British interests, while in case of war England would no longer have the advantage of being able to use their ports as naval bases. Besides, the growth of the colonial populations made it probable that they would in time become sources of military strength. Furthermore, the prestige of having possessions in all quarters of the Globe must be taken into account. It is, however, not on material, but on sentimental grounds that Labilliere chiefly bases his case: it cannot seriously be maintained, he writes, that it is not an advantage "that Englishmen at home, an Englishmen and their sons in the colonies, should not be foreigners to each others." "My great desire is to show that the idea of dismembering the British Empire should not for a moment be entertained by any good Englishman or by any good colonial; that the union of the Empire is a sentiment, or rather a sacred principle, in devoted loyalty to which we should vie with one another."(2) The paper concludes with the following characteristic passage: "When I look at the past history and present condition of British colonization I am amazed at the splendid vision, I should rather say splendid reality, that is before me. No portion of the history of England is more interesting and brilliant than that which records how this little island has, so to speak, been expanding herself over great continents, and has been developing herself through the Globe. Her language, her institutions, her liberties, have been sown broadcast over the face of the earth, and already in different soils and in various climes they have borne magnificent fruits. But splendid as the success of the past has been, splendid as the condition of the present is, the splendour both of the past and the present seems destined to be dimmed by what we are justified in expecting in the future. We have, hitherto, only seen England nursing infant nations. I believe and ardently hope, and I am certain I express the feelings of all the colonies in saying, that she is destined to retain under her mild sway her colonial children, long after they shall attain the maturity and strength of manhood. I am convinced that the existence of such a relation will not only be of vast moral and material advantage both to the parent nation and to the offspring nations, but will constitute an Empire more splendid than any the world has yet seen."

Such a passage may seem commonplace now. It was the very opposite at the time: The defence of the colonial connexion on sentimental grounds was then almost unknown, the apologists of the colonial

(1) Published as a pamphlet, under the name of *The Future Relations of England and her Colonies,* London 1869. (2) *Transactions* of the N. A. P. S. S. 1869. p. 114.

Empire having almost exclusively tried to meet the Manchester School on its own ground by marshalling again and again the same old half-score of arguments to prove the advantage of the connexion, and the note of romantic enthusiasm for the Imperialist idea was then almost without counterpart.

The other papers were not equal in interest to that of Labilliere. That of J. E. Gorst was a defence of colonial self-government, which, he maintained, was perfectly compatible with the unity of the Empire, and it incidentally touched upon a federal solution of the colonial question. Thomas Hare's paper was a somewhat fanciful scheme for a reform of the constitutional relations between England and her colonies by allowing each self-governing colony to appoint a member of its Ministry to serve in the British Cabinet as Secretary of State for that colony, and Macfie's was a plea for Imperial unity and a better understanding of the colonial point of view. To maintain that unity, he briefly suggested the formation of a standing Council of Advice composed of prominent men from all parts of the Empire.

In the discussion following the reading of the papers the policy of the Government towards New Zealand constantly cropped up, and the President of the Association, the Conservative ex-Minister, Sir Stafford Northcote, in concluding the debate criticised that policy and expressed his belief that the great majority of the British people were not in favour of dismemberment.(1)

On Nov. 10th, 1869, a long letter headed *National Disintegration* by Edward Wilson appeared in the *Times,* in which the writer maintained that the New Zealand policy of the Government must lead to separation and warned England that, though such an event would not necessarily be disastrous to the colonies, it might have very serious consequences to the mother country, which might wake up to find that, in letting the colonies go, it had "parted with three quarters of its prestige and half of its trade." If so vast an experiment were entered upon, it should, he maintained, at any rate be undertaken in a statesmanlike spirit: "we certainly ought not to moult away colonies, one by one, as feathers which we have become too spineless and decrepid to retain."(2)

The agitation started by the Youl circular was carried on by the series of weekly meetings which were held in the Cannon Street Hotel from November the 24th 1869 to January 5th 1870, and the principal share in convening which was taken by Edward Wilson. Youl was in the chair. The object of the meetings was explained on the first day by Wilson in the opening speech.(3) The relations between England

(1) *Transactions* of the N. A. P. S. S. 1869. p. 129. (2) In leading articles $^{10}/_{11}$ and $^{12}/_{11}$ the *Times* defends the Government against the accusations of Separatism and accuses Wilson of introducing the issue of disintegration himself "in a spirit which savours of menace". It will be noticed that the *Times* was not always consistent in its attitude to the colonial question.

(3) The *Times,* Nov. 25th, 1869.

and her colonies had, he said, arrived at a crisis, and a turning point in the history of the Empire had been reached. The Colonial Secretary was unfavourable to the Imperial connection, as appeared from his New Zealand despatches. A decision which involved the fate of the Empire ought, however, not to be taken without the voice of the people of England being heard, and the promoters of the meetings therefore considered it their duty to call the attention of the public to the dangerous trend of affairs.

In the discussion which followed, and in which, among others, Labilliere and Sir George Grey, of New Zealand fame, took part, the New Zealand dispatches were condemned, the advantages of the colonial Empire to the mother country were emphasized, and a series of resolutions drawn up by Westgarth were passed. One of these affirmed "that the colonies are a source of great commercial, political and social advantages to the parent country, and largely contribute to the influence and greatness of the Empire," while another declared "that, on the other hand the rights of Imperial citizenship, Imperial supervision, influence and example, and Imperial commerce and resources, promote all the best interests of the colonies, and they on their part are not wanting in a loyal appreciation of their beneficial relationship."(1) A third resolution declared "that this meeting deprecates the colonial policy of His Majesty's Government as illustrated by Lord Granville's dispatches."(2)

The meeting furthermore decided to form a deputation jointly with the Royal Colonial Institute in order to call upon Lord Granville. The deputation, which was introduced by Viscount Bury, (the Duke of Westminster, Frederick Young, Labilliere, C. W. Eddy, Roche, and others being among its members) called upon the Colonial Secretary on Dec. 15th, 1869(3) and urged upon him the expediency of calling together a conference of representatives from the colonies, as proposed by the Youl circular, for the purpose of discussing their relations with the mother country, the present state of things being unsatisfactory.

Lord Granville's reply was somewhat cold. He was not prepared to admit that relations with the colonies left anything to be desired, and he deprecated in somewhat vague terms the idea that he was hostile to the colonial connexion (see p. 93). This reply was considered unsatisfactory by the next Cannon Street Meeting (Dec. 22. 1869),(4) and provoked much indignation. The meeting passed a series of angry resolutions, one of them declaring "that as there is reason to fear that the policy of the Government is unfavourable to the maintenance and the consolidation of the British Empire, it is desirable that public opinion and action be evoked upon this momentous subject by holding public meetings and otherwise as occasion may serve."(4)

(1) The *Times* Dec. 2. 1869. (2) The *Times* Nov. 25. 1869. (3) The *Times* Dec. 17. 1869. (4) The *Times* Dec. 23. 1869. (5) The *Times* Dec. 23. 1869.

The Cannon Street Meetings, which had been for some time becoming somewhat confused, now entirely ceased to discuss general principles and devoted themselves to censuring Lord Granville and attacking the New Zealand policy of the Government. The meetings do not seem to have been well managed, and the course of proceedings was left too much to individual initiative. Long and wandering speeches were made. Interminable series of resolutions were proposed and carried. The proceedings became more and more futile.(1)

The Colonial Office was of course against the meetings from the very beginning.(2) The press, which at first had been, on the whole, not unfriendly, quickly dropped them as their failure began to become apparent. The *Times,* as was to be expected, was against them all along. Leading articles on Nov. 27 and Dec. 3 criticize the tone adopted by the meetings, and a leading article on Nov. 27th declares that "the time has come when the real equality of English-speaking communities must be pursued to its legitimate consequence. The only practical question is to what ultimate relations statesmen should look forward." Should they picture a group of friendly but independent states or "one vast Federation"? An examination of the latter alternative leads the *Times* to the conclusion that, "if the grand dream of Federation could be for a moment realized, it would break down under the first trial of its working." The deputation to Lord Granville is ridiculed. The speeches of its members are described as containing "flagrant puerilities", and "the Cannon Street Colonists and their noble patrons," who have been "brought to book" by the Colonial Secretary, are characterized as belonging to "a class of men whose beliefs are dreams, whose thoughts are guesses and who swallow the conclusions they accept."(3)

The Liberal *Daily Telegraph,* which at first supported the meetings,(4) later on took offence at the tone which began to prevail at them: "The loyalty of some of these gentlemen", it writes, "is so demonstrative as to be almost unpleasant. They may be as affectionately disposed towards the mother country as they claim to be; but it is hardly a filial way of showing fondness to 'square up' to the venerable creature with clenched fists and say in almost as many words that they will fight her if she does not lavish on them new displays of her maternal guardianship."(5)

The Liberal *Daily News* was full of contempt for "these purposeless and desultory meetings"(6). The Independent *Pall Mall Gazette* gently rebuked them for their fondness for abusing Lord Granville, instead of ascertaining what were the real wishes of the colonies, "and, above all, what sacrifices they were prepared to make."(7) The Conservative

(1) The following resumé of one of the speeches is characteristic of the tone of the debate: "*Mr. Simpkins* contended that the policy of the Government towards the colonies was at once suicidal and sacrilegious." *The European Mail* Dec. 31. 1869. (The E. M. was the paper which gave the fullest reports of the meetings.) (2) cf. Blachford's *Letters,* p. 279: "I think we shall beat them."
(3) Dec. 18. 1869. Similarly Feb. 15. 1870. (4) Nov. 26. 1869.
(5) Dec. 3. 1869. (6) Dec. 17. 1869. (7) Nov. 26. 1869.

Standard, otherwise ready to give its approval to any champion of Imperial unity, called the deputation "a tactical blunder."(1) Even the *Illustrated London News* contributed to the general censure.(2)

The final stroke came, however, when it appeared that the promoters of the meetings were being disavowed by the colonies themselves. The *Sydney Empire*(3) described the idea of calling such a meeting as "almost too ridiculous for words", asserted that the promoters were "almost entirely unknown in these colonies," and spoke of "the mischievous tendencies of this intermeddling on the part of our busybody absentees", while in the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales they were designated as "presumptuous busybodies."(4) Granville had at once countered the Youl circular by a dispatch to the colonial Governments, in which he deprecated the proposal to hold a colonial conference in London, and the scheme was accordingly turned down by all the self-governing colonies.(5)

Nevertheless, the Cannon Street Meetings created a good deal of stir. In the face of the discussion which they evoked it was impossible for the British public to forget that there was a colonial question. "They may boast" wrote the *Times,*(6) "that they have set politicians talking everywhere about the colonies and their relations with England. Reviewers and pamphleteers at home have taken up the subject. Every colonial mail adds something to its discussion."

In 1869 and 1870 the incipient Imperialist movement was greatly stimulated by an agitation in favour of State-aided emigration of the unemployed to the colonies. The end of the 'sixties was a period of great industrial depression and distress(7) and it might well seem as if England was getting over-populated. The agitation for subsidized emigration grew out of this crisis. This movement was largely promoted by people who were also prominent in the Imperialist agitation, with which it was vaguely associated. Organized emigration within the Empire was a favourite theme with the early Imperialists. Edward Wilson read a paper on *A Scheme for Emigration on a National Scale* before the Society of Arts (1869) in which he recommended emigration as a remedy for pauperism. Frederick Young, another of the pioneers of Imperialism published a pamphlet, entitled *Transplantation,* on the same subject in 1869. Edward Jenkins, a young Radical barrister, who was later to take a considerable part in the Imperialist movement, read a paper on emigration before the Birmingham meeting of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science in 1868,(8) and published in 1869 an essay entitled *State Emigration,* in which he pointed out that emigration to the colonies was a remedy for pauperism in two ways, because it relieved the pressure of over-population at home at the same time while it increased the buying capacity of the overseas

(1) Dec. 22. 1869. (2) Nov. 20. 1869. (3) Nov. 5. 1869. (4) The Melbourne *Argus.* Nov. 8. 1869. (5) *Parl. Papers* XLIX, C 24. C 25 (1870.)
(6) Jan. 18. 1870. Cf. D. Grant: *Home Politics or the Growth of Trade* 1870. (8) *Proceedings* of the N. A. P. S. S., 1868.

markets. C. W. Eddy (later Hon. secretary to the Royal Colonial Institute) published a pamphlet on *Assisted Colonization* in 1870. Besides, both Sir George Grey, Gorst, Young, Wilson, Youl, R. R. Torrens, McCullagh Torrens (1) and Froude took an active part in the emigration movement.

In 1869 and 1870 this movement attracted considerable public attention.(2) Three large Societies promoted emigration in London, and held numerous meetings. A scheme of State-subsidized emigration was proposed by R. R. Torrens in the House of Commons on March 1st 1870,(3) but was turned down by the Government, which persistently refused to entertain any such project, a refusal in which it was supported by the *Times,*(4) which characteristically warned its readers against the danger of creating such a precedent. For "if the State has to find work, so may it find food, lodging, education, amusement, until we are landed in a purely communistic society."(5) On the whole, the emigration campaign was considered an advanced Radical movement.(6)

If the agitation had been for supported emigration pure and simple, it might have been kept quite isolated from the Imperialist movement. But in point of fact, it soon became associated with the reaction against the supposed Separatism of the Gladstone Government and assumed an Imperialistic character. Its promoters avowedly pursued a twofold object: to relieve distress in England and to consolidate the Empire.(7) The hand of the Imperialists is clearly seen in the petition to the Queen, signed by 104,000 working men i London, and presented to the Home Secretary on Feb. 15, 1870, by a deputation headed by R. R. Torrens, and counting among its members Froude, Sir George Grey, McCullagh Torrens, Youl, Gorst and Eddy. The petition prayed that measures be taken to enable "those who are willing to work to go to those parts of your Majesty's dominions where their labour is required, and where they may prosper, and may increase the prosperity of the whole Empire." The signatories had "heard with alarm that Your Majesty has been advised to give up the colonies," containing "millions of acres which might be employed profitably both to the colonies and to ourselves as fields of emigration." The colonies, they declared, "were won for Your Majesty and settled by the valour and enterprise and treasure of the English people"; having become "a part of the National freehold and inheritance" they were "held in trust by Your Majesty, and ought not

(1) Cf. McCullagh Torrens: *Twenty Years in Parliament* pp. 99—104.
(2) The *Times* Index from July 1869 to July 1870 contains more than 170 references to emigration. (3) *Hansard* III, 199. p. 1002. (4) $^{28}/_{1}$, $^{10}/_{2}$, $^{1}/_{3}$, $^{8}/_{3}$, 1870, etc. (5) $^{28}/_{1}$. (6) Even Dilke, speaking in the House of Commons, March 1 1870, deprecated the scheme as "of a purely socialistic character." *Hansard* III. 199, p. 1058. (7) At a meeting on Jan. 26, 1870, at which a Committee was appointed to present the petition to the Queen, a series of resolutions were passed, one of them to the effect "that this meeting declares that it regards the colonists as fellow countrymen, whose rights are as sacred as their own, and is confident that all her Majesty's subjects, whether at home or in the colonies will cheerfully and loyally aid their beloved Queen in transmitting her possessions whole and entire to her successors. (*The Times* $^{27}/_{1}$, 1870.)

to be surrendered, but transmitted to Your Majesty's successors whole and entire, as they were received by Your Majesty."(1)

Hitherto the active promoters of the Imperialist movement had been, with few exceptions, men of no very great influence. About the beginning of 1870, the movement received two important recruits in the Liberal statesman W. E. Forster, and J. A. Froude, the historian.(2)

Forster gave it his support in a speech to his constituents at Bradford $^{17}/_{1}$, 1870. (The *Times* $^{18}/_{1}$ and $^{21}/_{1}$.) Speaking about the colonial problem, — "to me almost more important thant any other," — he expressed his satisfaction that the question had been raised, and maintained that "neither in England nor in the colonies do we intend that the English Empire shall be broken up. It may be a dream, but I still believe in its fulfilment. I believe that the time will come when, by some means or another, statesmen will be able to weld a bond together which will unite the English speaking people in our colonies at present — unite them with the mother country in one great confederation." The support of a statesman of Forster's standing was a

(1) The *Standard,* Nov. 4. 1869.

Another deputation headed by the Duke of Manchester and counting among its members Jenkins, Young, Youl, Denison, and Wilson, urged upon the Prime Minister the desirability of granting Government assistance to emigrating workmen, Feb. 3. 1870. (*The Times* $^{4}/_{2}$.)

(2) Ruskin may perhaps be cited as another proselyte. In the course of his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1870 he gave expression to views which may be called Imperialistic. As the alternative to Materialism and Mammon-worship he holds up colonial expansion as a task worthy of England: "this is what she must do, or perish: she must found colonies as fast and as far as she is able, formed of her most energetic and worthiest men; — seizing every piece of fruitful waste ground she can set her foot on, and there teaching these her colonists that their chief virtue is to be fidelity to their country, and that their first aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and sea: and that, though they live on a distant plot of ground, they are no more to consider themselves therefore disfranchised from their native land, than the sailors of her fleets do, because they float on distant waves," etc. (*Lectures on Art,* New Ed. 1887, pp. 39—40).

Too much stress should not, however, be laid on these utterances of Ruskin's or on those referred to below. They are introduced incidentally in the course of disquisitions on other matters. They hardly fill 10 out of the 18,000 pages of his writings. Ruskin is practically never mentioned by contemporary Imperialist writers and must on the whole be considered as remaining outside the current of Imperialist thought.

Other references to colonial policy in Ruskin's writings are: a letter written $^{15}/_{5}$, 1872, in which he suggests that the energy wasted on the conduct of wars might more profitably be spent on colonization (*Works,* Library Ed., vol. XXXVII. p. 67). A letter to the *Daily Telegraph,* $^{14}/_{1}$ 1870, in which he calls upon the country gentlemen to become "Captains of Emigration." (*Works,* Library Ed. vol. *XXXIV,* p. 498); a passage in *Unto this Last,* in which emigration is mentioned as a remedy for over-population (*Works* Library Ed. Vol. *XVII.* p. 108). One of the *Fors Clavigera* Letters (Oct. 1873), in which he argues against the idea that the bonds between the colonies and England may be disregarded as "purely sentimental". A passage in *The Crown of Wild Olive* (§ 159), in which he advocates organized emigration; and a passage in *A Knight's Faith* in which he touches upon the idea of trusteeship for weaker races. (*Works,* Library Ed. Vol. *XXXI.* p. 506)

great gain to the movement, and he soon became one of its recognized leaders. His address on *Our Colonial Empire,* delivered before the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh Nov. 5. 1875, was one of the ablest of the early statements of the case for closer union.

In Froude's activity in connexion with the colonial question three distinct phases are discernible. There is the period with which we deal here, in which he made his appearance as a champion of Imperialism in 1870 and 1871. There is a period from about 1874 to 1880, in which he took an active part in the colonial policy of the Disraeli Administration, and in which he wrote a number of papers on colonial questions, which strike the reader as anything but Imperialistic. Finally, there is the period of *Oceana* and *The English in the West Indies* and of his association with the Imperial Federation League.

As was the case with most of the other early Imperialists, the immediate cause of Froude's entrance in the lists was the belief that the Gladstone Government was about to cut the colonies adrift, a belief which is expressed in his letter to Skelton quoted on p. 91.

Already on March 19, 1869, in his inaugural address at the University of St. Andrews, he had touched upon the colonial question in the language of an Imperialist: "Britain may yet have a future before it grander than its past: instead of a country standing alone, complete in itself, it may become the metropolis of an enormous and coherent Empire."(1)

His contribution to the early Imperialist movement in 1870—71 took the form — apart from his support of the agitation for State-organized emigration — of a number of essays, published in *Fraser's Magazine,* in which he declared his belief in the future of the colonial Empire and its immense importance to the mother country, criticized the colonial policy of the Liberal Government, denounced the policy of laissez-faire and attacked the Manchester School. These essays are: *England and her Colonies, Reciprocal Duties of State and Subject, The Merchant and his Wife, an Apologue for the Colonial Office, On Progress, The Colonies Once More* and *England*'s *War.*

The most important of these is the first, which appeared in January 1870. This essay is by far the best of the early Imperialist contributions to the discussion of the colonial question. In its attacks on the Manchester School, its insistence upon the social and eugenic importance of emigration and colonization, its tendency to look upon the colonies as parts of England and upon the colonists as Englishmen beyond the seas, and its consequent optimistic view of the difficulties in the way of a closer union of the Empire, its belief in the consolidating effect of modern communications, and its conviction that England can only remain a great power by retaining her colonial Empire, it forms, as it were, an epitome of the early Imperialist movement. An account of the essay may therefore not be out of place:

Froude's starting point is the fact that England is getting over-

"(1) *Rectorial Addresses delivered at the University of St. Andrews,* p. 102.

populated, and that the annual increase of population has to be drafted off and disposed of elsewhere: during the last 25 years nearly 4 million British subjects have emigrated to the United States. These emigrants are not only lost to England, they go to strengthen England's greatest rival. At the same time England possesses dependencies of her own which are not inferior, as regards extent and natural resources, to the United States, and which might easily have been utilized to provide homes for these emigrants.

This is, however, he writes, a possibility which has no attraction for contemporary politicians. According to them it is of no consequence where the emigrants go and whether they remain British or become foreign subjects, provided they are able to consume English calico and hard-ware, this being the only way in which they can be of any use to the mother country. It is even argued that the existing English colonies are a burden, and that the sooner they separate from England the better.

"Such an attitude of a Government towards its subjects," Froude declares, "is so strange, so unexampled in the history of mankind, that the meaning of it deserves study if only as a political curiosity."(1) It is not shared by other countries. The United States have fought a civil war to preserve their national unity, Russia carries on a systematic work of colonization in Siberia, and if Germany and France had rival colonial Empires no one would expect Germany to look quietly on, while her subjects emigrated to French colonies.

The indifference of the British Government to the loss of her subjects through emigration to foreign countries and to the permanence of her colonial Empire might, he says, be understood on the supposition, either that England was strong enough as it was, and had no need to fear other countries, or that there was no likelihood of her ever being drawn into a war. But this is obviously not the case. The argument that a Government has no business to meddle with emigration which, like wages and prices, is best left to settle itself according to the laws of nature, is, according to Froude, fallacious. For human institutions are not governed exclusively by laws of nature, any more than is a cultivated field or a garden, which, if left to itself, will not yield corn but only docks and nettles. One million Irishmen might have been removed to the colonies at the cost of the Abyssinian war, and the money spent would probably in the long run have proved a profitable investment, for trade follows the flag: While the Americans import English goods to a value of 10/ per head of the population, the Australians import goods to a value of £10.

The real reason for the prevailing attitude to the colonial connexion is, according to Froude, twofold: the first reason is the fact that the colonies no longer answer the purpose for which they were originally maintained, England having given up all the privileges which used to

(1) *Short Studies on Great Subjects* vol. III, p. 3. (Longmans Green & Co. 1907.)

make the possession of colonies a profitable concern. The second reason is the ideal which has been accepted by so many Englishmen as the goal towards which England should strive. The England of the future is pictured as the emporium of the world's trade and the workshop of all mankind, and with such a future before her, the colonies are felt to be of little importance.

Against this view of the future of England Froude argues, in the first place, that it is possible that the confidence of its advocates in England's industrial and commercial future is not justified.(1) Foreign competition is already making itself felt, and England has only succeeded in holding her own in the increasing competition in cheapness by lowering the standard of quality and workmanship. Besides, the growing power of the trades unions constitutes a danger, because the English industrial monopoly, depending, as it does, on the ability to undersell the foreigner, would be imperilled if wages were to rise.

But even admitted that the English industrial monopoly can be maintained, there would still be no reason to think that all is well. To Froude the realization of the Manchester ideal of a completely industrialized England seems worse than its failure. Such a consummation would no doubt be advantageous to certain classes, such as bankers, merchants, and manufacturers, whose fortunes, already large, would be increased. To the great bulk of the people, and to the State, it would, he maintains, be nothing less than disastrous. The tendency of modern industrialism has been to reduce the working classes to a state of moral and material degradation. The great cities have become cesspools in which the poor are demoralized by drunkenness and disease. The old ideals of English life are being destroyed and displaced by the universal ambition to "get on."

But is such a state of things politically safe or morally and materially wholesome? According to Froude it is not: "The greatness of a nation depends upon the men whom it can breed and rear. The prosperity of it depends upon its strength, and if men are sacrificed to money, the money will not be long in following them."(2) England, he maintains, has attained her present position, because the English are a race of unusual vigour of body and mind, and if England is to keep her place, the English people must preserve the qualities which won it. Now the qualities which make nations great cannot be preserved under the conditions which must prevail in an industrial country. If the present development is continued the English will soon be a town-dwelling people. The country will have become the luxury of the rich. But: "it is against all experience that any nation can long remain great which does not possess, or having once possessed has lost, a hardy and abundant peasantry."(3)

Already as it is there is no longer land enough in England for the farming population she ought to carry, even if the land were distributed among small cultivators on a scale which could only be rendered

(1) See the quotation on p. 82. (2) Ibid. p. 18. (3) Ibid. p. 20.

possible by a revolution. The obvious solution of the problem is, according to Froude, to turn to the unoccupied land of the colonies: "We want land on which to plant English families, where they may thrive and multiply without ceasing to be Englishmen. The land lies ready to our hand. The colonies contain virgin soil sufficient to employ and feed five times as many people as are now crowded into Great Britain and Ireland. Nothing is needed but arms to cultivate it: while here, among ourselves, are millions of ablebodied men unwillingly idle, clamouring for work, with their families starving on their hands. What more simple than to bring the men and the land together!"(1)

At the end of the essay Froude touches upon the question of a closer union with the colonies, an ideal which must of course, form an important part of his plan; for if Englishmen emigrating to the colonies did not remain Englishmen, the farming population of the colonies could not in any sense be regarded as a supplement to the industrial population of England. A closer union is declared by statesmen to be impracticable, but, he points out, the legislative union with Scotland was found possible, though there were greater obstacles in the way of that, than those which would have to be overcome to form a union of Britain with her colonies, which are, after all, but "the scattered fragments of the same nation," while England and Scotland were two different nations and hereditary enemies.

Distance is no longer an insurmountable obstacle to such a union: "Distance frightens us;" he writes, "but steam and telegraph have abolished distance. A Cornish miner and his family can now emigrate to the Burra-Burra with greater ease and at less expense, than a hundred years ago they would make their way to a Lancashire coal-pit. St. George's Channel at the time of the union with Ireland was harder to cross in stormy weather than the Atlantic, is at present."(2) "Neither the terms of the federation, the nature of the Imperial Council, the functions of the local legislatures, the present debts of the colonies, or the appointment of taxation, would be found problems hard of solution, if the apostles of laissez-faire could believe for once that it was not the last word of political science."(3)

Finally there is another consideration which makes Imperial unity not only possible, but urgently necessary. "These," he writes, "are not days for small States: the natural barriers are broken down which once divided kingdom from kingdom; and with the interests of nations so much intertwined as they are now becoming, every one feels the benefit of belonging to a first rate power."(4) If England lets her colonies drift apart from her they may in time unite themselves to America instead: "We shall sink, as Holland has sunk, into a community of harmless traders, and leave to others the place which once we held and have lost the energy to keep."(5)

The immediate necessity is a vigorous emigration policy: "Let

(1) Op. cit. pp. 25—26. (2) Op. cit. 27. (3) Op. cit. p. 27. (4) Op. cit. p. 29. (5) Op. cit. p. 30.

it be once established that an Englishman emigrating to Canada, or the Cape, or Australia, or New Zealand did not forfeit his nationality, that he was still on English soil as much as if he were in Devonshire or Yorkshire and would remain an Englishman while the Empire lasted; and if we spent a quarter of the sums which were sunk in the morasses of Balaclava in sending out and establishing two millions of our people in these colonies, it would contribute more to the essential strength of the country than all the wars in which we have been entangled from Agincourt to Waterloo."(1) To realize this policy Froude appeals to Disraeli and the Conservative party: for the question is, according to him, one which the aristocracy are best qualified to solve, partly because they are raised by fortune above the exigencies of trade, and partly because the utilization of colonial lands for the settlement of the landless population is the only alternative to a complete and speedy overthrow of the present English land-laws.

The influence of Carlyle's *Past and Present* is unmistakable. Froude even employs the same simile as Carlyle (and Wakefield) about constructing bridges(2) for the emigrants into the overseas countries. The essay curiously anticipates some of Seeley's most characteristic ideas such as the annihilation of distance through steam and electricity, the necessity of considering the colonies as integral parts of England as English counties, and the belief that the future belongs to powers with a greater territorial extent than those of Western Europe.(3)

In the essay called *The Colonies Once More (Fraser's Magazine.* September 1870)(4) the idea of emigration to the colonies as a means of relieving distress in England and at the same time strengthening the Empire is elaborated. The description of the misery of the industrial classes and the widening chasm separating the rich from the poor is lurid enough to satisfy any revolutionary. The horrors of the slums are contrasted with the luxury with which the land-owning and manufacturing classes are surrounded. Parliament is denounced as caring only about the interests of the rich. Emigration is held up as the only thing that can save England: "Two alternatives lie palpably open to us at this moment. Shall there be a British Empire of which the inexhaustible resources shall be made available for the whole commonwealth? Shall there be ten millions of British subjects rooted in different parts of the globe, loyal all to one crown, and loyal to each other because sharing equally and fairly in the common patrimony? Or shall there be an England of rich men, in which the multitude are sacrificed to the luxuries of the few, an England of which the pleasant parks and woodlands are the preserves of the great; and the millions, the creators of the wealth, swill and starve amidst dirt and disease and vice and drunkenness and infanticide?"(5)

Reciprocal Duties of State and Subject (Fraser's Magazine, March

(1) Op. cit. p. 28. (2) Op. cit. p. 31. (3) All these ideas were, however, older than 1870. See pp. 172, 173. (4) Reprinted in *Short Studies on Great Subjects,* vol. III. (5) Op. cit. p. 218.

1870)(1) is a denunciation of the economic teachings of the Manchester School and the policy of laissez-faire — more especially as exemplified by the refusal of the Gladstone Government to have anything to do with organized emigration — and the alleged Separatism of the Liberal Party. It paints a gloomy picture of the disintegration of society under the reign of unbridled competition and the destruction of the old-fashioned virtues of service, honesty, and devotion to duty under the influence of a false standard of commercial success.

The attacks on the Manchester School are repeated in *On Progress* (*Fraser's Magazine,* Dec. 1870), in which it is maintained that the progress of the last century has been, "if it be progress at all, towards the wrong place,"(2) and that the remedy for the ills of modern life is "a return to the uninviting virtues of harder and simpler times." Here again the influence of Carlyle is obvious.(3)

The Merchant and his Wife,(4) is a story about a man who is continually pointing out to his wife that she costs him a great deal of money, and that she ought to live on the income of her own estate, which, however, she finds it difficult to work, because her husband will not lay out money and labour on it, as he fears that she may one day desert him. The husband's suspicions are groundless, for his wife is deeply attached to him and has never thought of leaving him. She does as she is told and pays for her dresses, her carriage, and her maid, and she even takes charge of such of their children as her husband cannot provide for himself. After that the merchant begins to tell her that, though he does not want her to leave him, she is now independent and morally entitled to do so if she likes, for in his opinion compulsory unions are bound to lead to unhappiness. Seeing her distress at this he tells her not to be sentimental: the only real bond between human beings is mutual interest. As long as she considers it to be to her interest to remain in his house, he will be glad to see her, but on the other hand he feels bound to say that, if he were alone, a smaller establishment would suffice for his wants. As day after day he repeats the same remarks his wife gets tired of it in the end. She sees that he has no real affection for her. She is a high-spirited woman and handsome, and her husband is the only man who does not admire her. One day when he comes home he finds that she has eloped with another man. When he complains of her ingratitude, his neighbour, to whom he appeals for sympathy, tells him that he has been an infatuated ass.

While in *England and Her Colonies* and *The Colonies Once More,*

(1) Reprinted in *Short Studies on Great Subjects.* Vol. III. (2) Op. cit. p. 180. (3) Thus e. g. "Are the individual citizens growing more pure in their private habits? Are they true and just in their dealings? Is their intelligence, if they are becoming intelligent, directed towards learning and doing what is right, or are they looking only for more extended pleasures, and for the means of obtaining them? Are they making progress in what old-fashioned people used to call the fear of God, or are their personal selves and the indulgence of their own inclinations the end and aim of their existence?" (Op. cit. p. 182). (4) Reprinted in *Short Studies.* vol. III.

Froude had been inclined to give the Liberal Government credit for not purposely trying to drive the colonies into separation,(1) he launches a direct attack on the Gladstone Government in *England's War.* (*Fraser's Magazine,* Feb. 1871).(2) In this essay beside lamenting the loss of general prestige which England had suffered lately, and which he ascribes to the adoption of the economic principles of the Manchester School, ("We are disesteemed because, as a nation, we no longer seem to live for any high and honourable purpose;" p. 285), he accuses the leading politicians of regarding with indifference the permanence of the colonial connexion, and of being bent only on maintaining their own supremacy from year to year "by humouring the so-called interests of the capitalists and manufacturers."(3) As for the Gladstone Cabinet, "that separation is, or has been, the drift of the colonial policy of the present Ministers there is no occasion to argue. The universal impression which they have created throughout the Empire outweighs their own feebly uttered and stammering denials.(4) .... Whatever Ministers may think now, it is certain that they did contemplate, and did most ardently desire, that at least Canada should declare herself independent."(5)

The article ends with a plea for organized emigration of the surplus population to the colonies. "Let the colonies remain attached to us," he writes, "and wherever our people thrive best they will conduce most to the strength of the Empire, of which they will continue as much subjects as before. If our manufacturing towns were shrunk to half their present size, if the floating tide of humanity which surges and eddies round the London suburbs were all gone, if the millions of English and Scotch men and women who are wasting their constitutions and wearing out their souls in factories and coal mines were growing corn and rearing cattle in Canada and New Zealand, the red colour would come back to their cheeks, their shrunken sinews would fill out again, their children, now a drag upon their hands, would be elements of strength, while here at home the sun would shine again, and wages would rise to the Colonial level, and land would divide itself, and we should have room to move and breathe."(6)

The progress of the Imperialist movement is reflected in a series or Parliamentary debates on the relations between the mother country and the colonies which took place during the first half of 1870. On February 14th Lord Carnarvon in the House of Lords attacked the supposed anti-colonial policy of the Government (see also p. 90) in language which suggests that of Froude's recent article.(7) Refusing

(1) "No one suspects the Government of meditating treason, and it would be nothing less than treason wilfully to abandon the protection of any part of Her Majesty's dominions." (p. 195). (2) Reprinted in *"Short Studies"* vol. III. (3) Op. cit. p. 277. (4) Op. cit. p. 279. (5) Op. cit. p. 280. (6) Op. cit. p. 284. (7) Carnarvon was a personal friend of Froude. See p. 178.

to subscribe to the doctrine that "the object of our whole national life is to become the mere workshop of the world,"(1) he exclaimed: "what fatal policy is it, then, which tempts us deliberately and with our eyes open to throw all this to the winds — to abandon these sources of possible — and if possible then of incalculable — strength, and to allow this country to subside into the position of a second Holland."(2)

The debate on emigration initiated by R. R. Torrens on March 1st 1870 has already been mentioned (p. 104). On April 26th the latter moved in the House of Commons the appointment of a Committee "to enquire into the political relations and modes of communication between the self-governing colonies and this country, and to report whether any or what modifications are desirable with a view to the maintenance of a common nationality cemented by a cordial and good understanding."(3) Expressing his distrust of the colonial policy of the Government he endeavoured to refute the familiar Separatist arguments. The motion was, however, negatived after a long debate.

On June 20th Earl Russell initiated a debate in the House of Lords on relations with the colonies, Earl Grey joining him in condemning the supposed anti-colonial policy of the Government and advocating the continued retention of the colonies.(4)

During the summer of 1870, the public interest, which had for a time taken the place of the usual indifference to colonial questions,(5) again relaxed somewhat, as it became clear that the New Zealanders were putting down the native rising by their own efforts, as the Government took no further steps to promote their supposed Separatist policy, and as Lord Granville was transferred from the Colonial to the Foreign Office,(6) his place being taken by Lord Kimberley.

The most interesting contribution to the discussion during this time, is an article in the July number of the *Westminster Review,* which supports the Imperialists and gives a formidable list of the fatal consequences which the emancipation of the colonies would entail, mentioning among others the loss of fields of emigration, the curtailment of trade, the enmity of the colonists, the possible transference of abandoned colonies to other powers, "the narrowing and debasement of national aspiration, the recognition of a lower standard of patriotism, the measuring of State duties by a false money test, and the sacrifice of national honour and good faith to a false and fatal economy."

At the Social Science meeting at Newcastle in Sept. 1870 two papers were read on colonial questions, one by Edward Wilson on *The Colonies as Fields of Experiment in Government* and one by Macfie entitled *Colonial and Imperial Policy.* In the latter paper the continued unity of the Empire is advocated and emigration as a remedy for pauperism recommended. Finally the paper suggests "the super-

(1) *Hansard* III. 199, p. 212. (2) Ibid. p. 201. (3) *Hansard.* III 200, p. 1817. (4) *Hansard* III. 203, p. 451—483. (5) It must not, however, be imagined that the press during these years ever treated the colonial question as one of the very first magnitude. It never attracted as much attention as e. g. The Irish question or the Alabama claims. (6) June 1870.

position over Administrations and Parliaments at home and in the colonies of a Supreme Council, invested with legislative and executive authority, whose functions should be to determine questions of peace and war, the contributions for national and Imperial defence which each portion of the Empire should make, the laws which are to affect the whole Empire, and the like."(1)

In the beginning of 1871 the Imperialist movement entered upon a new phase. There appeared in the *Contemporary Review*(2) two articles: *Imperial Federalism* and *An Imperial Confederation,* by Edward Jenkins who, as we have seen, had been active in the cause of assisted emigration, and who had during 1870 gained some celebrity by the publication of a social satire called "*Ginx's Baby,*" which won the praise of Carlyle.(3) Jenkins, whose ideas and style were strongly influenced by Carlyle, was a Radical, a temperance advocate, and a social reformer. The first of his two articles opens with a roll of Carlylean thunder against the "policy of drift." It advances the usual arguments about the advantages accruing to the mother country from her colonial possessions, but maintains that, even in the absence of these, the colonies should not be abandoned, being "as dear, as necessary as Ireland, or the Isle of Man, or the Isle of Wight."(4) Pointing out that most of the legislation of the so-called Imperial Parliament is of a purely parochial character, Jenkins proposes (without going into details) the formation of "a Senate or Parliament of representatives from every province, deliberating in public, and acting on the decision of the majority." "All other schemes" he declares ... "dwindle before the practical simplicity of a federal union." In the second article this idea is further elaborated. These articles attracted a good deal of attention and were followed by an increasing number of publications containing schemes for the closer political unity of the Empire. Though Jenkins was far from being the first to suggest a federative solution of the colonial question, he was the first to give a wide publicity to the idea, and he was looked upon by early Imperialists like Labilliere and Young as almost the inventor of Imperial Federation.

Under Froude's editorship *Fraser's Magazine* brought out a number of articles on the colonial question during 1871. Beside several articles on the various colonies, it printed in July and August two consecutive anonymous articles called *Great Britain Confederated,* advocating the federation of the Empire. They purport to be a sort of catechism for school children at some future age, describing in the form of questions and answers the federation of the British Empire. This federation, the first article says, was brought about between 1870 and 1880, at a time when the prospects of the continuance of the Empire were gloomier than ever: "Certain thoughtful and influential

(1) *Transactions* of the N. A. P. S. S. 1870. (2) Jan. and April.
(3) Froude: *Carlyle's Life in London,* II, p. 398. (4) Op. cit. p. 176.

men took up the question, and showed the people of Great Britain the precipice on the brink of which the Empire tottered." In consequence of this achievement the Empire became the most powerful of all States, and universal peace was imposed upon the world by the Federal Government. The second dialogue describes what would have happened if federation had not been effected: England would have accepted the position of "a second Holland, but much less happy because of its huge pauperism." The colonies would have left her in disgust to reproduce among themselves the revolutions and civil wars of the South American republics.

Federation is also advocated in an article in the September number of *Fraser's* entitled *The Imperial Connexion from an Australian Point of View* by W. Jardine Smith, while an article in the August number(1) maintains that Canada has no desire to withdraw from the Empire, and that England is bound in honour to uphold the connexion as long as Canada desires it. An anonymous and somewhat fantastic article in the October number *The English Statesman's Imperial Question,* contains a plea for extended colonization and State organized emigration.

In the summer of 1871 a Conference of people interested in the colonies was held in London. The object of this Conference, which took place at the Westminster Palace Hotel on July 19th, 20th, and 21st, 1871, was to afford an opportunity for the discussion of colonial questions. It had not the militant character of the Cannon Street Meetings, its tone was more detached, and the papers read of a more technical nature. Among the promoters were Edward Jenkins (who read the inaugural address and prepared the report,)(2) Labilliere (who acted as honorary secretary), Viscount Sandon, R. R. Torrens, W. Westgarth, and Edward Wilson. Most of the pioneers of the Imperialist movement attended the meetings and took part in the debate. (3) The Duke of Manchester, the Earl of Shaftesbury, and others presided.

Jenkins opened the Conference with an address in his best Carlylean style with quotations from *Past and Present.* He spoke for Imperial unity and described the present system as an anomaly: the colonies did not contribute to Imperial defence and the measure of autonomy which had been accorded to them was far too great (see p. 140). The result of the "drifting policy" must necessarily be that they would drop off one by one, under conditions which might make confederation as hopeless as it was now with the United States. Such a policy, though it might recommend itself to Goldwin Smith and his school," whose unit of measurement of a nation's greatness is the pound sterling,"(4) was "the policy of a craven and degenerate people — the policy of mammon."(5) "It is not necessary", he concluded, "that we should dissolve this marvellous Empire, the upgrowth of an energy and sa-

(1) *The Defence of Canada.* (2) Published under the name of *Discussions on Colonial Questions,* London. 1872. (3) Thus the Duke of Manchester, Sir. H. Drummond Wolff, McCullagh Torrens, R. R. Torrens, C. W. Eddy, Dennistoun Wood, Young and others. (4) Op. cit. p. 23. (5) Ibid.

crifice unrivalled in the history of races. It is not necessary that we should dismiss from our family circle that vast sisterhood of nations which has grown up under our parental care — . . . we must take our stand on the unity of our race, on the unity of our interests, on language, religion, laws, manners, customs, and a citizenship that are one. What God hath joined together let no man put asunder."(1) Professor Sheldon Amos read a paper on *Colonies and Colonial Government* in which he maintained that the key-stone of a wise political constitution for a colony must be liberty "controlled or interpreted by nothing else than the strict claims of economical science and political justice",(2) (by which he meant that the colonies should not be allowed to levy protective duties). He referred to "the constant tendency to habitual deviation on the part of members of individual colonies from the maxims of an elevated political ideal and a true human morality, such deviation manifesting itself in an eccentric and erroneus commercial policy, in exceptional or monstrous social institutions, and in a constant reproduction of the barest features of a slave system and a slave traffic."(3)

Labilliere read a paper on *Imperial and Colonial Federalism,* the object of which was to examine the best means of promoting union. A federal union of the British Empire, he remarked, might perhaps be regarded as an impracticable idea. Still it had made great progress in short time. The tendencies of the times favoured it; provincial jealousies had yielded to it in Italy and Germany, and distance no longer formed an obstacle. The affairs with which a Confederate Government would have to deal would almost entirely range themselves under the heads of peace and war, defence, and diplomacy, defence, more especially, being the great purpose for which the federation would exist. As far as commercial policy was concerned, Labilliere, an old Colonial, was wiser than Jenkins and Amos. "Though a thorough free-trader," he declared, "deploring on Imperial as well as on Colonial grounds, the adoption of protection in the colonies, I believe that the different provinces of the Empire may even impose protective duties upon each other's goods without interfering with the union."(4)

The Westminster Conference is interesting because of the evidence it affords of the progress of Imperialism during the time that had passed since the Cannon Street Meetings in 1869. It was not, like those meetings, a conference of practically unknown Colonials: well-known public men like the Duke of Manchester and the Earl of Shaftesbury, and rising politicians like Drummond Wolff took part in it. It also affords an example of the amazing ignorance of colonial conditions which characterized so many of the promoters of the Imperial Federation movement. Only a complete failure to understand the colonial temper and especially the true nature of colonial loyalty and colonial national feeling can account for the suggestions, so frequently bandied about even by strong Imperialists, that the colonies should be made to give up their tariff autonomy. If such a demand had ever been made, it would have met

(1) p. 28. (2) Op. cit. p. 49. (3) Op. cit. p. 47. (4) Op. cit. p. 82.

with the most peremptory refusal on the part of the colonies, while an attempt to press the demand might have led to the break-up of the Empire.

Another contribution to the discussion of the colonial problem is *A Colonist on the Colonial Question,*(1) by a Canadian, Jehu Mathews, a book which contains an able and detailed scheme of Imperial Federation.

At the Social Science Meeting at Devonport in Sept. 1872 the colonial question was again discussed. Westgarth spoke on *The Policy of Extending the Empire,* while Jenkins(2) and Labilliere(3) read papers advocating Federation. Imperial Federation was also advocated in an article in the December number of *Fraser's Magazine: Empire or no Empire* by "a Colonist."

In 1873 the question of closer union cropped up in Parliament(4), Macfie ($^{28}/_{2}$) moving for a Select Committee to consider the relations between the United Kingdom and the colonies, and propounding in the course of the debate a somewhat fanciful scheme of union. (5) On March 7, Lord Eustace Cecil proposed that the colonies should be invited to contribute towards Imperial defence.(6)

In 1873 the *Colonies,* a small newspaper, started and owned by S. W. Silver, joined the Federalists, and printed, in that and the following years, several leading articles (written by Labilliere and Bonamy Price,(7) Professor of Political Economy at Oxford), advocating Imperial Federation. Two long debates in the columns of this paper, throw some light on the stage reached by the Imperialist movement at that time. The first debate took place in the first months of 1873 between two correspondents signing themselves respectively "Philo-Colonus" and "H. de B. H." "Philo-Colonus," while recognizing the desirability of some form of federation, expressed his doubt as to its practicability, because the interests of England and the colonies were too divergent: neither party would submit to its wishes being overridden by the other. "H. de B. H.", on the other hand, maintained that federation was not an impracticable Utopia, though it might still be in the stage of speculative politics.(8)

The second debate took place from November 1875 to May 1876 between Young on one side and the late Premier of New Zealand, William Fox, and a correspondent calling himself "Colonus", on the other, several others joining in, such a Labilliere and the Duke of Manchester. Young described the federal movement as merely a continuation of a process, followed through the history of England for

(1) London 1872. (2) The *Colonial Question: its Present Position, and the Policy of the Future. Transactions* of the N. A. P. S. S. 1872. (3) *Permanent Union of the Empire Desirable, and how Maintainable,* ibid. (4) *Hansard* III. 214, p. 1102. (5) The British Ministry to be supplemented for Imperial purposes with representatives of the colonies, thus forming an "Imperial Council" whose duty it would be to "guide the policy of the Empire, negotiate treaties, fix the armaments, and declare war and peace." (6) *Hansard* III. 214, pp. 1520—34.

(7) Labilliere, *Federal Britain,* p. 25. (8) *The Colonies.* $^{21}/_{2}$ 73. The correspondence is reprinted in Young's *Imperial Federation.*

more than 600 years, and beginning with "the union of the different parts of this country under Alfred the Great." "Why should the Australian group, the Cape and the Dominion of Canada not be regarded as an extension of the counties of England," he asked, "sending their proper proportion of representatives, just as Middlesex and Yorkshire, Cornwall or Northumberland, to the British Parliament?"(1)

Fox's contributions were clearly dictated by a greater knowledge of popular opinion in the colonies than those of Young. The colonies, he said, would never give up independent control of local affairs in return for representation in the Imperial Parliament, where their representatives would not have sufficient weight to make themselves felt. "Colonus" took a similar line and warned against well-intentioned, but ill-advised schemes of confederation which might constitute a serious danger to Imperial unity.

The Duke of Manchester, while deprecating the idea of sending colonial members to Westminster, advocated the formation of a body of colonial representatives to advise the Secretary of State for the Colonies, trusting to the growth of constitutional practice to give further power to such a council(2).

The whole of this correspondence together with the controversy between "Philo-Colonus" and H. de B. H. and some other articles from the *Colonies* was published in book form in 1876 under the title of *Imperial Federation* by Frederick Young with a preface in which Imperial Federation is advocated as the only alternative to separation.

It has already been pointed out that about 1871 a change had come over the Imperialist agitation. Hitherto the promoters of the movement had mostly been content, chiefly by pointing out the benefits of the Imperial connexion, to stop the tide of Separatism and, in a general way, to endeavour to preserve the existing state of things. After the appearance of Jenkins' articles a new element is introduced in the movement. No longer content with preventing the break-up of the colonial Empire, the Imperialists begin to cast about for new means with which to preserve the unity of the Empire better than heretofore. From now on the history of the Imperialist movement becomes more and more a history of the attempts to formulate schemes of closer political union. The movement which is somewhat loosely called the Imperial Federation movement has begun, and a constantly broadening stream of books, pamphlets and articles, discussing the modes by which the closer union of the Empire can be brought about, makes its appearance.

This change in the character of the movement was no doubt partly due to the prevailing belief that the present constitutional relations between the mother country and the colonies were too precarious to endure, and that the only thing which could prevent an eventual break-up of the Empire was a constitutional reform, and partly to the

(1) Young: *Imperial Federation*. p. 3. (2) Op. cit. pp. 27—28.

fascination of playing with experiments in high politics. Chiefly, however, the change was due to a feeling among the Imperialists that they had won the opening battle, that public opinion was coming over to their side, that there was no longer any danger of the Government taking active steps to get rid of the colonies, and that the movement could now safely pass from the defensive to the offensive. That in the early 'eighties the change in public opinion had become so complete that practically no Englishman (with the exception of isolated die-hards like Goldwin Smith), would welcome the loss of the colonies, is common knowledge. But even if the change had not become quite so complete in the early 'seventies there is plenty of evidence of a very pronounced turn of the tide long before 1880.

The very confidence which transformed the Imperialists from the defenders of an almost lost cause into the advocates of a revolutionary constitutional reform is an evidence of the change in public opinion which had taken place. The speech of the Under Secretary for the Colonies in the House of Commons, May 12th, 1871, (see p. 93), contrasted with the somewhat frigid tone hitherto adopted by Gladstone and Granville when speaking on the same subject, may be an indication of the presence of a public feeling, which the Government had found it necessary to pacify. In the early 'seventies congratulatory references to a change in public opinion and in the attitude of the Government form a constant feature of the writings and speeches of the Imperialists:

As early as May 21, 1870, the *Spectator* spoke of a change in the colonial policy of the Government brought about by the fact that Ministers "had begun to discover that their line was not the line of the people of England, and would, if pushed to its logical results, end in events which would bring down upon them the bitterest displeasure of England." "This is in fact a death-bed repentance of the Ministry", it wrote ...." a repentance that came only just in time to secure its salvation. Had the colonial agitation and request for peacable separation come, we at least entertain no doubt that even Mr. Gladstone's popularity would not have sufficed to save the Ministry."

Young at the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference of 1871 said that "another change had more recently come over the spirit of the statesman's dream. It was found that the anti-colonial opinions of those men had revealed the fact that the English people in their heart of hearts were actually in love with their colonies .... Doubtless it was the dissemination of correct information, and the efforts of such gentlemen as Mr. Jenkins ... that had been the means of turning the tide and evoking, amongst those who had the rule of the Empire in their hands, a feeling akin to that of the people of this realm, so that the non-colonial policy was almost abandoned, and we now heard the remark: 'We don't want to get rid of our colonies, we are all united on that point everywhere.'(1)

(1) *Discussions on Colonial Questions.* p. 30.

Macfie in the preface to his *Colonial Questions Pressing for Immediate Solution* (1871) speaks of an increased popular interest in the colonies, and Jenkins in his article in the April number of the *Contemporary Review* declares that "it is clear that the policy of colonial independence, which Lord Granville was endeavouring to quicken into speedier consummation, was afterwards, upon the outcry happily raised in this country by a few earnest men, abandoned, or at least postponed." The *Standard,* $^{2}/_{7}$, 1872, writes: "Everybody, it seems, is now opposed to the idea of disintegration. The Tories are taunted with having raised an unnecessary clamour;" and the *Times,* $^{25}/_{10}$ 1872 admits that "the call for a severance of the connexion between England and her offspring ... has for the present died away." Both Jenkins and Labilliere allude to the same belief in a belated and involuntary change on the part of the Government in their papers at the Social Science Meeting at Devonport in 1872. (1)

Already shortly after its start, the movement had received the support of several politicians of some note. Of its earliest champions Macfie, R. R. Torrens, McCullagh Torrens, and Bury were members of the House of Commons. In the House of Lords it received the support of Lord Carnarvon, Lord John Russell and Earl Grey. By January 1870 one of the most prominent of the younger Liberals, Forster, had joined the movement, while one of the leading Conservatives, Sir Stafford Northcote, had expressed his sympathy with it.

The most important victory was, however, won when Disraeli gave it his blessing in 1872. Speaking at a Conservative banquet at the Crystal Palace on June 24 he proclaimed the three great objects of the Conservative party to be: the maintenance of English institutions, the preservation of the Empire, and social reform. On the second of these points he said:(2)

"If you look to the history of this country since the advent of Liberalism — 40 years ago — you will find that there has been no effort so continuous, so subtle, supported by so much energy, and carried on with so much ability and acumen, as the attempts of Liberalism to effect the disintegration of the Empire of England. And, gentlemen, of all its efforts, this is the one which has been the nearest to success. Statesmen of the highest character, writers of the most distinguished ability, the most organised and efficient means, have been employed in this endeavour. It has been proved to all of us that we have lost money by our colonies. It has been shown with precise, with mathematical demonstration that there never was a jewel in the Crown of England that was so truly costly as the possession of India. How often has it been suggested that we should at once emancipate ourselves from this incubus! Well, that result was nearly accomplished. When those subtle views were adopted by the country under the plausible plea of granting self-government to the colonies, I confess that I myself thought that the tie was broken.

(1) *Transactions* of the N. A. P. S. S. 1872, pp. 142, 156 Cf. also *Blackwood's,* Feb. 1870. pp. 260—61. (2) Buckle: *Life of Disraeli.* vol. V. pp. 194—95.

Not that I for one object to self-government; I cannot conceive how our distant colonies can have their affairs administered except by self-government.

"But self-government in my opinion, when it was conceded, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied by an Imperial tariff, by securities for the people of England for the enjoyment of the unappropriated lands which belonged to the Sovereign as their trustee, and by a military code which should have precisely defined the means and the responsibilities by which the colonies should be defended, and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the colonies themselves. It ought, further, to have been accompanied by the institution of some representative council in the metropolis, which would have brought the colonies into constant and continuous relations with the Home Government. All this, however, was omitted because those who advised that policy — and I believe their convictions were sincere — looked upon the colonies of England, looked even upon the connexion with India, as a burden upon this country, viewing everything in a financial aspect and totally passing by those moral and political considerations which made nations great, and by the influence of which alone men are distinguished from animals."

"Well, what has been the result of this attempt during the reign of Liberalism for the disintegration of the Empire. It has entirely failed. But how has it failed? Through the sympathy of the colonies for the mother country. They have decided that the Empire shall not be destroyed, and in my opinion no Minister in this country will do his duty who neglects any opportunity of reconstructing as much as possible our colonial Empire, and of responding to those distant sympathies which may become the source of incalculable strength and happiness to this land."

This speech is of the greatest importance. In the first place, the fact that is was thus taken under the wing of one of the great parties necessarily gave the movement a firmer standing.(1) From this speech dates the somewhat undeserved association of Imperialism with the Conservative party. But in the second place, the fact that Disraeli took up the movement is a sure sign that it had gained the day, and that Separatism had lost whatever hold i may have had on the public mind. For there seems to be reason to believe that this move of Disraeli's was due, less to his own conviction of the greatness of the cause af Imperialism, than to the realization that here was a new chance of "dishing the Whigs", and of monopolizing for the Conservatives a cause which was sure to be popular with the constituencies. Disraeli does not

(1) "The cue since Mr. Disraeli has spoken at the Crystal Palace is to affect surprise that anyone should talk of danger to the Empire" (*The Standard* $^{2}/_{7}$, 1872.) The Ministerial press disclaimed the imputation of Separatism and asserted that it was Liberalism which had preserved the Empire (*Pall Mall Gazette*, $^{26}/_{6}$; *Daily News*, $^{25}/_{6}$; *Spectator*, $^{29}/_{6}$; *Times* $^{25}/_{6}$).

seem ever to have been deeply interested in the colonial question. In his political life before the Crystal Palace Speech the colonies had played an insignificant part, and even after 1872 he cannot be said to have done much to promote the unity of the Empire.

In his writings and speeches he had, indeed, occasionally and incidentally touched upon the idea of giving the colonies representation at Westminster, but this idea seems to have been dictated less by Imperial than by party considerations. Thus in a letter to Lord Stanley, $^{28}/_{12}$, 1849, in which, incidentally, he expresses his distrust of the Colonial Reformers, he deplores the impracticability of adding 30 colonial members to Parliament: "Were it possible, it would be a great element of future strength to the Conservative party."(1) In another letter to the same, Dec. 9, 1851, he mentions, as an idea which had occurred to him in the train, that colonial articles might be freed from all duties, and that the colonies might be given some seats to be vacated by the disfranchisement of boroughs: "If feasible it would allow us to prevent, perhaps, the increase of the town or democratic power, without the odium of directly resisting its demands."(2) In another letter to Lord Derby, $^{18}/_{12}$, 1851, he repeats the suggestion that if the colonial members were sitting in the House "we may find them convenient allies."(3)

But, whatever weight is attributed to these utterances as evidence of a previous interest on the part of Disraeli in the unity of the Empire, against them must be set certain as weighty pronouncements of the very opposite character. The well-known exclamation in a letter to Lord Malmesbury (Aug. 13, 1852) that "these wretched colonies will all be independent in a few years, and are a mill-stone round our necks,"(4) may have been a mere petulant outburst, but it is not the sort of thing an Imperialist statesman would write, even in a confidential letter, and it is not an isolated example. As late as Sept. 30, 1866, in a letter to Lord Derby, advocating the withdrawal of Imperial troops from Canada and leaving the Canadians to defend their frontier against the Fenian raids themselves, he writes: "Power and influence we should exercise in Asia; consequently in Eastern Europe, consequently also in Western Europe; but what is the use of these colonial deadweights which *we do not govern?* ..... Leave the Canadians to defend themselves; recall the African squadron; give up the settlements on the West coast of Africa, and we shall make a saving which will, at the same time, enable us to build ships and have a good budget. (5)

(1) Monypenny & Buckle: *Life of Disraeli,* vol. III. p. 237. (2) Op. cit. Vol.. III.. p. 333. (3) Op. cit. Vol. III. p. 334. The direct representation of the colonies is also touched upon in a letter to Adderley, Jan. 26, 1862. (Op. cit.; vol. IV. p. 329) and in a speech May 14, 1866, on the second reading of Russell's Reform Bill, (Op. cit. Vol. IV. p. 434). The desirability of consolidating the Empire is maintained in a speech in the House of Commons, July 5, 1850 (Op. cit. vol. III. p. 253), while in a speech at Aylesbury 1859 he points out that England has become to some extent an extra-European power (Op. cit. Vol. IV. p. 231). (4) Op. cit. Vol. III. p. 385. (5) Op. cit. Vol. IV p. 476. In a speech in the House of Commons, March 13, 1865, he deprecated the aban-

According to Sir William Gregory, who knew him personally, "as for the colonies his expressions were always those of contempt and a contented impression that we should sooner or later be rid of them."(1)

The assertion sometimes made that Disraeli was one of the founders, even the founder, of British Imperialism(2) will, then, hardly stand the test of an examination of his correspondence, speeches, and colonial policy. In the first place one seems to be justified, in the light of his utterances before the Crystal Palace speech and of subsequent events, to say that Disraeli was never really much concerned about colonial questions for their own sake. The dominant factor in his political life, apart from personal ambition, was Party. As it has been seen, his utterances on colonial questions before 1872 are closely connected with considerations for the welfare of the Tory party, and it seems safe to say that his advocacy of Imperialism in the Crystal Palace speech was due less to a conviction of the greatness of the cause than to a desire to add a popular plank to the Conservative platform and to saddle the Liberal party with a colonial policy which was beginning to become unpopular.

But apart from his personal convictions, did Disraeli add anything to the stock of ideas of the Imperialist movement? That he initiated the connexion between Imperialism and Conservatism is undeniable. But apart from that, his contributions to Imperialism seem to be of questionable value. His criticism of the colonial policy of the Liberals was, as we have seen, directed against the grant to the colonies of fiscal autonomy and the control of waste lands, and the failure to bind the colonies to take their share in Imperial defence. Now this was no new idea. Lamentations over the too free grant of colonial self-government and expressions of a desire to resume the Imperial control of colonial tariffs and the disposal of colonial Crown lands constantly recur in writings on the colonial question from 1869 onwards.(3)

Furthermore, besides not being original, this criticism shows a considerable ignorance of colonial conditions. Any attempt to resume Imperial control of these subjects would, so far from conducing to the closer unity of the Empire, probably have resulted in declarations of independence on the part of the colonies.

When Disraeli tried to saddle the Liberal party with the policy

donment of Canada against the desire of the Canadian people, though foreseeing with obvious equanimity "that mature hour when we shall lose our dependency but gain a permanent ally and friend." (ibid. p. 407). Cf. also his satire on colonization in *Popanilla:* a desert island is discovered, and is immediately furnished with a full complement of civil servants, soldiers, judges and clergymen.

(1) *Autobiography of Sir William Gregory,* p. 105. Cf. also Cartwright's impression of Disraeli's attitude to the colonies, quoted on p. 45 (2) Iwan-Müller: *Lord Milner and South Africa,* p. 78. Gränström: *Britiska Rikets Reorganisationsproblem.* p. 171. F. Brie: *Imperialistische Strömungen.* p. 110. Thierry: *Imperialism.* p. 42. (3) Thus e. g. *Blackwoods* for Dec. 1869, (pp. 272—76) has a passage which closely resembles the Crystal Palace speech. See also pp. 138—140.

which he condemned he was, moreover, forgetting, or pretending to forget, the part which the Conservative party had played in the development of colonial self-government: The great champion of the rights of the Home Government against colonial claims was the Liberal statesman, Earl Grey, and it was his successor, Sir John Pakington, the Colonial Secretary of the Derby Administration of 1852 (of which Disraeli himself was a leading member) who had given in to the claims of the colonists to control their own waste lands.(1) Besides it was that same government which had granted self-government to New Zealand. Pessimism had been common to both parties, and up to 1872 the incipient Imperialist movement had not been associated with Conservatism at all. (see p. 128).

Two elements Disraeli did have a share in adding to Imperialism: the first beginnings of the association of Imperialism with Jingoism dates from his experiments in Indian and foreign policy, and the particular brand of Imperialism which Seeley called the bombastic school, i. e. the school of Imperialism which dwells on the spectacular aspect of the possession of colonies, which is prone to consider mere extent of territory an advantage in itself, and which glories in the possession of "an Empire on which the sun never sets" may be said to have been first brought into fashion by Disraeli's Indian policy and his taste for the external symbols of Imperial rule as exemplified by the Royal Titles Act, by which the Queen assumed the title of Empress of India.

Another important proselyte of the movement was Tennyson, whose adherence may be taken as a proof that Imperialism, from being the creed of a few enthusiasts, was becoming part and parcel of mid-Victorian respectability. Before 1872 Tennyson had written a number of patriotic songs the sentiment of which sometimes borders on Jingoism, but nothing which can be called Imperialistic in the sense in which that word is used here. The diary of Mrs. Tennyson shows that in 1870 Tennyson was getting interested in the question of Imperial unity.(2) In 1872 he directly attacked the Separatists in the Epilogue to the Queen which he added to the new edition of the *Idylls of the King*,(3) published in 1872—73.

> And that true North,(4) whereof we lately heard,
> A strain to shame us 'keep you to yourselves,
> So loyal is too costly! friends — your love
> Is but a burthen: loose the bond and go.'
> Is this the tone of Empire? here the faith
> That made us rulers? This, indeed, her voice.
> And meaning, whom the roar of Hougoumont
> Left mightiest of all peoples under heaven?
> . . . . . The loyal to their crown
> Are loyal to their own far sons, who love

(1) Despatch of $^{15}/_{12}$, 1852 (*Parl. Papers* LXIII, 1852—53, p. 45). *New Zealand Constitution* Act (1852), § 72. (2) *Memoir of Tennyson* by his son (Macmillan. ed. Vol. III. pp. 129, 288). (3) The Library ed. of Complete Works.
(4) i. e. Canada.

Our ocean-empire with her boundless homes,
For ever-broadening England, and her throne,
In our vast Orient, and one isle, one isle,
That knows not her own greatness: if she knows
And dreads it we are fallen.(1)

The *Epilogue* attracted much attention, and was received with satisfaction in the colonies. It was only the first of a number of poems in which the note of Imperialism is unmistakable:

Hands all Round, as written in 1852, was a denunciation of France and a declaration of friendship with America. In the new version of 1882 it became a hymn to freedom and to Imperial unity:

To all the loyal hearts who long
To keep our English Empire whole!
To all our noble sons, the strong
New England of the Southern Pole!
To England under Indian skies.
To those dark millions of her realm!
To Canada whom we love and prize,
Whatever statesman hold the helm.
Hands all round!
God the traitor's hope confound!
To this great name of England, drink my friends,
And all her glorious empire, round and round.

To all our statesmen so they be
True leaders of the land's desire!
To both our Houses, may they see
Beyond the borough and the shire!
We sailed wherever ship could sail.
We founded many a mighty state;
Pray God, our greatness may not fail
Thro' craven fears of being great.

On the occasion of the Indian and Colonial Exhibition of 1886 he wrote a poem on the subject of Imperial unity, of which the following stanza may be quoted:—

Sharers of our glorious past,
Brothers, must we part at last?
Shall we not thro' good an ill
Cleave to one another still?
Britain's myriad voices call,
Sons be welded each an all,
Into one Imperial whole,
One with Britain, heart and soul!
One life, one flag, one fleet, one throne!
Britons, hold your own.

An Imperialist note is also struck in *Harold* (1876), Act. III. Sc. I., and in his verses *On the Jubilee of Queen Victoria* (1887). He be-

(1) The *Epilogue* probably owes its origin to an article in the *Times* on Canadian affairs ($^{30}/_{10}$, 1872) ending with the words: "From this time forth look after your own business yourselves .... We are both now in a false position, and the time has arrived when we should be relieved from it. Take up your freedom; your days of apprenticeship are over." This is presumably the article which Tennyson spoke of in his diary for $^{8}/_{11}$, 1872 as "villainous."

came associated with the Imperial Federation League and became President of its Haslemere branch.(1)

Though Tennyson has been called "the true poet of Imperialism,"(2) too much importance must not be attached to his part in the movement. He no doubt did something to popularize the idea of Imperial unity and to bring home to the public a sense of the greatness of the Empire. But he was not a great or original political thinker, and he was a Nationalist, rather than an Imperialist; his advocacy of Imperial unity is principally inspired by pride in the glory of England, to which he thought the Colonial Empire contributed. If we exclude his purely patriotic poems on the Fleet, the Crimean War, the danger of a French invasion, etc., those of his poems in which an Imperialist note is struck are not very numerous.

It would take up too much space to follow the Imperialist movement in detail throughout the rest of the 'seventies, and the early 'eighties. An increasing number of influential men gave their adherence to it. W. E. Forster, who had supported it as early as 1870, became its most prominent leader after his address on *Our Colonial Empire* at Edingburgh, Nov. 5th, 1875. Separatism vanished almost completely.(3) Gladstone in a Speech at the Mansion House, Aug. 7, 1881,(4) deprecated the idea that any body of men were insensible to the glory and responsibilities of the colonial Empire and characteristically declared that „the business of founding and of cherishing those colonies is one which had so distinctly been entrusted by Providence to the care of the people of this country, that we should almost as soon think of renouncing the very name of Englishmen as of renouncing the very great duties ..... imposed upon us with regard to the more distant, but not less dear, portions of this great British Empire."

Even the sceptical *Times* capitulated. As late as June 13, 1872, it had maintained that from Canada "the Empire derives neither financial support, nor military strength, nor diplomatic influence, but ..... is, on the contrary, sensibly weakened and hampered ..... The question is whether a statesman should seek to divine and anticipate the course of events, or whether he should trust that the Dominion will, by some spontaneous action, work out its own destiny in the fulness of time. The latter seems to be the policy which recommends itself to British statesmanship;" and on Oct. 30, it had invited Canada to leave the Empire (See p. 125). But on May 1, 1875, it speaks hope-

(1) Cf. Stanley Little *The United States of Britain.* (2) In contradistinction to Kipling (*The True Poet of Imperialism, Macmillan's Magazine,* July 1889). (3) "The school of Mr. Goldwin Smith is as extinct as the megatharium," writes the *Pall Mall Gazette* ($^{30}/_{7}$, 1884), "the contraction of England has not one articulate advocate left in the daily press, and Liberals and Radicals vie with Conservatives in professions of enthusiastic patriotism in that larger sense, etc." (4) Quoted in the Report of the Adjourned Conference of the Imperial Federation League Nov. 18, 1884.

fully of "a vast United Empire:" "For some time yet it can only be a dream; but it is a dream which we are the better for indulging in, and the day in which it will be fulfilled literally may be nearer than any of us suppose." Meanwhile, it declares, England cannot do better than maintain a loyal union with the colonies, for such a policy "may be preparing the way for the grandest Federation of States the world has witnessed."(1)

Before leaving the earliest stages of the Imperialist movement in order to give a brief account of the search for a satisfactory scheme of closer political union, it may not be out of place to examine some of the characteristics of the early movement.

The early movement had no name of its own, till it became identified with what was somewhat loosely called the Imperial Federation movement. It was only towards the end of the 'seventies that the word "Imperialism" begins to be commonly used.(2) Lord Carnarvon, writing in 1878,(3) says that "we have of late been perplexed by a new word "Imperialism," which has crept in amongst us ..... It is not free from perplexity. I have heard of Imperial policy and Imperial interests, but Imperialism, as such, is a newly coined word to me." The name had, as hinted by Lord Carnarvon in the above article, a savour of militarism(4) which has never quite left it.

Among the men who started the Imperialist movement a large proportion were Colonials: Edward Wilson, Youl, Westgarth, Dennistoun Wood, R. R. Torrens, and Labilliere were Australians. Jenkins had spent a large part of his life in Canada. This reflects the fact that the movement was originally a protest against a supposed desire on the part of English statesmen to turn the colonies adrift, and that, in spite of the frequent attempts to prove that the colonies were of material benefit to England, there was during its early years a certain tendency to look upon the retention of the Imperial tie as a service rendered by England to the colonies. The colonies were supplicants and England the granter of a boon.

(1) Curiously enough, while the colonial question was being discussed so eagerly in the press, it was almost wholly absent from parliamentary debates between 1874 and 1886. This is due to the fact that no one any longer suspected the Government of trying to cut the colonies adrift, while Imperial Fedetion was not yet looked upon by professional politicians as within the sphere of practical politics. (2) It had been used sporadically during the early days of the movement. The *Spectator,* $^{11}/_{1}$, 1868, accuses Goldwin Smith of "lacking Imperialism in its best sense;" $^{24}/_{7}$, 1869, it speaks of "the spirit of Imperialism having died out of Englishmen," and $^{10}/_{9}$, 1870, it alludes to the Canadian loyalists as "Imperialists." The *Daily Telegraph,* $^{6}/_{1}$, 1870, calls Froude "an Imperialist" and an "Imperialist champion of unusual power."

The words "Empire" and "Imperial," on the other hand, had been in common use for centuries. They constantly recur in the discussion of the colonial question at the time of the American War of Independence. (3) *Imperial Administration. Fortnightly Review,* $^{1}/_{12}$, 1878. (4) Labilliere in a paper, *The Political Organisation of the Empire* (P. R. C. I. 1881), deplores that the word Imperialism is beginning to be used synonymously with Caesarism.

Another conspicuous fact is the comparatively insignificant character of the men who first started the movement. With the exception of Froude and Sir George Grey, there were at first no really well-known men in the front ranks of Imperialism.(1) The pioneers were soon forgotten, chiefly, no doubt, owing to the fact that the early Imperialist movement was so quickly merged into the Imperial Federation agitation, where their place was usurped by men more prominent in the public eye. The growing interest taken in the federation schemes, and the boom im Imperialism in the 'eighties caused the fact to be almost forgotten that there had once been a group of men who had protested against the dissolution of the Empire without offering some kind of federation as an alternative.

The influence of Carlyle is traceable in the writings of some of the early Imperialists. Froude was a disciple of Carlyle and was obviously influenced by the Sage's hatred of the social conditions produced by the industrialization of England and his advocacy of emigration as a cure for the evils of over-population. Jenkins was strongly influenced by *Past and Present,* which he was fond of quoting in his Imperialistic writings; indeed his very language, when not dealing with dry facts, became an imitation of Carlyle's prophetic style. There was in the early movement the same close connexion between Imperialism and social reform as that which is found in Carlyle's writings on the subject. Nevertheless, the rest of the early Imperialists practically never mention Carlyle, and evidently did not regard him as their master.

In spite of the fact that the movement had originated as a protest again the supposed Separatism of a Liberal Government, it was at first not especially associated with the Conservative party. The chief parliamentary adherents of Imperialism in its early stages were not Conservatives. Macfie was a Liberal, so were R. R. Torrens and Viscount Bury, while McCullagh Torrens was an Independent Liberal and Jenkins was a Radical. Froude, though he disliked the Liberals, denounced capitalist society in the language of a revolutionary. The agitation for State-aided emigration, with which the early movement was largely bound up, was generally considered extremely Radical; it was supported by Radicals like Beales and Auberon Herbert, and was, as we have seen, looked upon by the *Times* as verging upon Communism. The ablest and most persistent attack on the alleged Separatism of the Gladstone Government was made by the Radical *Spectator,* while one of the most prominent opponents of the schemes of closer union, Adderley,(2) was a Conservative. Disraeli's Crystal Palace Speech was one of the earliest attempts to annex the Imperialist movement for the benefit of Conservatism. That the attempt largely succeeded is

(1) Their names are not infrequently misspelt in the contemporary papers.

(2) Adderley's attitude was not due to Separatist views, but to his enthusiasm for colonial self-government and self-dependence, with which he feared that the movement might interfere.

curious in view of the fact that the Tory party had been almost as indifferent to the colonies as the Liberals, and that, after all, the policy of giving the colonies responsible Government, — a policy which had probably saved the Empire from disruption — was largely Liberal in origin.

The early movement had nothing whatsoever to do with Jingoism. It was directed to the maintenance, not to the expansion of the Empire. In defending Imperial unity it kept on a very sober and matter-of-fact plane. There is in the writings of some of its adherents, like for instance Labilliere, a sense of the future possibilities of the colonies and of the greatness of the task which the Empire offers to British statesmanship, but there is almost no trace of national self-glorification. Even attempts to defend the unity of the Empire on sentimental grounds, and allusions to the ties of common origin and history are rare, and the racial, biological, and ethical theories, so dear to a certain kind of modern Imperialist, are almost entirely absent. Most of the early advocates of the Imperial connexion confined themselves to estimates of profit and loss, trying to prove that the colonies were a source of material benefit to England.

The more recent association of Imperialism with Jingoism, — with which the desire to preserve and strengthen the bonds of union with the overseas parts of the Empire has logically nothing to do — is probably due to the fact that the Beaconsfield Government of 1874 —80 took up both these, in reality quite distinct ideas, and caused them to become afterwards associated in the popular mind as two different aspects of national self-assertiveness: Because the increase of the military strength of the Empire which might result from a consolidation of its component parts might be used to further a "spirited foreign policy," it became usual for a certain school of Imperialists to think of the two things as different sides of the same idea. But this mixture of two entirely dissimilar kinds of Imperialism is not found in the early movement. One of the early Imperialists, Jenkins, wrote a satire on Jingoism in 1878,(1) and in 1876 he had ridiculed the Royal Titles Act in a pamphlet called *The Blot on the Queen's Head, or how little Ben, the Head Waiter, changed the sign of the 'Queen's Inn,' to 'Empress Hotel' Ltd.*

With the colonies inhabited by native races the early movement had practically nothing to do. It almost entirely confined itself to what we should now call the Dominions. This is due to the fact that it started as a protest against Separatism, and that the attacks of the Separatists had chiefly been directed against the latter type of colony.

Attempts at an abstract justification of conquest and dominion over subject populations, and professions of a belief in a divine mission to

(1) *Haverholme, or the Apotheosis of Jingo.* Disraeli is presented as Lord Benjingo, and Jingoism is described as "a religion of selfishness, of ambition, of cruelty, of hypocrisy and lies." (p. 196).

rule others,(1) are almost totally absent from the literature of the early Imperialist movement, in spite of the fact that theories about the identity of right and might and of the right of superior races to dominate inferior ones formed part of the philosophy both of Carlyle and Froude. The absence of this element is due to the general sober and matter-of-fact character of the movement, and to the fact that it was almost exclusively directed towards the settlement colonies.

Just as the early movement had not yet become associated with the reaction against Liberal Pacifism, so it had during its first years nothing whatsoever to do with the reaction against Free Trade in which it gained such a powerful ally in the 'nineties. In fact, in so far as it had anything to do with commercial policy at all, it appealed especially to doctrinaire Free Traders, because of the possibility that under a closer union of the Empire it might be found practicable in some way to counteract the Protectionist tendencies of the colonies.(2)

The characteristic feature of the Imperialist movement after it had passed its earliest stage, throughout the 'seventies and the 'eighties, is that practically the entire stream of Imperialist energy is diverted into one channel: the so-called Imperial Federation movement, and is concentrated on the attempt to devise some better system to regulate the relations between the mother country and her colonies than that embodied in the colonial self-government which had been evolved during the 'forties, from the system devised by the Colonial Reformers.

Now the present system, besides striking many as illogical and unsystematic, had two drawbacks: On one hand it excluded the colonies from any share in that residuum of powers which the development of colonial self-government had left in the hands of the Home Government, notably foreign affairs, and on the other hand it left to the Home Government the entire burden of Imperial defence. In spite of some notable exceptions, it was the latter drawback which loomed largest on the horizon of early English Imperialism. As the New Guinea and Pacific questions became prominent the colonies did begin to feel the want of a share in the direction of foreign policy, but it may be considered more than doubtful whether they were sufficiently interested in acquiring such a share to sacrifice any of their powers of selv-government, by entering into a federation in which the mother country must necessarily become the predominant partner.

The desire to get rid of these drawbacks was, however, not the only, and perhaps not even the chief consideration with the "Imperial Federalists". The federal movement was largely due to the desire of the enthusiastic Imperialists for some outward and visible symbol of

(1) One of the earliest examples of this kind of Imperialism is found in an article in the *Spectator*, $^{29}/_{6}$, 1872, advocating the annexation of Fiji.

(2) For an account of the attitude of the "Imperial Federalists" to the tariff question, see p. 138 ff.

the unity of the Empire. Besides, the stability of the present constitutional relations was underrated. It was generally held that things could not go on as they were much longer, and that some constitutional reform was necessary if the Empire was not to break up. Already in *An Imperial Confederation* (April 1871) Jenkins had given out the watchword: "Confederation or confusion ..... we cannot go back; we cannot remain where we are: our only chance of unity is Federation." Mathews, too, had maintained that England and her colonies "must draw nearer to one another or separate".(1) Young in the introduction to his *Imperial Federation* had said that "at a certain stage of their growth, one of two alternatives must happen with all the great self-governing colonies of Great-Britain — 'Federation' or 'Disintegration.'" Even moderate Imperialists like Forster(2) and Lord Rosebery (3) and anti-Federalists like Freeman(4) endorsed this maxim.

The fact that the movement was continually spoken of as the Imperial Federation movement must however not be taken to indicate that the federal solution of the constitutional question was the only one proposed. It was customary to speak of almost any plan for a closer union of the Empire as a "Federation." Thus Jenkins in his paper read before the Social Science Meeting in 1872(5) spoke of Adam Smith's scheme for granting the colonies representation at Westminster as "a form of Federation." Forster, who was in favour of a Council of Advice habitually spoke of his scheme as "Imperial Federation," and Mathews said that the "ruling powers of the United Kingdom already constitute, to some extent, a Federal Government, and the countries comprising the British Empire a Federation."(6)

Considerations of space forbid me to give a detailed account of all the 150—200 schemes, or variations of schemes of closer union round which the Imperialist movement revolved during the 'seventies and 'eighties. Nor would such an account be very interesting. A large number of the proposals are hardly worth taking seriously, and the majority are framed with so little consideration of actual conditions, as to make them little more than valueless as contributions to the problem which they proposed to solve. Indeed Imperial Federation was to some extent becoming the happy hunting ground of cranks. On the other hand, to leave them without a brief notice would hardly be advisable, considering the part they played in contemporary Imperialist thought. I shall therefore give a very summary account of them.

(1) *A Colonist on the Colonial Question.* p. 59. (2) "Our relations with the colonies must ultimately end either in disintegration or in some form of Federation" (*Report* of the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference $^{27}/_{7}$, 1884. p. 25).

(3) "It is, I believe, absolutely impossible for you to maintain in the long run your present loose and indefinite relations to your colonies and retain those colonies as parts of the Empire." (Speech at Leeds $^{11}/_{10}$, 1888. S. H. Jeyes: *The Earl of Rosebery. p. 99).*

(4) *Imperial Federation (Macmillan's Magazine.* Sept. 1885). (5) *Transactions* of the N. A. P. S. S. 1872. (6) *A Colonist on the Colonial Question* p. 68. The author of *A Practical Method for the Constitutional Union etc.* speaks of the Advisory Council scheme as "Federation" and of the federal scheme as "Union".

On the whole the schemes which principally found favour with the advocates of closer union may be classed under the following heads:

(a) The admission of colonial representatives to the Parliament at Westminster.

(b) A federal constitution in the true sense of the word, more or less on the analogy of those of Canada or the United States, and embodying an Imperial Super-Parliament.

(c) A Council of Advice consisting of representatives of the colonies. Finally a few Imperialists advocated:

(d) The continuance of the present relations and the development of informal co-operation.(1)

THE ADMISSION OF COLONIAL REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PARLIAMENT AT WESTMINSTER

The grant to the colonies of seats in the House of Commons had been widely mooted during the crisis preceding the American Revolution, when it had, however, been considered less as a method by which the colonists might be given a share in directing the policy of the Empire than as a means of "saving their face" as against the demand for contributions towards Imperial expenditure, and as a way of getting round the awkward doctrine of "no taxation without representation."

The scheme had cropped up several times in connexion with the various proposals for a reform of the House of Commons. Thus it had been advocated by Joseph Hume in the House of Commons $^{16}/_{8}$, 1831,(2) by the *Colonial Magazine* in 1847, and by Th. Banister in 1848,(3) touched upon by Molesworth in the House of Commons $^{18}/_{2}$, 1850,(4) by Cobden in the House of Commons, $^{28}/_{4}$, 1853,(5) and by Joseph Howe in the Nova Scotian Assembly, $^{11}/_{3}$, 1854(6). It had been debated in 1857 in the "General Association for the Australian Colonies" in London, (7) and the scheme had, as we have seen, at various times been favoured by Disraeli.(8)

(1) There were several other schemes, some of them of a rather eccentric nature. The most popular af these was that of admitting colonial representatives into the British Cabinet. (2) *Hansard* III, 6, p. 110. (3) *The Asiatic and Colonial Quarterly Journal,* vol. IV. (4) Egerton: *Selected Speeches of William Molesworth* p. 315. *Hansard* III, 108, p. 1007. (5) *Speeches I.* pp. 568—69.

(6) *Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe* II, pp. 174—206. Reprinted as a pamphlet under the title of *The Organization of the Empire* in London in 1855. In 1866 Howe published another pamphlet under the same title, also advocating colonial representation at Westminster. (7) Labilliere: *Federal Britain.* p. 14. (8) Besides, similar schemes were advocated by J. Beverley Robinson in 1822 (Egerton & Grant: *Canadian Constitutional Development,* p. 147.) H. Clinton *Suggestions towards the Organisation of the British Empire by Realising the Parliamentary Representation of all Home and Colonial Interests* (1856); J. C. M. Meekins: *Parliamentary Reform. Should the Colonies be Represented?* (1859), and others.

To the needs of the present situation this expedient was so obviously unsuited that it played only an unimportant part in the discussion after 1869. On one hand the presence of a few colonial representatives, who would always be in an insignificant minority in the Imperial Parliament, would not be of sufficient value to induce the colonies to give up their exclusive right of self-taxation, and on the other hand it would be difficult to prevent them from joining the English parties and vote on questions which concerned the United Kingdom only.

It was advocated by Westgarth in 1871 in *Practical Views and Suggestions on our Colonial Relations*(1) and (in combination with a Council of Advice) by Sir Edward Creasy in *Constitutions of the Britannic Empire* (1872).(2) A Canadian, G. M. Sproat, recommended it in 1873,(3); and a South African, J. M. Orpen, advocated colonial representation at Westminster (1879) with the reservation, however, that this should not confer upon the Imperial Parliament the right of taxing the colonies.(4) In an article *Have we a Colonial Policy,* in the *National Review* for Sept. 1883, Sir Bartle Frere recommended a similar scheme, while the *Quarterly Review* for April 1885 advocated the grant to the colonies of seats without votes in the Imperial Parliament.

An essentially different plan was the introduction of colonial representatives into the House of Lords, a much less far-reaching scheme, which had the advantage that it would not involve interference with the colonial rights of self-taxation, and that it offered less risk of intervention on the part of the colonial representatives in the local affairs of the United Kingdom. The conversion of the House of Lords into an Imperial Senate by the introduction of retiring colonial Governors was advocated by a South African, Dr. Adamson, in 1870.(5) The admission of colonial representatives to the House of Lords was also suggested by Lord Rosebery(6) and Lord Lymington(7) in 1884 and by F. Wicks in 1886.(8)

FEDERATION.

The establishment of some form of federation on American or Canadian lines was the solution which at first found most favour with the early Imperialists. To many of them this idea seemed a panacea for all the constitutional difficulties of the Empire. Curiously enough an impression seems to have prevailed among many of them that Imperial Federation was their own invention. Labilliere and Young seem only to

(1) P. R. C. I. 1871. (2) Op. cit. pp. 42—44. Creasy's scheme was, however, not to involve the right of taxing the colonies. (3) *Canada and the Empire.* (4) Hattersley: *The Colonies and Imperial Federation,* p. 53. (5) *The House of Lords as a Senate Universal.* Quoted by Hatterley, p. 53. (6) *Report* of the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference, 29th July 1884. p. 46. (7) *The Opportunity of the Peers,* (*Nineteenth Century,* Sept. 1884). (8) *The Confederation of the Empire Practically Considered,* (*National Review* Sept. 1886, p. 74). Colonial Representation in the House of Lords is also advocated in *Imperial Federation* by "a Leaguer" (1885), p. 11.

have heard of the scheme through Jenkins' articles in 1871.(1) In reality Imperial Federation was far older. Apart from earlier vague suggestions,(2) a fairly complete statement of the idea of a British federation is found in an article by W. Arthur in the *London Quarterly Review* for Dec. 1853, and a pamphlet called *An Essay on the Constitutional Integrity of the British Empire* by „Carfax" (1857) contains a remarkable scheme for a federal constitution on the basis of group federations. A somewhat eccentric work: *England and her Colonies, or Progress in Unity* by R. Fletcher (1857) concludes in another federal scheme.(3)

Both John Stuart Mill in his *Representative Government* (1861)(4) and Goldwin Smith in *The Empire* (5) speak of the idea as a familiar one, and Adderly in his *Review of 'the Colonial Policy of Lord John Russel's Administration' by Earl Grey*(6) (1869) mentions that he once took part in a long controversy with Mr. Godley, and Mr. Howe of Nova Scotia on this question. With the example of the United States and of the existing and earlier European federations before the public, it needed, indeed, no exceptional political genius to think of applying the federal solution to the constitutional problem of the British Empire.

Some time before the appearance of Jenkins' articles, Federalism was, as it were, in the air. A. Mills mentions it as "a popular and fashionable idea" in 1869.(7) J. E. Gorst in his paper, read before the Social Science Meeting at Bristol in the Autumn of 1869, said that all parts of the Empire should "continue in one free confederation", one of the practical objects of which should be a common organization for defence(8). Macfie touched upon the federal idea in a speech at Leith in September 1862(9); and in his *Letter to a Prominent Member of the Cabinet* (Sept. 1870)(10) he recommended a federation on American lines. The federal solution is also touched upon in the Youl Circular of 1869. A pamphlet entitled *Worth Doing* by "An Anglo-Australian", published in 1869 propounds a detailed federative scheme(11) and an article by A. Helps in *Good Words* (Dec. 1870) discusses various forms of federation. Lord John Russell in an autobiographical preface to his *Speeches and Despatches* (1870) recommended the summoning of "a Congress, or Assembly, representing great Britain and her dependencies . . . . . to sit for some months in the autumn" (Op. cit. 152).

In the campaign against the supposed Separatist schemes of the

(1) Labilliere: *Federal Britain*, p. 20; Young: *Imperial Federation* pp. 67—68.
(2) Lowe (the later Liberal statesman) in the Legislative Council at Sydney $^{20}/_{8}$, 1844: . . . . . "knitting herself and her colonies into one mighty confederacy" (Quoted by Labilliere p. 6.) Godley in a Lecture delivered in New Zealand $^{1}/_{12}$, 1852: . . . . "an Imperial Congress for the British Empire, in which all its members may be fairly represented" (Ibid. p. 8.) (3) Op. cit. pp. 196—97.
(4) Op. cit. Ch. 18. (5) Op. cit. p. 85. (6) Op. cit. I. p. 12.
(7) *Our Colonial Policy (Contemp. Review,* May 1869). (8) *Transactions* of the N. A. P. S. S. 1869, p. 100. (9) Reprinted in his *Colonial Questions.*
(10) Reprinted in his *Colonial Questions.* (11) Op cit. pp. 13—19.

Gladstone Government in 1869—70 allusions to federation recur again and again, and, even allowing for the lack of precision with which the expression was used, many passages leave no doubt that what is meant is the establishment of a super-Parliament for the Empire.(1) It did not, however, dominate the whole Imperialist movement till the publication of Jenkins' two articles in 1871. From this time onwards there is a stream of suggestions and proposals, the leading exponents of the idea in its earlier stages being Jenkins, Labilliere and Young. One of the most notable of its early supportes was Russell, who reiterated his recommendation of Federalism in his *Recollections and Suggestions* (1874)(2). In the 'eighties it received a great impetus from the debate which raged round the Home Rule question.

I shall not attempt to give an account of all the various schemes of federation proposed. Some confined themselves to advocating the federal principle without going into details.(3) Others, however, constructed elaborate schemes, and a certain type of Federalists seemed to delight in working out the most minute details of federal constitutions, specifying the representation to be accorded to each colony,(4) and even inventing names for the new assemblies(5), etc.

Following Freeman, whose History of Federal Government(6) had no little influence on the movement, though he himself was against it,(7) a good deal of discussion took place on the question whether a federal compact between Governments, in which the federal authority would not come in direct contact with individuals, (8) or a federal Union in which the federal authority co-ordinately with the State power should act directly on all citizens, was to be preferred. Some, like Young, Jenkins and Labilliere,(9) advocated the closer form of Union, thus showing how little they understood the nature of the problem.

The questions whether the Federal Parliament should consist of

(1) The *South Eastern Gazette* $^{30}/_{8}$ -69, The *Pall Mall Gazette* $^{26}/_{11}$ -69, the *Daily Telegraph* $^{2}/_{12}$-69, the *European Mail* $^{3}/_{12}$-69, and the *Times* $^{10}/_{9}$ and $^{29}/_{12}$ -69, all mention the scheme as familiar, and the *Standard,* $^{25}/_{8}$-69, speaks of a "British Confederacy, which would last as long as the world." Froude in his essay *England and her Colonies* (1870) discussed the federal solution of the colonial question. (See p. 109). It was mentioned by Torrens in the debate in the House of Commons $^{26}/_{4}$, 1870, (see p. 92) and some of the papers read at the Social Science Meeting of 1870 advocated the establishment of a federal Parliament (see p. 98 ff). An article in the *Westminster Review* for July, 1870, also discusses the scheme. (2) Op. cit. pp. 235—36. Granville mentions that Russell had recommended the scheme in a private letter to him. (Fitzmaurice: *Life of Granville,* II, p. 22). (3) Thus Jenkins, Young, J. Stanley Little: *The United States of Britain.* (4) Thus *The Federation of the English Empire (Westminster Review,* April, July, Oct. 1879) A. Staveley Hill: *An Empire's Parliament* (P. R. C. I. 1880). S. Wilson: *Imperial Federation (National Review,* Nov. 1884); *British National Consolidation,* by "A British Colonist," 1887. (5) Hollis True, *Victoria Britannia* (1879) and S. W. Kelsey, *Imperial Federation* (Reprint of articles from 1883—84) p. 12. (6) Cf. op. cit. p. 11. (7) Cf. his article *Imperial Federation, Macmillan's Magazine* April 1885. (8) Thus e. g. G. F. Bowen; *The Federation of the British Empire* (1886). (9) Jenkins in the *Contemporary Review,* April 1871. Labilliere: *Federal Britain.* p. 65. Young: *On the Political Relations of Mother Countries and Colonies.*

one or two Chambers,(1) whether India should be represented,(2) or no,(3) whether the Federal Parliament should consist of the present Imperial Parliament with the addition of colonial representatives,(4) one or more local houses being established for Great Britain and Ireland, or whether a new Parliament of the Empire should be formed, the Westminster Parliament becoming the local Parliament for the United Kingdom(5), were made the subjects of interminable discussions. An important question was, of course, what functions should be delegated to the federal authority. That it should deal with foreign relations and expenditure on certain Imperial heads, notably defence,(6) was commonly agreed upon. But should it deal with tariffs,(7) or ought they, as hitherto, to be left to the local Governments?(8)

On the whole it cannot be denied that many contributions to the discussion of the federation issue were characterized by a certain amateurishness, even a certain *naiveté*. A great proportion of the schemes proposed seem to have been constructed without the faintest regard to actual conditions or to the chance of their ever being accepted. Indeed some of the advocates of federation appear to have thought that the constitution of the British Empire could be subjected to a revolutionary change as easily as the rules of a club.(9)

Those who did realize the difficulty of carrying through such a radical change as that embodied in federation hardly ever perceived that the difficulty was twofold: that not only England, but also the colonies might object to such a change. The residuum of Imperial powers was in the hands of the Home Government alone. The colonies, it seemed to them, were supplicants, and federation would be a gift to them from the Home Government of a share in those affairs which had hitherto been its own exclusive preserve.(10) The chief obstacle wrote Jardine

(1) Thus e. g. *The Federation of the English Empire (Westminster Review* Oct. 1879, p. 323) E. Guthrie: *Home Rule and Federation* (1887 p. 8). Mathews: *A Colonist on the Colonial Question* (1872) (2) Thus e. g. Guthrie: *Home Rule and Federation,* p. 9. (3) Thus e. g. The Duke of Manchester, Letter to the *Colonies* $^{11}/_{3}$, 1876 (Young: *Imperial Federation* p. 58) Bowen's *Letter to a Member of Parliament,* p. 20. Staveley Hill: *An Empire's Parliament* (P. R. C. I., 1880.) p. 150. (4) Thus e. g. *The Westminster Review* (Oct. 1879); Labilliere: *Federal Britain* p. 69. F. Wicks: *The Confederation of the Empire Practically Considered (National Review.* Sept. 1886). (5) Thus e. g. G. B. L. Woodburne: *Imperial Federation and Home Rule (National Review* July 1885, p. 612); Mathews: *A Colonist on the colonial Question.* (6) The details of Imperial defence were discussed in numerous articles. This subject is, however, outside the scope of this book. (7) Thus e. g. Staveley Hill: *An Empire's Parliament* (P. R. C. I. 1880, p. 149). *A Practical Method for the Constitutional Union* etc. p. 44.

(8) As for he question of colonial tariff policy, see p. 138 ff. (8) Thus Kelsey (*Imperial Federation,* pp. 12, 20—24) proposed the dissolution of England as a separate State, and the formation, instead, of 5 or 6 "Grand Municipalities" grouped round the larger cities. F. Wicks advanced a similar scheme (*The Confederation of the Empire Practically Considered. (National Review* Sept. 1886, p. 70) The partition of the United Kingdom into English, Scotch, Irish and Welsh States was frequently advocated: Thus: J. Mathews: *A Colonist on the Colonial Question (1872)* p. 100, and Guthrie: *Home Rule and Federation* (1886), etc.

(10) *The Westminster Review* (Oct. 1879, p. 318) characteristically deprecated

Smith(1) in 1871, would be "the extreme unwillingness of the Imperial Parliament to yield its pride of place." "When Englishmen within the narrow seas consent to share the power and the responsibilities and duties of Empire with Englishmen outside," declared Howe in 1870, "we can hold the whole together and defy the world; but they won't do that" .....(2) The view that federation meant the giving up of power already held by England is well expressed in the following sentence from a paper read by Westgarth before the Royal Colonial Institute $^{15}/_{1}$. 1872:(3) "Are we, who are in possession of a united and centralised Government, to disintegrate ourselves into the looser tie of a federation?" Young in a letter to the *Colonies* newspaper $^{16}/_{2}$ 1876. (Reprinted in his *Imperial Federation* p. 42) wrote that proposals of federation should "originate with the mother country and be laid before the colonies as a plan of inestimable benefit and blessing to the outlying portions of the Empire." "The proposal", wrote Freeman in 1885,(4) "that a ruling State ..... should come down from its position of Empire and enter into terms of equal confederation with its subject communities, is a very remarkable proposal, and one which has perhaps never been made in the history of the world."(5)

The fact that so many Colonials had taken part in the early Imperialist movement and that several of them had expressed similar views may to some extent account for the fact that Imperial Federation was so universally looked upon as a concession to the colonies on the part of the mother country.(6) In reality there was a good deal of suspicion of the federation schemes in the colonies, and it is very doubtful if they would have been accepted by colonial public opinion if they had been victorious in England.(7) Even if the encroachments

the Advisory Council scheme on the ground that the colonies would not be satisfied with less than a regular federation, and the author of *A Practical Method for the Constitutional Union,* etc. thought that the Council Scheme was insufficient to "satisfy full-grown colonial politicians" (p. 4).

(1) *Fraser's Magazine. Sept.* (2) Quoted in *P. R. C. I.* 1888. p. 157.

(3) *Propositions for the Reform of our Relations with our Colonies. P. R.C. I.* 1872. (4) *Imperial Federation (Macmillan's Magazine.* April). (5) Similarly Montagu Burrows in the *National Review* Nov. 1884 and Lord Norton (Adderley) in *Imperial Federation — Its Impossibility (Nineteenth Century,* Sept. 1884); "There is about as much chance of the English people turning their ancient Parliamentary system into such a constitution, as of their deliberately restoring feudalism or the Heptarchy — — — a Minister coming down to the House with a proposal for abolishing Parliament, and issuing writs for a Federal Congress, would be immediately consigned to Bedlam." (6) Cf. also T. Saunders at the Westminster Conference of 1871. *(Discussions* p. 84), and Samuel Wilson: *A Scheme for Imperial Federation. (Nineteenth Century,* April 1885, p. 593).

(7) Cf. Hattersley: *The Colonies and Imperital Federation,* p. 76; Strangway in a debate at the Royal Colonial Institute $^{24}/_{2}$, 1880 (P. R. C. I. 1880). Parkin: *Imperial Federation* pp. 219—24; Letter from "Colonus" in Young's *Imperial Federation,* p. 86; Childers speaking at Pontefract $^{16}/_{10}$, 1879 (Quoted in Labilliere's *Federal Britain* pp. 92—93). E. Morris *Memoir of G. Higginbotham,* p. 208. Several of the anti-Federal articles mentioned on p. 142 were written by colonials. Dilke states that Imperial Federation in Australia "is now very generally described as the subjection of Australia to England." (*Problems of Greater Britain,* p. 638).

of a Federal Parliament on the powers of colonial self-government had been limited to an absolute minimum, it must necessarily have involved the abandonment of the exclusive right of self-taxation hitherto enjoyed by the colonies.

Moreover the undisguised desire of a large section of the Federalists to use federation as a pretext to withdraw from the colonies some of their powers of self-government, and to bring about the resumption, by a federal Government in which England would have the predominant voice, of the right to control colonial tariff policies (see p. 139) must necessarily make the colonists suspicious.

Indeed it is somewhat strange that the Federalists should have looked upon Imperial Federation as essentially a concession to colonial wishes, at the same time while so many of them, by openly discussing the possibility of using a federal constitution for the purpose of overriding colonial tariff legislation, showed that they quite clearly realized that it would mean the abrogation of rights hitherto enjoyed by the colonies rather than an increase of their present powers. The fact that no Federalist entertained the idea that a federation might conversely bring about an abandonment of English Free Trade in favour of the colonies, shows that it was quite realized that the mother country would occupy a predominant position in the proposed federation.

The desire to retract some of the self-government granted to the colonies is a feature which is often perceptible in the Imperial Federation movement. When that movement began, colonial Protectionism was still a comparatively new thing, and English public opinion had not yet quite recovered from the shock of seeing British colonies adopting a policy which seemed to many Englishmen not only unwise but positively sinful.(1) It has already been pointed out that when the New Zealand crisis made it clear that the colonists might prove unable to do without Imperial assistance there was a general tendency, both among the supporters and the opponents of Lord Granville's policy, to use the position in which New Zealand found itself as a means to bring about the resumption on the part of the Imperial Government of some of the powers entrusted to the colony, notably the control of its commercial policy. Thus the *Pall Mall Gazette*,(2) commenting on the Conference proposed by the Youl circular, wrote: "There is only one condition on which the colonists can ask the British Government to reverse the policy of recent years, and that is by themselves consenting that any extended responsibility accepted by the mother country shall be accompanied by proportionally extended control of colonial affairs."(3) Even the *Standard*, which so warmly espoused the cause of the New Zealanders, wrote:(4) "What were his (Lord Grey's) predecessors and his successors about, that they permitted this quasi-independence of the colonies? ..... It is unfortunately too true, that some of the colonies have been permitted to assume a large

(1) Thus the *Times* $^{27}/_{10}$, 1869; the *Pall Mall Gazette* $^{2}/_{9}$, 1869. (2) Oct. 25. 1869. (3) Similarly the *European Mail* Dec. 3. 1869. (4) Oct. 28. 1869.

license in the matter of their tariffs. ..... It has been possible at any time — it is possible now — to correct this fault by a simple Act of Parliament, removing all doubts as to the power of the Crown to disallow colonial tariffs. We are quite sure that to such an act there would be no serious opposition in the colonies."

The most prominent representative of the tendency to use the desire for closer union as a lever for the removal of colonial tariffs was Earl Grey. In his letter to Youl, Sept. 4. 1869 (see p. 97), he wrote that he considered the present colonial policy unlikely to be altered, unless the colonies on their part "were ready to recognise the propriety of the exercise of a larger measure of authority over them by the Imperial Government than they had of late been willing to submit to." "I am bound to say," he declared, "that for my own part, much as I deplore what I regard as the virtual dissolution of our colonial Empire by the adoption of the policy in question, I do not think it ought to be abandoned except on the condition I have mentioned."(1) In his speech in the House of Lords in the debate on June 20th, 1870 (see p. 92) he expressed his belief that the policy of non-intervention in colonial affairs had been carried too far. The imperial Government ought to "maintain a very considerable measure of authority, to be exercised for the common benefit of the Empire at large ..... if the colonies and this country were to form an Empire at all, one of the very first points upon which the Imperial Government must exercise its control was that of commercial policy. Although what they formerly did in allowing the local Legislatures to decide for themselves on the customs duties to be levied in the colonies was proper enough, yet they had still a right to say that this power must be exercised under certain conditions, and that, having adopted, for the benefit of the whole Empire, a certain commercial policy, it was the duty of each colony in its own internal administration to conform to the great principles of that policy, and to take no measures which could interfere with its success."(2) — In other words, the colonies were perfectly free to choose whatever tariff policy they liked, provided always that it was the same as that adopted by the mother country. In the article in the *Nineteenth Century* for June 1879,(3) in which he published his well-known plan for a Council of Advice, (see p. 144) he repeats the same arguments, and even threatens that, if the colonies do not give up their protective tariffs, "it may come to pass that the people of this country, finding the connexion between the parent state and the colonies thus reduced to a barren responsibility on the part of the former for the defence of the dependencies, may decline to go on submitting to the burden. ..... Nor am I prepared to assert that this result would be one to be deplored, since, if it is to be deprived of what gave it life and strength, it is not apparent how the connexion between England and its colonies can be of value to either

(1) *The Times*, Oct. 26. 1869. (2) *Hansard* III, 202, p. 475. (3) *How Shall We Retain the Colonies.*

party." The proposed Council of Advice might, he remarks, "facilitate an arrangement for again bringing into use the power of the Crown to withhold its assent from Colonial Acts calculated to injure the general interests of the Empire."

Westgarth, though more cautious, was of the same opinion: "Interference here must be judicious, but the Empire's policy and interests require some supervision, and the colonies generally would be disposed to listen, even on this subject, to Imperial councils, and to submit to Imperial vetoes."(1)

Distrust of the ability of the colonies to manage their own commercial and land policy was very pronounced in the speeches at the Westminster Conference of 1871 (See p. 115.) Jenkins in his inaugural speech complained of the too liberal measure of self-government granted to them: "That it was incautious is too little to say — it was idiotic."(2) "We have failed," he said, "to insist with older colonies, or lay down the preliminary with new ones, that Free Trade was to be the principle of their financial legislation,"(3) and Secretaries of State have left the veto unused when they ought to have applied it.(4) Amos' speech (see p. 116) is another example of the desire to tamper with colonial self-government,(5) and Disraeli's Crystal Palace Speech (see p. 120 ff) is an evidence of the same regret at the extensive powers of self-government granted to the colonies.(6)

In the often expressed desire to retract the power of the colonies to control their own waste lands may be traced a remnant of the spirit of the old colonial system and the view of the colonies as the property of the mother country. This attitude is, moreover, a consequence of the failure to realize that the colonies were separate entities in themselves, and not mere provinces of one British State, a fallacy on which, for instance, Froude's idea of the colonies as an agricultural supplement to the industrialism of England rests.

The indiscretion of such statements as those of Grey and Jenkins is amazing, coming, as they do, from men who earnestly desired to bring about a closer union of the Empire. They are also symptoms of a certain ignorance of colonial conditions which characterized many of the contributions to the federal agitation. To speak so lightly of abolishing colonial protective tariffs betrayed a complete ignorance of colonial Nationalism and a failure to grasp the part which the desire to broaden the economical basis of the colonies by the

(1) *On the Colonial Question P. R. C.. I. 1870.* That closer political union would entail the abandonment of protective duties on English goods in the colonies is often asserted by other "Imperial Federalists." Thus e. g. *The Federation of the English Empire* (*Westminster Review*, Apr. July, Oct. 1879).

(2) *Discussions on Colonial Questions.* p. 18.

(3) Op. cit. p. 17. (4) Op. cit. p. 20. (5) See also Froude's remarks on self-government, pp. 180, 183, 184, 192. (6) Others were, however, more cautious. Labilliere pointed out that Federation need not interfere with Colonial tariffs (*Federal Britain* p. 106). Young advocated leaving tariff affairs to the local Parliaments (*On the Political Relations of Mother Countries and Colonies*, 1883). So did Forster (*Imperial Federation, Nineteenth Century.* Feb. 1885).

creation of national industries played in the colonial public mind. On the whole the rise of separate nationhoods in the colonies, a movement which was, it must be admitted, not yet very pronounced, but which was destined to an increasing extent to govern the whole question, was almost entirely ignored by the Federalists. In their discovery of colonial loyalty they overlooked colonial Nationalism. The constitutional problem was constantly treated as if it were a question of uniting the divided branches of one uniform nationality,(1) while in reality Canada and Australia were already developing nationalities of their own. Young regarded the colonies as "an extension of the counties of England," and asked why they should not "send their proper proportion of presentatives — just as Middlesex and Yorkshire, Cornwall and Northumberland"(2) — to the British Parliament. The word "National" was frequently used as a synonym for "Imperial." Thus Young spoke of „Revenue and expenditure for national, as distinguished from local purposes."(3) Lord Rosebery spoke of "Imperial or National Federation."(4)

The failure to see that there was, strictly speaking, no such thing as a British nationality, and the assumption that the people of the colonies were simply "Englishmen beyond the seas," were made more plausible by the fact that many of the Colonials who took part in the discussion belonged to the old school of colonial loyalty, whose adherents were largely English-born, and who really did look upon themselves more or less as Englishmen in exile, men who were not completely in touch with the new generation of native-born Colonials, with whom colonial Nationalism was a much stronger force.(5) The tendency to regard the colonists as Englishmen who happened to live outside England was largely an inheritance from earlier theories of the colonial status. In the time before the American Revolution, the theory that the colonists were "Englishmen beyond the seas" had been invoked at different times both by the colonists and by the defendants of the Home Government: by the colonists when they claimed the same rights as Englishmen at home, and by the defendants of the Home Government when asserting the right of the Imperial Parliament to tax the colonists.(6)

In the 'seventies and 'eighties this tendency was strengthened by the stress laid by almost all writers on the subject on the development of communications and the diminution of distance through the submarine cable and the ocean liner. From this development the Federalists were inclined to draw the conclusion that the centrifugal

(1) "The problem now is but to reunite the scattered fragments of the same nation." Froude: *England and her Colonies.* p. 27. (2) *Imperial Federation.* p. 3. (3) *On the Political Relations of Mother countries and Colonies* (1883). Similarly G. Baden-Powell *Our National Future* (*National Review,* Feb. 1885). (4) Quoted by Worsfold *The Empire on the Anvil.* p. 31.

(5) Cf. H. B. T. Strangways in a debate at the Royal Colonial Institute $^{24}/_{2}$, 1880 (P. R. C. I. 1880, p. 168). (6) Cf. B. Holland: *Imperium et Libertas,* pp. 26—36.

forces within the Empire had ceased to operate, and that its different parts were being welded together by the improved means of communication. Of this effect of modern communications they were apt to form a somewhat exaggerated idea. It is true that science had made the establishment of the exterior machinery of federation physically possible: that it was no longer impracticable to send delegates from the colonies to some assembly in London. But the means of communication were not enough to overcome the psychological obstacle to federation: the fact that the different parts of the Empire did not constitute one public having the habit of thinking and acting collectively.(1)

A COUNCIL OF ADVICE.

The formation of some Council of Advice to keep the Home Government in touch with the wishes of the colonies was generally proposed as a second best by Federalists who either despaired of realizing a real federation, or who thought that such a Council might prove an intermediate stage on the way to a more complete form of union. The idea was much older than 1869. A "Board of Controul," consisting of ex-governors, officials, and native Colonials was proposed as early as

(1) Among other publications advocating a federal solution may be mentioned, beside those referred to above: W. Bousfield: *The Government of the Empire* (1877). "A British Subject": *The Great Game, a Plea for a British Imperial Policy* (1875). J. M. Dalton: *The Federal States of the World.* (*Nineteenth Century.* July. 1884). P. S. Hamilton: *An Alternative in Colonial Policy* (*St. James's.* Sept. 1873). J. Stanley Little: *A World Empire* (1879). W. Leggo: *Imperial Federation from a Canadian Point of View* (*Scottish Review.* July 1885). The *London Quarterly,* July 1885. R. A. Macfie: *A Glance at the Position and Prospects of the Empire* (1872). Sir Robert Stout: *A Colonial View of Imperial Federation* (*Nineteenth Century,* March 1887). Sir Julius Vogel: *Greater or Lesser Britain,* (*Nineteenth Century.* July 1877). The *Westminster Review* (January 1880). S .Wilson: *Imperial Federation* (*National Review,* Nov. 1884). F. Young: *An Adress on Imperial Federation at Cambridge* (1885).

Among the publications in which opinions hostile to federation were expressed may be mentioned: Adderley: *Imperial Federation. Its Impossibility. (Nineteenth Century.* Sept. 1884). Lord Blachford: *The Integrity of the British Empire* (Ibid. Oct. 1877). Bury: *The Unity of the Empire (Nineteenth Cent.* March. 1885). A. C. Cattanach: *On the Relations of the Colonies to the Parent State* (P. R. C. I. 1870). W. Clarke: *Federalism in the British Empire* (*British Quarterly* Oct. 1884). J. Douglas: *Imperial Federation* (*Nineteenth Cent.* Dec. 1884). Freeman: *Imperial Federation (Macmillan's* Ap. 1885). Freeman: *Greater Greece and Greater Britain* (1886). F. Hincks: *The Political Destiny of Canada.* (*Nineteenth Cent.* June 1898). R. Lowe: *The Value to the United Kingdom of the Foreign Dominions of the Crown* (*Fornightly Review* $^1/_{11}$, 1897). J. A. Farrar: *Imperial Federation* (ibid. $^1/_3$, 1885). A. Mills: *The Imperial Federation League* (ibid. $^1/_3$, 1885). J. Morley: *The Expansion of England* (*Macmillan's* Feb. 1884). Goldwin Smith: *The Expansion of England* (*Contemp. Rev.* Feb. 1884). *Straining at the Silken Thread* (*Macmillan's* Aug. 1888). H. Thring: *The Fallacy of Imperial Federation* (*Nineteenth Cent.* Jan. 1886). B. R. Wise: *A Menace to National Unity* (*Macmillan's* June 1888). Frederick Harrison's *Empire and Humanity* (*Fortnightly Review* $^1/_2$, 1880) is one of the very few articles of the period in which not only federation, but the continuance of the Empire is attacked.

1843—44 by T. C. Haliburton, the author of *Sam Slick.(1)* A joint Committee of the home and colonial Governments, meeting in London and discussing, without legislative or taxative powers, questions submitted to it by the home and colonial legislatures, was proposed by H. Kilgour in 1858.(2) The idea of a Board of Advice is touched upon in the Youl circular (1869) and mentioned in the *South Eastern Gazette* and in an article by Helps in *Good Words* for Dec. 1870. The scheme was briefly recommended by Macfie in his paper read at the Social Science Meeting at Bristol in 1869. A Council of Advice, in which the agents of the colonies should have seats, presided over by the Colonial Secretary, was advocated by H. Drummond Wolff in a letter(3) to the *Times,* Dec. 8, 1869, and attracted some attention at the time.(4) An anonymous pamphlet *Our Relations with the Colonies and Crown Colonies. An Attempt of the Passage between Scylla and Charybdis, with some Remarks on Pilots,* published in London in 1870 advocates the transfer of the office of the Colonial Secretary to a President of Council guided and assisted by representatives from the Colonies.(5) A Council of Advice is also proposed in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1870 (Op. cit. p. 160). Merivale mentions the scheme as "a popular one" in 1870.(6) Westgarth in the same year proposed the formation of a Colonial Committee of the Privy Council, consisting of ex-governors and prominent Colonials,(7) and in 1871 he suggested a similar scheme in combination with colonial representation at Westminster.(8) Labilliere supported the scheme at the Westminster Conference(9) 1871 as an intermediate stage on the way to a real federation. Some kind of Imperial Council was proposed by Macfie in the House of Commons, Feb. 28th, 1873 (10) and in the discussions which took place in the *Colonies* newspaper in 1872—76 the idea of a Council of Advice constantly cropped up.(11) The schemes proposed varied a good deal in detail. It was sometime proposed to give the Council certain actual powers,(12) or to let it acquire such powers through constitutional practice, but in this respect the proposals are not always very clear, owing to the two entirely different meanings of the word "advice" in constitutional terminology.(13) There were also widely divergent opinions on the com-

(1) *The Attaché* (the essay called *The Colonial Office, p. 52).* Similarly in his *Address on the Present Condition etc. of British North America* (1857), p. 42. (2) In a pamphlet called *The British Empire — Proposed Institution of a Joint Committee of the Legislatures and Governments of the Empire having periodical meetings in Great Britain.* Reprinted in London 1867. (3) Reprinted in 1869 as a pamphlet: *The mother Country and her Colonies.* (4) Discussed in the *Globe* $^{16}/_{12}$ and the *Morning Post* $^{17}/_{12}$, 1869. (5) Op. cit. p. 64.

(6) *The Colonial Question* in 1870. (*Fornightly Review* $^{1}/_{2}$, 1870).

(7) *On the Colonial Question.* P. R. C. I. 1870. (8) *Practical Views and Suggestions on our Colonial Relations* P. R. C. I. 1871. Similarly in *Propositions for the Reform of Our Relations With Our Colonies.* (P .R. C. I. 1872).

(9) *Discussions on Colonial Questions,* p. 83. (10) *Hansard* III, 214, p. 1105. The proposal is not very clear. (11) Young: *Imperial Federation,* pp. 37, 43, 105, 110. (12) Thus in *The Future of the British Empire, Westminster Review,* July 1870. (13) The decisions of a British Cabinet being also technically advice to the Sovereign.

position of the proposed Council, whether it ought to be elected or nominated etc. Reference is often made to the Council of India as a precedent for such a body.(1)

As it began to become clear that the chances of carrying through a regular federation were very slight, the Council scheme gained a considerable popularity. It was the one finally accepted by the Imperial Federation League. The particular project which was most widely accepted was that of reviving the Committee for Trade of Plantations of the Privy Council by the admission of colonial agents. This scheme was proposed by C. W. Eddy in a paper read before the Social Science Meeting at Glasgow in 1874 and after his death in the Royal Colonial Institute $^{8}/_{12}$, 1874.(2) The advantages of the scheme which, according to its author, had received the approval of Froude, was that it could be carried out without creating a power unknown to the Constitution. It was advocated by Earl Grey in his article *How shall we retain the Colonies?* in the *Nineteenth Century* for June 1879, and is generally associated with his name. Forster endorsed it in an article, *Imperial Federation,* in the *Nineteenth Century* for February 1885, and the Marquis of Lorne, the former Governor General of Canada and the son-in-law of the Queen, supported it in his book *Imperial Federation*(3) (1885) adding the proposal to give the agents a seat in the House of Commons without a vote.

Though the Council schemes may sometimes bear some exterior resemblance to the scheme now adopted, i. e. that of consultation through agents of the colonial Governments and the Colonial Conference, they were really radically different from that system. What was contemplated was an administrative, rather than a constitutional reform, and the projected council was intended by most of its advocates only to be advisory to the Colonial Secretary, as is seen from the frequent references to the Council of India. There was no question of consultation between equals.

INFORMAL CO-OPERATION.

The Proposal to let the present state of things go on and trust to the more informal bonds of union rather than to constitutional reforms, did not find much favour with the Imperialists of the 'seventies and the early 'eighties, who, as we have seen, largely accepted the doctrine that the only alternative to a constitutional reform was separation. The principal advocates of informal co-operation among the early Imperialists were R. R. Torrens and Viscount Bury. It also received the support of Adderley.

(1) Thus, e. g. Montagu Burrows: *Imperial Federation* (*National Review* Nov. 1884); Forster: *Imperial Federation* (*Nineteenth Century,* Feb. 1885, p. 209); the Duke of Manchester in a letter to the *Colonies* $^{1}/_{5}$, 1876 (Young's *Imperial Federation,* p. 105); "Colonus" ibid. p. 110; *Quarterly Review,* Jan. 1870. (p. 160). *Good Words,* Dec. 1870, p. 862. (2) *What are the Best Means of Drawing together the Interests of the United Kingdom and the Colonies and of Strengthening the Bonds of Union.* (P. R. C. I. 1874). (3) Op. cit. ch. 8.

During the New Zealand crisis in 1869 a letter from Torrens was published in the *Pall Mall Gazette,*(1) in which it was proposed as a remedy for the present state of things not, as it was commonly suggested, to limit the colonial powers of self-government, but to go one step further: to reduce the exercise of the Imperial veto on colonial acts to a minimum, and to allow the colonies to have a representation in London similar to the diplomatic representation of other powers. When moving his resolution in the House of Commons April 26, 1870 (see p. 92) Torrens proposed a similar plan, and in the discussion following the reading of Westgarth's paper *Practical Views and Suggestions on our Colonial Relations* in the Royal Colonial Institute, March 6, 1871, he proposed "That the colonies should be put upon the same footing as Belgium."(2)

Viscount Bury advocated the policy of letting well alone in the debate on Torrens' motion $^{26}/_{4}$, 1870,(3) and in an article *The Unity of the Empire* in the *Nineteenth Century* for March 1885 he entreated the Federalists not to endanger the unity of the Empire by rash experiments, comparing the spirit in which Federalism was advocated to that of a schoolboy who examines the works of his watch. Pointing out that, disguise it how one would, closer political union meant the renunciation on the part of the colonies of rights which they at present enjoyed, he asserted that "there never was a question which more deserves to be treated according to Lord Melbourne's famous phrase: Why can't you let it alone?" This article brought down upon its author a violent attack from Harold Finch Hatton in the *National Review* for April 1885.(4)

Adderley consistently advocated the free development of colonial self-government and deprecated all hard and fast schemes of union in his *Present Relation of England with her Colonies* (1861); *Review of the Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's administration by Earl Grey* (1869); *How to Retain our Colonies* (*Nineteenth Century* July 1879), *Imperial Federation — Its Impossibility* (ibid. Sept. 1884), etc. and in numerous speeches).(5)

(1) Dec. 31. (2) P. R. C. I. 1871. (3) *Hansard* III, 200, p. 1852.
(4) *Lord Bury and Imperial Federation.* (5) For other publications deprecating Imperial Federation, see the footnote on p. 142.

III

THE CLASSICAL EXPRESSIONS OF IMPERIALISM

SEELEY.

The development of which an account has been given in the foregoing pages, the increasing flow of Imperialist literature and the discussion which had, since the beginning of the 'seventies, revolved round the question of what was popularly called Imperial Federation, form the background on which *Seeley* made his appearance as a champion of Imperialism.

John Robert Seeley(1) (1834—1895) was Professor of Latin in University College, London, from 1863 to 1869. In 1865 he attracted considerable attention by the publication of *Ecce Homo,*(2) an attempt to analyse the teachings of Christ, which exhibits many of the qualities that characterize his later work: his logical and analytical turn of mind for one thing, his exalted conception of the character and functions of the State for another. In 1869 he was made Professor of modern history at Cambridge. His inaugural lecture *The Teaching of Politics*(3) embodies his favourite theory, which pervades much of his most important work, notably *The Expansion of England,* namely that history is the school of statesmanship, that to study history is to study politics, and that the object of studying the past is to understand the

(1) No life of Seeley exists. A biographical memoir by Professor Prothero is prefixed to *The Growth of British Policy*. Articles on Seeley are found in: the *Dictionary of National Biography;* Gooch: *History and Historians in the 19th Century;* the *Quarterly Review* (Oct. 1895); the *Westminster Review* (May 1896; by M. Todhunter); the *Fortnightly Review* (1896; by H. A. L. Fisher); The *Albany Review* (Feb. 1908; by Oscar Browning); the *English Historical Review* (1895; by J. R. Tanner); Adolf Rein's *Sir Robert Seeley* (Langensalza 1912), mainly a study of Seeley's historical work, also contains some biographical information. Some information may also be gathered from the obituary notices which appeared in the press after his death: the *Saturday Review* (Jan. 19, 1895); the *Athenaeum* (Jan. 19, 1895); the *Academy* (Jan. 19, 1895); The *Manchester Guardian* (Jan. 15, 1895); the *Caian* (Easter Term 1895 and Lent 1895); the *Cambridge Review* (Jan. 24 and 31, 1894); the *Journal of Education* (Feb. 1895); the *City of London School Magazine* (Apr. 1895). The *Cambridge University Reporter* for Oct. 11, 1895 contains the report of a meeting to promote a memorial of Seeley, with speeches by the Marquis of Lorne, G. R. Parkin, Sir John Colomb, and others. P. Fredericq *The Study of History in England and Scotland* (*Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science,* 5 series, no. X. p. 28—31) contains some information about Seeley's activity in Cambridge. (2) The book was published anonymously, but its authorship was an open secret. (3) Published in *Macmillan's Magazine* (1870 p. 433) and reprinted in *Lectures and Essays* 1870.

problems of the present. In the same year he published in *Macmillan's Magazine*(1) three essays on *Roman Imperialism,* which however throw no light on his opinions on the colonial question.(2) In 1871 he published in collaboration with E. A. Abbot a book on language and style: *English Lessons for English People,* which forms a good example of his power of analysis and definition. He edited the first book of Livy in the same year and in 1878 he brought out his largest work *The Life and Times of Stein. Natural Religion* (1882) is an examination of religion from an extremely rationalistic point of view, in which he defines religion as the opposite of selfishness and tries to demonstrate the possibility of a religion without supernaturalism. It contains a good statement of his view of religion as the great State-building principle and as the most important of the factors which go to make up nationality, with which indeed, he somtimes, almost identifies it (See pp. 153, 162). In 1883 he published two series of his Cambridge lectures under the title of *The Expansion of England.*

The publication of this book at once gave him a place in the front rank of the Imperialist movement. When the Imperial Federation League was formed in 1884, (see p. 206) he took an active part in the work of this society. He gave it his support in a letter to the Westminster Conference, July 29th, 1884. He became a member of both the Committee and the Council of the League and contributed to its journal *Imperial Federation.*(3) He addressed the conference which the League arranged on the occassion of the Colonial and Indian Exhibition, and together with Froude and Sir Alexander Galt he acted as judge at the competition arranged by the London Chamber of Commerce for the best essay formulating a practical working plan for the federation of the Empire.(4) In 1887 he published an essay called *Georgian and Victorian Expansion,*(5) a variation on the theme of *The Expansion of England.* In an article in *Good Words* for June 1888 called *The Eighty-Eights* he touched on the problem of Imperial Defence, and in 1889 he read a lecture on *The Empire* at Aldershot. In 1890 he wrote an introduction to the *Colonial Year Book* which is more or less a repetition of the ideas contained in *The Expansion of England.*

On the whole his speeches and writings on the colonial question after the publication of *The Expansion of England* contain little of interest which is not to be found in the earlier book as well. Indeed

(1) July, Aug. and Oct. Reprinted in *Lectures and Essays.* 1870.

(2) In these essays, as in his subsequent writings Seeley does not use the word Imperialism to denote the school of colonial policy to which he belonged. Imperialism means with him the reign of force, etc: "Imperialism is neither more or less than the form a state assumes when it postpones every other object to military efficiency;" *From the Cambridge Lecture Room — Bonaparte* (*Macmillan's Magazine,* July, 1881). "The country (under the rule of Cromwell) falls under the yoke of Imperialism" (ibid. p. 251). Similarly *Introduction to Political Science* p. 318. (3) Jan. 1. 1886. (4) *Imperial Federation* April 1, 1886. (5) Rede Lecture 1887. Printed in the *Fortnightly Review,* July 1887.

it is difficult not to think that his subsequent career must have been something of a disappointment to the Imperialists. His later contributions to the great questions of colonial policy were of a somewhat insignificant character and are, apart from repetitions of the views stated in the *Expansion,* mainly confined to expressions of general sympathy with the Imperial Federation movement and to the very sensible, but not very startling advice not to force a premature solution of the constitutional question. Though in favour of the principle of federation he never advocated any definite scheme.

The last years of his life were occupied with the writing of *The Growth of British Policy,* which was not published till after his death It is a history of the position of England in the European system from the accession of Elizabeth to the reign of William of Orange. The book thus leaves off approximately where the *Expansion of England* begins, and may be considered as an introduction to that work, but on Seeley's attitude to the colonial question it throws practically no light, being almost silent on the history of the colonial Empire. Like the *Expansion* it is characterized by its author's preference for large views and generalizations rather than for data.

A Short Life of Napoleon I, published in 1885, contains an account of the life of the Emperor and an attempt to analyse the ideas which guided him and to determine his place in history. An account of the philosophy of Goethe *(Goethe reviewed after Sixty Years)* was published in 1893. *Introduction to Political Science,* which was published after his death, in 1896, is a series of lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1885, and 1886. It forms an admirable illustration of Seeley's genius for analysis and definition. The whole book may be considered as an attempt to define the various forms of Government and to determine the essential meaning of such conceptions as democracy, aristocracy, despotism, etc.

Seeley's was made a K. C. M. G., presumably for his services to the cause of Imperialism on the recommendation of Lord Rosebery in 1894.

As far as his contribution to the discussion of the colonial question is concerned, Seeley is practically a man of one book: the *Expansion of England.* Great as undoubtedly was the interest which he took in the future of the colonial Empire in the later part of his life, it is difficult to avoid a suspicion that this interest was to some extent a matter of chance, being largely due to the success of the *Expansion,* and that it was the success of that book, rather than anything else, which caused him to make the promotion of the unity of the Empire one of the chief objects of his later life. His writings prior to the lectures of which the *Expansion* consists, afford no proof that he took any very great interest in the colonial question at the time,(1) and with the pub-

(1) In the official programme for the Cambridge academic year 1871—72 (*Cambridge University Reporter,* Oct. 18, 1871), two series of lectures by Seeley on *The British Empire* are announced for Lent and Easter 1872. These lectures, if ever delivered, have not been printed, and I have been unable to find any reference to them anywhere else.

lication of that book his ideas on colonial policy seem to have been exhausted. His position in the front rank of Imperialism was due solely to the prestige which he had acquired in 1883 and to which he never added anything more. To his contemporaries he was the author of *Ecce Homo* and the advocate of a particular theory of history just as much as the author of the *Expansion of England*. Even in the *Expansion* itself his historical theories occupy at least as important a place as his Imperialism, the defence of his theories of historical research forming the warp into which the woof of his Imperialism is woven.

It is not easy to trace Seeley's Imperialism back to the influence of other writers.(1) To Carlyle he seems to have owed nothing. Like him he was strongly influenced by German thought and like him he was sceptical of democracy,(2) but the mentalities of the two men were poles asunder. While Seeley, at least on one occasion,(3) expressed his admiration for "this striking appearance of the Hebrew prophet in the modern world," he despised Carlyle's idea of history(4) as he was apt to despise any historical theory which did not square with his own; and Carlyle's method of writing history was as different from his own; as anything could possibly be: his essay *From the Cambridge Lecture Room — Bonaparte* (*Macmillan's Magazine,* July 1881) is an attempt to disprove the Hero-theory in the case of Napoleon.(5)

Some influence of Froude's essays on colonial questions in 1870 may be perceptible, but on the other hand he does not seem to have had a high opinion of Froude,(6) whose want of exactitude probably shocked him. Indeed Seeley was habitually contemptuous of most other historians. But even if Seeley's Imperialism can not be traced back to the influence of any individual writer this does not mean that Seeley's place in the history of Imperialism is an isolated one. The relations of England with her colonies had formed a subject of public discussion for many years before Seeley's lectures, and most of Seeley's arguments, in fact some of his very phrases, were frequently used in that discussion (see pp. 171, 172, 173).

To the influence of Ranke his theories of the writing of history, and his conception of the nature and functions of the State, are probably largely due. With his belief that the State was not a mere administrative unit, but the outward expression of all that is best and most unselfish in human nature (indeed the ideals which make a number of

(1) In a preface to the *Expansion* he expressed his indebtedness to W. Cunningham's *Growth of English Industry and Commerce* (1882), a sociological history of England which practically does not touch upon colonial questions.
(2) Cf. *Political Somnambulism* (*Macmillan's Magazine,* Nov., 1880).
(3) Ibid. (4) "Mr. Carlyle has, in my opinion, no real talent for reviving distant times," "Mr. Carlyle usually produces his effects at the expense of truth." His method consists "in enormous exaggeration and is therefore quite as repulsive to the serious historical student as it is attractive to the beginner in history." (ibid). (5) "Great men are neither demi-gods, nor yet charlatans. They do not act but are acted on; they are hurried forward by vast forces of which they can but slightly modify the direction." (6) Cf. *Sir John Seeley by* M. Todhunter (*Westminster Review,* May 1896).

human beings constitute a State are almost identical with what he calls "natural religion,") (1) Seeley's Imperialism is closely connected. But this belief, thanks to Seeley's natural sobriety and rationalistic turn of mind, never developed into those transcendental realms in which a certain type of Imperialist delights to move. In contradistinction to Dilke he cared much less for the race than for the State. Race to Seeley was only one, and not even the most important, of the factors which go to build up the national solidarity on which the State rests. This fact accounts for the difference in the outlook of these two writers, both of them deeply concerned about the future of English nationality, ideals, and traditions. Because to Dilke race and national civilization were the only things that mattered, and the State merely an artificial administrative unit, he could look forward with equanimity to the possible break-up of the Empire. Because to Seeley the State meant so much more, he wished to preserve and to make closer the unity of the British Empire, i. e. he was an Imperialist.

It has already been remarked that almost all Seeley's ideas on the colonial question are to be found in the *Expansion of England.* The *Expansion of England* is a reprint of two series of lectures delivered in the autumn of 1881 and the spring of 1882. According to Oscar Browning(2) the idea on which these lectures are based was conceived by Seeley during his stay at Pontresina in 1879. In form this book is different from all the earlier writing on the subject, being neither a book of travel, nor a description of the colonies, nor a treatise on the benefits and drawbacks of colonies. It is typical of all the work of its author, his love of generalizations, problems and abstract ideas, rather than facts, his detached calmness, his freedom from national prejudice, his slightly dogmatic depreciation of other views than his own, his gift of apt illustration, and the extremely analytical character of his mind. Unlike Dilke, Seeley does not combine a fondness for generalizations and large views with an imaginative turn of mind. He was not an imaginative writer, though, in spite of his frequent denunciations of historians who try to make their work interesting by appealing to the public's taste for the picturesque, he was not a dull writer. His thoughts and his style alike are clear, sometimes perhaps a little dry. There is in his work a quality which reminds one of mathematics. He delights in analysing ideas and sequences of events in order to ascertain their essential character and the traits which make them different from others.

(1) "The province of religion .... is much more national and political, much less personal, than is commonly supposed." (*Natural Religion,* p. 195). "There is a higher life, of which the animating principle has been called at different times by different names, but the most comprehensive name for it is religion. It is the influence which draws men's thoughts away from their personal interests .... Under this influence the individual ceases to be an individual and becomes the member of some corporate body, whether city or nation or tribe or church." (*Natural Religion,* p. 236). (2) *Some Personal Recollections of Sir John Seeley and Lord Acton* (the *Albany Review,* Feb. 1908).

In the following I shall give an account of his ideas on the colonial question, chiefly from the *Expansion of England,* but supplemented from his other writings.

It has already been pointed out that the ostensible object of these lectures was not primarily to convert the audience to certain views on colonial questions, but to advocate a particular theory of how history should be studied. (1) It was only owing to the fact that Seeley for a paradigm to illustrate his theory chose the overseas expansion of England in the 18th century that these lectures have become the classical statement of the ideas and aims of the school of Imperialism to which their author belonged.

The theory, to demonstrate which is the primary object of the lectures, is the following: history, while it should be scientific in its method, should pursue a practical object.(2) It should not be a mere enumeration of dates and names, nor a mere romantic narrative, nor, as some writers would have it, a description of the manners of bygone times.(3) It should not only gratify the reader's curiosity about the past, it should modify his view of the present and his forecast of the future: "When you study English history you study not the past of England only, but her future. It is the welfare of your country, it is your whole interest as citizens, that is in question while you study history."(4) "We study history that we may be wise before the event."(5)

The task of the historian is, then, to use his knowledge of the past as a guide to the present and to form a forecast of the future. How is this to be done? Out of the mass of information about the past the historian must select that which is of essential importance, leaving aside as irrelevant the merely accidental facts. In other words, the historian must pick out the most important — not the most spectacular or amusing — events. By the most important events Seeley understands the most pregnant, i. e. those that have the greatest power to influence the future.(6) There is, however, a vast amount of information about the past which the historian ought to pass by as outside the field of the historian proper, such as the lives of individuals, the progress of science, etc. Such subjects are better left to other departments of science, the proper domain of the historian being the State, and his legitimate task to inve-

(1) "But though this (that England cannot get rid of the colonies and become again, with perfect comfort to herself, the old solitary island of Queen Elizabeth's time) is a conclusion to which I am led, it is not the conclusion which I wish to leave most strongly impressed on your minds. What I desire here is not so much to impart to you a just view of practical politics as a just view of the object and method of historical study. My chief aim in these lectures has been to show in what light the more recent history of England ought to be regarded by the student." (op. cit. p. 318).

"The main reason why I have chosen this subject is that it illustrates better than any other subject my view of the connexion between history and politics. The ultimate object of all my teaching here is to establish this fundamental connexion, to show that politics and history are only different aspects of the same study." (Op. cit. p. 176). (2) Op. cit. p. 9. (3) Ibid. p. 182. (4) Op. cit. p. 184.
(5) Ibid p. 180. (6) Ibid. p. 155.

stigate the laws of political growth and change. (1) Now, if the historian proceeds on these lines he will find that there is generally in any given period a sequence of events that, so to speak, give the key-note of that period, and beside which the other events of the time recede and prove of smaller importance. In finding, as it were, the formula to which the principal tendencies of the time can be reduced, the historian is able to trace the line of development running like a scarlet thread through it all, and by projecting this line into the future he will be able to form some idea of the character which the development in question is likely to adopt in times to come.

To test this theory Seeley applies it to English history. If the theory is sound the history of England ought to end with something that might be called a moral. "Some large conclusion ought to arise out of it; it ought to exhibit the general tendency of English affairs in such a way as to set us thinking about the future and divining the destiny which is reserved for us." (2)

Now English history as it is popularly represented does not end "with something that might be called a moral." On the contrary, it leaves off in such a gradual manner, growing feebler and duller towards the close, that one might be tempted to believe that England had for the last century or two been dying of old age. The reason for this is that the popular historians have not known how to find the clue by which the history of England during the last two centuries can be read. Instead of trying to find the formula which explains what this period really *means* they have contented themselves with giving a large number of uncorrelated, and therefore bewildering facts.

What is then the formula which sums up the tendency of the last two centuries of English history? In what direction and towards what goal has England been advancing? To most people the obvious answer will perhaps be Liberty and Democracy. But if we try to find out what these somewhat vague words really mean we find that they do not really offer a clue by which the history of the period can be read. The growth of political liberty has certainly been a leading characteristic of England, but it is not so much a thing towards which England in this period was tending, as a possession which it was already enjoying, for it was secured already by the struggles of the 17th century. Democracy, i. e. the development by which first the middle classes, and then the lower classes, have been admitted to a share of influence in public affairs, is certainly a tendency discernible in English history, but it belongs to the 19th, not the 18th century. The growth of political liberty and of democracy have attracted an exaggerated attention, because historians have been inclined to concentrate too much on parliamentary affairs.

If, however, we take a more comprehensive view we shall find another, and far more important, tendency, which has been more or less overlooked, because it proceeded more gradually and excited less

(1) Op. cit. pp. 13—15, 249. The same theory is maintained in his *Inaugural Lecture,* in *Introduction to Political Science* (ch. I.) and in *the Teaching of History* (*the Health Exhibition Literature,* 1884). (2) Op. cit. p. 9.

opposition, namely the expansion of the English State in the New World and in India. The settlement of the practically empty territories of the New World and the establishment of English rule over the ancient and densely populated States of India are, of course, two entirely different things. This is clearly perceived by Seeley, who treats them separately, devoting one course of lectures to the colonies in the New World, and one to India.

In thus applying the first part of his historical method — namely that the historian should try to find the keynote to any given period — to the history of England in the 18th century, Seeley arrives at a reading of English history as as process of expansion of the English State. By applying the second part of the maxim — namely that the historian should be able to use the lessons of the past as a guide to present and future problems — he arrives at a certain theory of the relations between England and her colonies.

An examination of Seeley's views both of the past and of the future of the Empire may not be out of place here. In the following I shall therefore, in the first place, give an account of Seeley's theories of the part which the overseas expansion has played in English history, that is, the application of his historical method to the past — while in the second place, I shall try to show how, in accordance with his theory, he applies the lessons of the past to the present and future problems of colonial government.

According to Seeley, as we have seen, the expansion of England is the characteristic tendency of English history in the last two centuries. This has for several reasons been somewhat overshadowed by other more conspicuous, but really less important events: "There is something very characteristic", he says, "in the indifference which we show towards this mighty phenomenon of the diffusion of our race and the expansion of our state. We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind. While we were doing it, that is in the eighteenth century, we did not allow it to affect our imaginations or in any degree to change our ways of thinking; nor have we even now ceased to think of ourselves as simply a race inhabiting an island off the northern coast of the Continent of Europe. We constantly betray by our modes of speech that we do not reckon our colonies as really belonging to us; thus if we are asked what the English population is, it does not occur to us to reckon-in the population of Canada and Australia. This fixed way of thinking has influenced our historians. It causes them, I think, to miss the true point of view in describing the eighteenth century. They make too much of the mere parliamentary wrangle and the agitations about liberty, in all which matters the eighteenth century of England was but a pale reflexion of the seventeenth. They do not perceive that in that century the history of England is not in England but in America and Asia. In like manner I believe that when we look at the present state of affairs, and still more at the future, we ought to beware of putting England alone

in the foreground and suffering what we call the English possessions to escape our view in the back-ground of the picture."(1)

But even if the enormous importance of this spreading of the English race over the greater part of the New World is recognized, it is commonly believed that the process was so simple and so inevitable that there is little to say about it, that it has scarcely had any history. The empty countries of the New World, it is said, were simply occupied by the nation which happened to have the greatest surplus population and the greatest maritime power.(2) Now this is an entire misconception; so far from the occupation of North America being a peaceful and inevitable process, it took place against the heaviest odds and under constant struggles. In fact, so far from being an obscure side-issue, this struggle for the New World is the determining factor in English history in the whole period from the time of Louis XIV to the time of Napoleon.

It is for want of perceiving this fact that most people are apt to find the history of the 18th century uinteresting. This age, as generally represented, seems a dull period, entirely wanting in greatness; the wars lead to nothing; no new political ideas make themselves felt.

In this period seven wars were fought, namely: the European war in which England was involved by the Revolution (1689—97), the War of Spanish Succession (1702—1713), the so-called "War of Jenkins' Ear" (1739—48), the Seven Years War (1756—63), the American War (1775—83) and the two great wars with revolutionary France (1793—1802, and 1803—1815).

These wars at first blush seem to be totally unconnected. We must however not be misled by names: because one of these wars was ostensibly waged in order to decide the Spanish, and another to decide the Austrian, succession we must not believe that they were wars of mere dynastic ambition.

Indeed, if we look a little closer we will find a trait common to all these seven wars. Five of them were wars with France from the beginning. The two others began, indeed, as wars with Spain and with the American colonies respectively, but they ended as wars with France. "The truth is, these wars group themselves very symmetrically and the whole period stands out as an age of gigantic rivalry between England and France, a kind of second Hundred Years' War."(3)

In point of fact in those times it seemed to the English a sort of law of nature that they should always be in an open or latent state of war with France. France seemed a natural enemy, and the periods of peace rather exceptions than the rule. This state of things was not a mere accident arising out of the geographical situation of the two countries; in fact in former times France and England had often been allies. The struggle between England and France in the 18th century had a definite object, namely the mastery of the New World. This is especially true of the three great wars between 1739 and 1783, namely the War of Austrian succession, the Seven Years' War and the American War;

(1) Op. cit. p. 17. (2) Op. cit. p. 38. (3) Op. cit. p. 33.

these, as far as England and France are concerned, are intimately connected and form as it were a trilogy of wars. They are the great decisive duel between England and France for the possession of the New World. In the first of them the two antagonists join issue, in the second France is defeated and loses her colonial Empire, in the third she takes her revenge by bringing about the loss of the first English Colonial Empire.

The Napoleonic wars are, according to Seeley, the logical sequence of this trilogy of wars. As in the American War France avenged on England the loss of her overseas Empire, so under Napoleon she made a last effort to recover her lost place. Napoleon never looked upon England as merely a European State, but as a world-Empire. His mind was constantly occupied with plans for striking at England's extra-European dominion. If the second epoch of the Napoleonic wars do not, on the surface, seem to be a war for the New World, this is due to the fact that the naval superiority of England from the first was too great to permit Napoleon to strike directly at the overseas possessions of England.(1)

This idea: that the European and the colonial policy of England are really different aspects of the same great national development, namely the expansion of England, is further developed in a more detailed account of the phases of expansion showing that the rivalry with France was merely the last phase of a development in which each of the great colonizing powers in turn had been England's rival and enemy. (2)

It may be asked why the victory in this hundred years' duel between England and France fell to the former. A political prophet comparing the prospects of the two powers about the year 1700 would probably have concluded, from the strategic advantages which the French possessed by their command of the Mississipi and the St. Lawrence rivers, that North America would in the future belong to France rather than to England. The reason why this has not come to pass is not, according to Seeley, to be sought for in any inherent superiority of the English. Their undeniable success was in his opinion due to special circumstances for which they themselves cannot claim any credit. As far as North America is concerned, England won it by the advantages given her by the accident of her geographical position. France was the loser because, owing to her continental position, she was much more exposed to being drawn into European entanglements than England. She was always divided between a policy of colonial extension and a policy of European conquest, while England has not been thus distracted between

(1) Op. cit. pp. 43—45. p. 115.

The attempt to make the Napoleonic wars fit in with this theory is repeated in Seeley's *Short History of Napoleon I:* "the actual Napoleonic Empire, as it was founded between 1805 and 1807, was not a work deliberately designed by Napoleon. It was a *pis aller*. His original plan had been to engage England singly, and to crush her." (p. 289). "The special and peculiar work of Napoleon is that colossal attempt to conquer England by conquering Europe." (p. 297).

(2) Op. cit. Lecture VII.

two objects. (1) "In one word," he says, "out of the five States which competed for the New World success has fallen to that one — not which showed at the outset the strongest vocation for colonization, not which surpassed the others in daring or invention or energy — but to that one which was least hampered by the Old World."(2)

We have now seen how the first colonial Empire of England was won. It remains to see how it was lost. Just as we are apt to overlook the fact that England was already in the 18th century partly an extra-European State, so we are apt to forget that a number of other European States were in the same position. In that century there was also a Greater France, a Greater Holland, a Greater Portugal and a Greater Spain. Indeed it is a fundamental characteristic of Europe at the time, that each of the five Western States had a colonial Empire of its own. Now in a sense colonies were not an invention of the time. There had been colonies in older periods of the world's history; both Greece and Rome were colonizing powers. But, Seeley points out, (3) the words colonies and colonization are used to denote entirely different things in different ages. What we call the colonies of Greece are quite different from the English colonies in America in the 18th century. There are, Seeley argues, two totally different kinds of colonization. First, there is what may be called *natural* colonization, natural, that is, in the sense that it has analogies in the natural world. This is the sort of colonies of which Turgot's saying, that colonies are like fruits which only cling till they ripen, is true, or to which the wellknown similes of the swarming of bees or the departure of grown-up children apply. This is the type of colony founded by ancient Greece. The Greek colony was independent of the mother State, a condition of things which was indeed inevitable because the Greek States were city States incapable of territorial expansion beyond the seas.

This system has, however, not been revived in modern times. The colonization which began with the discovery of the New World differs from it by the fact that the parent State has always retained the supreme control of the colony, except where the latter gained its independence by a successful rebellion. We must not let ourselves be misled by the analogies from natural history into believing that there is anything artificial or contrary to the order of nature in this more recent system of colonization. This system is, indeed, a logical consequence of the more modern conception of the State, just as the Greek method of colonization was a logical consequence of the Greek view of the State. To the ancient Greeks the State was a territorial entity, the State meant the city; in fact so completely did the Greek mind identify the two that the language had only one word for them both. Now this conception of the State naturally precluded an extension of the State overseas by emigration. If the State is the city, it follows that those citizens who leave the city leave the State too.

The modern idea of the State is different; it is not purely territorial; it does not rest on the city, but on the idea of nationality; in other

(1) Op. cit. pp. 106—107. (2) Op. cit. p. 108. (3) Lecture III.

words, the modern idea of the State is that people who feel themselves to belong to the same nationality should as far as possible be under the same Government. Accordingly, where the modern view is accepted, the emigrant who goes to an unoccupied territory does not necessarily leave the State to which he used to belong; he carries the State with him. The reason why this view prevailed at the time when the Western European States acquired their colonial Empires in the New World is that the organization of the modern State — in contradistinction to the Greek State, whose very constitution necessarily limited it to one city — admits of unbounded territorial extension.

But these colonial empires did not last. England, Spain, and Portugal all lost their colonies by rebellion. What was the reason why these colonies were lost? The loss of the colonies was caused by no natural law which ordains that a colony, arrived at a certain stage of maturity, must invariably separate from the mother country; it was due to certain specific causes.

These causes Seeley analyses as far as the first English colonial Empire is concerned. In the first place, the Western European powers never acted quite consistently on the principle that citizens who left the metropolis for the colonies retained exactly the same status as before, and that a colony was a mere extension of the mother country. In the 16th century there was no natural overflow of population from Europe to the colonies. The idea of using the colonies as outlets for emigration, and thus to settle them with a European population, was not very self-evident. It seemed a much more natural idea to utilize the colonies as sources of revenue. Hence it became customary to regard them less as offshoots of the parent State than as sources of so much wealth to be transported into Europe. Accordingly in the first settlement of America the conception of a Spanish colony as an extension of Spain was mixed up with a different idea of it as a possession belonging to Spain. In this way a dangerous element entered into the old colonial system. The idea of using the colonies as objects to be exploited by the Home Government seemed the more plausible because, whereas the formation of a new part of the State separated from the metropolis by the sea was a new thing in history, there had before been States (as for instance Venice) having regular possession overseas, held for the sole purpose of exploitation. The methods of Spain were imitated by the other colonizing powers, and thus the colonial system of Western Europe originated as a mixture of two radically inconsistent theories.

In England the possessive view of the colonies never triumphed completely. The treatment of the American colonies by the English Government could not at any time be called tyrannous. The colonists carried their nationality with them and claimed everywhere the rights of Englishmen. In all the American colonies Representative Assemblies sprang up, and some of them were for practical purposes almost independent States. There remained hovewer just enough of the exploitation theory in the colonial policy of England to make the Home

Government maintain that the colonies must somehow pay; England must have *some* pecuniary advantage from her possessions. This advantage the mother country got by reserving for itself certain trade privileges in the colonies. These were not very oppressive, but as a matter of principle they were considered unjust by the colonists. The fact that the Home Government insisted on them seemed to show that it claimed to treat the colonies as an estate to be worked for the benefit of those Englishmen who had remained at home, and to put England in a position somewhat similar to that of an absentee landlord.

Another factor which tended to make the connexion between England and the American colonies precarious was the fact that the latter had largely been settled by emigrants who had left England to escape religious persecution and who were therefore likely to remember the country of their birth with less affection than the modern emigrant. Consequently the first English Empire carried in itself the seeds of destruction and was short-lived like all the other colonial Empires of the time. From the loss of it England learnt not wisdom, but only despair. When she acquired another she did not change her old colonial policy, which was only abandoned accidentally, with the introduction of Free Trade. And even then the spirit of the old system remained. As the English of the 18th century had found that they could make no use of colonies except by extracting trade-advantages from them, so the English of the 19th century doubted if there was any reason to retain the colonies, now that those trade-advantages were gone.

In the second course of lectures Seeley considers the acquisition of the Indian Empire in so far as it illustrates the general law of expansion which according to him is the essence of modern English history.

The acquisition of India was made blindly. "Nothing great that has ever been done by Englishmen was done so unintentionally, so accidentally."(1) England never intended to conquer India, her object was trade. Wars with native States were not undertaken till 100 years after the first settlement, and then not for conquest but in order to support trade; the 19th century had almost begun before the policy of acquiring an ascendency over the native States was deliberately entered upon.

The series of lectures is, however, not so much an account of the growth of British rule in India as an analysis of the causes which made the conquest and the retention of India possible — another instance of Seeley's preference for ideas rather than facts.

It is, he points out, at first blush extremely difficult to understand how England conquered India. From European history we are accustomed to look upon the subjugation even of a small nation by one much larger as an extremely difficult thing, *vide* the examples of Holland and Switzerland. In India we see a handful of Englishmen con-

(1) Op. cit. p. 189.

quer an enormous country with a dense population and an ancient civilization, and that at a time when the English government proved particularly incompetent in other parts of the world, showing itself unable to beat three millions of its own subjects in America. The seemingly miraculous character of the English conquest of India has tempted English historians with "the childish eagerness with which historians indulge their national vanity,"(1) to ascribe it to some innate superiority of the English race.

In reality India was not conquered by English troops at all. It was conquered by an army four fifths Indian. The defeats of the native armies were caused not so much by a difference of race as by a difference of discipline and military science. A parallel to this process would be found in Europe if England had invaded France and then by offering good pay had raised an army of Frenchmen to conquer the country. Now such a thing would be quite inconceivable in the case of England and France, because it would be impossible to find a large number of Frenchmen willing to wage war on their own country. In India, however, the thing could easily be done, and for two reasons. In the first place India was a mere geographical expression like Europe or Africa, not a political unit. In the political sense there was, properly speaking, no India at all, only a number of mutually hostile states differing in race, language and religion. There was therefore no Indian national feeling to prevent Indians from entering the service of foreigners.

Europeans are apt to assume that where there is a country which has a name of its own there must be a nationality answering to it. But this, Seeley points out, is an error. The nation-State, though we assume it as if it were a matter of course, is really much more exceptional than we suppose. A nation is not the same thing as a population, it is a population united in a very special way and by very special forces. The chief of these forces are, according to Seeley: a) community of race, or rather the belief in a community of race. — This was totally lacking in India. b) the sense of a common interest, and the habit of forming a single political whole. — This was, if not entirely absent, at any rate extremely weak in India. c) Community of religion.(2) —

(1) Op. cit. p. 211. (2) This may be the best place to mention Seeley's theory of the importance of a common religion to the State: "I always hold that religion is the great State building principle ..... The church, so at least I hold, is the soul of the State." (op. cit. p. 166). In *Ecce Homo* parallels are constantly drawn between the Christian Church and the State. Christ is described as the founder of a new kind of "Commonwealth" (e. g. p. 315); and his teaching is presented in terms which suggest that Seeley considered his mission almost as a political one (cf. the quotation on p. 153). The theory that religion is the great State-building principle is expanded in *Natural Religion:* "You find religion, wherever it works freely and mightily, either giving birth to and sustaining States, or else raising them up to a second life after their destruction. It is a great State-builder in the hands of Moses and Ulfilas, Gregory and Nicholas; in the ruder hands of Mohamed and many another tamer and guide of gross populations it has the same character" (Op. cit. p. 197). Occasionally religion and nationality

This only partly exists in India owing to the presence of a strong Mohammedan minority.

In the second place, even in the individual States of which India consisted, the English did not supersede national Governments. They did not introduce foreign domination for the foreign domination was there already. It was not so much foreign conquest as a replacement of one set of foreign rulers by another, and it was chiefly effected by Indians. In fact it was really more in the nature of an international revolution than a conquest and it might quite conceivably have been effected by Indians, say, by a number of Parsee merchants from Bombay.

The same considerations apply to the way in which British rule in India is maintained. This is often described as if it were "an exception to all ordinary rules, a standing miracle in politics, only to be explained by the heroic qualities of the English race and their natural genius for government."(1) It would be a miracle indeed, if the Indians had been accustomed to be ruled only by their own countrymen and were familiar with the idea of resisting authority, and if they formed a single nationality. As this is not the case, the constinuation of British rule in India is not the result of any supernatural statesmanship.

Hitherto we have seen Seeley apply his historical method to the events of the past only. But it will be remembered that according to his view of history it is the task of the historian to distill from the experience of the past some lesson that can be used as a guide to the present and the future. Now just as to Seeley the greatest event in modern English history was the acquisition and loss of the first British colonial Empire, so the greatest question of the future is what is to become of the Empire which still remains to England.(2) This is where his Imperialism comes in: "In the solution of this question," he says, "lies that moral which I said ought to result from the study of English History."(3) What then is the answer which Seeley in the light of the events of the past gives to the all-important questions with which British colonial policy is confronted: is it desirable and is it possible to retain the colonial Empire?

"There are," says Seeley, "two schools of opinion among us with respect to our Empire, of which schools the one may be called the bombastic and the other the pessimistic. The one is lost in wonder and ecstasy at its immense dimensions, and at the energy and heroism which presumably have gone to the making of it; this school therefore

are practically identified: "As the Church without the State becomes a mere philosophical, or quasi-philosophical sect, so the state *without the Church (i. e. without a living conscious nationality)* is a mere administrative machine" (ibid p. 198). "Every community has in a form more or less organized that for which Christianity furnished a name, i. e. a Church, or rather every such community is in one aspect a Church as in another it is a State." (ibid. p. 206).

(1) Op. cit. p. 228. (2) Op. cit. p. 23. (3) Ibid.

advocates the maintenance of it as a point of honour or sentiment. The other is in the opposite extreme, regards it as founded in aggression and rapacity, as useless and burdensome, a kind of excrescence upon England, as depriving us of the advantages of our insularity and exposing us to wars and quarrels in every part of the globe; this school therefore advocates a policy which may lead at the earliest possible opportunity to the abandonment of it."(1) Neither of these two schools does he approve of. As for the bombastic school he feels bound to take a much more sober view of the Empire than that of the adherents of this school. The mere extent of the Empire is in itself no reason for gratification, because there is no reason in the nature of things why a State should be any the better for being large. Nor can he admit that respect for the heroism of those who founded the Empire should impose upon present-day Englishmen the duty of maintaining it. For "all political unions exist for the good of their members, and should be just as large, and no larger, as they can be without ceasing to be beneficial. It would seem to us insane that if the connexion with the colonies or with India hampered both parties, if it did harm rather than good, England should resolve to maintain it to her detriment and to that of her dependencies."(2) Nor does the vastness of the Empire necessarily prove any invincible heroism or supernatural genius for government in the English. A further reason for disagreeing with the bombastic school is that its adherents still carry on something of the confusion of ideas which proved the bane of the old colonial system, namely the mixture of the mutually conflicting conceptions of the colonies as on the one hand parts of England and on the other hand as so much property belonging to her.(3)

It is, however, in his criticism of the anti-colonial school and in his answer to the question raised by the adherents of this school: What is the good of colonies? that Seley's views on colonial policy are most characteristically expressed. Here, as in his historical survey, Seeley makes a very pronounced distinction between the problems of the settlement colonies and the problems of India. Let us take the settlement colonies first.

Now, he points out, the question, what is the good of colonies? implies that the speaker does not think of the colonists as Englishmen overseas. It implies that in his mind there still lingers some of the old conception of a colony as a possession, the only value of which was the pecuniary advantage which it could bring to its owner. If the colonies were really looked upon as extensions of the English State, if Greater Britain in the full sense of the phrase really existed, nobody would think of inquiring whether Australia or Canada render a sufficient return for the money which the English Government lays out upon them, just as nobody thinks of asking whether Cornwall or Kent pay.(4) Evidently the colonies are not at the present moment really

(1) Op. cit. p. 304. (2) Op. cit p. 305. (3) Op. cit. p. 305.
(4) Op. cit. p. 73.

extensions of the English State.(1) In his own words: "We have not really then as yet a Greater Britain. When I speak of the creation of Greater Britain during the 18th century, I in a certain sense exaggerate. In our colonial Empire was laid the foundation of a Greater Britain, and a Greater Britain may in the end arise out of it, but nothing of the kind was originally intended, nor later was the true significance of what had taken place perceived."(2)

But if the colonies are not mere extensions of the mother State it does become necessary that the question: What is the good of colonies? should be answered by proofs that not only the mother country but also the colonies benefit by the connexion. In other words the connexion, no longer a matter of course, must rest on common interest.(3)

Even on this basis it might quite conceivably be found profitable and possible to keep the Empire together. The bond of common interest might prove strong enough even if the colonies continued to be looked upon as being outside the English State proper.(4) One advantage of colonies is that they offer an outlet for emigration of the surplus population: "Considered in the abstract colonies are neither more nor less than a great augmentation of the national estate. They are lands for the landless, prosperity and wealth for those in straitened circumstances."(5) "If there is pauperism in Wiltshire and Dorsetshire, this is but complementary to unowned wealth in Australia; on the one side there are men without property, on the other there is property waiting for men."(6) To be sure there is nothing to prevent an emigrant from settling in an independent State or in a colony belonging to some other country, but in doing so he places himself at a disadvantage by having to live in a country which has different laws, institutions and religion and may even have a different language from those to which he is accustomed.

But it is *not* necessary to argue on these lines and to attempt to prove that colonies pay. There is still the alternative that the English can adopt in earnest the view that the colonies are a part of England: "We must," he says, "cease altogether to say that England is an island off the north western coast of Europe, that it has an area of 120,000 square miles and a population of thirty odd millions. We must cease to think that emigrants, when they go to the colonies, leave England or are lost to England. We must cease to think that the history of England is the history of the Parliament that sits at Westminster, and that affairs which are not discussed there cannot belong to English history. When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire together and call it all England we shall see here too is a United States. Here too is a great homogeneous people, one in blood, language, religion and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space."(7)

In former times the idea of a Greater Britain in the full sense

(1) Op. cit. pp. 71, 73. (2) Ibid. p. 71. (3) Op. cit. p. 74. (4) Op. cit. p. 74. (5) Op. cit. p. 68. (6) Ibid. p. 70. (7) Op. cit. p. 171.

of the words remained a Utopia, because the distance between the mother country and the colonies was too great. But this impediment exists no longer: "Science has given to the political organism a new circulation, which is steam, and a new nervous system, which is electricity. These new conditions make it necessary to reconsider the whole colonial problem."(1) And beside the progress of science another influence has been at work to make possible the formation of larger States. The city-State of antiquity was superseded by the larger States of the middle-ages, but for a long time these were lower organisms governed by primitive methods. Through the invention of the representative system these States rose to a higher level. Now a further advance is being made; the federal system has been added to the representative system and these improvements have resulted in the possiblity of highly organized States on a yet larger scale.

These developments make the realization of the Utopia of a Greater Britain not only possible, but urgently necessary. "For the same inventions which make vast political unions possible, tend to make States which are on the old scale of magnitude unsafe, insignificant, second-rate. If the United States and Russia hold together for another half-century, they will at the end of that time completely dwarf such old European States as France and Germany, and depress them into a second class. They will do the same to England, if at the end of that time England still thinks of herself as simply a European State, as the old United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, such as Pitt left her. It would indeed be a poor remedy, if we should try to face these vast States of the new type by an artificial union of settlements and islands scattered over the whole globe, inhabited by different nationalities, and connected by no tie except the accident that they happen all alike to acknowledge the Queen's authority."(2)

If the people of England realize that the colonies are part of England, and accustom themselves to think of emigrants as not in any way lost to England by settling in the colonies, the result might be, firstly, that emigration on a large scale became the remedy for pauperism and, secondly, "that some organisation might gradually be arrived at which might make the whole force of the Empire available in time of war."(3) This, and the allusion on p. 311 to the federal system, is the nearest that Seeley comes to formulating any definite scheme of federation.

If these arguments are accepted Seeley has demonstrated that the retention of the colonial Empire would be a desirable thing. But will it be possible to maintain it? According to Seeley the current belief that colonies when grown up will invariably endeavour to become independent is due to a mistaken reading of history and a false analogy from natural history. ("When a metaphor comes to be regarded as an argument, what an irresistible argument it always seems!")(4) But the

(1) Op. cit. p. 85. (2) Op. cit. p. 86. (3) Op. cit. p. 309. (4) Op. cit. p. 308.

ultimate independence of colonies is not a law of nature. The English colonies in America rebelled against the mother country, not simply because they were colonies, but because they were colonies under a colonial system which they considered oppressive, and because specific religious conditions made the sentimental ties between them and the mother country exceptionally slender.(1) The true moral of the American Revolution is not that colonies will leave the mother country as fruits fall from the tree as soon as they ripen, but that colonies of religious refugees under a bad colonial system are likely to rebel.(2)

Now the two causes that led to the American Revolution are no longer present in the British colonies. The old colonial system is gone; the mother country no longer claims from the colonies any trade advantages detrimental to their own interests. They have not sprung from any religious exodus, and can only look on the country from which they came with kindly feelings. Thus "the English Empire is on the whole free from that weakness which has brought down most Empires, the weakness of being a mere mechanical forced union of alien nationalities."(3) It has already been pointed out that Seeley considers the three chief forces that hold a community together and cause it to constitute a national State to be: a) community of race (or belief in community of race), b) community of interest and the habit of forming a single political whole, and c) community of religion. Strange to say Seeley finds that the different parts of the British Empire are bound together by community of religion and of race, while he considers it doubtful if they can be said to be united by community of interest.(4) The assertion that the Empire constitutes one British nationality is a favourite one with Seeley and forms the basis of his Imperialism, which essentially consists in advocating that this national unity should be recognized and acted upon: "What we call our Empire" he says, ... "is not properly, if we exclude India from consideration, an Empire at all, it is a vast English nation, only a nation so widely dispersed that before the age of steam and electricity its strong natural bonds of race and religion seemed practically dissolved by distance. As soon then as distance is abolished by science, as soon as it is proved by the examples of the United States and Russia that political union over vast areas has begun to be possible, so soon Greater Britain starts up, not only a reality but a robust reality."(5) "When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire together and call it all England, we shall see that here too is a United States. Here too is a great homogeneous people, one in blood, language, religion, and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space."(6) In his letter to the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference, July 29th, 1884, at which the Imperial Federation League was formed, he speaks of the sentiment of Imperial unity as "some sort of pan-Anglicanism"

(1) Op. cit. p. 165. (2) Ibid. p. 167. (3) Op. cit. p. 56. Seeley must for the moment have forgotten India. (4) Op. cit. p. 61. (5) Op. cit. pp. 86—87. (6) Op. cit. p. 171.

and compares the movement for closer union to the struggle for national unity in Italy and Germany.(1)

Seeley's assertion that the British Empire is bound together by community of race and religion, though perhaps not by community of interest is very curious and seems not far from being the very reverse of the truth. Even apart from the fact that such an assertion leaves out of the calculation India, the West Indies, and the greater part of the African colonies, even apart from the fact that it completely disregards the feeling of separate nationality which was growing up even among the colonists of English and Scotch descent in the settlement colonies, it seems highly questionable. Seeley seems to have forgotten the French Canadians (at that time almost one third of the population of the Dominion), the Boers, who constituted a majority of the white population of the South African colonies, (to say nothing of the black population of those colonies, which vastly exceeded all the white inhabitants), and the very numerous Irish element in the settlement colonies. Nor is the Empire by any means "one in laws." As for religion it is difficult to see how it can be maintained that the British Empire — even if we confine ourselves to the settlement colonies — is bound together by a common religion, considering that the white population of the Dominions is probably more or less equally divided between Anglicanism, Roman Catholicism, and a number of Protestant sects. On the other hand the Empire does seem to be bound together by certain material interests such as defence and the very considerable inter-Imperial trade.

According to Seeley, however, the Empire possesses the most important elements of stability and fulfills all the conditions necessary for the realization of that closer union, which is now made possible by the diminution of distance and the invention of the federal system, while it is made necessary by the growth of rival States.

It will have been observed that the questions connected with British rule in India (and still more those connected with the Crown Colonies) attracted comparatively little attention from the Imperialists of the 'seventies and 'eighties, who were mainly concerned about the possibility of a closer union between England and what would now be called the Dominions, just as the Separatists had mainly concentrated on the latter, because self-governing colonies offered an easier target for their arguments than the possessions proper. Any attempt to describe the growth of Imperialism in these periods must therefore chiefly deal with the self-governing colonies. In the case of Seeley, however, it may be worth while to give some attention to his views on colonial policy in relation to India, if only because they really show more information and more acumen than his views on the problems connected with the self-governing colonies.

According to Seeley the question: What is the good of colonies?

(1) Printed in the *Report* of the Conference.

which was irrelevant when applied to the settlement colonies, is not at all out of place when dealing with India. The connexion between England and India does not rest on a community of blood, nor is there any community of religion or of interest.(1) The connexion of England with India seems, at first sight at least, in the highest degree unnatural. That it imposes upon the former heavy responsibilities is evident. It seems, then, a very obvious thing to ask what England gets in return. She gets no tribute or any other direct pecuniary advantages from her supremacy. There are of course the indirect advantages derived from the trade with India which, if that country relapsed into anarchy or passed into the hands of another European power, would most probably cease. But against this must be set the fact that India locks up an English army and exposes England to the constant danger of entanglements with Russia. Indeed according to Seeley "it may fairly be questioned whether the possession of India does or ever can increase our power or security, while there is no doubt that it vastly increases our dangers and responsibilities."(2)

But while it is thus possible to hold that it would have been better for England if she had never founded an Indian Empire, the idea of abandoning India now is not a scheme within the range of practical politics. " A time may conceivably come when it may be practicable to leave India to herself," he declares, "but for the present it is necessary to govern her as if we were to govern her for ever."(3) At this conclusion Seeley arives by no considerations of sentiment or prestige: "Nothing is to be considered for a moment but the well-being of India and England, and of the two countries India, as being by much the more nearly interested, by much the larger, and by much the poorer, is to be considered before England."(4)

By taking upon herself the task of introducing Western civilization in India England has undertaken an experiment of momentous importance and equal in interest and consequences to that undertaken by Rome.(5) This experiment may turn out to be the greatest of all the achievements of England, or it may fail. That English rule in India is perfect it would be impossible to maintain — indeed Seeley looked upon developments in India with some misgiving,(6) — but be it

(1) Op. cit. pp. 195—196. (2) Op. cit. p. 20. (3) Op. cit. p. 204.
(4) Op. cit. p. 204. (5) Op. cit. pp. 265—57. (6) "If you ask on which side the balance will incline, and whether, if we succeed in bringing India into the full current of European civilization, we shall not evidently be rendering her the greatest possible service, I should only answer, I hope so; I trust so. In the academic study of these vast questions we should take care to avoid the optimistic commonplaces of the newspaper. Our Western civilization is perhaps not absolutely the glorious thing we like to imagine it. Those who watch India most impartially see that a vast transformation goes on there, but sometimes it produces a painful impression upon them; they see much destroyed, bad things and good things together; sometimes they doubt whether they see many good things called into existence. But they see one enormous improvement, under which we may fairly hope that all other improvements are potentially included, they see anarchy and plunder brought to an end and something like the *immensa majestas Romanae pacis* established among two hundred and fifty millions of human beings." (Op. cit. pp. 316—17).

for good or for evil, the experiment cannot now be broken off in the middle. England cannot withdraw from India, because India is not as present capable of standing alone. Withdrawal would be "the most inexcusable of all conceivable crimes and might possibly cause the most stupendous of all conceivable calamities."(1)

If we thus grant that England ought, if possible, to maintain her Indian Empire, the question remains: Is is possible to maintain it? This question is answered by a reference to Seeley's account of the British conquest of India and of the character of British rule. It will be remembered that in Seeley's opinion neither the conquest nor the continued retention of India rested on any inherent superiority of the British rulers. What made it possible was the tacit consent and even the assistance of the native population. As long as British rule meets with this tacit consent there is no reason why it should not last.

But will the Indians continue to look upon their foreign rulers in the same way? The fact that British rule is upon the whole the best rule that the peoples of India have known for many centuries is not in itself enough to make it secure. The English must not expect gratitude: "The Dominion of Rome over the western races was the empire of civilization over barbarism. Among Gauls and Iberians Rome stood as a beacon-light; they acknowledged its brightness and felt grateful for the illumination they received from it. The dominion of England in India is rather the empire of the modern world over the mediaeval. The light we bring is not less real, but it is probably less attractive and received with less gratitude. It is not a glorious light shining in darkness, but a somewhat cold daylight introduced into the midst of a warm gorgeous twilight."

"Many travellers have said that the learned Hindu, even when he acknowledges our power and makes use of our railways, is so far from regarding us with reverence that he very sincerely despises us. This is only natural. We are not cleverer than the Hindu; our minds are not richer or larger than his. We cannot astonish him, as we astonish the barbarian, by putting before him ideas that he never dreamed of."(2)

At present English rule in India rests, not on the gratitude of the people, but on the army which is indispensable both in order to maintain peace and orderly government within the border and to defend India against Russian schemes of conquest.(3) But the army consists chiefly of Indians. The reason why England can govern India by an army of Indians is, as has already been pointed out, that India possesses no national unity. But "if by any process the population should be welded together into a single nationality, if our relation to it should come to resemble even distantly the relation of Austria to Italy then I do not say we ought to begin to fear for our dominion, I say we ought to cease at once to hope for it."(4) For the English do not really

(1) Op. cit. p. 207. (2) Op. cit. pp. 255—56. Cf. also pp. 286—87.
(3) The danger of a Russian attack on India is discussed on pp. 299—303.
(4) Op. cit. p. 244.

rule India as conquerors and if they tried to do so, even if they succeeded they would be ruined financially by the mere effort.(1)

It remains to examine Seeley's contribution to Imperialist thought and his influence on the further development of the movement.

As to Seeley's contribution to the stock of ideas of Imperialism, it seems to me that, apart from the literary merit of his work, his importance has been somewhat overrated, chiefly, no doubt, because the contributions of almost all the earlier Imperialist writers to the discussion of the colonial question are now forgotten, and because Seeley's work, from a literary point of view, is far above that of the majority of his predecessors. But Seeley was not the first advocate of Imperialism. He was only one of a considerable group of Imperialists, the *Expansion of England* was only one out of a very large number of Imperialist publications, and the book is strongly tinged with ideas current at the time, which Seeley did not invent.

In how far are Seeley's theories of colonial policy original? These theories may be summed up as follows: The continued unity of the Empire is desirable. Apart from considerations of profit and loss it is desirable as a matter of course because the colonists are, and should be recognized as, Englishmen who happen to to live beyond the seas, and because the colonies are, and should be looked upon as, integral parts of England just as well as Cornwall or Kent. The continued unity of the Empire and the closer union of its members is made possible by the development of communications and the federal system, and is made necessary because the future will belong to big States, and because England without her colonial Empire would become a third-rate State in a world of Empires.

As far as the general advocacy of the retention of the colonies is concerned it will appear with sufficient clearness from the account of the development of Imperialism in the 'seventies that Seeley cannot by any means be considered a pioneer. The reaction against indifference and hostility to the colonial connexion had set in long before Seeley's lectures were delivered.

The assertion that the colonial question should not be considered a matter to be decided by calculations of profit and loss, the colonies being merely extensions of the British State and the colonists Englishmen beyond the seas, had not before been expressed with so much clarity and force, but it was far from new: Young had spoken of the colonies as extensions of England (see p. 118), and the analogy between the colonies and the counties of England had been a favourite one with writers on the subject for many years.(2) Indeed the theory

(1) In the 7th lecture of the second course Seeley examines the probalitity of a national feeling springing up in India, an examination upon which space forbids me to enter. (2) Thus e. g. J. Mill in the 1818 supplement to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Colony). Wakefield: *A Letter from Sydney* (1829) p. 100. Peel in the House of Commons $^{16}/_{1}$, 1838 (*Hansard* III, 40, p. 72). Carlyle: *Latter Day*

that the colonists were "Englishmen beyond the seas," (1) pervades the whole discussion of the colonial question in the 'seventies and early 'eighties, and it was, as Seeley himself pointed out, merely the continuation of an old tradition which ran back to the days before the American Revolution.

Incidentally the theory is a fallacy; it had its root in the prevailing ignorance of colonial Nationalism, which was shared by almost all English writers on the subject at the time, and which is the more pardonable because colonial Nationalism was not then such a conspicuous phenomenon as it is now. Still, Australia and Canada were not, even in Seeley's time, mere extensions of England. They were developing nationalities of their own, differing perceptibly from that of the mother country. What Seeley, like most other Imperialists of the period, failed to see was that the analogies of the Italian and German struggles for national unity did not apply,(2) because, strictly speaking, there was no longer a common British nationality: it was no longer a question of achieving an outward expression of national unity, but of finding a method by which several mutually different though closely related nations could work together. While Seeley thus committed the usual error of taking the existence of a common British nationality for granted it is, however, worth noticing that his common-sense prevented him from committing the grosser error, of which so many other Imperialists were guilty, of advocating a reduction of the colonial powers of self-government as regards tariffs and waste lands.

As he shared the belief of the school of Imperial Federalists in the national unity of the Empire, so he shared their doctrine that the only alternative to closer union was disintegration: "the present connexion between England and her colonies", he says, "is evidently not definitive, and as it must either grow slighter and slighter until it is dissolved, or else be strengthened, while it cannot be strengthened without being modified and reformed, the latter alternative is to be preferred to the former."(3)

Furthermore, as for the argument that science had made closer

Pamphlets (1850) p. 142. T. C. Mossom Meekins: *Parliamentary Reform* (1859), p. 16. Drummond Wolff in the *Times* $^{8}/_{12}$ 1869. The *Bee-Hive* $^{16}/_{11}$, 1869; the *Spectator* $^{4}/_{9}$, 1869 (p. 1034) and $^{19}/_{2}$, 1870 (p. 227) Froude: *England and her Colonies* (1870) p. 28. Jenkins in the *Contemporary Review* Jan. 1871 (See p. 114). C. W. Eddy: *What are the best means of drawing together the interests of the U. K. and the Colonies* (P. R. C. I. 1874). *The Westminster Review,* July 1879, pp. 42, 48.

(1) *The Expansion of England* p. 20. (2) It is true that Seeley sometimes speaks of pan-Anglicanism less as a fact than as an ideal to be realized. But there can be no doubt that what he means is that this common British nationality is already there, though it is not sufficiently grasped by Englishmen. What he advocates is that it should be recognized and that it should find its practical expression in some kind of closer union. (cf. the quotations on p. 167, and his allusions to the U. S. as a case in point — e. g. Op. cit. p. 310). (3) Paper read at the Conference of the Imperial Federation League, July 1, 1886 (*Imperial Federation,* Aug. 1886).

union possible by diminishing distance, it recurred, as has already been pointed out, again and again in writings on the colonial question long before the publication of the *Expansion*. (1) Seeley, like almost all other Imperialists, failed to understand the limitations of this effect of modern communications. If, as has been already pointed out, it made the establishment of a federal organization physically possible by permitting delegates from the outlying provinces of the Empire to come together, it was not strong enough to make the people of England and of the Dominions form one public with a habit of looking at the same questions in the same way.

That federalism offered the solution of the problem of closer union was no new idea. It had, as we have seen, been advanced long before 1869, and after the publication of Jenkins' articles in 1871, it had formed the subject of a standing controversy. It should be noticed, however, that Seeley realized more fully than most other Imperialists the difficulty of establishing a federal system, and that he deprecated the premature formation of cut-and-dried schemes.

Finally the argument that England deprived of her colonies would be dwarfed into insignificance by larger rivals had frequently been advanced before Seeley's time. (2)

What Seeley did do for Imperialism was in the first place to give a well-written and logical statement of the case for retaining the colonies, a statement which summed up the best arguments that had been advanced before, and which superseded the more or less amateurish pleas for Imperial unity in which the preceding decade had been so prolific. His bold assertion that the question whether the colonies should be maintained or not had nothing to do with calculations of profit and loss (an assertion which incidentally had its root in an exaggerated idea of the common nationality of the different parts of the Empire), though implied in the writings of earlier Imperialists, had not been expressed with so much vigour and clarity before, the earlier Imperialists having generally, even when sharing that view, been much concerned with trying to demonstrate the material benefits of the colonial connexion.

Moreover in maintaining that the overseas expansion of England

(1) Thus e. g. Creasy: *Imperial and Colonial Constitutions of the Britannic Empire* (1872) p. 42. Froude: *England and her Colonies* (1870), p. 27; the *Spectator* $^{29}/_{6}$, 1872 p. 810. Mathews: *A Colonist on the Colonial Question* (1872), p. 75; Thorold Rogers: *The Colonial Question* (Cobden Club Essays 1872) p. 442. G. M. Sproat: *Canada and the Empire* (1873); Forster: *Our Colonial Empire* (1875); *Our Colonial Empire* (*Westminster Review* 1876). Sir Julius Vogel: *Greater or Lesser Britain* (*Nineteenth Century*, July 1877) and *The British Empire* (ibid. April 1878).

(2) Thus: The *Quarterly Review*, March 1830, p. 510 Watkin in the House of Commons, $^{28}/_{2}$, 1867 (*Hansard* III, 185, p. 1190) Macfie in 1868 and 1870 (*Colonial Questions* pp. III and 43). Carnarvon in the House of Lords $^{14}/_{2}$, 1870, (*Hansard* III, 199, p. 201) Froude: *England and her Colonies* pp. 29, 30; *Fraser's Magazine*, Aug. 1871 (p. 250); Thorold Rogers: *The Colonial Question* (1871) p. 414. R. N. Fowler in the House of Commons, $^{7}/_{3}$, 1873 (*Hansard* III, 214, 1526). *The Spectator*, $^{4}/_{9}$, 1869 (p. 1035). Carfax: *An Essay on the Constitutional Integrity of the British Empire* (1857), p. 37.

was the pivot round which English history for the last two centuries had revolved and that the colonization of the new world, so far from being an incidental side-issue, was the most important and lasting achievement of the English people, he gave a heightened importance to the colonial question in public estimation, though protests were from the first raised against his somewhat one-sided reading of history.(1) Furthermore his demonstration that the fate of the colonial systems of Antiquity was not a case in point, and that the loss of the American colonies was due to specific circumstances and hence could not be used to prove the existence of a law of nature making the ultimate independence of colonies unavoidable, was extremely able, and had probably never been done so well before; but the once almost universal belief that independence was the ultimate and inevitable destiny of the colonies had been on the decline for several years, and Seeley did not so much create a confidence in the permanence of the Empire as furnish rational grounds for, and strengthen, a confidence which was already there.

Finally his demonstration that the success of the English as colonizers was not due to heroic qualities and superhuman statesmanship, but to the accident of England's geographical position, and the studied sobriety with which he tried to damp what he called bombastic Imperialism, was a word in time. Seeley's Imperialism, like that of most of his predecessors, consisted in the advocacy of the preservation and closer union, not of the extension of the Empire. Jingoism, though it had an immense boom in the last years of the 'seventies, was as yet only very hazily, if at all, associated with Imperialism in the public mind. What Seeley means by "bombastic Imperialism" it not so much Jingoism as the flamboyant and romantic Imperialism of Disraeli(2) as exemplified by the Royal Titles Act.

On the whole, then, Seeley's contribution to the ideas of Imperialism cannot be called very striking. His analytical rather than imaginative turn of mind and his want of special knowledge of conditions in the self-governing colonies(3) destined him to analyse and present the case for ideas already existent rather than to contribute new ideas of his own. He popularized rather than created Imperialism.

(1) Morley in *Macmillan's Magazine* Feb. 1884; the *Saturday Review* April 5, 1884; the *Times* June 14, 1884. Indeed, for all Seeley's contempt for "picturesque" and "artistic", as opposed to "dry fact" history, it seems doubtful if he himself was quite so matter-of-fact as he set up to be. What is his method of singling out one sequence of events as constituting the key to a certain period and of concentrating a limelight on those particular events but the artistic method of "enormous exaggeration" which he condemned in Carlyle? It may fairly be maintained that Seeley — at least as far as the *Expansion* is concerned — was just as keen on the picturesque as his contemporaries, though the picturesqueness after which he aspired was that of ideas rather than of events. Cf. also his love of paradoxes and the delight he took in demonstrating that accepted views of history and politics were the very reverse of the truth, a trait which characterized both his conversation and his books. (2) Seeley calls it "oriental", a favourite epithet with the critics of Disraeli. (3) His analysis of the character of British rule in India is, however, admirable.

It is not easy to determine what was, apart from his contribution to the stock of ideas of Imperialism, his influence on the development of the movement. On the whole the influence of the *Expansion of England* must be said to have been considerable and out of proportion to the originality of the ideas which it contained. The book was so extraordinarily well-written; Seeley's professed admiration for dryness and precision in preference to art is entirely platonic as far as the *Expansion* is concerned: the book read like a novel; it put the writings of his predecessors, with their eternal attempts to prove that "trade follows the flag" and that the loss of the colonies would lower England's prestige, completely in the shade. It is said to have reached 80,000 copies in the first two years after its publication.(1) It was reviewed at great length in almost all the important periodicals. It is constantly referred to and quoted in articles dealing with the colonial question during the following years.(2) At the Westminster Palace Hotel Conference in 1884,(3) at which the Imperial Federation League was founded, several of the speakers referred to it, and one speaker(4) proposed that one of the first actions of the League should be to print and circulate it in England and the colonies.

As an excellent statement of the case for Imperialism the *Expansion* did much to make the movement popular. Still its influence was perhaps not so great as has been sometimes believed. The Imperial Federation movement was already in full swing when it was published. The Imperial Federation League would probably have been founded and the boom in Imperialism have taken place, even if it had never been written. It seems probable that it was carried along by the crest of a wave of Imperialism rather than that it created that wave.(5) It is significant that most of the contemporary reviews of the book do not treat Seeley's theories of colonial policy as new or startling. With few exceptions(6) they dismiss them with some expressions of praise and agreement. They awake no strong oppisition, while on the other hand Seeley's theories of history are given a good deal of attention and criticisms.(7) Similarly in the obituary notices and in the other articles appearing

(1) A. Rambaud's Preface to the French edition of 1885. (2) e. g. Labilliere *Federal Britain* pp. 33, 150, 176, 252; Stanley Little *The U. S. of Britain,* the *Quarterly Rev.* Ap. 1885. pp. 510—11. W. C. Perry: *An Apology for Jingoism (National Review* May 1885). Bowen: *Substance of a Letter to a Member of Parliament* (1885) p. 15, and *The Federation of the British Empire* (1885), p. 15. Montague Burrows: *Imperial Federation (National Review,* Nov. 1884), etc, etc. (3) See p. 206. (4) Mr. Borlase (*Report* of the Conference) p. 60).

(5) Cf. Morley's review of it in *Macmillan's Magazine* Feb. 1884. in which he points out that public interest in colonial policy is growing: "Mr. Seeley's book has thus come upon a tide of popular interest." (6) Morley in *Macmillan's Magazine* Apr. 1884; Goldwin Smith in the *Comtemporary Review* Feb. 1884.

(7) The *Contemporary Review* Feb. 1884; the *Saturday Review* Apr. 5. 1884; the *Modern Review* Apr. 1884; the *Athenaeum* Oct. 20th, 1883; the *Westminster Review* Jan. 1884; the *Academy,* Oct. 20th. 1883; the *Times* June 14, 1884. On the other hand the *Quarterly Review* (July 1884) and Labilliere in the *National Review* (June 1884) made the review of the book the occasion for an advocacy of Imperialist views.

after his death he is treated as much as the author of *Ecce Homo* and the expounder of a special theory of history as the author of The Expansion of England.(1)

As for the theory that the colonists were "Englishmen beyond the seas," which Seeley helped to popularize, it was followed up by the Imperial Federation movement for some years until it was exploded by the increasing self-assertion of the colonies. As for his criticism of the bombastic school of Imperialism and his implied disapproval of Jingoism, it did not prevent Imperialism from developing in both directions in the years following the publication of the *Expansion of England*. There is some truth in Gooch's remark that Seeley would have been called a Little Englander if he had been alive at the time of the South African War.(2)

FROUDE.

Froude's best known work on colonial questions, *Oceana* and *The English in the West Indies,* was published after the appearance of Seeley as an advocate of Imperialism and after the start of the Imperial Federation League, though, as we have seen, he had entered the lists as a champion of the colonial connexion and of Imperial consolidation much earlier. In contrast to Seeley, Froude really was a pioneer of the movement. The articles of his Imperialistic creed were established already in 1870 and little was added to them during the 'seventies.

In Froude's social theories, which colour all his writings on colonial subjects, the influence of Carlyle is very pronounced. No reader of Froude and Carlyle can help being struck by the extraordinary similarity between their ideas on political, social, moral, and religious questions. Like Carlyle Froude combined a strongly conservative turn of mind with a zeal for radical social reform. He shared Carlyle's distrust of political democracy, his preference for an older and more patriarchal state of society, his dislike of the Industrial system, and his disbelief in nineteenth century progress. Like Carlyle he advocated emigration as a remedy for the evils which the industrial system had brought down upon England, and like him he hated political economy in general and the doctrines of Utilitarians and the Manchester School in particular, denouncing those who held that the chief object of a community was the acquisition of wealth, instead of, as in older times, the formation of

(1) The *Saturday Review* (Jan. 19th, 1895); J. Jacobs in the *Athenaeum* (Jan. 19th. 1895); the *Academy* (Jan. 19th, 1895) M. Todhunter in the *Westminster Review* (May 1896); the *Quarterly Review* Oct. 1895. Gooch in *History and Historians of the Nineteenth Century*. The *Cambridge Review* Jan. 1. and Jan. 24, 1895); the *Caian* (Lent 1895); the *Manchester Guardian* Jan. 15th, 1895). His collaborator E. A. Abbot says that "the work by which he is at present, and perhaps always will be, best known, is *Ecce Homo* (*City of London School Magazine* Apr. 1895). (2) *The Heart of the Empire*. p. 331.

character. He shared Carlyle's distrust of parliamentary institutions, his predilection for "strong silent men" and his contempt for orators in general and Gladstone in particular. Like Carlyle he was a Puritan, an admirer of old-fashioned, hard-working and simple-living men, an idealist who considered unselfishness, service, and devotion to duty the highest civic virtues, and a denouncer of shams and incompetence. Like Carlyle he worshipped force because he believed that only the just could in the long run remain strong, and like Carlyle he defended the right of stronger and more capable races to dominate the weak and the incompetent. Both disbelieved in the capability of the coloured races to govern themselves, and both were sceptical as to the emancipation of slaves. Both had leanings towards Calvinism and both strongly disliked Catholicism.

It is, of course, difficult to determine exactly to what extent Froude's views were due to the influence of Carlyle, or to what extent the friendship between them was due to a similarity of outlook. There can however be no doubt that Carlyle's influence on his disciple was very great. As a fellow of Exeter College in the beginning of the 'forties Froude had been strongly influenced by *The French Revolution, Past and Present,* and *Heroes and Hero Worship.*(1) In 1849 he met Carlyle and gradually became one of his most intimate friends. Carlyle read and corrected parts of Froude's *History* before it was published. "If I wrote anything," Froude declares,(2) "I fancied myself writing it to him, reflecting at each word on what he would think of it, as a check on affectations." According to his biographer(3) he had imbibed Manchester principles during his stay in that city in 1849, and it seems thus probable that the denunciation of those principles, which is so characteristic of his later work, is due to the influence of Carlyle. In his attitude to Disraeli's foreign policy Carlyle's influence also seems perceptible: Froude, who in contrast to the Sage (who detested Disraeli) rather admired that Statesman,(4) at first supported his Russian policy,(5) but after Carlyle had given his verdict against Turkey, his disciple followed his lead.(6) He was for "agitating in the great towns,"(7) against war with Russia, spoke of "the evil shadow of the Premier"(8) and described Disraeli as "dosing the country with bad champagne."(9)

Great as was doubtless Carlyle's influence on Froude, I do not think that Froude's Imperialism is *directly* attributable to the influence of the former. Carlyle's writings on colonial questions all date from the

(1) Paul: *Life of Froude,* p. 31—32. (2) *Carlyle's Life in London* I p. 457.
(3) Paul: *Life of Froude,* pp. 54—55. (4) Cf. his Lord *Beaconsfield.*
(5) Letters to Lady Derby, Sept. 19 and Sep. 22. 1876; (Paul: *Life of Froude,* p. 279—80.) (6) *Life of Froude.* pp. 279—80. (7) Letter to Lady Derby, Apr. 30. 1877; (ibid p. 283). (8) Letter to Lady Derby, Nov. 24, 1878; (ibid p. 286).
(9) Letter to Lady Derby, July 21, 1878; (ibid. p. 286) similarly in his Preface to the anonymous book. *Is Russia Wrong,* which was published in 1878.
The influence of Lord Derby and Froude's personal friend Lord Carnarvon may, however, also have had something to do with Froude's attitude.

early half of the century. They are more or less associated with the Colonial Reform Movement which flourished in the 'thirties and the 'forties, and take the form, not so much of the direct advocacy of the continuance of the colonial connexion or of closer union, as of criticism of the bureaucracy by which the colonies were administered, advocacy of emigration as a remedy for pauperism, and expressions of pride in the colonizing ability of the English people. I do not think that Carlyle thought or talked much about the colonies after Froude made his acquaintance, and there is certainly no evidence that he took any great interest in the Imperialist movement which started about 1870. What Froude owed to Carlyle was probably not so much his Imperialism itself as the social theories underlying that Imperialism, and a general antipathy against the school of economics and the view of the duties of State and subject with which Separatism had become identified.

An account of Froude's activities in connexion with the Imperialist movement in 1870 has already been given. After 1871 Froude's writings on colonial questions almost completely ceased. *Party Politics*(1) (1874) is another attack on the alleged materialism of the Liberal Party, and preaches a more idealistic conception of the State. *On the Uses of a Landed Gentry*(2) incidentally mentions emigration to the colonies as the true solution of the land question. That is practically all. The first part of Froude's career as an Imperialist may be said to have closed in 1871.

But in 1874 Froude was again drawn into colonial politics. This time he was called upon to take an active part in the politics of one of the great groups of colonies, South Africa. Both the part thus played by Froude and the writings of which it was the cause, are extremely curious.

Lord Carnarvon, the Secretary of State for the colonies of the Disraeli Administration, who was a personal friend of Froude's,(3) was anxious to bring about a federation of South Africa similar to that effected in Canada under his auspices in 1867, a federation which was to comprise both the two British colonies of the Cape and Natal and the two Boer Republics. Froude himself happened to take an interest in some questions connected with South African politics. He was interested in schemes of emigration, in the dispute between the British Government and the Orange Free State about the possession of the Diamond Fields of Griqualand West, and in the treatment by the Government of Natal of the Kaffir Chief Langalibalele.(4) He therefore

(1) *Short Studies*. Vol. IV. (2) An address delivered before the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh, Nov. 6, 1876. Reprinted in *Short Studies*. vol. IV.

(3) Disraeli complained that Carnarvon was in the hands of Froude and consulted him on all occasions and on all matters (Letter to Lady Bradford $^{3}/_{1}$, 1878. Buckle: *Life of Disraeli*. VI. p. 214). (4) By the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 England had given up its sovereignty over the Orange River Territory, guaranteed the independence of that country, and disclaimed all alliance with native chiefs or tribes to the north of the Orange River. In 1867 diamonds were found in the district of Griqualand West, to the north of the Orange River. To the land where the diamonds were found the Griqua chief Waterboer laid, as it seems

offered Lord Carnarvon to go out to South Africa in order to inquire how federation could be brought about. Ostensibly his visit was to be unofficial. He left England in August 1874 arriving at Cape Town in September. From Cape Town he went to Port Elizabeth, from there by sea to Durban and by mule-cart through Natal and across the Drakensberg into the Free State. From there he went into the Transvaal, where he met President Burgers at Pretoria. He visited the Diamond Fields and crossed into the Free State, meeting President Brand at Bloemfontein, and returning to Cape Town by way of Colesberg.

A diary which Froude kept on this journey was published in 1877 under the title of *Leaves from a South African Journal* in the third series of *Short Studies on Great Subjects*. One wonders if he was quite so frank in his conversation with the South Africans as in this Journal. If so, it is not difficult to understand the unsuccessful character of his next mission (see below). In spite of the prejudice with which the Boers were at that time usually regarded in England, Froude at once took a strong liking to them. He found in them a nation after his own heart, a patriarchal people living in accordance with the Bible in simplicity and honesty, who had been wise enough to refuse to accept an inferior form of civilization under the name of progress. "I was told a characteristic story of a Dutch farmer to-day," he writes in his diary,(1) "His estate adjoined the Diamond Fields. Had he remained where he was he could have made a large fortune. Milk, butter, poultry, eggs, vegetables, fruit ran up to fabulous prices. The market was his own to demand what he pleased. But he was disgusted at the intrusion upon his solitude. The diggers worried him from morning to night demanding to buy, while he required his farm produce for his own family. He sold his land, in his impatience, for a tenth of what he might have got had he cared to wait and bargain, mounted his wife and children into his waggon, and moved off into the wilderness. Which was the wisest man? The Dutch farmer or the Yankee Englishman who was laughing at him? The only book that the Dutchman had ever read was the Bible, and he knew no better."

It is sometimes alleged that Froude expressed his sympathy with the Dutch South Africans in language bordering on the seditious.(2)

a somewhat doubtful, claim. Waterboer petitioned for British sovereingty over his land, and in 1871 his allegiance was accepted, while the Orange Free State protested on the grounds that in the first place the land was not Waterboer's at all, and that in the second the acceptance of his allegiance was a breach of the Bloemfontein Convention.

Langalibalele was the chief of a Kaffir tribe in Natal. Being summoned on the charge of allowing his men to possess unregistered firearms he failed to appear. An attempt to seize him resulted in the loss of two or three lives. He was finally arrested, tried before a special court and sentenced to banishment for life. The part played by the Natal Government in this affair was strongly denounced by philanthropists like Bishop Colenso. (1) Op. cit. p. 373.

(2) Cf. Greswell: *Our South African Empire* I. pp. 228—29, 236—37, 239. Iwan Müller: *Lord Milner and South Africa,* pp. 192—93. P. A. Molteno: *Life and Times of Sir John Charles Molteno* I. pp. 330, 382.

This is quite probable. Froude's theory that no country had a right to more independence than it could defend by force of arms(1) was often expressed in language which seemed equivalent to a recommendation of armed rebellion, and when he toured the United States in 1872 in order to convince the American public of the justice of British rule in Ireland he practically told the Irish that they had lost their right of self-determination because they had ceased to fight for it, and that if they wanted it back, they must take it by force of arms.(2) As for South Africa, he reports himself in his diary as having told the President of the Transvaal that "a South African flag would float over Cape Town Castle and Simon's Bay when South Africa were strong enough to drives us out, but neither he nor I would live to see it."(3)

To his admiration for the Boers corresponded a somewhat low opinion of the British South Africans; "The English in South Africa," he writes, "are pulpy endogens. They may make a nation some day, but they have a long journey to travel first."(4) "There are a set of people," he writes in another place, "who answer to the mean whites of the Southern States of America. A large part of our emigrants are more or less vagabonds, whom their friends have got rid of. When they see out here anyone who looks like a gentleman, they make it their business to teach him at once that he is not in England by a rudeness which they mistake for independence. They suppose this country to be virtually a republic, and they consider courtesy to be a bad tradition of the old world."(5) On the whole a marked dislike of colonial manners is often perceptible in Froude's writings. (See p. 202.)

Such opinions were hardly calculated to endear him to British South Africans. Nor were his views on colonial self-government, if he was as outspoken in conversation as in his published diary, likely to make him popular in a country which was in the first flush of the enjoyment of self-government. A few days after his arrival he writes, after remarking on the contrast between the solidity of the old buildings in Cape Town and the flimsiness of the houses run up in more modern settlements: "They had no responsible government when Cape Town was built. What is it that has sent our colonies into so sudden a frenzy for what they call political liberty?"(6)

As regards the question of the Diamond Fields, he came to the conclusion that England was entirely in the wrong, and that their annexation was not only a breach of definite promises on the part of the British Government, but had also alienated the sympathies of the Dutch and thus placed a very serious obstacle in the way of federation.

It is, however, when writing about the great question of colonial policy, the question whether the Imperial connexion should be maintained or no, that Froude's opinions are most remarkable. Having spent three days in South Africa and having seen Cape Town and

(1) E. g. in *The English in Ireland,* vol. I. pp. 1—2. (2) Paul: *Life of Froude* ch. VI. (3) *Leaves from a South African Journal,* op. cit. p. 396.
(5) *Parl. Papers.* C. 1319, No. 1 (1876.)

its immediate surroundings, he unhesitatingly comes to the conclusion that England had better abandon the whole of South Africa, with the exception of the few square miles of the Cape Peninsula, which might be turned into an impregnable fortress: "Were England wise in her generation," he declares, "a line of forts from Table Bay to False Bay would be the northern limit of her Imperial responsibilities."(1) His further experience of the country only confirmed this view. On Nov. 18. he writes: "My own private opinion is more and more that the Imperial government should confine itself to the Table Mountain Peninsula, fortify the two harbours, and hold it as a naval and military station, leaving the rest of the country to itself."(2) Writing about Natal he employs language which reminds one of Goldwin Smith: "I cannot but think that it would have been a wise policy; when the Free States were thrown off, to have attached Natal to them; the object was to limit British responsibilities and to throw an independent community in the way of any further advance into the interior. The Free States without Natal and a seaboard do not answer the purpose. As matters stand, Natal is a danger and a difficulty. We keep troops there, and as long as a single soldier is in Maritzburg the Cape Government will never exert itself to maintain an adequate colonial force."(3)

In January 1875 Froude left South Africa for England, and reported in person to Lord Carnarvon his impressions of the South African situation. The latter had already interfered on behalf of Langalibalele, who was allowed to leave Robben Island, where he had been interned, and live in the Cape Colony. Partly, it seems, on Froude's advice the Colonial Secretary resolved to come to terms with the Orange Free State on the Diamond Fields question(4) and to summon a conference at Cape Town to discuss schemes for a South African federation. Froude was to represent the Imperial Government, and again left for South Africa, where he arrived on June 18th, 1875. A few days before his arrival, Lord Carnarvon's despatch embodying his proposals for a conference(5) had been received by the Colonial Government. Ostensibly the chief aim of the conference was to be the discussion of native affairs, while the question of confederation was mentioned as a secondary object.

The despatch had the very opposite effect of that which Carnarvon had intended. Molteno, the Prime Minister of the Cape, looked upon the invitation to the conference as an attempt on the part of the Home Government to interfere in affairs properly belonging to the sphere of the colonial Government. To make matters worse, the fact that Lord Carnarvon had proposed that the Cape Colony, besides being represented by Mr. Molteno at the conference, should also be represented by the member for Port Elizabeth, Mr. Paterson, was taken as an indi-

(1) Op. cit. p. 367. (2) Op. cit. p. 395. (3) Op. cit. p. 369. (4) A compromise was arrived at in 1876, England undertaking to pay over to the Free State a sum of £90,000 in return for the abandonment of its claim.
(5) *Parl. Papers.* C. 1319, No. 1 (1876).

cation that the Colonial Secretary favoured the schemes for the formation of a separate colony out of the Eastern part of Cape Colony, schemes which were at that time highly unpopular at Cape Town. A ministerial minute condemning the proposals was approved of by the Cape House of Assembly.(1) Thus Froude on his arrival found himself in a disagreeable position. The proposed conference could not be held, and he found himself looked upon as the agent of the Colonial Office in its sinister attempt on the freedom of the colony.

It must be admitted that Froude's conduct in the difficult situation in which he was placed was highly injudicious. Instead of acquiescing in the fact that, the conference being shelved, there was nothing for him to do, he made up his mind, in spite of the protests of Molteno and the Governor, Sir Henry Barkly, to start an agitation of his own for the proposed confederation. He toured the country, making speeches which necessarily, at least indirectly, took the character of attacks on the Government of the colony. He allowed himself to be made use of by the opposition, chiefly the Dutch and those in favour of the partition of the colony.(2) The meetings and public banquets which he attended were made the occasion for demonstrations against the Molteno Ministry. The fact seems to be that Froude did not quite understand the nature of colonial self-government. He thought that as a British citizen he had as much right to carry on an agitation against the Government of Cape Colony as to address a political meeting in London.(3) He failed to perceive that, whatever may have been the strictly legal aspect of the question, the Cape Government looked upon their own country as independent as far as the question of federation was concerned, that they regarded Froude as the official representative of the Government of another country, and that they looked upon his activities almost with the same feelings as those with which an English Liberal Ministry would look at the French Ambassador in London, if he were to tour the country making speeches in the Conservative interest.(4) Moreover he held that the question, being one of external affairs, was outside the scope of colonial self-government, and for the Secretary of State alone to decide.(5)

Besides compromising the federation issue and creating a good deal of unpleasantness for himself nothing came of Froude's campaign. In the autumn of 1875 he returned to England.(6) His official report was presented to Lord Carnarvon on Jan. 1st, 1876.(7) In this well-written

(1) *Parl. Papers C. 1319* No. 3. 1876. (2) *Life of Molteno,* I. p. 406; C. 1399. No. 50 (1876) p. 78 and *Two Lectures on South Africa* pp. 61—62. In his report (p. 74) Froude represents himself as having studiously avoided any advocacy of the separation of the Eastern province. That he was in favour of such a scheme appears however from *Two Lectures on South Africa.* pp. 82—83.

(3) *Cf. 1399.* No. 50 (1876) pp. 70, 79. (4) Cf. Ibid. p. 79 and *Two Lectures on South Africa.* p. 61. (5) *Cf. 1399* No. 50 (1876) p. 66. (6) A detailed account of the whole affairs is given in P. A. Molteno: *Life and Times of Sir John Charles Molteno,* I. pp. 327—457; II. pp. 1—92. Cf. also Paul: *Life of Froude.* ch. VII. W. Greswell: *Our South African Empire,* I. ch. 9.

(7) Printed in *C. 1399.* No. 550 (1876).

and unconventional State paper Froude gives a short survey of the history of South Africa, in which he defends the Boers and condemns the policy hitherto followed towards them by the British Government, more especially as regards the annexation of the Diamond Fields. The rest of the paper is an apology for the discharge of his mission.

Another result of Froude's South African experiences is an article from his pen in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1877,(1) in which he surveys the history of South Africa, strongly condemning British policy towards the Dutch, accuses the British Government of repeated breaches of faith, and describes its proceedings as discreditable to England. This article elicited an answer from Lord Blachford (Rogers) in the *Edinburgh Review* for April(2) 1877, in which the latter defends British policy towards the Dutch, Froude's description of whom he finds too idealized. He accuses the Boers of various aggressions toward the natives, and defends the annexation of the Diamond Fields. We are here treated to the spectacle of one of the men who have been most severely criticized by Imperialist writers as a Separatist reproving Froude the Imperialist for opposing the policy of expansion in South Africa and for running down his country.

It is not to be wondered at, then, that Froude was opposed to the first annexation of the Transvaal, which he condemned in an article in the *Quarterly Review* for April 1879,(3) entitled *The South African Problem.* This article also contains denunciations of the annexation of the Diamond Fields, the treatment of Langalibalele and the Zulu War. The writer recommends the suspension of the Cape constitution, "which ought never to have been granted," and the introduction of a government similar to that of India: "South Africa," he remarks, "we would be inclined to say, must belong to us in these terms or it ought not to belong to us at all. There is a superstition that a constitution once conceded cannot be withdrawn, and that the confidence of the rest of our colonies would be shaken if they saw us reimpose our authority after we had once relinquished it. We do not share the alarm."(4) If the colonies will not submit to this, he goes on to say, they must shift for themselves: "there can be no hardship in saying to South Africa, 'We cannot go on as we are doing. We offer you an alternative. Come back of yourselves under the Crown, or be completely free. You will not allow us to govern you — govern yourselves then . . . ."(5) In other words, England should withdraw from South Africa, keeping only the naval station at Simon's Bay, and "Dutch, English, Caffre, and Zulu, might then be left to settle their own differences," while

(1) The article is anonymous like the other contributions to the *Quarterly* at the time, but the style and arguments are unmistakably Froude's. Blachford mentions Froude as the author of the article (*Letters of Lord Blachford*. p. 376), so does the *Dictionary of National Biography* (under Froude). (2) Anonymous; that Blachford was the author appears from the *Letters of Blachford* p. 376.

(3) Anonymous, but attributed to Froude by the *Dictionary of National Biography*. Style and opinions are unmistakably Froude's. (4) Op. cit. p. 578.

(5) Op. cit. p. 579.

the British government "should meddle as little with them as the garrison of Gibraltar interferes with Spanish revolutions."(1) In spite of some concluding remarks to the effect that "for our reputation's sake we ought to leave no means untried to discover a *modus vivendi* between ourselves and our fellow-subjects without parting company,"(2) the article bears a remarkable likeness to the writings of Goldwin Smith and to passages in *Greater Britain.*

Finally Froude summed up his views on South Africa in two lectures delivered before the Philosophical Institution at Edinburgh on the 6th and 9th of Jan. 1880 and published in the same year under the title of *Two Lectures on South Africa.* These two lectures contain in the first place a short history of South Africa, in which Froude's well-known views on that subject are embodied. It praises the Boers, defends their attitude to the natives, and condemns the treatment of Langalibalele, the seizure of the Diamond Fields and the annexation of the Transvaal. Besides, the lectures contain an account of Froude's travels in South Africa in 1874, and a defence of his activities during his mission to that country in 1875. The general tone of these lectures is not what one would expect from an Imperialist. Emphasis is laid on the cost and trouble of maintaining the South African colonies. There is no sympathy with the colonists. His distrust of their ability to govern themselves is repeatedly expressed. "I believe responsible government," he says, "to be totally unsuited to the circumstances of South Africa."(3) "I did not then (in 1874), and I do not now think that we ought to establish a self-governed dominion in South Africa. Self-government in South Africa means the government of the natives by the European colonists, and that is not self-government."(4) He casts a longing glance at the possibility of abolishing the self-government which has already been granted to the Cape Colony, though he recognises the impossibility of such a plan being realized: "... we might suspend the Cape constitution and place all the States and Colonies under an impartial administration like that of India. Able men with full powers of government could then keep order and do justice there at no cost to this country."(5)

As to the desirability of maintaining British rule in South Africa his opinions remain unchanged. "For us," he declares, "the happiest issue by far would be the separation of Table Mountain from the rest of South Africa. We might keep our naval station in our own hands. The remainder might do as it pleased."(6) And again: "If a line could be drawn across from Table Bay to False Bay, if the Cape Town peninsula was ours and ours only, and the whole of the rest of the country was entirely independent of us, as I heartily wish it was, then I would leave South Africa to the South Africans, white or coloured, to shape out its own fortunes."(7)

(1) Op. cit. p. 579. (2) Op. cit. p. 580. (3) Op. cit. p. 47. (4) Op. cit. p. 52. (5) Op. cit. p. 81. (6) Op. cit. p. 81. (7) Op. cit. p. 53.

If Froude had died in 1880 it is probable that he would have been remembered as an enemy of colonial expansion, an advocate of separation, and a defender of oppressed nationalities in the colonies. The cool proposal to abandon the English settlers in South Africa (who, be it remarked, had originally been sent out there by the British Government under a system of State-organized emigration such as Froude had spent a good deal of his life in advocating) to the mercy of the Kaffirs, while the English garrison at Simon's Bay remained „rigidly neutral"(1) could hardly be surpassed by the most extreme Separatist.

What is the explanation of this singular contrast between Froude's writings in 1870—71 and in 1874—80? Why did he in 1874—80 recommend a policy of abandonment which he had taxed his vocabulary to denounce in 1870? Why was it sinful to rule Boers by force, when it was a meritorious exercise of power derived from justice in the case of Ireland? Is it a case of backsliding? Did Froude momentarily abandon the true faith and lapse into the heresies of the Manchester School?

It is improbable that a complete change took place in Froude's views on colonial policy in general between 1871 and 1874, and that the opinions expressed in his writings on South African affairs were meant to apply to the Empire in general. Froude looked upon South Africa as occupying somehow a different position from the rest of the colonies. He had special reasons to take a different view of South Africa, and Froude was a special pleader rather than a detached investigator: when he had made up his mind what side to take, he looked for arguments in support of that side, and of that side only, to the exclusion of the most obvious arguments to the contrary.

But what is the cause of Froude's curious prejudice against British South Africa? In *Two lectures on South Africa* he is careful to point out that South Africa occupies a different position from that of the other colonies: "We speak of South Africa", he says, "as an English colony. It is not a colony. It is a conquered country, of which we took possession for our own purposes against the wish of its proper owners. English colonists have since settled there; but South Africa is Dutch."(2)

This is not a very convincing reason for Froude's attitude to British rule in South Africa. Even if the Dutch were at the time in a considerable majority, a large proportion of the population was English, and the English element would soon become predominant if Froude's own programme of organized emigration from the British Islands was carried out. Moreover it is somewhat surprising to see Froude — who defended British rule in Ireland on the ground that a nation which could not defend itself had no right to independence — in the role of the protagonist of oppressed nationalities. Nor is it very probable that his attitude was really to any large extent due to the injustice and the breaches of faith

(1) *The South African Problem, Quarterly Review* April 1879. (2) Op. cit p. 6.

towards natives and Boers of which he believed the British Government to be guilty, for it is difficult to maintain that British rule in Ireland, which it was one of Froude's chief objects in life to defend, could show a better record.

All the arguments which Froude adduced against British rule in South Africa are really attempts to furnish rational grounds for an opinion which he had formed independently of these arguments. The real reason for Froude's attitude was his admiration for the Boers. In them he had found a realization of the ideal which he held up to the English public, a patriarchal society of old-fashioned, simple-minded, Bible-reading men who lived on the land and spurned industrialism and the pursuit of wealth, the very opposite, in short, of the type of men admired by the Manchester School. Such a people could not fail to enlist his sympathies. On the other hand the usual objections to the Boers had no weight with Froude. They were unpopular in England because they were represented by missionaries and philanthropists as slave-holders and oppressors of the natives. Such objections left Froude cold. He had no sympathy with the negrophiles, holding, as he did, with his master Carlyle, that the negroes had no claim to self-determination, and no right of priority to the land, that they ought to be made to work, and that all that was due to them was impartial justice and decent treatment. (1) Moreover Froude's feelings towards the British South Africans were, as has already been pointed out, not calculated to counterbalance his sympathies with the Dutch. With all his theoretical admiration for Colonial life, Froude never liked colonials.(2) He admired style, natural dignity, and good manners, and he found in the colonials a tendency to self-assertiveness and a lack of courtesy, masking a democracy, which shocked him. In the case of South Africa this feeling may have been further aggravated by the unpleasant experiences connected with his mission. Besides, he seems to have looked upon the Diamond Fields as the symbol of British civilization in South Africa, and the Diamond Fields appear to have been less like the mining camps of romance than a mixture of a Ghetto and an East End slum on saturday night. (3)

The *Two Lectures on South Africa* close this chapter of Froude's Imperialism.(4) When he took up the discussion of the colonial question

"(1) "It would be better to make the natives into serfs under an organised system, with security for property and life, than to give them the rights of freemen and leave them to be eaten up, as it is called, when public policy pretends that an example is wanted (*Leaves from a South African Journal* p. 369). "Our grandfathers treated them as cattle; we treat them as if it were a sin to lay them under the same restraint as our own children. Our cruelty and our tenderness are alike fatal to them; the second, perhaps, is the most fatal of the two." (Ibid. p. 378).

"If we can make up our minds to allow the colonists to manage the natives their own way, we may safely confederate the whole country. The Dutch will be in the majority, and the Dutch method of management will more or less prevail." (Ibid. p. 380). (2) See p. 202. (3) A vivid, if unpleasant account of life in the early days of Kimberley is given in Louis Cohen: *Reminiscences of Kimberley*. (4) *Oceana* contains however some remarks on South Africa.

again, with *Oceana,* it was in his old role as an advocate of Imperial consolidation and of organized colonization.

Oceana, or England and her Colonies(1) was published in 1886 at a time when public interest in Imperial Federation was at its height. Seeley's *Expansion of England* had been published three years before, and the Imperial Federation League was two years old.

Oceana is a book of travel and describes the author's impressions during his visit to Australasia in 1885. The object for which Froude undertook this journey was, as he remarks in the preface, "not only to see the colonies themselves, but to hear the views of all classes of people there on the subject in which I was principally interested."

Froude left England on Dec. 6, 1884, bound for Australia by the long route round the Cape, where his ship touched. Leaving Cape Town after a very short stay, he arrived at Adelaide on Jan. the 18th and went from there by sea to Melbourne. He spent some time in Melbourne as the guest of the Governor, made journeys as the guest of the State of Victoria to Ballarat and Bendigo and other places of interest, and left on February 11th for Sydney. Here he spent some days meeting the prominent men of the colony, and thereafter went to Moss Vale where he stayed as the guest of the Governor of New South Wales. On Feb. 26th he left Australia for New Zealand, where he arrived on March 4th.(2) He spent two days at Auckland, and then on March 6th started on a tour to the Lakes of the North Island, where he spent a week sight-seeing. The rest of his time in New Zealand was spent as the guest of Sir George Grey in the Island of Kawau off the coast of the North Island near Auckland. He left New Zealand at the end of March going home via America.

Considered as a book of travel *Oceana* is much inferior to its predecessor, Dilke's *Greater Britain,* to which otherwise it bears some likeness. It completely lacks Dilke's unconventional freshness, originality, and breadth of view. It is obviously founded on a diary which it follows closely. There is almost no attempt at arrangement. An idea is taken up, dropped, and taken up again in another place. The narrative is continually broken by the introduction of disquisitions on the most different topics ranging from Greek literature to the Irish question. Parts of the book are written in a gossipy style with innumerable discourses on the food, wine, and accomodation of ships and hotels, and random details about fellow- passengers, etc.

Froude's visit to the Australasian colonies was too short to enable him to get a very reliable impression of conditions there, the more so as he spent much of his time in the exclusive atmosphere of Government House, and as his excursions in Victoria were in the character of an

(1) The title of the book is taken from Sir James Harrington's Utopia of 1656 in which he describes the destiny which he believed to be reserved for Great Britain as an oceanic world power. (2) I give these dates because they throw some light on Froude's opportunities of getting a first-hand impression of colonial conditions.

official progress with its accompanying public dinners and receptions, which left him little opportunity of seeing much for himself or of forming an opinion of his own on what he did see. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the book contains a great number of errors of fact which have been denounced, sometimes with undue severity,(1) and of which a few examples out of many will serve: in his description of Adelaide he writes that the River Murray "falls into the sea at no great distance to the westward."(2) As a matter of fact the Murray falls into the sea some sixty miles to the south-east of Adelaide. Writing about Adelaide a few pages further on(3) he says: "... we saw below us in a basin, with the river winding through it, a city of 150,000 inhabitants, not one of whom has ever known, or will know, a moment's anxiety as to the recurring regularity of his three meals a day." Adelaide is not in a basin, it is on a hill. It had not more than 100,000 inhabitants, and it was at the time of Froude's visit passing through a period of commercial depression which caused serious distress.

Errors of this kind are, however, when all is said and done, of no very great importance. Froude's want of contact with colonial opinion and his failure to understand the colonial outlook are more serious. Thus during his visit to Victoria he notices with satisfaction that a landed gentry is springing up as a natural growth in that colony, and remarks that the theories of Henry George will find no audience there.(4) A little further on (5) the prophecies that the English landed interest "will perhaps one day migrate *en masse* to a country (meaning Australia), where they can live in their own way without fear of socialism or graduated income-tax." This is a remarkably unfortunate prophecy, considering that Victoria has been a pioneer in the application of the theories of Henry George. Already at the time of his visit the squatter aristocracy, so far from being considered a natural growth in Australia, was being fought as an enemy of the community. Writing of Sydney he says(6) — "Property rises fast in value, and the 'unearned increment' is in no danger from Socialistic politicians." A few years after Froude's visit Australia had carried State Socialism to a greater extreme than any other country in the world.

The interest of *Oceana* is, however, not so much in the specific information about Australasian conditions which it contains, as in the statements of Froude's views on the great questions of colonial policy in general which are scattered throughout the book.

Beginning with a short sketch of the growth of the Empire since the time when Harrington wrote his *Oceana*, Froude passes on to the usual attack on the Separatists and the familiar denunciations of the way in which colonial self-government was granted. "Both parties in the

(1) Thus e. g. by Edward Wakefield in a review in the *Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1886. H. A. L. Fisher: *Modern Historians* (*Fortnightly Review*. Dec. 94), Langlois & Seignobos: *Introduction aux études historiques*, pp. 101—102.

(2) *Oceana*. p. 72. (3) Ibid. p. 75. (4) Op. cit. pp. 107, 95. (5) Op. cit. p. 111. (6) Op. cit. p. 164.

state", he writes, "had been irritated in turn by their experience in Downing Street, and for once both were agreed. The troops were withdrawn from Canada, from Australia, from New Zealand. A single regiment only was to have been left at the Cape to protect our naval station. The unoccupied lands, properly the inheritance of the collective British nation — whole continents large as a second United States — were hurriedly abandoned to the local colonial governments. They were equipped with constitutions modelled after our own, which were to endure as long as the connection with the mother country was maintained; but they were informed, more or less distinctly, that they were as birds hatched in a nest whose parents would be charged with them only till they could provide for themselves, and the sooner they were ready for complete independence, the better the mother country would be pleased."

"This was the colonial policy avowed in private by responsible statesmen, and half confessed in public fifteen years ago. And thus it seemed that the second group of territorial acquisitions which English enterprise had secured was to follow the first. The American provinces had been lost by invasion of their rights. The rest were to be thrown away as valueless. The separation might be called friendly, but the tone which we assumed was as offensive to the colonists as the intended action was unwelcome, and if they were obliged to leave us it would not be as friends that we should part. The English people too had not been treated fairly. A policy so far-reaching ought to have been fully explained to them, and not ventured on without their full consent. A frank avowal of an intention to shake the colonies off would have been fatal to the ministry that made it. Ambiguous expressions were explained away when challenged. We were told that self-government had been given to the colonies only to attach them to us more completely, while measures were taken and language was used which were indisputably designed to lead to a certain and early disintegration."(1)

That it was the intention of the Home Government to cut the colonies adrift was, according to Froude, an open secret "if it can be called a secret at all"(2) and he quotes in proof the statement of "an eminent Colonial Office Secretary," to Froude himself: "it is no use to speak about it any longer. The thing is done. The great colonies are gone. It is but a question of a year or two."(3) The reckless way in which the colonial patronage was used by the Home Government and the ignorance of colonial conditions in official circles is illustrated by anecdotes, some of them of somewhat doubtful authenticity.(4)

The deepest reason for this attitude to the colonies was, he goes on to say, the economic theories which at that time prevailed in England.

(1) Op. cit. p. 6. (2) Ibid. p. 7. (3) Op. cit. p. 7. (4) The well-known anecdote about Lord Palmerston who being unable to find a Colonial Secretary for his new Ministry said "I suppose I must take the thing myself. Come upstairs with me, Helps, when the council is over. We will look at the maps and you shall show me where these places are" (*Oceana* p. 12) is asserted by Froude's biographer to be absolutely untrue (Paul: *Life of Froude* p. 352).

Great Britain was to become the workshop of the world. Her people were to be kept at home and multiply. "The Empire brought us nothing, save expense for armaments and possibilities of foreign complications. Shorn of these wild shoots we should be like an orchard tree pruned of its luxuriance, on which the fruit would grow richer and more abundant."(1)

But the foundations on which these theories rested were wrong. The assumption that the first object of a nation is the production of wealth is false: 'Man shall not live by bread alone'. In professing to disregard the sentimental factor, the Manchester school forgot that "the chief part of the reality in questions of this kind is sentiment. A nation with whom sentiment is nothing is on the way to cease to be a nation at all,"(2) and "the British nation is something more than a gathering of producers and consumers and taxpayers."(3)

The prosperity of a nation, Froude argues, depends in the long run on the mental and physical qualities of the individuals that compose it, and it is obvious that the conditions under which Englishmen live in the industrial districts of England are not calculated to maintain the qualities that have made the race what it is. What England will become if the dreams of the Manchester School are realized can be seen already in London and the great manufacturing cities: "Miles upon miles of squalid lanes, each house the duplicate of its neighbour; the dirty street in front; the dirty yard behind, the fetid smell from the ill-made sewers, the public house at the street corners. Here, with no sight of a green field, with no knowledge of flowers or forests, the blue heavens themselves dirtied with soot amidst objects all mean and hideous, with no entertainment but the music hall, no pleasure but in the drink shop, hundreds of thousands of English children are now growing up into men and women. And were these scenes to be definitely multiplied?" Froude asks, "Was this to be the real condition of an ever-increasing portion of the English nation? And was it to be supposed that a race of men could be so reared who could carry on the great traditions of our country? I for one could not believe it. The native vigour of our temperament might defy the influence of such a life for a quarter or for half a century. Experience, even natural probability, declared that the grandchildren of the occupants of these dens must be sickly, poor and stunted wretches whom no school teaching, however excellent, could save from physical decrepitude" ....(4) "These islands cannot bear a larger population than they have at present without peril to soul and body".(5) If Manchester triumphs England will be threatened by the fate of Rome.(6)

According to Froude the remedy is, however, near at hand. English enterprise has already occupied the fairest parts of the earth where the race can renew itself for ages, where the people who are now crowded in the slums of London and Manchester may find new and happier homes,

(1) Op. cit. p. 17. (2) Op. cit. p. 91. (3) Op. cit. p. 338. (4) Op. cit. p. 8. (5) Op. cit. p. 9. (6) Op. cit. p. 9.

and where their children may grow up to understand what "Merry England" means.

This, then, is Froude's answer to the question: what is the use of colonies? "With her colonies part of herself, England would be, as Harrington had foreshadowed, a commonwealth resting on the mightiest foundations which the world had ever seen. Queen among the nations, from without invulnerable, and at peace and at health within — this was the alternative future lying before Oceana: in every way more desirable than the economic."(1)

This becomes the more urgently necessary for two reasons. In the first place it begins to be realized that it is doubtful if England can keep the place which she has hitherto held. She is no longer alone in the field. The competition of other nations is beginning to make itself felt. "Hence those among us" he remarks, "who have disbelieved all along that a great nation can venture its whole fortunes safely on the power of underselling its neighbours in calicoes and iron-ware no longer address a public opinion entirely cold. It begins to be admitted that were Canada and South Africa and Australia and New Zealand members of one body with us, with a free flow of our population into them, we might sit secure against shifts and changes. In the multiplying number of our own fellow-citizens animated by a common spirit, we should have purchasers of our goods from whom we should fear no rivalry."(2) For trade follows the flag, which is shown by the the fact that the colonists import three times more from England in proportion to their numbers than foreigners do.

In the second place England is placed among large and growing States. Her rivals are constantly adding to their numbers while the British Islands are alreary full to overflowing. The colonies are the only thing that can save England from being reduced to a State of the rank of Holland.(3)

Finally, apart from all the reasons which may be adduced to show that the retention of the colonies is beneficial to England, there remains the argument that the whole question is not one that can be decided by an estimate of advantages and drawbacks; for "it may be doubted whether any country has a right to disown so summarily the rights of its own citizens."(4) The colonists are British subjects and between them and the Government there are reciprocal obligations which cannot be abrogated at will.

So far, it will be seen, the views which Froude expounds in *Oceana* are exactly the same as those which we found him advancing in 1870. There is the same reluctance to eliminate the sentimental factor and to assess the value of colonies solely on economic grounds, the same mixture of Imperialism and theories of social reform, the same view of the colonial Empire as a means to save the soul of the English people from the perils of industrialism. But since 1870 the discussion of

(1) Op. cit. p. 10. (2) Op. cit. p. 12. (3) Op. cit. pp. 150, 174.
(4) Op. cit. p. 332.

colonial questions had entered upon a new phase. The question whether the Imperial connexion was to continue had been practically settled by a large majority of the public deciding that it should continue. The question was now which form that connexion was to take and if it was possible to effect a closer union between England and her colonies than that which existed at the moment.

As to this question Froude started on his journey with an open mind.(1) Desirous though he was to see a union of the different parts of the Empire as close as that of the United States he had formed no notion of how such a union could be brought about. The result of his Australasian experiences was to make him extremely sceptical of all the schemes for closer union which had hithertho been advanced, and he came to the conclusion that the best thing was to let the whole question well alone and to continue the present system with some slight improvements. The question was not urgent at all. The most arduous part of the task had already been performed by past generations: "Oceana" was an achieved fact. The land was there, and the people of the mother country and the colonies already formed a family which did not wish to be divided.(2) If the colonies and the mother country should at some future time desire to enter into a closer union there would be no difficulty. The wish would be its own realization. (3) At present the colonies were not inclined to purchase closer union with the sacrifice of liberties which they possessed.(4) "Ingenious schemes", he writes, "brought forward prematurely, perhaps in the interest of some party in the State, can only fail and are therefore to be deprecated .... A federation contrived by politicians would snap at the first strain."(5) So far from desiring to limit the self-government actually enjoyed by the colonies, Froude is of the opinion that if they wish to extend that self-government they should be permitted to do so. He would even allow them to make the office of the Governor elective,(6) (the implication being that they should be given a chance to abolish the party system and elect a "strong man" for their ruler). This standpoint is the more remarkable when one remembers Froude's frequently expressed distrust of colonial self-government.(7) But Froude was not always consistent.

As regards the various schemes proposed by the advocates of closer union, none of them, in Froude's opinion, would serve any good purpose: the formation of a regular Federal Parliament, composed of representatives of all parts of the Empire and relieving the Parliament at Westminster of the management of foreign and colonial policy he considers "chimerical and absurd."(8) No power on earth could persuade the House of Commons to abdicate half its functions. Nor does he approve of the proposal to form a council of the agents-general of the colonies

(1) Op. cit. p. 79. (2) Op. cit. p. 13. (3) Op. cit. p. 338. (4) Op. cit. p. 137. (5) Op. cit. pp. 339. 269. (6) Op. cit. pp. 195—196. (7) Thus when speaking about New Zealand he describes self-government as a failure, and suggests that it would be better for the country to be ruled by a wise governor or a wise president. Op. cit. p. 227—28, p. 238. Cf. also his remarks on South African self-Government. pp. 180, 183, 184. (8) Op. cit p. 190.

to advise the Colonial Secretary. As the council could only be consultative, the position of impotence and inferiority in which the colonial representatives would find themselves would only cause irritation. Besides, the agents-general could not properly represent the colonies because they are not elected to represent them.(1)

The proposal to give prominent Colonials seats in the House of Lords as life peers might in his own opinion be useful, but he feels bound to say that he did not meet one person in the colonies who believed in it, the reason being that the colonial democracy had no sympathy with the House of Lords, and that it was believed that life peers residing in England would soon lose touch with colonial opinion.(2)

Nor has he the slightest belief in the proposals for commercial union, i. e. in the Zollverein schemes. "Those who really desire the union of Oceana," he remarks, "will avoid, as far as possible, all such idle suggestions."(3) "I was certain that ... if Imperial Confederation could only be brought about by a Protection tariff we should have to wait for it till the Greek kalends."(4)

What, then, can be done to promote a closer union with the colonies?

The strongest bonds of union, according to Froude, are the spiritual bonds, and those who wish to draw the Empire together should above all endeavour to strengthen those bonds. In the first place, then, "let it be understood among us, as it is among the Americans, that we are one — though the bond be but a spiritual one — that separation is treason, and the suggestion of it misprision of treason, and all is done ... Let separation be dismissed into silence as a horrible thing, 'not to be named among us', and the union is already made, and the forms which it may assume may be left to time and circumstance to shape and reshape."(5)

In the second place there must be an end of the just complaints of the colonies that they are treated with coldness and lack of sympathy by the Home Government. England must show them that she understands their feelings and respects their ambitions.(6) If the colonies desire it, they should be given a joint interest in the Imperial navy. The advances must however come from them, or it would be construed into a design for levying revenue on them.(7) Besides, England can bestow public honours(8) on prominent colonials, and admit them to the Privy Council, and to service in the British Army and Navy.(9)

(1) Op. cit. p. 187. (2) Op. cit. pp. 187—90. (3) Op. cit. p. 193.
(4) Op. cit. p. 222. (5) Op. cit. pp. 306—307. (6) Op. cit. p. 191.
(7) Op. cit. p. 160. (8) Op. cit. p. 339. The bestowal of the Order of the Bath on Colonists was a favourite idea of Froude's, on which he laid great stress. (*Oceana* p. 194). Also *The Colonies Once More*, p. 196. (9) Op. cit. p. 339. Beside these general disquisitions on colonial policy, Froude's short visit at Cape Town gave him an opportunity of repeating the views on the history and politics of South Africa with which we have already dealt. At the time of his visit the South African situation was, in his opinion, aggravated by the decision of the Home Government to assert its sovereignty over the districts of Stellaland and Goshen on the western border of the Transvaal, which the Boers at the time were trying to occupy. The assertion of British sovereingty over these territories, which Froude

Oceana was a popular success. In the summer of 1886, Froude writes to a friend that 75,000 copies had been sold.(1) It was praised by the *Times* (Jan. 15. 1886), the *Westminster Review* (July 1886) and the *Academy* (Jan. 30, 1886). The *Athenaeum* (Jan. 30. 1886) reviewed it favourably. The *Edinburgh Review* (April 1886) gave it 31 pages, mostly of praise, though the reviewer pointed out Froude's errors in describing the idyllic social condition of the Australian cities. *Imperial Federation* (Feb. 1. 1886) praised it, though it felt bound to say that its author was "not exactly a federationist after our own heart." *Blackwood's* (Feb. 1886) was enthusiastic about it, delighted to learn that Gladstone was unpopular in the colonies, and willing to subscribe to all and more than Froude had said about the sins of the Liberals. The *Quarterly Review* (April 1886) was equally full of praise and equally ready to welcome Froude as an ally in a campaign against Liberalism. In *Macmillan's Magazine* (Aug. 1886) B. R. Wise, an Australian politician, praised Froude for his sensible advice to let federation schemes well alone, introducing some side-hits at Seeley and the Imperial Federation League. In contrast to these, Edward Wakefield, a member of the New Zealand House of Representatives, attacked it violently in the *Nineteenth Century* (Aug. 1886), describing it as "the worst book which has ever been written on these colonies" and devoting himself to an easy hunt for errors and misunderstandings.

In 1888 Froude followed up his success with *The English in the West Indies, or the Bow of Ulysses.*(2) This book was the literary result of his travels in the West Indies in the Winter of 1886—87, during which he visited a number of the British West Indian possessions beside Cuba and Hayti. Like *Oceana* the book is not so much a finished narrative as a journal, a rambling story interspersed with observations on many different things, ranging from the respective merits of different brands of cigars to Greek literature, the shortcomings of Mr. Gladstone and the superiority of "doers" to "talkers". As a source of information about West Indian conditions it is of no great value and compares unfavourably with its predecessor: Kingsley's *At Last.*

Beside the account of his impressions of the various places which he visited, the book contains observations on colonial policy similar to those of *Oceana.* There is the same condemnation of the colonial policy of the Liberals (Froude maintains that a project of cutting the West Indian colonies adrift was at one time actually ventilated at the Colonial Office),(3) the same advocacy of emigration as a cure for the evils of industrialism, and the same assertion that questions about the advantages

strongly condemns, was a necessary condition for the realization of Cecil Rhodes' plans for the colonization of Rhodesia, a fact which Froude could not, however, very well be expected to perceive at the time.

(1) Paul: *Life of Froude,* p. 347. (2) The second title of the book refers to a simile which he employs about British rule in the West Indies; The bow of Ulysses is the ancient strength of the English race. The bow is as sound as ever, but it is unstrung and the arrows which are shot from it drop feebly to the ground. Op. cit. p. 315. (3) Op. cit. p. 6.

of colonies are irrelevant. There is the same theory that the retention of the colonies is necessary to preserve England from being reduced to the rank of a second-rate power,(1) the same scepticism as to the practicability of a closer political union,(2) and the same assertion that such a union must come as the result of the spontaneous action of the different members of the Empire. Over and above this the idea of trusteeship for inferior races (an idea which was to play a considerable part in the further development of Imperialism, but which does not enter into Froude's earlier writings on colonial questions) is incidentally touched upon as a justification for maintaining the colonial Empire. "We have" he writes, "another function, such as the Romans had. The sections of men on this globe are unequally gifted. Some are strong and can govern themselves; some are weak and are the prey of foreign invaders or internal anarchy; and freedom, which all desire, is only attainable by weak nations when they are subject to the rule of others who are at once powerful and just. This was the duty which fell to the Latin race two thousand years ago. In these modern times it has fallen to ours, and in the discharge of it the highest features in the English character have displayed themselves."(3)

These general problems, however, play a less important part in this book than the specific questions peculiar to the British West Indies, more especially the questions raised by the presence there of a negro population — the descendants of the former slaves, far outnumbering the white colonists. The tone adopted by Froude in dealing with these questions is highly controversial. Underlying the whole book is a sustained criticism of the idea of majority rule and Parliamentary institutions.

The chief impression left on Froude's mind after his visit is one of a spirit of decay brooding over these islands which were once considered the most valuable of the British colonies, and for the possession of which England fought innumerable wars. Froude is haunted by the idea, that European civilization in these islands is struggling against a sea of barbarism in which it may eventually be swamped, and that the British West Indian Colonies may in the end, like Hayti (which was at the time attracting some unfavourable attention through a book published by an English official, Sir Spencer St. John) relapse into demon-worship and cannibalism.(4)

(1) Op. cit. p. 182. (2) Op. cit. p. 324. (3) Op. cit. p. 182. (4) Froude was deeply interested in the reports of what negro rule had made of Hayti and made up his mind to go there "to learn what he could on the spot" (p. 113). Though not expecting that he would have time to look deeper into the truth than Sir Spencer St. John he "would not take with him a mind already made up, and he was not given to credulity." (p. 113). He paid two visits to Hayti, one to the Port of Jacmel, where he spent an hour, and one to Port au Prince, where he spent a morning. In spite of his lack of prejudice these visits were enough to convince him of the horrible state of affairs in that independent black republic. "There was no room to doubt" that serpent worship, child sacrifice and cannibalism were rampant (p. 303).

Accordingly his chief fear is that the Home Government might give the negroes a further measure of self-government. If the West Indies are constituted a self-governing Dominion that will in his opinion come to the same thing, for if such a dominion comes into being it will necessarily entail a full negro vote. It will be a rule by the blacks for the blacks. "Let a generation or two pass by and carry away with them the old traditions," he declares, "and an English governor-general will be found presiding over a black council, delivering the speeches made for him by a black prime minister; and how long could this endure? No English gentleman would consent to occupy so absurd a situation. The two races are not equal and will not blend. If the white people do not depart of themselves, black legislation will make it impossible for any of them to stay who would not be better out of the way."(1)

The fact is that Froude considers the negroes totally unfit for self-government. Though he does not directly advocate slavery (a return to slavery in 1888 was, of course, outside the range of possibilities), his eloquent defence of the slave-system is significant, and he hardly disguises his belief that, all things considered, slavery was the best condition for the negroes. The benevolent and patriarchal relations which existed in the slavery times between the white master and mistress and their black servants, have been destroyed by emancipation.(2) Often the slaves were under worse masters in Africa than when they were sold to the West Indies. "In many instances," he asserts, "perhaps, in most, (the slave trade) was innocent and even beneficient."(3) "The negroes in Mandeville were, perhaps, as happy in their old condition as they have been since their glorious emancipation, and some of them to this day speak regretfully of a time when children did not die of neglect; when the sick and aged were taken care of, and the strong and healthy were, at least, as well looked after as their owner's cattle."(4) He even cites "an American lady from Pennsylvania" who had told him that in her opinion "emancipation had been a piece of folly, and that things would never mend till they were slaves again."(5)

To the conviction of the incapacity of the negroes for civilized life is added Froude's distrust of colonial self-government in general: "self-government is a beautiful subject for oratorical declamation. If the fact corresponded to the theory and if the possession of a vote produced the elevating effects upon the character which are so noisily insisted upon, it would be the welcome panacea for political and social disorder. Unfortunately the fact does not correspond to the theory. The possession of a vote never improved the character of any human being and never will."(6) Self-government may have answered in the colonies where the people are British (though compare his observations on New Zealand) but it has failed and always will fail in countries where the majority of the population are not British, as, Froude remarks, it has

(1) Op. cit. p. 109. (2) Op. cit. p. 93. (3) Op. cit. p. 207 (4) Op. cit. p. 217. (5) Op. cit. p. 310. (6) Op. cit. p. 146.

failed in Ireland, and as it would fail in India if England were rash enough to venture the experiment.(1)

It is now too late, he recognizes, to colonize the West Indies by white settlers. The vast majority of the people of these colonies must remain black. They are therefore unfit for self-government and should be governed by a benevolent despotism like India.(2) In Froude's dissertations on the blessings of personal rule by a strong man, the influence of Carlyle is obvious: "Among the silent thousands whose quiet work keeps the Empire alive, find a Rajah Brooke if you can, or a Mr. Smith of Scilly.(3) If none of these are attainable, even a Sancho Panza would do. Send him out with no more instructions than the knight of la Mancha gave Sancho — to fear God and do his duty. Put him on his mettle. Promise him the respect and praise of all good men if he does well; and if he calls to his help intelligent persons who understand the cultivation of soils and the management of men, in half a score of years Dominica would be the brightest gem of the Antilles. From America, from England, from all parts of the world, admiring tourists would be flocking there to see what Government could do, and curious politicians with jealous eyes admitting reluctantly unwelcome conclusions .... The leading of the wise few, the willing obedience of the many, is the beginning and the end of all right action. Secure this, and you secure everything. Fail to secure it, and be your liberties as wide as you can make them, no success is possible."(4)

As to the future of the West Indies, Froude is convinced that there are only two alternatives: England must rule the West Indian colonies despotically or she must leave them to shape their own destinies, which means negro supremacy. The latter of these two alternatives would not be creditable to England, England is responsible for the social condition of these islands and ought to bear the consequences of her own actions. The loss of the West Indies would not in itself be serious as far as its immediate material consequences go; but it would be "nothing less than a public disgrace. It would be an intimation to all the world that we were unable to maintain any longer the position which our fathers had made for us and when the unravelling of the knitted fabric of the Empire has once begun the process will be a rapid one."(5) It would diminish the chances of Imperial Federation by causing the self-governing colonies to doubt the strength and ability of the mother country.(6) Finally it would not in the long run benefit the blacks either.(7)

The English in the West Indies was not, on the whole, so well received as *Oceana*. The disquisitions on the great questions of colonial policy which it contained were no longer new, and the specific problems of

(1) Op. cit. pp. 247—48. (2) Op. cit. p. 252. (3) Augustus Smith, a Radical and Benthamite land-lord, under whose paternal sway the Scilly Islands rose from poverty to prosperity, was one of Froude's favourite heroes. He is mentioned in *On the Uses of a Landed Gentry* (*Short Studies on Great Subjects*. vol. IV.) and in *Party Politics* (Ibid.). (4) Op. cit. pp. 154—155.
(5) Op. cit. p. 293. (6) Op. cit. p. 314. (7) Op. cit. p. 251.

British rule in the West Indies naturally did not command so much interest. Besides, Froude's strongly expressed opinions on these questions, opinions which ran counter to an old-established philanthropic and negrophile tradition in England, called forth a good deal of adverse criticism. Like almost all other books which Froude ever wrote *The English in the West Indies* was accused of errors of fact, and in this case the accusation was comparatively easy to prove.

The *Athenaeum* (Jan. 21, 1888) criticized it severely, finding fault with the arrangement, or want of arrangement, of the subject-matter, accusing the author of numerous self-contradictions and condemning his opinions on the negro question. The *Academy* (Feb. 18, 1888) pointed out certain errors of fact, and found the attacks on negro-government uncalled for, as nobody comtemplated the transference of the government to the blacks. Froude's low opinions of the qualities of the black race elicited several replies. Thus C. S. Salmon, a colonial official of West Indian experience, published a book called *The Caribbean Confederation* (Cobden Club, 1888) which defends the negroes against Froude's attacks, and accuses Froude of being ignorant of West Indian affairs, of being prejudiced against the black race, and of indirectly defending slavery. A West Indian, F. F. Thomas, as it seems a negro himself, attacked Froude's views on the negro question in a curious book entitled *Froudacity, West Indian Fables by James Anthony Froude explained by F. F. Thomas*. Another West Indian, N. Darnell Davis, wrote a pamphlet *Mr. Froude's Negrophobia or Don Quixote as a Cook's Tourist* in which he attacked Froude's negro theories and pointed out numerous erroneous statements in the book. On the other hand The *Times* (Jan. 13, 1888) was enthusiastic, and a review in the *Quarterly* (April 1888) again welcomed Froude as an ally against Liberalism and Democracy, but was otherwise colourless. The *Edinburgh Review* (April 1888) was appreciative, but sceptical as to Froude's theories about self-government and the black race.

It has already been pointed out that in Froude's writings on colonial questions three distinct stages are discernible. About 1869—70 we find him actively opposing Separatism and advocating extended colonization and a closer union of the Empire. From 1874—80 we find him advancing opinions on the specific questions connected with South African policy, opinions which might incline a reader ignorant of his earlier writings to set him down as a decided Anti-Imperialist. In 1886 and 1888 we find him restating the opinions which he had professed in 1870 and giving, in addition, his views on the question of Imperial Federation — views which events of later years have showed to be substantially correct.

Froude's Imperialism is a much more complicated affair that that of Seeley. Being men of almost opposite character, temperament, and ideas, they arrived at the advocacy of the maintenance and closer union

of the Empire by entirely different routes. Seeley was above all a logician and an analyst; he was a professed despiser of the picturesque, a man of scientific mind who tried to look at things from a detached point of view, and who studiously avoided national prejudices. Apart from a slight penchant towards political mysticism when dealing with theories about the State, he had his feet firmly planted on the ground. Froude, on the other hand, was a much less clear-headed and logically-minded man; he was not so much a scientist as an artist — sometimes a great artist — a romantic, and a moralist, to whom history was nothing if not picturesque. His writings were strongly coloured by his national, moral and religious prejudices, and he was ready, as we have seen in the case of South Africa, to disregard his most cherished principles if they ran counter to his personal likes or dislikes. He was not so much a detached investigator as an advocate pleading some special case.

While Seeley's Imperialism was founded on his worship of the State and Dilke's on his worship of race and national civilization, Froude's Imperialism rests principally on his social theories. He wished to retain the colonies because he thought it possible to reproduce in them a simpler state of society and a nobler way of life than were possible in industrial England. But Froude was an English patriot, and when he advocated emigration to the colonies he did not mean to advise the best of his countrymen to leave the old country to founder, as rats leave a sinking ship. On the contrary the colonies were to save the soul of England from the perils of industrialism. A colonial population of healthy, open-air men and women were to compensate England for the racial deterioration of her town-dwelling, industrial population.

It is an obvious condition of the realization of such an ideal that the colonies must remain integral parts of England, for if they constituted separate political or social entities their rural populations could not in any real sense be considered a supplement of the industrial population of England. But contrary to Froude's belief the colonies were *not* integral parts of England like English counties: socially and, to some extent, politically they did constitute separate entities. They did not form part of the same public as the people of England and they were not in the habit of looking upon themselves as merely Englishmen beyond the seas. The system of organized emigration advocated by Froude might be an excellent remedy for distress in England. It was undoubtedly calculated to promote the growth of the colonies and the development of their resources. By increasing the English-born element in the colonial populations it might prepare the way for closer union. But it could not do what Froude especially wanted it to do: it could not compensate England for the deterioration of her industrial population. If industrial England was going to the dogs, no amount of agricultural population in the colonies would prevent it from doing so.

The truth is that Froude, like almost all the early Imperialists, greatly exaggerated the national unity of the Empire. He was incli-

ned, especially in his early work, to look upon the colonies as merely territorial extensions of England. Of colonial Nationalism he was at first entirely ignorant, though later, in *Oceana* and *The English in the West Indies* he shows a somewhat juster appreciation of this decisive factor. With the exception of South Africa he had no special knowledge of colonial conditions. His ideas of colonial life before his Australasian journey were wide of the mark: the colonies were to him places where every honest Englishman willing to work with his hands could become a squire.(1) Even after that journey he retained his romantic idea of the colonies as Eldorados for country gentlemen, (2) and of colonial life as consisting largely of going about on horseback in the daytime and sitting on the veranda in the evening, and generally enjoying a pleasant existence free from financial worries. The temper of Australian society he understood so little that he thought Australia a bulwark against socialism and the ideas of Henry George, and a place where the landed gentry could continue to exist when it had been destroyed in other countries.

Thus even his journeys did not teach him much about colonial conditions. They were hurried; Froude was too ready to jump to conclusions and not a sufficiently keen observer to correct preconceived opinions by personal observation, and, to make matters worse, most of his time in the colonies was spent among people who did not represent current colonial opinion.

It is, however, only fair to say that, in spite of his imperfect knowledge of colonial conditions and his propensity to disregard facts when they did not square with his preconceived ideas, his estimate of the attitude of the colonial public towards the schemes of federation, then so widely debated, was perfectly correct. No doubt the colonies would not have stood any attempt to bring about a hard-and-fast system of federation. On the whole it would seem that Froude somewhat revised his original ideas of the colonies as being merely extensions of England,(3) though he maintained until the last his theories of the colonial Empire as a means towards the social regeneration of the people of England, theories which, as has been pointed out, were really incompatible with the recognition of a separate colonial nationhood.

(1) "You who are impatient with what you call a dependent position at home, go to Australia , go to Canada, go to New Zealand, or South Africa. There work for yourselves, there gather wealth as all but fools and sluggards are able to gather it. Come back if you will as rich men at the end of twenty years. Then buy an estate for yourselves; and when you belong to the landed gentry in your own person, you will find your eyes opened to their value to the community." *On the Uses of a Landed Gentry,* (*Short Studies,* vol. IV. pp. 319—20). Cf. also his idea of what an Australian squatter's station was like (*Oceana* p. 104). (2) *Oceana* pp. 104—107. (3) "The present relation between the mother country and her self-governed colonies is partly that of parent and children who have grown to maturity and are taking care of themselves, partly of independent nations in friendly alliance, partly as common subjects of the same sovereign, whose authority is exercised in each by ministers of its own." (*The English in the West Indies* p. 324).

There entered into Froude's Imperialism a good deal of the distrust of colonial self-government which characterized so many of the early Imperialists. It is quite clear that he regretted the grant of self-government and would like to see it undone again in spite of his occasional disclaimers of any desire to advocate the resumption of Imperial control,(1) and that he looked upon that grant as part and parcel of an attempt on the part of Liberalism to get rid of the colonial Empire. (2)

The very fact that Froude could seriously advocate paternal government by a "strong man" for a settlement-colony like New Zealand is another proof of his failure to understand the colonial temperament. There are probably no countries in the world that would be less disposed to stand government on Carlylean principles than the British Dominions.

His distrust of colonial self-government was however due, not so much to any objection to colonial autonomy in itself, as to his dislike of parliamentary institutions. He would have granted the colonies any amount of independence within the Empire if they had chosen to be ruled by a "Hero" instead of a responsible ministry.

On the whole Froude's Imperialism was strongly coloured by his conservatism, or rather his dislike of political democracy and parliamentary government. Not only was his principal motive for wishing to retain the colonies the desire to establish in them a society untainted by what he would have called Liberal (i. e. Utilitarian and materialistic) ideas and sustained by the virtues and ideals of a past age, but he seems actually to have entertained a vague idea that an Imperialist revival might prove a short cut to the downfall of Liberalism and the establishment of a system of Government on Carlylean principles, that Imperialism and democracy would prove incompatible, and that in the clash between the two ideas parliamentary government would go under. "If there be one lesson which history clearly teaches," he wrote in *Caesar*,(3) "it is this, that free nations cannot govern subject provinces." "Lord Derby once said to me," he writes to Skelton,(4) "that kings and aristocracies can govern empires, but one people cannot

(1) E. g. *The English in the West Indies* p. 247. But cf. his remarks about South African and New Zealand self-government. (2) "Constitutions were granted so unconditional, so completely unaccompanied with provisions for the future relations with the mother country that the connexion was obviously intended to have an early end ..... The country, when made aware of what had been designed, spoke with a voice so unanimous that they (ministers) disclaimed their intentions, sheltered themselves behind the necessity of leaving the colonies to manage their own affairs, and assured the world that they desired nothing but to secure colonial loyalty; but these hasty measures had brought about a form of relation which, not being designed for continuance, had no element of continuance in it, and the ablest men who desire the maintenance of the Empire are now speculating how to supply the absence of conditions which might have been insisted on at the concession of the colonial constitutions ...."

Lord Beaconsfield p. 239. Cf. also p. 189. (3) Op. cit. p. 1. (4) *Table Talk of Shirley*, p. 220.

govern another people. If we have to choose between the Empire and the Constitution, I think I know which way it will be."

There is a curious quality of unreality about Froude's Imperialism. That the rosy-cheeked, merry-English colonist of his imagination, satisfied with the station of life which Providence has assigned to him, guided by a Puritan religion, indifferent to money-making and inspired by the ideals of duty and service, had hardly any existence in reality, he must have known very well, and yet he clung to his conception of this ideal creature to the last. He must have known that colonial society was no nearer to the Carlylean ideas than society in England, that there was less of the patriarchal spirit which he admired and more of the democracy which he disliked in the colonies than at home. He cannot have been ignorant of the fact that the colonies had no intention of remaining in the position of agricultural supplements to an industrial mother country, which was assigned to them in his theories, and that they were busily at work reproducing, with the assistance of protective tariffs, that very industrial system which he detested and the absence of which he considered the very *raison d'etre* of the colonies. His love of the over-seas British was, as has already been pointed out, largely platonic. He never really liked Colonials. In spite of his theories he much preferred Englishmen.(1)

On the whole there is often a curious lack of correspondence between Froude's theories and his practice. Just as he could maintain a theory which his experience must have told him was contrary to fact, so he would disregard even his favourite theories if he found them incompatible with some preconceived like or dislike. Thus the combined force of his English national pride and his avowed belief in the right of the stronger to govern the weaker did not prevent him from denouncing his own country as a bully when it encroached upon the liberties of the Boers.

Like that of many other early Imperialist writers, Froude's Imperialism consisted largely in the denial of the theories of economics and of the duties of State and subjects which held the field about the middle of the century. It was one of the forms taken by his reaction against an excessively materialist view of society and may almost be defined in negative terms as the opposite of the Manchester theories. This partly accounts for the curious association of Imperialism with

(1) See his remarks on the South African English quoted on p. 180 and his complaints of Melbourne rowdyism in *Oceana* (p. 138) and the materialism of the Sydney people (ibid. p. 165). Of his colonial fellow-passengers on the way back from New Zealand he writes: "Of these I liked none. They were, as a rule, vain, ignorant, underbred, without dignity, without courtesy and with a conceit which was unbounded. Middle-class democracy is not favourable to the growth of manners, and, with all my wish to find it otherwise, I had to contrast them, not to their advantage, with two or three English youths among us, who, though belonging to the same social class, might have been another order of beings," (*Oceana* p. 298). The type of colonist which Froude liked best was the older type, chiefly English-born and still English in manners and ideas. (Cf. *Oceana* p. 299.)

Hero-worship and denunciations of democracy which is found in almost all Froude's writings on colonial questions. Logically, of course, Hero-worship and Imperialism have nothing to do with one another, and the British colonies are probably the very last place where Carlylean forms of government would be likely to prevail.

The mixture of Imperialism and Carlylean theories of Hero-worship seems the more uncalled-for as Froude, apart from his excursion into the negro problem in the West Indies and a few casual remarks on India and on the native population of South Africa, did not write about the great colonies peopled by non-European races. Like that of most of the earlier writers on colonial questions his Imperialism is principally directed towards the problems of the self-governing colonies. The idea, so familiar to modern Imperialists, of England acting as a trustee for the less advanced races in order to prepare them against a time when they will be able to stand alone he only touched upon incidentally. This is the more remarkable as Froude had a theory ready to hand about the right of progressive and strong nations to dominate backward and weak ones, which would have fitted the case admirably. Like Carlyle he denied the existence of any natural right of self-determination. A people had a right only to so much independence as it could successfully defend. Right was in so far the same as might, as history showed that only the just cause can in the long run succeed. (1) This very comforting theory

(1) "A natural right to liberty irrespective of the ability to defend it, exists in nations as much as and no more than it exists in individuals. Had nature meant us to live uncontrolled by any will but our own, we should have been so constructed that the pleasures of one would not interfere with the pleasures of another, or that each of us would discharge by instinct those duties which the welfare of the community requires from all. In a world in which we are made to depend so largely for our well-being on the conduct of our neighbours and yet are created infinitely unequal in ability and worthiness of character, the superior part has a natural right to govern, the inferior part has a natural right to be governed: and a rude but adequate tests of superiority and inferiority is provided in the relative strength of the different orders of human beings.

"Among wild beasts and savages might constitutes right. Among reasonable beings right is for ever tending to create might. Inferiority of numbers is compensated by superior cohesiveness, intelligence, and daring. The better sort of men submit willingly to be governed by those who are nobler and wiser than themselves; organization creates superiority of force; and the ignorant and the selfish may be and are justly compelled for their own advantage to obey a rule which rescues them from their natural weakness. There neither is nor can be an inherent privilege in any person or set of persons to live unworthily at their own wills, when they can be led or driven into more honourable courses; and the rights of man — if such rights there be — are not to liberty, but to wise direction and control" (*The English in Ireland*. Vol. I. p. 1—2). "The right of people to self-government consists and can consist in nothing but their power to defend themselves." (ibid. p. 3).

"On the whole, and as a rule, superior strength is the equivalent of superior merit; and when a weaker people are induced or forced to part with their separate existence, and are not treated as subjects, but are admitted freely to share the privileges of the nation in which they are absorbed, they forfeit nothing which they need care to lose, and rather gain than suffer by the exchange." (ibid. p. 4).

"As a broad principle it may be said, that as nature has so constituted us that we must be ruled in some way, and as at any given time the rule inevitable will be

which is, of course, only another aspect of the Carlylean theory of Hero-worship was one of Froude's favourite ones, and he expounded it whenever he took part in the discussion of Irish affairs. He did not, however, apply it to colonial policy in general, though he expounded it in connexion with the specific problem of the ex-slaves in the West Indies, and though he incidentally touched upon it in connexion with South African politics. But he never used it as a general apology for aggressive Imperialism, and when he might have been expected to act on the theory, in the case of the Boers, he went back on it. The explanation is, in the first place, as has already been pointed out, that the self-governing Dominions almost monopolized the attention of contemporary Imperialism to the exclusion of the colonies inhabited by non-European races only, and in the second place that Imperialism was as yet essentially a sober and matter-of-fact movement, aiming at the maintenance, not at the extension of the Empire, and as yet in no need of justification by new moral codes "beyond good or evil."

What was Froude's contribution to the ideas of Imperialism?

He was, as we have seen, one of the pioneers of the movement. He was one of the first to take up arms against the supposed Separatism of the Gladstone Government in 1869—70, and one of the most active advocates of emigration to the colonies as a remedy for pauperism. He was by far the ablest of the earliest champions of Imperialism, and he presented in *England and her Colonies* a better statement of the case for the continuation of the Imperial connexion than any of the other contributions to the discussion before the appearance of Seeley's *Expansion of England*. With Jenkins he formed the connecting link between Carlyle and the early movement, while the alliance of early Imperialism with social reform and the reaction against the Manchester theories is probably largely due to him. Most of the arguments advanced by the Imperialists in the 'seventies og 'eighties for the retention of the colonies are to be found in his essays of 1870—71.

The extent of his influence on the growth of the movement is not so easy to determine. His activity in 1869—71, though it attracted no little attention at the time, seems to have been almost completely forgotten. *Oceana* and *The English in the West Indies* were widely read and did much to popularize ideas which, however, were far from new when those two books appeared. His timely warning against premature

in the hands of those who are then the strongest, so nature has alotted superiority of strength to superority of intellect and character; and in deciding that the weaker shall obey the more powerful, she is in reality saving them from themselves, and then most confers true liberty when she seems most to be taking it away . . . the right to resist depends on the power of resistance." (ibid. pp. 5, 6).

Cf. also: "I say frankly, that I believe the control of human things in this world is given to the strong, and those who cannot hold their own ground with all advantage to their side must bear the consequences of their weakness" and other passages from Froude's lectures in America quoted in Paul's *Life of Froude*, ch. VI. Cf. also his poem *Romsdal Fiord*.

attempts at federation may have done something to convince Imperialists in England that other means of consolidating the Empire must be found. Later Imperialists had more use than the contemporary readers of *The English in Ireland* for abstract justifications of the employment of force, but they mostly went for their arguments to Carlyle or to German writers, instead of Froude. Unfortunately for Froude's reputation among later Imperialists, the colony in dealing with which he had appeared least as an Imperialist, i. e. South Africa, attained an especial prominence at the end of the century and attracted more attention than all the other colonies. In the temper which prevailed about the time of the Boer War, English Imperialists were not inclined to take a benevolent view of writers who had defended the Boers against the British Government, and some Imperialist writers(1) of that time have treated Froude with as much scorn as he himself bestowed upon the Separatists of the Manchester School.

THE IMPERIAL FEDERATION LEAGUE

The 'eighties witnessed a boom in Imperialism. The race between the Great Powers for the acquisition of colonies, the growing militarism on the Continent, and the defeat of Free Trade in almost all foreign countries had placed the value of colonies beyond all doubt. Prominent states men of all parties were vying with each other in declaring their attachment to the colonial Empire. Public attention was directed to the problem of the relations between England and her colonies by a stream of publications, by far the most important of which were Seeley's *Expansion of England* and Froude's *Oceana,* and by spectacular events like the Colonial and Indian Exhibition in 1886 and the Jubilee in 1887.

Towards the end of the 'eighties the Imperialist movement was beginning to lose its original simplicity. It had long ago ceased to confine itself to advocating the retention of the colonies. Though the so-called Imperial Federation movement, i. e. the attempt by some means or other to bring about the closer political unity of the Empire, still easily held the field as the centre of the Imperialist movement, other schemes for promoting Imperial unity were beginning to be discussed. The proposal to bind the separate parts of the Empire together by a customs union or by preferential tariff arrangements made its first appearance(2) as a rival to the federal movement and was gaining ground, especially in the colonies. In 1887 the first Colonial Conference assembled in London and the principle of informal consultation and co-operation — another rival of the federation movement — was inaugurated. New varieties of Imperialism were making their appearance, and the originally simple principle of promoting the unity of the Empire was beginning to get

(1) E. g. Iwan Müller: *Lord Milner and South Africa,* ch. III.

(2) An elaborate preferential system had, however, existed before the victory of Free Trade.

mixed up with elements with which it had at first had nothing to do. A small section of the Imperialists was getting tinged with Jingoism, another was soon to get associated with a reaction against Free Trade, etc. Considerations of space forbid me to follow in detail these developments into which Imperialism was beginning to branch off, developments which, moreover, were not very pronounced till the 'nineties. A short account of the activities of the Imperial Federation League, which represents the culmination of the tendencies examined in the foregoing chapters, which formed the centre round which the Imperialist agitation of the last years of the 'eighties and the early 'nineties revolved, and in whose fate the zenith and decline of the Federation movement is reflected, may perhaps, however, form a fitting conclusion of this account of the early Imperialist movement: with the dissolution of the League, the virtual abandonment of the attempts at bringing about a closer political union of the Empire, and the start of the Tariff Reform movement, a definite chapter in the history of British Imperialism may be said to be closed.

The idea of forming a society for promoting the policy of so-called "Imperial Federation," seems to have originated with Labilliere,(1) who early in 1884 formed a committee together with Westgarth, Young, Dennistoun Wood and others, to prepare the ground for such a society. The committee called upon W. E. Forster and submitted to him a proposal to invite a number of public men to a strictly non-partisan conference. Forster gave his support to the plan, and a conference was held at the Westminster Palace Hotel, July 29, 1884, Forster taking the Chair. The meeting was attended by prominent men of all parties and by English as well as by colonial politicians. (2) Numerous letters expressing sympathy with the objects of the conference were received from well-known men in England and the colonies, among others from Seeley.

Significantly enough the resolutions which the promoters of the conference submitted to the meeting went further than the Colonials present were prepared to follow, and called forth a good deal of opposition. The resolution moved by W. H. Smith ran as follows: "that the political relations between Great Britain and her colonies must inevitably lead to ultimate Federation or Disintegration. That in order to avert the latter, and to secure the permanent Unity of the Empire, some form of Federation is indispensable." This resolution, embodying the belief, so commonly expressed in the writings of the Imperialists, that there was no choice between federation and separation, was opposed by Tupper,(3)

(1) Federal Britain, p. 28. (2) Among the speakers were Forster, W. H. Smith, who had been First Lord of the Admiralty in the Beaconsfield Cabinet from 1877 to 80; Sir Henry Holland (afterwards Lord Knutsford), who had been Assistant Under-Secretary for the Colonies in Gladstone's Government from 1870 to 1874; Lord Rosebery, one of the most prominent members of the Liberal party; Edward Stanhope, who had been Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade and Under-Secretary for India in the second Beaconsfield Administration; Sir Charles Tupper, the well-known Canadian statesman, at that time High Commissioner for Canada in London; O. Mowatt, Prime Minister of Ontario; W. Gisborne, formerly Member of the New Zealand Ministry, etc. (3) *Report* of the Conference p. 43.

who declined to subscribe to the doctrine that the present relations must necessarily lead to the break-up of the Empire. After a long discussion the following resolution was passed unanimously as a compromise: "that, in order to secure the permanent unity of the Empire, some form of federation is essential."(1)

At the adjourned conference which took place Nov. 18, 1884, the league was formally constituted with Forster as Chairman. Its objects were stated in the following resolutions:

"That the object of the League be to secure by Federation the permanent unity of the Empire.

"That no scheme of Federation should interfere with the existing rights of Local Parliaments as regards local affairs.

"That any scheme of Imperial Federation should combine on an equitable basis the resources of the Empire for the maintenance of common interests, and adequately provide for an organized defence of common rights."

The affairs of the League were placed in the hands of a General Committee. Of this and of the smaller Executive Committee Seeley became a member. An annual meeting of the League was to be held in London.

The start of the League was very auspicious. It had secured the support of prominent men of all parties, and of Englishmen as well as Colonials. It was carried into existence on a wave of Imperialist enthusiasm. The press was almost unanimous in commending the League and its objects, and in expressing its contempt for the discredited school of Goldwin Smith. The *Times,* the *Standard,* the *Daily News,* the *Daily Telegraph,* the *Morning Post,* the *Daily Chronicle,* the *Pall Mall Gazette,* the *Globe,* the *Scotsman,* the *Spectator,* and the *Saturday Review* all commented on it at great length, and expressed their sympathy with its aims, most of them echoing the question of the *Pall Mall Gazette,*(2) "the advocates of a little England, where are they now?"

It is not unlikely that the founders of the Imperial Federation League were influenced by the example of the Anti-Corn Law League. If so, it may have seemed probable to them that it would be accompanied by the same success as its great predecessor. The transformation of public opinion during the last few years had been so marvellous that they might well believe the time to be at hand for a wholesale conversion of the people of the Empire to Imperial Federation. Belief in the future of the Empire was to many of them the same as belief in a federation of its various parts, a belief which, as we have seen, was reflected in the original resolutions submitted to the conference of July 29th, 1884: "federation or separation" was their watchword. As for colonial opinion, the public in Great Britain was largely ignorant of the feeling of separate nationality which was beginning to spring up in the colonies. The League had succeeded in enlisting the support of prominent Colonials, and the main difficulty to be overcome was believed to be the re-

(1) *Report* of the Conference. p. 54. (2) $^{30}/_{7}$-84.

luctance of the English people to admit the colonies to a share in the foreign policy of the Empire.

In reality the League was not so strong as it seemed. It harboured within its ranks many shades of opinion. At the outset, at the Conference of July 29th 1884, Forster had to apologize for and almost explain away the very word "federation." The promoters, he explained, only wanted by that word "to convey the notion that ultimately, hereafter, there must be a union, in some form or other, of England with her colonies, on terms of perfect equality to the colonies as well as to England; and he did not know any word which would better express that notion than the word "federation". (1)

Some of the members of the League were in favour of a complete federal system, others were for smaller and less sweeping constitutional reforms. Some were mainly interested in the military aspect of the question and looked upon the consolidation of the military resources of the whole Empire as the chief object of the League. Some, especially among the colonial members, were in favour of the indirect strengthening of the Imperial tie through preferential trade arrangements. It was only by taking care not to commit itself to definite schemes that the League succeeded in keeping together. Many of the colonial members, who were suspicious of any attempt to encroach upon or to limit the powers of colonial self-government, were only kept within the fold, because the League, as Mr. Duncan Hall points out, (2) treated Imperial Federation as if it were synonymous with the much more general concept of Imperial unity.

Meanwhile the League threw itself into a vigorous propaganda throughout the Empire. Numerous branches were established in Great Britain and in the colonies. The Cape Town branch was even formed before the mother League ($^{23}/_{10}$-84). In Montreal a branch was formed in 1885, which became a centre of opposition to the policy of annexation to the United States. As the Canadians who opposed this policy relied on preferential trade arrangements with the mother country to combat it, the Canadian branch of the Imperial Federation League became closely associated with the preference policy, and formally accepted the promotion of that policy as one of its aims. This was not a step calculated to further harmonious relations within the League, for in the mother League with its Liberal Chairman and its many Liberal members the advocacy of such a policy was naturally at the time, out of the question.(3)

Branches were also formed in Australia and New Zealand. The League held meetings all over the Empire. In 1889 it sent G. R. Parkin on a lecturing tour to Australia, and New Zealand. From 1886 it published a monthly review under the name of *Imperial Federation.*

(1) *Report* p. 46. (2) *The British Commonwealth of Nations.* p. 68.

(3) Lord Rosebery, the President of the League, mentioned the Zollverein plans at the Mansion House Meeting of the City Branch of the League, $^{15}/_{11}$-89, and characterized them as impracticable because Free Trade was too deeply rooted in England. (*Imperial Federation,* $^{1}/_{12}$-89).

When Forster died ($^{5}/_{4}$-86) he was succeeded as President by Lord Rosebery, with Edward Stanhope as Vice-President. In 1892 Lord Rosebery resigned on becoming Foreign Secretary in the Gladstone Government. Stanhope then became President with first Lord Rosebery and later Lord Brassey as Vice-Presidents.(1)

Though in its final object, to secure Imperial Federation, the League failed completely, it did have some incidental successes, apart from the way in which it succeeded in keeping alive public interest in the colonial question. Thus the Colonial and Indian Exhibition in London in 1886 was largely due to its initiative. On the occasion of this exhibition it convened a conference on July 1, 1886, which was attended by many of its colonial members, and at which papers were read, among others by Seeley.(2)

The most important achievement of the League was, however, its share in the summoning of the first Colonial Conference, which met in 1887. On July 17, 1886, the Executive Committee passed a resolution proposed by McGoun (Canada) and supported by Sir Alexander Galt (Canada) and G. W. Rusden (New Zealand) to the effect that a deputation from the League should call upon the Prime Minister or the Colonial Secretary in order to urge upon the Government to "call a conference, or to appoint a Royal Commission, to be composed of accredited representatives of the United Kingdom and of each of the self-governing colonies, for the purpose of suggesting some practical means whereby concerted action may be taken (a) for placing upon a satisfactory basis the defence of the Ports and the Commerce of the Empire in time of war, (b) for promoting direct intercourse, Commercial, Postal, and Telegraphic, between the several countries of the Empire in time of peace, and any other means for securing the closer federation or union of all parts of the Empire."(3)

The deputation called upon Lord Salisbury $^{11}/_{8}$-1886. It was favourably received by the Prime Minister who promised to put the matter before the Cabinet. The invitations were sent out to the colonial Governments by the then Colonial Secretary, Stanhope, one of the leading members of the League. The first Colonial Conference assembled in London on April 4th, 1887 under the presidency of the then Colonial Secretary, Sir Henry Holland (afterwards Lord Knutsford), another prominent member of the League.

At the first Colonial Conference the question nearest to the heart of the League, that of closer political union, was, however, banned. Under Lord Rosebery's leadership the League now set itself two aims: in the first place to make the Colonial Conference a permanent institution, and in the second place to effect that the subject of closer union should no longer be excluded from its deliberations.(4)

(1) Worsfold: *The Empire on the Anvil,* p. 28. (2) *Imperial Federation.* Aug. 1886. (3) *Imperial Federation* Aug. 1886; Rusden *History of Australia,* vol. III. p. 487. (4) Thus Lord Rosebery at the Mansion House Meeting $^{15}/_{11}$-89. *Imperial Federation* $^{1}/_{12}$-89.

Lord Rosebery on several occasions deprecated the formation of definite federation schemes by the League.(1) Seeley had spoken in the same vein at the conference held in connexion with the Colonial and Indian Exhibition $^{1}/_{7}$-86.(2) Labilliere, Rusden and others(3) had uttered similar warnings.

An unforeseen event, however, caused the League to abandon this cautious policy, and to embark upon the formulation of a definite scheme of federation, a course which proved fatal to its existence. This course of action was forced upon the League by Lord Salisbury.

In pursuance of the cautions policy which had hitherto been followed by the League, i. e. the policy of leaving the formulation of schemes to the Colonial Conference and of pressing for periodical meetings of the latter, the League sent a deputation to wait on Lord Salisbury, June 17, 1891, in order to urge "the convocation, on the earliest timely date, of a Conference of the self-governing countries of the Empire, to consider the question of securing to them a real and effective share in the privileges and responsibilities of a United Empire, under conditions which are consistent with the present political constitution of the United Kingdom, and with the self-government possessed by the colonies."(4)

The Prime Minister was very sympathetic, pronouncing the subject with which the League dealt to be "nothing more nor less than the future of the British Empire." He declared himself willing to communicate with the colonial Governments in the matter. But, he said, it would not do to summon their representatives from the ends of the earth without having a plan ready to submit to them. "It would be a frivolity, almost amounting to an insult to ask those statesmen to come together here without any definite idea of what ought to be done, merely in the hope that some scheme would generate itself from the contact of so many distinguished minds. We should not venture to treat foreign countries in such a way. If you summon a conference, you always have some proposition to make to that conference." He further stated his opinion that to create a United Empire in the fullest sense a "Zollverein" and a "Kriegsverein" would have to be established, and pointed out how difficult it would be to bring about such an arrangement. (5)

Lord Salisbury's reply could only mean that if the League wished to press its demand for another Colonial Conference it must abandon its

(1) "If any closer scheme of Federation is to come about, it can only come about through the medium of .... a conference .... and not through the medium of any private organisation;" Mansion House Meeting, 15 Nov. 1889, (*Imperial Federation* $^{1}/_{12}$-89). "In my judgment, it is not for the Imperial Federation League to propose schemes," speech in Edinburgh. Oct. 1888 (quoted by Rusden: *History of Australia,* vol. III. p. 488).

"I believe, and I have always held, that if a plan is to come at all, it must come in the shape of a colonial and not a British demand," Speech at the fourth annual meeting of the League, $^{20}/_{5}$, 1889 (*Imperial Federation,* $^{1}/_{6}$-89).

(2) "But is the time come yet? Might we not by a too hasty scheme involve ourselves in inextricable difficulties? I am in favour of federation, not of premature federation." (*Imperial Federation,* Aug. 1886). (3) Rusden: *History of Australia,* vol. III. pp. 486—87. (4) *Imperial Federation* $^{1}/_{5}$, 1891. (5) *Imperial Federation* $^{1}/_{7}$, 1891.

former cautious attitude and commit itself to a definite scheme. In thus forcing the hand of the League, Lord Salisbury led it to its destruction. A Committee of the League, presided over by Lord Brassey, and among whose members was Tupper, drew up a scheme, which was passed by the Council on Nov. 16, 1892.

The report of the Committee(1) begins by laying down the principle that in order to combine the resources of the Empire for the purpose of defending and maintaining common interests, some central body, in which all its parts are represented, is essential. It then goes on to consider, how a Council of the Empire shall be constituted, and by what means the resources of the Empire can be most effectively combined.

To these questions the Report gives the following answer: when Australasia and South Africa shall have been, like Canada, united under one Government, and represented in London by "a member of each government," such representatives should be available for consultation with the Cabinet when matters of foreign policy affecting the colonies are under consideration, thus placing the Imperial Government in closer touch with the Governments of the colonies. In this way a Council would be established, to consist, beside the representatives of the three great Dominions, of the Prime Minister, the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, War, the Colonies, and India; the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The Report is careful not to limit or define "the functions the exercise of which a council might attract to itself in the process of time," the idea being, that the sphere of action of the Council might be gradually extended by constitutional practice. Such proposals as are embodied in the Report are therefore meant solely for practical and immediate purposes.

The chief duty of the proposed Council would be to deal with Imperial Defence, and it would have to supervise the appropriation of any moneys provided for the Defence of the Empire by the common contribution of the United Kingdom and the colonies.

The Report then goes on to discuss the important question of how the revenue for Imperial Defence is to be raised. While cautiously pointing out that at present and in the near future no large readjustment of burdens is called for, it lays down as a leading principle that, as all parts of the Empire enjoy the benefits of Imperial Defence, they should all contribute towards the cost.

As to the method of raising contributions, the Report suggests that it would probably, by general consent, be left at the outset to the choice of the individual self-governing States, but that "future developments may disclose a means of raising the necessary contributions upon some uniform principle throughout the Empire, by the allocation to this purpose of special sources of revenue, or otherwise." The several amounts should be fixed in the first instance for a term of years by a Conference, and should be subject to periodical revisions.

(1) Printed in *Imperial Federation*, for $^1/_{12}$, 1892.

In order to determine the basis upon and the method by which contributions should be levied, and in order to ascertain the views of the self-governing colonies on the subject of Imperial unity and the defence of the Empire, the Report advocates the summoning of a Colonial Conference *ad hoc,* stating however that such a Conference should not be convoked until the Government have satisfied themselves that the moment is opportune, and that a favourable reception of the proposals which they intend to submit to it may reasonably be expected.

Having thus dealt with the essentials of the case the Report recommends some minor measures as conducive to the maintenance to the unity of the Empire, and finally it hints,(1) at the possibility of preferential trade arrangements: "Among the measures which, if not at first practicable, might become more so with the growth of a feeling of a permanent national unity, the most important would be those connected with the fuller development of inter-Imperial trade and the removal of existing hindrances thereto due to tariff arrangements. The course of events may remove the obstacles at present retarding the interchange of commodities between the countries which constitute the Empire. The sense of the permanence of the political union would naturally induce the people of the various countries in the Empire to make, for the sake of strengthening the union, fiscal arrangements, which, under existing circumstances, they are not prepared to adopt."

It will be seen that, in spite of Lord Salisbury's indirect request, the League did its best to adhere to its original policy of not formulating definite schemes. The project embodied in the Report is anything but a cut-and-dried scheme. It deliberately refrains from defining the subjects with which the proposed Council would have to deal. It does not even expressly state if it is to have full powers, or if it is to be merely consultative, though it seems to appear from the speech with which Stanhope represented it to Gladstone,(2) that the latter was the case. It does not state the basis on which the contributions of the respective colonies to Imperial Defence should be calculated, and it does its best to place the responsibility for definite schemes with the special Colonial Conference to be summoned *ad hoc.*

In this vagueness it was guided not only by wisdom, but also by necessity, for it would probably have been found impossible to make the divergent elements within the League agree on anything more definite. Beside being vague, the proposals were moderate; they were very far from what the out-and-out Federalists would have desired. Indeed the proposals can hardly be said to constitute a scheme of federation at all. The project to keep the Imperial Government in touch with the Dominion Governments through their representatives in London and of consulting them, without being bound to take their advice, on questions of Imperial Defence, cannot be called a Federal Scheme in the true sense of the word.

Probably the Report was a compromise between the divergent

(1) §§ 36, 37. (2) *Imperial Federation.* $^{1}/_{5}$-93.

elements within the League. The insertion of § § 36—37, which virtually amounts to a recommendation of tariff preferences, was a concession to the Canadian branches of the League, and may be ascribed to the influence of Sir Charles Tupper, who asserted that their adoption was due to himself "almost singlehanded"(1)

Meanwhile Lord Salisbury had gone out of office. It was accordingly not to him, but to Gladstone, that the Report was presented on April 13, 1893, by a deputation introduced by Stanhope. Gladstone's answer was discouraging. After expressing his sympathy with the desire to consolidate the Empire, he at once fastened on the passage in the Report which recommended preferential trade arrangements, declaring that neither himself nor his colleagues would ever be prepared to propose the consolidation of the Empire by means which involved the abandonment of the principle of Free Trade. Furthermore, he pointed out that the Report did not define the nature and powers to be attributed to the proposed Council of Defence, and that it did not lay down the principles on which the burdens of common defence were to be distributed. Consequently he could not admit that the Report amounted to the definite scheme for which his predecessor had asked.(2)

After this interview the Executive Committee appointed a Committee "to inquire into and report upon the course of action to be adopted by the League in the immediate future." In July, 1893, this Committee presented its report.(3) It pointed out that the question was whether, certain specific courses having been negatived, there were other lines upon which the League could agree to work. This question it answered in the negative. The Report laid before the Prime Minister "represented the maximum of political principles and opinions attainable, as a homogeneous body, by all the numerous and diverse elements of which the League was composed," and the Committee therefore recommended that the operations of the League should be brought to a close. The leading article of *Imperial Federation* for Dec. 1st, 1893, likewise explained that a dead-lock had ensued between the various shades of opinion within the League, which paralysed all real movement or activity. Probably the main cause of the deadlock was the failure to agree on a policy of advocating Imperial Preference as an indirect means of consolidating the Empire.(4) Furthermore there were

(1) E. M. Saunders *Life of Tupper,* p. 170. (2) *Imperial Federation.* $^{1}/_{5}$-93. (3) *Imperial Federation.* $^{1}/_{12}$-93. (4) Cf. Sir Frederick Young. *A Pioneer of Imperial Federation in Canada* pp. 137—38.

Some light is thrown on the difficulties within the League by an affair which took place in 1893. During a lecturing tour in Canada, G. R. Parkin stated in Toronto $^{29}/_{11}$ 1892, that "Canada did not pay the smallest fraction of a farthing" towards Imperial Defence. Sir Charles Tupper, who always maintained that Canada did contribute indirectly to Imperial Defence, was annoyed at this, and in a private letter, which found its way into the press, he asserted that "the most active members of the Imperial Federation League were mainly interested in levying a large contribution on the revenues of the colonies for the support of the Army and Navy of Great Britain." The incident caused some stir and bad feeling within the League and Tupper had to offer a somewhat unwilling and not quite unqualified withdrawal. (E. M. Saunders: Life of Tupper II pp. 170—173).

financial difficulties. (1) At a meeting held Nov. 24, 1893, the Council decided to dissolve the central organization of the League. (2)

With the dissolution of the Imperial Federation League the early Federation movement which had started with such high hopes of success may be said to have come to an end, though attempts were later, at different times, made to revive it. Other means had now to be attempted. In the following years the energy of the Imperialist movement was mainly concentrated on the attempts to bring about a commercial, instead of a political, approximation between the mother country and the colonies, which culminated in Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Campaign. As far as the agitation for political union was concerned, the line followed after the decline of the federation movement, was that of informal consultation, principally through the medium of the Colonial Conference, which from now on constantly grew in importance.

(1) Labilliere: *Federal Britain* p. 31. (2) *Imperial Federation* Dec. 1. 1893.

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The following abbreviations have been used:

Cont	= the Contemporary Review.
Fort	= the Fortnightly Review.
Frasers	= Fraser's Magazine.
Macm.	= Macmillan's Magazine.
19 Cent.	= the Nineteenth Century.
Nat. R.	= National Review.

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
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